Rukmani v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by Secretary to Government Social Welfare Department Madras
2013-03-13
A.ARUMUGHASWAMY
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT V. DHANAPALAN, J. 1. Applicants are respondents 1 to 4 in the Writ Appeal. They have come forward with the present Review Application to review the judgment, dated 02.09.2008, passed in W.A.No.868 of 2001, by a Division Bench of this Court. 2. The admitted facts are that G.O.Ms.No.1119, dated 15.05.1085, was issued by the Social Welfare Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, requesting the Collector of Coimbatore, to instruct the Land Acquisition Officer to cause publication of Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in short, "the Act". It was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 29.05.1985; vernacular newspaper "Daily Thanthi" on 12.06.1985 and in English newspaper "The Indian Express" on 13.06.1985. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued as per G.O.Ms.No.1536, Social Welfare Department, dated 18.06.1986, regarding acquisition of 1.42 acres of land in S.F.No.142/1 of Ganapathy Village, Coimbatore, for Adi Dravidar Welfare Scheme and requesting the Collector of Coimbatore to prepare a layout for house sites and it was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 20.06.1986; English daily "News Today" on 21.06.1986 and in the locality on 23.06.1986. 3. W.P.No.5220 of 1987 was filed by the owners of the land seeking to quash the above said two G.Os.viz., (1) G.O.Ms.No.1119, dated 15.05.1985, and (2) G.O.Ms.No.1536, dated 18.06.1986. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by an order, dated 06.01.1997, allowed the said Writ Petition, following a covered decision of this Court in the case of Seethalakshmi Ramakrishnananda v. Tahsildar (LA) II, Bharathiar University, Coimbatore. As against the said order of the learned Single Judge in allowing the Writ Petition, Writ Appeal No.868 of 2001 was preferred by the State before the Division Bench. By an order, dated 06.03.2002, in W.A.M.P.No.836 of 2002, interim stay of the order of the learned Single Judge was granted and, ultimately, by the judgment, dated 02.09.2008, the Writ Appeal was allowed by the Division Bench. 4. Now, the applicants, claiming to be the original owners of the land in question, have filed this Review Application, to review the judgment, dated 02.09.2008, passed in W.A.No.868 of 2001 by the Division Bench, on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of record. 5.
4. Now, the applicants, claiming to be the original owners of the land in question, have filed this Review Application, to review the judgment, dated 02.09.2008, passed in W.A.No.868 of 2001 by the Division Bench, on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of record. 5. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants is that as per Section 11-A of the Act, final award has not been passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of Section 6 Declaration, even assuming the stay period of three months is taken into account, and that the period of computation has to be followed as per the said Section. He relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, one in Vijay Narayan Thatte v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (3) SCC 470 and the other in Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by LRs. v. State of U.P., 2007 (5) SCC 85 , regarding the effect of nature of stay order for computation of limitation period and contended that the Division Bench, without considering the said aspect, allowed the Writ Appeal on the sole ground that the decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge in Seethalakshmi Ramakrishnananda's case was not applicable to the case of the applicants, which was against law, and, as such, there is an error apparent on the face of record. 6. Conversely, the learned Advocate General, appearing for respondents 1 to 3, would contend that Writ Appeal was allowed on 02.09.2008; the present Review Application was filed on 11.08.2010, which was after a lapse of nearly two years and, hence, the Review Application is barred by limitation and not maintainable. He would also argue that final award has been passed within the period of limitation and if the applicants are aggrieved over the judgment of the Division Bench, it is for them to prefer an SLP before the Supreme Court, and, at this stage, there is no need to review the said judgment. 7. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants and the learned Advocate General, appearing for respondents 1 to 3, and also given our thoughtful consideration to their submissions, in addition to going through the records. 8.
7. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants and the learned Advocate General, appearing for respondents 1 to 3, and also given our thoughtful consideration to their submissions, in addition to going through the records. 8. It is not in dispute that as per G.O.Ms.No.1119, Social Welfare Department, dated 15.05.1985, Notification under Section 4 (1) was issued on 29.05.1985 and, as per G.O.Ms.No.1536, dated 18.06.1986, Section 6 Declaration was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary, dated 20.06.1986, and in English daily "News Today" on 21.06.1986 and it was also published in the locality on 23.06.1986. It is also not debated that Section 6 Declaration was made in time. Thereafter, the award was passed on 22.09.1988. 9. In order to deal with the sole contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants that the period of computation has not been properly applied while passing the award, it is relevant to refer to Section 11-A of the Act, which reads as under : "11-A. Period within which an award shall be made.—(1) The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall he made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation.—In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded." 10. As per Section 11-A, award has to be passed within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if there is any stay of operation of the proceedings in pursuance of the declaration, the said period has to be excluded. In this case, Section 6 Declaration was last made on 23.06.1986, where the period of limitation commenced. The stay order, which was passed on 20.05.1987 was made absolute on 19.08.1987.
In this case, Section 6 Declaration was last made on 23.06.1986, where the period of limitation commenced. The stay order, which was passed on 20.05.1987 was made absolute on 19.08.1987. So, if the stay period of three months, which is also admitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants, is excluded, the award ought to have been passed on or before 22.09.1988, when the two year period expired, and the same had exactly happened in this case, the award being dated 22.09.2008. Therefore, the Division Bench upheld the land acquisition proceedings. 11. On a perusal of the judgment under review, it is seen that the Division Bench has held that the order of the learned Single Judge was not a reasoned order and hence it was not sustainable in the eye of law. Holding so, the Division Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and allowed the Writ Appeal filed by the State, as a result of which the prayer sought for by the writ applicants, who are the applicants herein, praying for issuance of a writ of certiorari, calling for the records comprised in the proceedings of the first respondent in G.O.Ms.No.1119, Social Welfare Department, dated 15.06.1985, and G.O.Ms.No.1536, Social Welfare Department, dated 18.06.1986, and to quash the same, came to be dismissed. 12. During the course of Writ Appeal, when the judgments in Vijay Narayan Thatte and Kunwar Pal Singh, relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicants in this Review Application were very much available, nothing prevented the applicants from raising the question regarding computation of period under Section 11-A, were the said decisions of any help to them. Having failed to raise the said point at the appropriate time and only as an afterthought, the applicants have put forth the same in this Review Application, which cannot be countenanced. At best, were the applicants really aggrieved over the decision of the Division Bench, they ought to have preferred an SLP before the Supreme Court. Instead, they presented this Review Application on 17.10.2008 to review the judgment, dated 02.09.2008, with some defects, and the same was finally filed on 19.04.2012, much after rectifying the defects pointed out by the Registry, after a long lapse of time. Therefore, it is barred by limitation as well. 13.
Instead, they presented this Review Application on 17.10.2008 to review the judgment, dated 02.09.2008, with some defects, and the same was finally filed on 19.04.2012, much after rectifying the defects pointed out by the Registry, after a long lapse of time. Therefore, it is barred by limitation as well. 13. In the light of what is stated above, we do not see any error apparent on the face of record. Accordingly, this Review Application is dismissed as not maintainable and also on merits. No costs.