Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal is focussed by the plaintiff animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated dated dated 11.6.2009 passed by the District Judge, Villupuram, in A.S.No.2 of 2009, confirming the judgment and decree dated 5.11.2007 passed by the Subordinate Judge, Gingee, in O.S.No.14 of 2005, which was one for partition. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. Niggard and bereft of unnecessary details, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus: (i) The appellant herein, as plaintiff, filed the suit for partition citing as many as 28 items of the properties, on the main ground that all the suit items happened to be the coparcenary properties and out of which, some of the items had already came into the hands of the plaintiff's father-Vellaiya Gounder, who had two sons, namely, the plaintiff and D.1. D2 is the wife of D.1. D.1 was in the know of things as he happened to be a Government Servant, who was only dealing with the financial matters concerning the suit properties and as such, he had the opportunity of having joint family funds in his hands and as such, he purchased certain joint family properties in his own name, which are to be treated only as joint family properties. (ii) Over and above that D1 also from out of the joint family income purchased some items of the suit properties in the name of his wife-D2, which are also to be construed as the joint family properties. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought for partition of the entire suit properties and for allotting half share in them, in his favour. (iii) Per contra, the defendants resisted the suit by raising various pleas, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: Defendant No.1 being a Government Servant, from out of his own income purchased certain items of the suit properties and D2, being a Government teacher, also having income and she purchased certain items of suit properties in her own name. However, the defendants had no objection for dividing those properties standing in the name of D.1 and D.2 into two halves and allotting one such half to the plaintiff. (iv) Whereupon issues were framed. However, the defendants had no objection for dividing those properties standing in the name of D.1 and D.2 into two halves and allotting one such half to the plaintiff. (iv) Whereupon issues were framed. Up went the trial, during which, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.Ws.2 and 3 and marked Exs.A1 to A38. On the defendants' side, the first defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.Ws.2 and 3 and Exs.B1 to B144 were marked on their side. (v) Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit in respect of all items of the suit properties, excluding the items standing in the names of D.1 and D.2. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the appeal was filed by the plaintiff for nothing but to be dismissed by the first appellate Court, confirming the judgement of the trial Court. 5. Challenging and impugning the judgements and decrees of both the fora below, this second appeal has been focused on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: "(a) Whether the Courts below correct in interpreting Section 120 of Evidence Act holding the husband can give evidence on behalf of his wife while the facts of this case are different? (b) Whether the documents of sale deeds standing in the name of 2nd defendant(wife) are not legally proved when she failed to examine herself as a witness? (c) While the Supreme Court held that the power agent cannot give evidence pertaining to certain facts of personal to the principal, similarly 1st defendant could not lead evidence about the personal savings and purchasing certain suit items? (d) Whether the landed properties and houses are thrown into common hatch pot by 1st defendant and the suit for partition younger brother plaintiff, is maintainable. (e) When the lower Court decreed the suit for partition in respect of some items and dismissed the suit in respect of certain items is not valid decree? (f) If the lower Courts correct in holding that some items are joint family properties and some items are separate properties especially when they have not been proved to be separate properties?" (extracted as such) 6. (f) If the lower Courts correct in holding that some items are joint family properties and some items are separate properties especially when they have not been proved to be separate properties?" (extracted as such) 6. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would pyramid his arguments which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (i) D2 was not examined as a witness and as such her contention that the properties standing in her name belong to her should be eschewed. (ii) Both the Courts below failed to take note of the fact that in undivided state, D.1 being the elder son of Vellaiya Gounder, purchased the properties in his name and in the name of his wife and that would connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that those properties are the joint family properties. (iii) Once the properties purchased by D.1 and D2 in their names were thrown into the common hatch pot, then those properties should be treated only as joint family properties. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would pray for setting aside the judgments and decrees of both the fora below in respect of rejection of the part of the prayer of the plaintiff for partition and for decreeing the suit in toto. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants would advance his arguments, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: (i) The presumption is in favour of D.1 and D.2 to the effect that the properties standing in their names should be taken as their separate self acquired properties, unless there is evidence to the contrary. (ii) In this case there is no shard or shred, molecular or jot, miniscule or iota evidence to connote and denote, convey and portray that the properties standing in the name of D.1 and D.2 were purchased from out of the income derived from the joint family properties. In the absence of such evidence, both the Courts below were proper in decreeing partly the suit and rejecting the remaining prayer for partition of the properties standing in the names of D.1 and D.2. In the absence of such evidence, both the Courts below were proper in decreeing partly the suit and rejecting the remaining prayer for partition of the properties standing in the names of D.1 and D.2. (iii) The question of examining D2 the wife of D.1 does not arise in this case, as D1, the husband of D2 was examined and ex facie and prima facie D2 happened to be a Government teacher and she purchased certain items of properties in her own name and since the burden was not on her, her non-examination was not fatal to the case. 8. At the out set itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court: 2012(8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]; an excerpt from it would run thus: "59. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13) "13......The word "substantial" prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law......There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case." (emphasis added) 9. In the same precedent, the following decisions are found referred to: (1) AIR 1962 SC 3314 [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. In the same precedent, the following decisions are found referred to: (1) AIR 1962 SC 3314 [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. Ltd.] (2) (2011) 1 SCC 673 [Vijay Kumar Talwar v. CIT] (3) AIR 1947 PC 19 [Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy] (4) (1949) 17 ITR 269 (Nag) [Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT] (5) AIR 1957 SC 852 [Oriental Investment Co. Ltd. v. CIT] (6) AIR 192 SC 1604 [Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh] (7) (1996) 5 SCC 353 [Parativa Devi v. T.V.Krishnan] (8) (1998) 6 SCC 423 [Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar] (9) AIR 2000 SC 534 [Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.] (10) AIR 2000 SC 1261 [Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.] (11) (2010) 11 SCC 483 [Bharatha Matha v. R.Vijaya Renganathan] (12) (2010) 12 SCC 740 [Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali] (13) (2002) 3 SCC 634 [Jai Singh v. Shakuntala] (14) (2008) 12 SCC 796 [Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh] 10. A mere running of the eye over it would connote and denote, exemplify and demonstrate that unless there is any substantial question of law is involved, the question of upsetting the findings of the courts below would not arise. 11. With the aforesaid proposition of law as found embodied in the precedents cited supra I would like to analyse the facts and figures placed before me. 12. Indubitably and indisputably, unarguably and unquestionably, Vellaiya Gounder had two sons, namely, the plaintiff and D.1. Vellaiya Gounder died only in the year 1990. Whereas, during the life time of Vellaiya Gounder, D1 being the Government Servant purchased various items of properties, as per the sale deeds-Ex.A4 dated 4.1.1978, Ex.A6-dated 28.8.1963, Ex.A7-dated 1.9.1974 and Ex.A8 dated 3.9.1982. 13. It is not as though D.1 could be portrayed or parodied as the 'kartha' of the family. When Vellaiay Goudner was alive up till 1990, the question of labeling or dubbing D.1 as the 'kartha' of the family is well-nigh impossibility as per the Hindu Law. 14. There is nothing also to exemplify and demonstrate that Vellaiya Gounder, during his life time himself had become so invalid that he dis-entitled himself to be a 'kartha', as per the Hindu law. 15. I would like to recollect the following maxims: (i) Affirmatis est probare – He who affirms must prove. 14. There is nothing also to exemplify and demonstrate that Vellaiya Gounder, during his life time himself had become so invalid that he dis-entitled himself to be a 'kartha', as per the Hindu law. 15. I would like to recollect the following maxims: (i) Affirmatis est probare – He who affirms must prove. (ii) Affirmanti, non neganti incumbit probatio– The burden of proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon one who denies. 16. It is the duty of the person who affirms a particular fact to prove it and he cannot call upon the other side to prove the negative aspect. 17. The onus probandi undoubtedly is on the plaintiff to prove that from out of the income derived from the joint family properties, D.1 and D.2 purchased properties in their own names. Both the Courts below thoroughly analysed the evidence and gave a finding that absolutely there was no evidence in support of the case of the plaintiff. It is not as though D.1 and D.2 projected a case without any basis. Their plea cannot simply be thrown or pooh-poohed, belittled or slighted by observing that apparently D1 and D2 had no known source of income. Indubitably and indisputably D.1 happened to be a Government servant having sufficient income. D2 also happened to be a Government teacher having sufficient income and they purchased properties under various sale deeds as under: The following are the sale deeds stood in the name of D1 Ex.A4 dated 4.1.1978 Ex.A6 dated 28.8.1963 Ex.A7 dated 1.9.1974 Ex.A8 dated 3.9.1982 The following are the sale deeds stood in the name of D2 Ex.A9 dated 12.11.1984 Ex.A10 dated 12.10.1989 Ex.A11 dated 27.11.1996 Ex.A12 dated 31.12.1997 Ex.A13 dated 31.12.1997 Ex.A14 dated 12.10.1998 Ex.A15 dated 12.10.1998 Ex.A16 dated 14.12.1998 18. Wherefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the presumption is available in favour of D1 and D2 and the deposition of D.W.1 cannot be brushed aside as his ipse dixit. No doubt, onus probandi is ambulatory. It has to be seen as to whether ex facie and prima facie the plaintiff adduced acceptable evidence and if there is one, then the burden will get shifted to the defendants' side. But in this case, my discussion supra would indicate and convey that absolutely the burden was not discharged by the plaintiff. No doubt, onus probandi is ambulatory. It has to be seen as to whether ex facie and prima facie the plaintiff adduced acceptable evidence and if there is one, then the burden will get shifted to the defendants' side. But in this case, my discussion supra would indicate and convey that absolutely the burden was not discharged by the plaintiff. The first appellate Court, au fait with law and au courante with facts, being the last Court of facts adverting to the pros and cons of the matter, decided that the plaintiff had not established his contention that the properties standing in the names of D.1 and D.2 were purchased from out of the joint family income. With regard to that finding is concerned, no interference in second appeal is warranted. 19. The pure legal question raised by the plaintiff that non-examination of D2 was fatal to the case of the defendants, in my considered opinion, fails to carry conviction with this Court. 20. At this juncture, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following judgements of the Honourable Apex Court: (i) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1341 (Iswar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera and another),certain excerpts from it would run thus: "29. Applying the principles stated above to the instant case, it would be found that in the instant case also the appellant had abstained from the witness-box and had not made any statement on oath in support of his pleading set out in the written statement. An adverse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against him. Since it was specifically stated by Respondent 2 in his statement on oath that it was at the instance of the appellant that he had issued the cheque on the account of Respondent 1 in Central Bank of India Ltd., Sambalpur Branch and the appellant, admittedly, had encashed that cheque, an inference has to be drawn against the appellant that what he stated in the written statement was not correct. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of Respondent 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also." (ii) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1441 (Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another),certain excerpts from it would run thus: "15. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of Respondent 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also." (ii) AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1441 (Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another),certain excerpts from it would run thus: "15. It was Defendant 1 who contended that the sale deed executed by Defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff was fictitious and the whole transaction was a bogus transaction as only Rs.500 were paid as sale consideration to Defendant 2. He further claimed that payment of Rs.4500 to Defendant 2 at his home before the registration of the deed was wholly incorrect. This plea was not supported by Defendant 1 as he did not enter the witness-box. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the trial court and avoided the witness-box so that he may not be cross-examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the transaction of sale between Defendant 2 and the plaintiff was a bogus transaction. 17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh case. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath held that if a party abstains from entering the witness-box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box." 21. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box." 21. A mere running of the eye over those precedents would exemplify and demonstrate that a party, in whose knowledge there are certain facts, should necessarily examine himself and his failure to examine himself by shunning the witness box would certainly be fatal to his case. 22. Here, to the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without being tautalogous, I would like to point out that the burden of proof did not get shifted to the defendants' side and on the defendants' side the unchallengeable and indubitable facts are that both the defendants were Government servants at the relevant time of purchasing their properties, having known source of income and the sale considerations contemplated in their sale deeds Exs.A4, A6 to A16, were not huge. In such a case, the non-examination of D2 cannot be taken as fatal to her case and the plaintiff cannot try to make a mountain out of a molehill and try to blow that point out of proportion and try to achieve success in the litigative process. 23. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would lay stress upon the fact that item No.22 of the suit property was purchased as a site only; whereupon, construction was put up with the help of the joint family funds. 24. The perusal of the evidence would exemplify and demonstrate that such a contention stood torpedoed in view of the fact that the first defendant produced evidence before the Court to the effect that he availed loan from the land mortgage Bank and raised the construction. In such a case, there is no knowing of the fact as to how it could be assumed or presumed that the building was put up on the vacant site with the help of the joint family funds. As such the aforesaid contention of the plaintiff also remained unestablished. 25. At this juncture I recollect the following maxim: 'In re dubia magis infitiatio quam affirmatio intelligenda' – In a doubtful matter, the negation is to be understood rather than the affirmation. When evidence is lacking and is sketchy and patchy in the case, only the negative could be presumed and not the affirmative. 26. 25. At this juncture I recollect the following maxim: 'In re dubia magis infitiatio quam affirmatio intelligenda' – In a doubtful matter, the negation is to be understood rather than the affirmation. When evidence is lacking and is sketchy and patchy in the case, only the negative could be presumed and not the affirmative. 26. Not to put too fine a point on it, on balance, I could see question of law much less substantial question of law involved in this second appeal and accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.