Hon'ble RANKA, J.—Instant writ petition has been filed by the defendant-petitioner assailing the order dt.28/01/2011 passed by the learned trial court whereby while partly allowing the application filed by the defendant-petitioner under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC framed an issue on limitation but shifted the burden of the same on the defendant-petitioner. 2. Thus the controversy involved in the instant case is as to on whom the burden of proof must be thrown on the issue of limitation. 3. The brief facts, emerging on the face of record, are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for recovery of an amount against the defendant-petitioner. It is the case of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendant-petitioner obtained a loan of Rs.1,50,000/- from the plaintiff-respondent on interest and executed an agreement dt.03/12/2004 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent further asserted that in compliance of such agreement, interest @ Rs.1500/- per month was paid by the defendant-petitioner to the plaintiff-respondent upto December, 2008 and thereafter neither any interest was paid nor any amount was paid towards the principal loan amount and in such situation, the plaintiff-respondent was constrained to institute a suit for recovery in the year 2009. It is pertinent to mention that in the suit, the plaintiff-respondent has nowhere elaborated upon as to how the suit was in limitation and only mentioned in Para 15 of the plaint as under:- ^^;g fd izRrqr okn vUrxZr vof/k vf/kfu;e vUnj fe;kn is'k gSA** 4. The defendant-petitioner put up appearance and denied the averments of the plaint by submitting his written statement. On or about 04/12/2010, the defendant-petitioner moved an application under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC demanding framing of additional issues proposed as issues No. 4 and 5 as under:- ^^4- D;k oknh dk okn vUrxZr vUnj fe;kn gS\ 5- D;k /kkjk 18 o 19 ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh ikyuk ugha gksus ds ckotwn oknh dk okn vUnj fe;kn gS\ 5. The trial court, after hearing arguments, framed an additional issue No.5, as under:- ^^D;k nkok vUnj fe;kn ugha gS\ ¼izfr-½ 6. Feeling aggrieved by the order dt.28.1.2011 of the trial court, the defendant-petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing instant writ petition. 7. The trial court, after hearing arguments, framed an additional issue No.5, as under:- ^^D;k nkok vUnj fe;kn ugha gS\ ¼izfr-½ 6. Feeling aggrieved by the order dt.28.1.2011 of the trial court, the defendant-petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing instant writ petition. 7. The main thrust of arguments advanced by counsel for the defendant-petitioner is that Section 3 of the Limitation Act casts a mandatory obligation on the Court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation and it is the duty of a plaintiff to establish at any rate prima-facie that the suit is within time and is not barred by lapse of time. He relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Nanji and Co. vs. Jatashankar Dossa and others, reported in AIR 1961 (SC) 1474 . 8. Thus, according to counsel for the defendant-petitioner, the trial court has committed a grave and serious error in framing of issue No.5 and placing the burden of proving the same upon the defendant-petitioner. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent supported the order passed by the trial court and contended that the trial court has rightly placed the burden of issue no.5 with regard to limitation upon the defendant-petitioner and thus submitted that the writ petition has no force and deserves to be dismissed. 10. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record before this Court including the plaint, written statement and the order impugned. 11. It is appropriate to refer Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides as under:- “3. Bar of Limitation.-(1)Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. It is appropriate to refer Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides as under:- “3. Bar of Limitation.-(1)Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) For the purposes of this Act- (a) a suit is instituted- (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted- (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.” 12. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a number of judgments, has defined the law as regards the issue of limitation and it would be appropriate to refer few of them. 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Food Corporation of India and others vs. Babu Lal Agrawal, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 712 , has held as under:- “A suit filed beyond limitation is liable to be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. This position, as provided under the law, cannot be disputed nor has it been disputed before the Supreme Court. But in all fairness, it is always desirable that if the defendant-appellant would like to raise such an issue, he had better raise it in the pleadings so that the other party may also note the basis and the facts by reason of which the suit is sought to be dismissed as barred by time. But in all fairness, it is always desirable that if the defendant-appellant would like to raise such an issue, he had better raise it in the pleadings so that the other party may also note the basis and the facts by reason of which the suit is sought to be dismissed as barred by time. It is true that the court may have to check at the threshold as to whether the suit is within limitation or not. There is always an office report on the limitation at the time of filing of the suit. But in case the court does not prima facie find it to be beyond time at that stage, it would not be necessary to record any such finding on the point, much less a detailed one. In such a situation, at least at the appellate stage, if not earlier, it would be desired of the defendant to raise such a plea regarding limitation.” 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gojabai vs. Gangabai Ramchandra Pawar and another, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1436 has held as under:- “Held further that although the plea of limitation had not been raised in the written statement initially the same was rightly allowed to be raised by way of amendment in the appeal. The case of agreement of sale and a prayer to seek specific performance thereof put forth by plaintiff in appeal was not merely a new and inconsistent case that what had been pleaded initially, but was put forward with a view to get over the bar of limitation which clearly lay in her way of getting pre-emption. The High Court was therefore right in setting aside the order allowing the amendment sought by the plaintiff and dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation.” 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K.S. Nanji and Co. vs. Jatashankar Dossa & Ors., reported in AIR 1961 (SC) 1474 has held as under:- “A person having the right to the possession of a property wrongfully taken from him by another can file a suit to recover the said specific moveable property or for compensation therefor within three years from the date when he first learns in whose possession it is. Obviously where a person has a right to sue within three years from the date of his coming to know of a certain fact, it is for him to prove that he had the knowledge of the said fact on a particular date, for the said fact would be within his peculiar knowledge. That apart, S.3 of the Limitation Act makes it obligatory on the court to dismiss a suit barred by limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defence, indicating thereby that it is the duty of a plaintiff to establish, at any rate prima facie, that the suit is within time. It is the obligation of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his action is not barred by lapse of time.” 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Draupadi Devi and others vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2004) 11 (SCC) 425 has observed in Para 72 to 75 of its judgment as under:- “72. That brings us to the issue of limitation. The learned Single Judge held that the plea of limitation not having been taken in the pleadings Defendants 1 and 2 should not be allowed to raise the said plea. 73. We may notice here that under the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 7 Rule 1(e) requires a plaint to state “the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose”. The plaintiff was bound to plead in the plaint when the cause of action arose. If he did not, then irrespective of what the defendants may plead in the written statement, the court would be bound by the mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 to dismiss the suit, if it found that on the plaintiff's own pleading his suit is barred by limitation. In the instant case, the plaint does not plead clearly as to when the cause of action arose. In the absence of such pleadings, the defendants pleaded nothing on the issue. However, when the facts were ascertained by evidence, it was clear that the decision of the Government of India not to recognise the suit property as private property of the Maharaja was taken sometime in the year 1951, whether in March or May. Dewan Jarmani Dass, the plaintiff and the Maharaja were very much aware of this decision. Yet, the suit was filed only on 11-5-1960. “ 74. Dewan Jarmani Dass, the plaintiff and the Maharaja were very much aware of this decision. Yet, the suit was filed only on 11-5-1960. “ 74. The Division Bench was, therefore, right in applying Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 under which the period of limitation for a suit for which no specific period is provided in the Schedule was six years from the date when the right to sue accrues. The suit was, therefore, clearly barred by limitation and by virtue of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the Court was mandated to dismiss it. 75. As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench, the learned Single judge ought to have permitted the plea to be raised on the basis of the facts which came to light. The Division Bench has correctly appreciated the plea of limitation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and rightly came to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. We agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench on this issue.” 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. vs. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 613 , has held in Para 20 of its judgment as under:- “20. The mandate of Section 3 of the Limitation Act is that it is the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact that limitation has not been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex facie barred by the law of limitation, a court has no choice but to dismiss the same even if the defendant intentionally has not raised the plea of limitation.” 18. The point, which emerges from the judgments, referred to supra, is that a plaintiff is duty bound to establish prima facie that the suit is within limitation and it is the duty of the Court to see that the suit, if barred by limitation, is dismissed irrespective of the plea about it having been raised or not. To prima facie show that the suit is within limitation, the plaintiff must categorically and specifically plead necessary facts in the plaint itself to fulfill his mandatory obligation. To prima facie show that the suit is within limitation, the plaintiff must categorically and specifically plead necessary facts in the plaint itself to fulfill his mandatory obligation. The plaint must contain the necessary averments, which, when taken in totality, amply demonstrates that the suit is within limitation. A mere general statement as in the instant case will not suffice the mandatory requirements. Thus, in view of this, the trial court has committed an error in framing additional issue No.5, referred to herein above and in the opinion of this Court, the additional issue on the limitation should have been as under:- ^^vk;k oknh dk okn vUnj fe;kn izLrqr gS\ ¼oknh½** 19. In the view of this Court, while framing the additional issue No.5, as referred to supra, the burden of proving the same, should have been on the plaintiff-respondent. 20. As far as the other issue proposed by the defendant-petitioner in his application is concerned, in my view, the same is not needed as the point is already covered under the above issue, referred to supra. 21. Consequently, the writ petition is partly allowed. The order impugned dt.28/01/2011 passed by the learned trial court is hereby set aside and the learned trial court is directed to frame additional issue as referred herein above in Para 18 and proceed further in accordance with law. No order as to costs.