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2013 DIGILAW 1322 (PAT)

Pawan Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar

2013-11-22

I.A.ANSARI, V.N.SINHA

body2013
I. A. ANSARI, J.:–By the judgment, dated 01.03.2007, passed, in Sessions Trial No. 125 of 1995, by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. IV, Muzaffarpur, the appellant stands convicted under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. In consequence of his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant stands, under Order, dated 02.03.2007, sentenced to serve imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, suffer imprisonment for three months and to also undergo, for his conviction under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code, rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, suffer further imprisonment for a period of three months. 2. The prosecution’s case, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described as follows:– (i) On 11.08.1994, at about 3 A.M., while the informant (PW 1), an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, was on patrolling duty along with other police personnel, they saw the accused proceeding, on a bicycle, towards river and, on noticing the accused moving towards the river with a motri (a bundle), the informant asked the accused to stop, but the accused started to flee on his bicycle. The police patrolling party, headed by PW 1, then, chased, on suspicion, the accused and caught hold of him. On being so apprehended, the accused disclosed his name as Pawan Kumar Yadav. The accused also disclosed his address and told the police that he had married twice and he was carrying, in the said bundle, the dead body of his second wife, whom he had done to death by pressing her neck and, then, having cut her neck, leg and hand, disposed of her head, leg and hand and it was thereafter that he was carrying, in the said bundle, remaining part of his second wife’s dead body to the river to dispose of the same. On being so informed, PW 1 took the accused into custody and, on opening the bundle, they found some parts of the human body inside the bundle, whereafter inquest was held and inquest report (Exhibit-3) was prepared. The accused was brought to the Muzaffarpur Town Police Station and an information, in writing, was lodged, in this regard, at the same police station by PW 1. The accused was brought to the Muzaffarpur Town Police Station and an information, in writing, was lodged, in this regard, at the same police station by PW 1. Treating the said written information as First Information Report (in short, the “FIR'), Muzaffarpur Town Police Station Case No. 225 of 1994, under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, was registered against the accused. (ii) Based on the statement made by the accused, PW 1, accompanied by other police personnel and the accused, went to the house of the accused, and, on arriving there, PW 1 noticed, on the floor of the room of the accused, some blood stains, which appeared to have been wiped. Dabiya (a sharp-edged instrument used for cutting grass) was recovered and the same was seized by a seizure list (Exhibit-4). The part of the body, which had been recovered from the possession of the accused, was sent for post mortem examination. Having obtained post mortem report and having completed investigation, a charge sheet was laid, under Sections 302/201 of the Indian Penal Code, against the accused. 3. At the trial, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against him under Section 302 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 8 (Eight) witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein the accused denied that he had committed the offences, which were alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being that of denial. No evidence was adduced by the defence. 5. Having arrived at the finding that the accused had been proved to have intentionally caused the death of his second wife and also proved to have disposed of parts of her dead body, which was an important piece of evidence, in order to screen himself from being punished, learned Trial Court convicted him under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and passed sentences against him as already mentioned above. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences, which had been passed against him, the accused has preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant, and Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sinha, learned Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State. 7. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences, which had been passed against him, the accused has preferred this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant, and Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sinha, learned Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State. 7. Assailing the conviction of the accused-appellant, Mr. Kanhiaya Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel, has pointed out that the statement, which had allegedly been made by the accused to PW 1, a police officer, was confessional in nature and unless such a statement can be shown to have led to the discovery of a fact, the so-called confessional statement ought not to have been treated as an admissible piece of evidence. Points out, in this regard, Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel, that though Dabiya was allegedly recovered from the house of the accused and the same had been treated as the weapon of offence by the learned Trial Court, the fact of the matter remains that the evidence of PW 2, who has claimed to have been present at the time of the recovery of the Dabiya, shows that the said Dabiya was found rusted and there was no stain. This apart, further points out, Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, that the said Dabiya was not sent to Forensic Science Laboratory and the said Dabiya, having not been subjected to any serological examination, cannot be said to have been proved as the weapon of offence. 8. In other words, what the learned counsel for the appellant submits is that when there is no evidence on record to show that the Dabiya had stains of human blood or that the Dabiya was, in any manner, used in either commission of offences or in cutting the said dead body into pieces, Section 27 of the Evidence Act could not have been held to have been attracted and the Dabiya ought not to have been held by the learned Trial Court to be the weapon of offences. 9. Apart from the fact that the submissions, which we have noted above, could not be disputed by the prosecution, we find considerable force in the submissions made by Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel. 10. 9. Apart from the fact that the submissions, which we have noted above, could not be disputed by the prosecution, we find considerable force in the submissions made by Mr. Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel. 10. We, therefore, hold that the statement, which had been allegedly made by the accused-appellant to PW 1 informing the latter to the effect that the former had put to death his second wife by throttling, that he (accused) had cut her dead body into pieces and, then, disposed of some parts of her body, were all inadmissible pieces of evidence inasmuch as the alleged statement of the accused-appellant, apart from being confessional in nature, had not led to the discovery of any fact. Thus, when the seized Dabiya, in the light of the evidence on record, did not have any blood stains and when the evidence, on the record, does not show that the Dabiya had been used, in any manner, in the commission of offences, which the accused-appellant had allegedly committed, the said Dabiya could not have been treated, as a weapon of offences allegedly committed by the accused-appellant. 11. Moreover, the blood stains, which PW 1 claims to have noticed on the floor of the room of the house of the accused-appellant, has also not been proved to be of human blood. 12. Nothing having been discovered in consequence of any information, which the accused-appellant had allegedly given to PW 1, who is a police officer, Section 27 of the Evidence Act was not attracted. The entire information, therefore, which the accused-appellant was alleged to have given to PW 1, ought to have been kept excluded by the learned Trial Court from the purview of its consideration. 13. What, however, remained and still remains on record, as the incriminating piece of evidence, is the fact that the accused, as late as 3 O’clock at night, was allegedly seen, moving on a bicycle, carrying a bundle and, inside the said bundle, parts of human body were found. In substance, therefore, the incriminating piece of evidence against the accused-appellant is that the accused-appellant was found, at 3 O’clock at night, moving on a bicycle towards a river carrying with him on a bicycle a bundle, which had some parts of a human body. In substance, therefore, the incriminating piece of evidence against the accused-appellant is that the accused-appellant was found, at 3 O’clock at night, moving on a bicycle towards a river carrying with him on a bicycle a bundle, which had some parts of a human body. If this incriminating piece of evidence is taken into account, it logically follows that it was within the special knowledge of the accused as to how he had come into possession of some parts of human body and as to why he was carrying the said parts of the body, hidden inside a bundle, towards a river. Whether this piece of incriminating evidence, which has surfaced from the evidence on record, shall or shall not be believed, would be a question to be answered only after appropriate examination of the accused-appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. Sadly enough, we find that the learned Trial Court has not put to the appellant various incriminating pieces of evidence, which became the basis of conviction of the appellant. If the accused-appellant is not properly examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, none of the incriminating pieces of evidence can be relied upon by this Court, for, placing of reliance on an incriminating piece of evidence, which had not been put to the appellant, would cause serious prejudice to the accused-appellant. At the same time, if the accused-appellant is given the benefit, because of the vital omission or lapse on the part of the learned Trial Court, it would cause serious prejudice to the prosecution inasmuch as prosecution cannot be made to suffer, because of the lapse on the part of the learned Trial-Court. 15. The remedy, therefore, lies, in our considered view, in remanding the case to the learned Trial Court for proper examination of the accused-appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, then, to come to its own judicious conclusion depending on what surfaces from the record. 16. We may refer, at this stage, to the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. 16. We may refer, at this stage, to the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1662), wherein their Lordships have succinctly laid down the law on the above subject as follows:– “As these circumstances were not put to the Appellants in their statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure they must be completely excluded from consideration because the Appellants did not have any chance to explain them. This has been consistently held by this Court as far back as 1953, wherein the case of Hata Singh Bhagat Vs. State of Madhya Bharat MANU/SC/0073/1951 : AIR 1953 SC 468 this Court held that any circumstances in respect of which an accused was not examined under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used against him. Ever since this decision there is a catena of authorities of this Court uniformly taking the view that unless the circumstances appearing against an accused is put to him in his examination under Section 342 of Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the same cannot be used against him....It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this point as this question now stands concluded by several decisions of this Court in this view of the matter the circumstances, which were not put to the Appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have to be completely excluded from consideration.” (Emphasis is supplied by me) 17. Even in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukdeo Singh and Anr. (MANU/SC/0416/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 2100 ), their Lordships have observed as follows:– “The trial judge is not expected, before he examined the accused under Section 313 of the Code, to sift the evidence regarding any incriminating material to determine whether or not to examine the accused as that material. To do so, would be to prejudice the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314 of the Code. Therefore, no matter how weak or scanty prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereon.” (Emphasis is added by me) 18. To do so, would be to prejudice the evidence without hearing the prosecution under Section 314 of the Code. Therefore, no matter how weak or scanty prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation thereon.” (Emphasis is added by me) 18. It is, now, settled beyond dispute by a catena of judicial pronouncements that every circumstance, on which a trial Court relies upon to hold an accused guilty, must be put to the accused person and his answer sought thereto. The very purpose of Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure will stand defeated if a trial Court, without asking for explanation of an accused on the circumstances, which appear to it to be incriminating, bases its conviction on such circumstances. It is in this view of the matter that the examination of an accused person, under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, is considered a solemn act of a trial Court and it cannot, and must not, be treated as an empty formality. 19. In the case at hand, the incriminating circumstances, spoken to by each prosecution witness, on which the learned trial Court has relied upon, ought to have been put to the accused-appellant, when he was being examined under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same having not been done, learned trial Court ought not to have based its findings on such incriminating pieces of evidence. In fact, it appears to us that the learned trial Court had not put to the accused-appellant, in the present case, even the sum-total of the prosecution's case, which, in our considered view, does not satisfy the requirements of law. 20. Situated thus, one has no option but to conclude that if the accused-appellant is not examined under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as warranted by law, it will deny to the accused-appellant a valuable right vested in him by law to properly and effectively project his defence. At the same time, prosecution, to our mind, cannot be made to suffer solely for the lapse on the part of the learned trial Court in properly examining the accused-appellant under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At the same time, prosecution, to our mind, cannot be made to suffer solely for the lapse on the part of the learned trial Court in properly examining the accused-appellant under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are, therefore, clearly of the view, if we may reiterate, that this case needs to be remanded to the learned trial Court. 21. Ordinarily, we would have re-appreciated the entire evidence on record to arrive at a legally correct finding; but in the case at hand, since we have found that before the evidence on record is re-appreciated in this appeal, further examination of the accused-appellant, under Section 313 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in accordance with the requirements of law contained in that behalf, is imperative and that the case, for this purpose, needs to be remanded back to the learned Court below, we do not wish to enter into the merit of the various grounds on which the judgment has been impugned in this appeal and we do not even remotely wish to make any observation about the reliability of the relevant evidence on record so that the learned trial Court does not get fettered by any of the observations of this Court on any piece of evidence on record and it may feel free to come to its own independent findings. 22. In the result and for the reasons indicated above, this appeal partly succeeds. The impugned judgment and order shall stand set aside and the case is remanded to the learned Court below with direction to examine the appellant, with respect to the incriminating pieces of the evidence as discernable from the evidence on record, and, then, to dispose of the case in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the Lower Court Records. 23. Send back the Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment and order. V. N. SINHA, J.:–I agree.