ORDER Since the aforesaid petitions are interrelated and involve similar question of facts and law, on the joint request, matters are heard analogously and decided by this common order. W.P. No. 1191/2013 2. In this petition, the petitioner, Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, assailed the transfer order dated 18.02.2013. By this order it is directed that till further orders he is transferred and posted at Sanjay Gandhi Yuva Netrutva Vikas Training Centre, Pachmarhi, Distt. Hoshangabad. This order is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that petitioner is subjected to frequent transfers. On 28.05.2012 he was posted at Pahargarh. On 19.10.2012 he was posted at Sironj, from Sironj he was transferred to Sabalgarh on 06.11.2012 and from Sabalgarh he was transferred by the impugned order on 18.02.2013 to Pachmarhi. 3. Shri Vivek Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner joined at Sabalgarh on 09.11.2012. At the time of joining at Sabalgarh, respondent No. 3 was enjoying the current charge of post of C.E.O. It is contended that he is close associate of respondent No. 2, Ex-M.L.A. who belongs to ruling party. The petitioner was actually given charge only on 03.12.2012 nearly after one month from the date of joining. Charge handing over letter is annexed as Annexure P/7. 4. The next attack on the transfer order is on the ground of malafide. It is contended that the respondent No. 2, Ex-M.L.A., on his letter head wrote a letter to the Principal Secretary Panchayat and Rural Development on 12.11.2012 requesting transfer of the petitioner to elsewhere and in lieu thereof, requested to continue respondent No. 3 on current charge basis as C.E.O., Janpad Panchayat. It is contended that on the same date superior officer put a mark on the forehead of the same document Annexure P/8 that "As discussed put up immediately Shri Vivek Jain submits that even before petitioner could resume the charge, on 03.12.2012 a complain was made against him which has nothing to do with administrative exigency or public interest. He submits that respondents No. 2 and 3 are in good relation and with a view to accommodate respondent No. 3, petitioner was shunted. Criticizing the transfer order, it is contended that entire action of transfer is founded upon Annexure P/8. He submits that respondents No. 2 and 3 are in good relation and with a view to accommodate respondent No. 3, petitioner was shunted. Criticizing the transfer order, it is contended that entire action of transfer is founded upon Annexure P/8. By drawing attention of this Court to Annexure P/5, it is contended that respondents decided to transfer the petitioner and then started searching the place where he could be posted. Attention is drawn to the relevant portion of notesheet dated 12.11.2012. Subsequent portion of said note sheet shows that information was desired from Joint Director Training Centre, Pachmarhi whether equivalent post is lying vacant because petitioner was proposed to be posted at said training Centre at Pachmarhi. Note sheet further shows that information is received from the training Centre of Pachmarhi that petitioner's salary can be drawn against the post of Lecturer/Reader. Said note sheet was approved and petitioner is transferred. Shri Jain contended that transfer is malicious in nature. 5. The next ground of attack is that the petitioner is appointed to perform duty as Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat under the relevant recruitment rules. The said rules provide certain nature of duties and responsibilities. Petitioner has statutory, legal and vested right to perform only such duties which are attached to his statutory post, he is under no obligation to be transferred to any other organization/institution. More so, when there is no equivalent post in the said institution. The setup of the Pachmarhi is shown in Annexure P/12 with rejoinder. As per this setup, it is contended that no administrative post is lying vacant and the respondents intend to draw salary of the petitioner from post of Reader/Lecturer which itself shows that relevant or equivalent post is not lying vacant at Pachmarhi Centre. W.P. No. 3162/2013 6. The grievance in this petition is that in W.P. No. 1191/2013 this Court has stayed operation of the transfer order, resultantly, the petitioner had a right to continue as C.E.O., Janpad Panchayat, Sabalgarh by the impugned order dated 27.04.2013 (Annexure P/1). It is contended that since petitioner has "obtained stay", the monitoring, drawing and disbursing powers of the petitioners are given to respondent No. 3, Shri B.R. Jatav, B.D.O. Kailaras. It is contended that this is an attempt to nullify the interim order. It is contended that since petitioner has "obtained stay", the monitoring, drawing and disbursing powers of the petitioners are given to respondent No. 3, Shri B.R. Jatav, B.D.O. Kailaras. It is contended that this is an attempt to nullify the interim order. Shri Jain submits that if the monitoring, drawing and disbursing powers are taken away, C.E.O.'s status is reduced as clerk and in view of interim order, this was impermissible. W.P. No. 5419/2013 7. In this case order dated 22.07.2013 is called in question. In W.P. No. 3162/2013 this Court stayed the operation of the impugned order, thereafter, by order dated 22.07.2013 the petitioner is directed to be posted in Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission under Development Commissioner. It is contended that said transfer is impermissible. By placing reliance on the setup, it is contended that there is no such post on which petitioner can work there. No post is also defined where petitioner could be posted. Said transfer/posting amounts to change of service condition of petitioner which is impermissible. 8. Per Contra, the stand of Mrs. Pachauri is that the transfer order dated 18.02.2013 is passed in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in the same. She submits that the employer is the best judge to decide as to where the employee is to be posted. The petitioner has no right to remain posted at particular post. Shri Praveen Visoriya, Advocate for the respondent No. 3 in W.P. No. 5419/2013 submits that he received Govt. order to take over the charge from the petitioner. He has no interest, whatsoever, to take said charge. He only acted as per Govt. order. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The basic order is transfer order dated 18.02.2013. Other orders are subject matter of challenge in W.P. No. 3162/13 and W.P. No. 5419/2013 and are passed in continuance of order of transfer. The petitioner has specifically pleaded in W.P. No. 1191/2013 that respondent No. 3 is close associate of respondent No. 2, former M.L.A.. Despite service on the respondent No. 2, said respondent has not rebutted the same. This is trite in law that allegations of malafide must be rebutted by filing reply in a specific manner. So far as allegations of malice are concerned, it is apt to reproduce the letter of the respondent No. 2 (Annexure P/8) XXX XXX XXX 11. Despite service on the respondent No. 2, said respondent has not rebutted the same. This is trite in law that allegations of malafide must be rebutted by filing reply in a specific manner. So far as allegations of malice are concerned, it is apt to reproduce the letter of the respondent No. 2 (Annexure P/8) XXX XXX XXX 11. On this letter itself by putting a note it was ordered that respondent No. 3 shall continue to work as C.E.O. (In-charge). The note sheet (Annexure P/5) shows that respondents decided to transfer the petitioner and then searched where he could be transferred. After obtaining information from Training Centre, Pachmarhi, the petitioner is directed to be posted there with further direction that his salary will be drawn from the post of lecturer/reader. Question is whether said transfer can be said to be in administrative exigency or in public interest. 12. Transfer order can be passed only in administrative exigency or in public interest. I find substantial force in the contention of the petitioner that even before he could resume charge at Sabalgarh on 03.12.2012, the respondent No. 2 wrote a letter for his transfer. Thus the grievance of the respondent No. 2 is not that petitioner could not perform properly or his actual functioning is contrary to public interest. The request of transfer is based on the ground that the petitioner has association with some political party. In addition, it is requested that the arrangement of current charge with respondent No.3 be continued. The respondents acted on this communication Annexure P/8, which is clear from the entry mentioned on the forehead of the document which is reproduced in para 4 of this order. 13. In 2003 (11) SCC 740 (Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi v. U.P. Jal Nigam and others) the Apex Court held that the power of transferring an officer cannot be wielded arbitrarily, malafide or an exercise against efficient and independent officer or at the instance of politicians. For better administration, the officers concerned must have freedom from fear of being harassed by repeated transfers or transfers ordered at the instance of someone who has nothing to do with the business of administration. 14. For better administration, the officers concerned must have freedom from fear of being harassed by repeated transfers or transfers ordered at the instance of someone who has nothing to do with the business of administration. 14. The Allahabad High Court in 1996 (1) LLJ 26 (Pawan Kumar Shrivastava v. U.P. Electricity Board and others) held that where the transfer order is on political considerations and complaints and not based on administrative exigencies or public interests, it is bad in law. This Court in ILR (2011) MP 1720 (K.S. Verma v. State of M.P. and others) opined that note sheet/complaint is taken into consideration by the Minister. It is held that this kind of complaint cannot be a foundation for transferring the employee from one place to another. Except a bald complaint lodged by the district head of a political party, no other material brought on record to justify that the petitioner derelicted in his duty. The Court imposed cost also. This case has similarity with the present matter. The record shows that the entire action of transfer is based on bald complaint of Ex- M.L.A./Respondent No. 2. 15. In the light of aforesaid judgments, the transfer order on the basis of such complaint cannot be said to be a fair exercise of power. Such transfer cannot be said to be in administrative exigency or in public interest. Thus, it is clear that transfer order is passed for reasons which are not germane for passing the valid transfer order. On this score alone transfer order is liable to be interfered with. 16. This is settled in law that exercise of power for an extraneous or ulterior purpose amounts to "malice in law". Legal malice or malice in law means something done without lawful excuse. In other words, it is an act done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill-feeling and spirit. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of the other (See: State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC 739 ). Where government action is unreasonable or lacking in quality of public interest, though different from that of mala fides, it may in a given case furnish evidence of mala fides (See : Kasturi Lal v. State of J & K (1980) 4 SCC 10). Where government action is unreasonable or lacking in quality of public interest, though different from that of mala fides, it may in a given case furnish evidence of mala fides (See : Kasturi Lal v. State of J & K (1980) 4 SCC 10). Even if an order is found to be not vitiated by malice in fact, but still can be held to be invalid, if the same is passed for unauthorized purpose as it would amount to malafide in law [see (2005) 6 SCC 776 (Punjab State Electricity Board v. Zora Singh) ]. In (2009) 2 SCC 592 (Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India) it is opined that transfer order will be bad in law, if it is issued not based on any factors germane to the passing of an order of transfer and based on irrelevant grounds. 17. On the basis of aforesaid, it is clear that transfer order dated 18.02.2013 is malicious in nature. Thus, this order is set aside. It needs to be set aside for yet another reason that petitioner was transferred to Sabalgarh only on 06.11.2012 and before he could resume the charge, he is shunted to Pachmarhi on irrelevant consideration. This action of respondents is not appreciable and not in the spirit of democratic principles. 18. So far as W.P. No. 3162.2013 is concerned, impugned order shows that since the interim order is passed against transfer order dated 18.02.2013, the respondents have decided to take away monitoring, drawing and disbursing power form the petitioner. In the return of this case the respondents have made attempt to justify the transfer order. In the considered opinion of this Court, once interim order is passed staying the order dated 18.02.2013, it was not proper for the respondents to take away the said powers from the petitioners. The petitioner's service conditions are governed by M.P. Panchayat (Powers and Functions of Chief Executive Officer) Rules, 1995. As per these rules, petitioner is entitled to exercise certain statutory powers. There was no justification in not permitting the petitioner to exercise those statutory powers attached to this post. In the opinion of this Court, reasons assigned for taking away those powers from the petitioner is arbitrary and impermissible. Every citizen has a right to approach the Court against any wrong and pray for interim order. There was no justification in not permitting the petitioner to exercise those statutory powers attached to this post. In the opinion of this Court, reasons assigned for taking away those powers from the petitioner is arbitrary and impermissible. Every citizen has a right to approach the Court against any wrong and pray for interim order. If interim order is passed, unless it is vacated or modified, parties are bound to follow it in letter and spirit. In the manner order Annexure P/1 is passed, it shows that respondents have made an oblique attempt to overreach the order passed by this Court and made an attempt to nullify the same. This is liable to be deprecated. Reasons assigned in order dated 27.04.2013 are totally unsustainable and accordingly this order is also set aside. 19. So far as W.P. No. 5419/2013 is concerned, by this order, the petitioner is directed to work under Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission It is not clear as to on which post petitioner is transferred. I find force in the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is not obliged to work on any other post than the post for which he was selected and appointed. The order dated 22.07.2013 is also bad in law because it is issued with a view to nullify the interim protection given to the petitioner. In other two writ petitions, the respondents have made consistent efforts to nullify the orders of this Court which amounts of malice. This also amounts to colourable exercise of power. No material is placed by the respondents either in W.P. No. 1191/2013 or in W.P. No. 5419/2013 to show that the petitioner is transferred to any equivalent post. 20. The Principal Seat in W.P. No. 112/97 (Manish Menon v. Shri Gujrati Shikshan Sangh Raipur and others) set aside the transfer order of a Upper Division Teacher whereby he was directed to teach middle school students of the same institution. In the said case the petitioner was appointed as U.D.T. to teach class -XI and XII students. The management transferred him in the same school without reducing salary. Yet, this Court by order dated 01.12.1997 set aside the said order and opined that it amounts to change of service condition. The said order was affirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. This is settled in law that equivalence is not confined to pay scale only. The management transferred him in the same school without reducing salary. Yet, this Court by order dated 01.12.1997 set aside the said order and opined that it amounts to change of service condition. The said order was affirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. This is settled in law that equivalence is not confined to pay scale only. It has relation with nature of duties, responsibilities, powers which are being exercised. These relevant factors have relation with status of the officer. Supreme Court in (2007) 6 SCC 220 (Tejshree Ghag and others v. Prakash Parashuram Patil and others) has opined as under:-- “An order of transfer ordinarily should be in terms of the existing rules. Transfer may even be incidental to the conditions of service, but thereby nobody can be deprived on his existing right. Existence of power and exercise thereof are two different concepts. An executive power in absence of any statutory rules cannot be exercised which would result in civil or penal consequences. Such exercise of power must, moreover, be bonafide. It cannot be done for unauthorized purpose. An executive order passed for unauthorized purpose would amount to malice in law. An order of transfer cannot prejudicially affect the status of an employee. If order of transfer substantially affect the status of an employee, the same would be violative of the conditions of service and this illegal. (Emphasize supplied) In (1986) 2 SCC 7 (Vice-Chancellor, L.N. Mithila University v. Dayanand Jha) the Apex court opined as under:-- “In the present case, although the two posts of Principal and Reader are carried on the same scale of pay, the post of Principal has higher duties and responsibilities. Apart from the fact that there are certain privileges and allowances attached to it, the Principal being the head of the College has many statutory rights. Thus the post of Principal cannot be treated as equivalent to that of Reader for the purposes of Section 10(14).” 21. In the light of aforesaid, in my opinion, petitioner's transfer to Pachmarhi or under Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission cannot be said to be on equivalent post. By passing impugned orders, petitioner's service conditions are changed. He is deprived to perform statutory duties attached to his post. The petitioner being a C.E.O. was equipped with statutory powers which includes administrative powers. Same could not have been taken away arbitrarily. 22. By passing impugned orders, petitioner's service conditions are changed. He is deprived to perform statutory duties attached to his post. The petitioner being a C.E.O. was equipped with statutory powers which includes administrative powers. Same could not have been taken away arbitrarily. 22. As analyzed above, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned orders passed in these writ petitions cannot be permitted to stand. The same are set aside. In the manner respondents have passed impugned orders, I deem it proper to impose a cost of Rs. 5000/- which shall be paid to the petitioner within 30 days. The petitions are allowed.