Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 133 (PAT)

Saraswati Devi v. Mahabir Pd. Daruka

2013-01-29

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2013
Mungeshwar Sahoo, J. – The defendants 2nd party have filed this First Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31.5.1979 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Subordinate Judge, Sitamarhi in Title Suit No.122 of 1966/8 of 1979 decreeing the plaintiff-respondent’s suit. 2. The plaintiffs-respondents filed the aforesaid suit praying for declaration of title and recovery of possession over 8 katthas 11 dhurs land with structure thereon. The plaintiffs prayed for the aforesaid relief alleging that the plaintiff nos.1 to 3 and 5 and one Narain Prasad Daruka had filed Money Suit No.195 of 1950 in the court of Sub Judge, Darbhanga for recovery of Rs.10,000 against the defendants 1st party wherein the suit properties were attached before judgment. The said suit property belonged to defendants 1st party. Ultimately, the suit was decreed on 16.5.1952 for Rs.11,896 and odd. In Execution Case No.73 of 1955, the Schedule I property were auction sold and the decree holder purchased the same for Rs.8,800 on 22.5.1957 and he got delivery of possession through court on 19.5.1957. 3. The further case is that the defendant no.1 fraudulently got a rent suit filed against himself by the landlord in the court of 2nd Munsif being Rent Suit No.459 of 1951. A collusive decree was obtained in the said suit which was executed in Execution Case No.401 of 1954 and the Schedule I property was auction sold which was purchased by Jainandan Singh but he could not deposit the balance of purchased money. The defendant no.1 deposited the decreetal dues and the execution was dismissed. Again, the defendant no.1 got another rent suit filed in the court of Munsif II being Rent Suit No.1027 of 1954 against himself by bringing the Amlas of Malik in his collusion and again obtained a collusive decree against him on 25.11.1954. The said decree was executed in Execution Case No.15 of 1955 which was dismissed and ultimately Execution Case No.153 of 1956 was filed and the suit property was auction sold on 24.7.1956. The defendants 1st party purchased the same in the name of the defendants 2nd party. The rent suit, execution cases, the auction sale and delivery of possession were obtained collusively and notices were suppressed. The plaintiffs had no knowledge of the same. The defendants 1st party purchased the same in the name of the defendants 2nd party. The rent suit, execution cases, the auction sale and delivery of possession were obtained collusively and notices were suppressed. The plaintiffs had no knowledge of the same. The defendant no.1 got another rent suit filed against himself being Rent Suit No.559 of 1956 which was dismissed when a petition was filed by defendant no.2 stating full satisfaction. The defendants 1st party fraudulently got the name of defendants 2nd party mutated over the suit land. According to the plaintiff, he is coming in possession and the defendants 2nd party never came in possession. At the time of revisional survey, the defendant put a false claim and refused to vacate a portion of the suit properties. Therefore, the suit was filed. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants 2nd parties have dispossessed the plaintiffs on 5.2.1979 after an order was passed in a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. 4. The defendants 2nd party only contested the suit. Besides taking various pleas, the main defence put fourth by the defendants 2nd party is that the allegation of attachment before judgment is false and incorrect. In fact, no order for attachment before judgment was passed. Any report about the service of notice of attachment before judgment was collusive. On the date of alleged purchase by the plaintiffs, the property had already been sold to defendants 2nd party who had already come in possession of the same. The defendants 2nd party had already purchased the Schedule I land in Execution Case No.153 of 1956 and the auction sale was confirmed. The defendants 2nd party also obtained delivery of possession on 9.10.1956 and since then the defendants 2nd party are coming in possession over the Schedule I land. They have filled up the ditch and have constructed a temple and Fush house. Their names have been mutated and they are paying rent for 8 katthas 11 dhurs land. Subsequently, they purchased 1 kattha 8 dhurs and they are getting consolidated receipts for 9 katthas 19 dhurs land. The further defence is that in revisional survey operation, the plaintiffs got their names recorded, therefore, the defendants 2nd set filed objection and thereafter the name of the plaintiff was removed by order dated 23.10.1962. Subsequently, they purchased 1 kattha 8 dhurs and they are getting consolidated receipts for 9 katthas 19 dhurs land. The further defence is that in revisional survey operation, the plaintiffs got their names recorded, therefore, the defendants 2nd set filed objection and thereafter the name of the plaintiff was removed by order dated 23.10.1962. The defendants denied the story of permissive possession and asserted that they are in possession as title holder obtained by them through auction sale, sale certificate and delivery of possession. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed: – (i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Have the plaintiffs got cause of action or right to sue? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation, estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and adverse possession and u/s 47 of the C.P.C.? (iv) Is the suit bad for defect of parties? (v) Whether the lands described in schedule I of the plaint were attached before judgment and any legal and valid attachment subsisted at the suit property at the time when the alleged sale is said to have been taken place? (vi) Whether the defendant 1st party had any subsisting right, title and interest on the date, plaintiffs claim to have purchased the disputed property at the auction sale. (vii) Whether the plaintiffs acquired any right, title and interest in the disputed property by virtue of their alleged purchase at the auction sale in case 73/55? (viii) Is the story of possession and dispossession as set up by plaintiffs correct? (ix) Are the plaintiffs in titled to get a decree for recovery of possession and mesne profits? (x) To what other relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 6. The trial court after trial recorded a finding that the defendants 2nd parties have not made out a case that it was a Kasth land of Kashi Prasad. This is a circumstance to show that on the basis of sale certificate and delivery of possession, Subhkaran Bajoria did not acquire any title to the suit properties and did not come in possession over it vide end of paragraph 16. The defendant had not filed any document to prove the fact that there was any rent due to Kashi Prasad and rent suit was filed when the zamindari vested in the year 1956. The defendant had not filed any document to prove the fact that there was any rent due to Kashi Prasad and rent suit was filed when the zamindari vested in the year 1956. Subhkaran Bajoria was in friendly term with Kashi Prasad and he purchased the property for a sum of Rs.189 only so that the plaintiff may be deprived of the fruits of his decree in money suit. The property was sold for inadequate price which established fraud and these circumstances suggest that the defendants 2nd party did not acquire title by purchase in the rent decree and the defendants 2nd party did not come in possession of suit land on the basis of sale certificate and delivery of possession. Since the sale standing in favour of defendants 2nd party is illegal, so the defendants 2nd party did not acquire right, title and interest over the disputed property vide paragraph 18. The plaintiffs have been able to establish that they came in possession over the properties and they have been dispossessed. The suit is not barred as the same has been filed in the year 1966 within 10 years, therefore, the defendant cannot acquire title by adverse possession. On these findings, the plaintiff’s suit was decreed. 7. The learned senior counsel, Mr. T.N.Maitin appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that in the present case, the facts are admitted by the parties and the appeal involves only question of law to be decided. So far the evidences produced by the parties are concerned, it is only related to possession. According to the plaintiffs themselves, they admitted the possession of the defendants although, their claim is that the defendants 2nd set dispossessed them. The learned counsel submitted that the plaintiffs claim their title on the basis of the order of attachment passed before judgment in the money suit filed by the plaintiffs. The learned court below without considering the provisions as contained in Order 38 Rule 10 read with Section 64 and 65 wrongly held that the property could not have been sold as the same was attached before judgment. The appellants purchase is of the year 1956 and this purchase is not purchase from the judgment debtor rather in auction sale. The defendants 2nd set-appellants have purchased the suit property one year prior to the purchase by the plaintiffs. The appellants purchase is of the year 1956 and this purchase is not purchase from the judgment debtor rather in auction sale. The defendants 2nd set-appellants have purchased the suit property one year prior to the purchase by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs never challenged the decree passed in the rent suit and the auction sale and the sale certificate coupled with delivery of possession in favour of the defendants-appellants effected in the year 1956. According to Article 58 or 59 of the Limitation Act, the period for setting aside a document or a decree is only 3 years. When the plaintiffs came to know about the claim of the defendants on the basis of the same in the year prior to 1962 itself, the suit could have been filed for setting aside the decree or the sale certificate within 3 years from the said knowledge but the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1966. In such view of the matter, the judgment and decree passed in the rent suit became final. In collateral proceeding, the correctness or otherwise of the said judgment and decree cannot be challenged by the plaintiffs. The learned counsel further submitted that there is difference between the private sale and sale by court i.e. auction sale. The judgment debtor has not sold the property to the present appellants. Pursuant to the decree, execution case was filed and in auction sale, the court sold the property to the present appellants, therefore, by operation of law, the appellants got title over the suit property and came in possession thereof. The plaintiffs never challenged the same. The appellants were never added as party in the suit filed by the plaintiffs. The learned counsel relying on AIR 1978 Kerala 11(V.S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar vs. S. Noordeen and another,) submitted that the effect of order of attachment before judgment is only to prevent alienation and not to confer title by way of charge or otherwise on the attaching decree-holder and it is only aimed at private alienations. It does not prevent involuntary alienations or sale by court in auction. Therefore, it does not bar a court sale in execution of another decree and with the court sale the interest of the judgment debtor passes to the auction purchaser and there is nothing left to be sold later at the instance of another decree holder. It does not prevent involuntary alienations or sale by court in auction. Therefore, it does not bar a court sale in execution of another decree and with the court sale the interest of the judgment debtor passes to the auction purchaser and there is nothing left to be sold later at the instance of another decree holder. The trial court without going through the provisions of the law wrongly decreed the plaintiff’s suit. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiffs-respondents cannot be allowed to say that the judgment and decree and the delivery of possession effected in favour of the appellants as far back as in 1956 are void in this collateral suit because the plaintiffs never challenged the same earlier. It is well settled principles of law that even if a decree is void ab initio, a declaration to that effect has to be obtained from competent court but here, the trial court without considering these settled principles of law, decreed the plaintiff’s suit and thereby indirectly set aside the judgment and decree and sale certificate issued in favour of the defendants-appellants and delivery of possession given to the appellants in the year 1956 in the suit filed by the plaintiffs in 1966. 8. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs indirectly admitted the possession of the defendants and, therefore, they pleaded that the defendants were in permissive possession on a portion of suit property and subsequently, they dispossessed the plaintiffs. The defendants have adduced reliable evidences in support of their case of possession. Their names were recorded in the revisional survey record of right after removal of the names of the plaintiffs in the year 1962 but they did not challenge the same also. The appellants are obtaining rent receipts regularly but the trial court wrongly held that the plaintiffs came in possession of the suit property on the basis of the auction sale in the year 1957 without considering the fact that the possession has already been delivered in favour of the appellants. The trial court has not considered the evidences in their right perspective. Moreover, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that delivery of possession was given by the court after dispossessing the defendants. It is settled principles of law that the act done by a court is presumed to be genuine unless the contrary is proved. The trial court has not considered the evidences in their right perspective. Moreover, it is not the case of the plaintiffs that delivery of possession was given by the court after dispossessing the defendants. It is settled principles of law that the act done by a court is presumed to be genuine unless the contrary is proved. Here, the only allegation made by the plaintiffs is to the effect that the defendants did not come in possession on the basis of the sale certificate and delivery of possession. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment and decrees are liable to be set aside and the plaintiff’s suit be dismissed with cost. 9. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel, Mr. Shivnandan Roy appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the property was attached prior to judgment in the money suit filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1950. After order of attachment before judgment, the property came in the custody of the court, therefore, the said property could not have been sold subsequently by even court and if there is any sale that sale will be void sale. The defendant no.1 got 3 rent suits collusively filed and obtained collusive decree against him only with a view to deprive the plaintiffs from the decree. The attachment order was not conditional attachment under Order 38 Rule 5 rather it was full and final attachment and a proclamation was made which was issued and the plaintiffs have produced the said notice. The learned counsel further submitted that since the sale itself was void, it was not necessary to institute a suit by the plaintiffs for setting aside the said decree and delivery of possession in favour of the appellants. The same can be said to be void in any collateral proceedings also. The learned counsel on these points relied upon AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853(S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Jagannath(dead) by L.Rs. The same can be said to be void in any collateral proceedings also. The learned counsel on these points relied upon AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853(S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Jagannath(dead) by L.Rs. and others), (1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 163(Asharfi Lal vs. Koili(Smt.) Dead by LRS.), (1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 310(Gowrishankar and another vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust and others), (2000) 7 Supreme Court Cases 543(Gram Panchayat of village Naulakha vs. Ujagar Singh and others), AIR 1959 Patna 508(Sukhi Sahu vs. Prayag Sah and others) and 2012(4) PLJR 146 (Bharat Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) and submitted that it was not incumbent on the plaintiffs-respondents to have obtained a declaration that the judgment and decree and the sale in favour of the defendants 2nd set-appellants is void on account of the fact that the sale was made when there was an order of attachment before judgment. The same can be demonstrated here in this suit also and if the plaintiff is able to satisfy the court that when the property was attached prior to judgment, the same cannot be sold, the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of his title and he is not required to pray for setting aside the decree and auction sale made in rent suit. The learned counsel also relied upon 7 Indian Appeal 157 and submitted that any alienation of property subject to a valid and subsisting attachment is null and void as against the attaching creditors and those deriving title under them. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial court has rightly held that the suit is not barred by law of limitation because the plaintiffs were in possession of the property and they were dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs have only prayed for declaration of their title on the basis of their purchase in auction sale. If it is held that their purchase is legal, they are entitled for the decree and, therefore, the trial court has rightly held so. The learned counsel further submitted that the trial court has rightly considering evidences recorded a finding that the defendants-appellants never came in possession on the basis of the auction sale and delivery of possession, therefore, the same were only paper transactions. The learned counsel further submitted that the trial court has rightly considering evidences recorded a finding that the defendants-appellants never came in possession on the basis of the auction sale and delivery of possession, therefore, the same were only paper transactions. The trial court has rightly found that the plaintiffs came in possession on the basis of the auction sale and delivery of possession. 10. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the points arise for consideration in this First Appeal are as follows: – I. Whether the plaintiffs-respondents acquired any right, title and possession over the suit land on the basis of the auction sale in Execution Case No.73 of 1955 and came in possession of the same or not? II. Whether the suit property which were attached before judgment could have been sold by another court in auction sale in favour of the defendants-appellants and pursuant to that the defendants-appellants came in possession of the same or not? 11. So far the point no.1 and 2 are concerned, the same are intermingled with each other, therefore, both are taken together. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the trial court has recorded a finding that the plaintiffs-respondents are in possession of the property, therefore, in view of the decision in the case of Bharat Singh (supra), this court can recognize the possessory title also. So far this submission is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the plaintiffs-respondents never claimed possessory title. They filed the suit claiming title on the basis of auction purchase in the; year 1957. So far the decision relied upon is concerned, has got no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. From perusal of the decision, it appears that in that case nobody was claiming title on the dhab and the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that the said dhab is not a part and parcel of the government land. Both the courts below found that the plaintiffs were in possession of the dhab by rearing fish and no other is claiming as owner thereof. In such circumstances, this court decided the said case. In the present case at our hand, there is rival claim of title between two parties. In support of the respective cases of the parties, they have adduced oral and documentary evidences. In such circumstances, this court decided the said case. In the present case at our hand, there is rival claim of title between two parties. In support of the respective cases of the parties, they have adduced oral and documentary evidences. So far possession is concerned, P.W.4 has stated that the defendant no.1 was living in the suit property which belonged to him. P.W.15 has stated that in his presence, delivery of possession was affected and the report has been proved as Ext.3. P.W.17 also stated that in his presence, the delivery of possession was affected. Kashi Babu vacated the house and delivery of possession was affected. P.W.22 stated about Ghee business by the plaintiff on the suit premises. The evidence of P.W.29, 30 are also in the same line. P.W.31 has also stated that plaintiff is in possession. P.W.34 has stated that delivery of possession was affected in his presence. P.W.36 is the plaintiff himself. The other witnesses are not on the point of possession. D.W.6 has stated that he filled up the ditch on the suit land. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were inducted as tenants, therefore, admittedly, the defendants were in possession of the suit property. D.W.10 has stated that he is a tenant since 1964 to 1973. According to D.W.11, there was a temple constructed by the defendant on the suit property which was constructed 21 ½ years ago. D.W.15 also stated that he is a tenant under the defendant. D.W.17 also stated that he filled up the ditches in the suit property. D.W.19 has stated that in 1957, temple was constructed. D.W.20 has stated about preparation of door of temple by him. Likewise, the other witnesses, D.W.23, 24, 28 and 29 have stated that the temple was constructed by the defendant and defendants are in possession of the property. Therefore, from the above evidences, it appears that there are oral evidences vs. oral evidences. The trial court disbelieved the evidences of the defendants only on quoting some discrepancies in their cross-examinations. D.W.49 has stated about filing of rent suits. The trial court disbelieved him on the ground that he stated that he had no paper to show what was the rent dues. D.W.50 has deposed to the effect that in his presence, delivery of possession was affected and the land was parti at that time. D.W.49 has stated about filing of rent suits. The trial court disbelieved him on the ground that he stated that he had no paper to show what was the rent dues. D.W.50 has deposed to the effect that in his presence, delivery of possession was affected and the land was parti at that time. D.W.51, one of the defendants deposed that he came in possession over the land in suit on the date of delivery of possession and is continuing in possession since then. The trial court disbelieved the case of the defendant holding that there was a house over the suit land and existence of Well is admitted but no bakast paper of Malik has been filed to show what was the price for which it was purchased and who were the bidder who took part in the sale were not examined in the case. So, it is not established that the defendants ever cultivated suit land and it was being used as Kasth land and the defendants failed to establish that they came in possession. So far these findings of the trial court is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the reasons assigned by the trial court for rejecting the evidence of witnesses are not acceptable. Since the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title, it is for them to prove that although, they subsequently purchased in auction sale they came in possession after dispossessing the defendants. Here, the defendants are also claiming title and possession on the basis of auction sale and delivery of possession through court. Their purchase is prior to the purchase by plaintiff. In such circumstances, there cannot be any presumption that no delivery of possession was affected on the defendants after their purchase through court. The witnesses as discussed above stated about possession of defendant and delivery of possession in their presence. It may be mentioned here that so far the judgment and decree and auction sale in execution case and delivery of possession to defendants was never challenged by the plaintiffs. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to challenge the decree passed in rent suit which was collusive and void decree and therefore, the same can be shown to be void or a nullity in subsequent proceeding. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the aforesaid decisions. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to challenge the decree passed in rent suit which was collusive and void decree and therefore, the same can be shown to be void or a nullity in subsequent proceeding. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the aforesaid decisions. 13. In the case of Ram Krishna Das Surrowji vs. Surfunnissa Begum, Richard Hendry and others, Vol. VII Indian Appeal 157, it has been held that any alienation of property subject to a valid and subsisting attachment is null and void as against the attaching creditors and those deriving title under them. So far this decision is concerned which has been relied upon by the respondents, it may be mentioned here that it was a private transaction. The creditor against whom the order for attachment before judgment was passed, sold the property. 14. In the case of Dinendronath Sannyal and others vs. Ramcoomar Ghose and others, Vol. VIII Indian Appeal 65, it has been held that under a private sale by a judgment debtor of property attached in execution, a purchaser acquires no better title than his vendor possesses, i.e., he buys subject to any alienation or incumbrance effected since the date of the attachment. Under an execution sale, a purchaser acquires title by operation of law adversely to the judgment debtor, and freed from such subsequent alienation or incumbrance. Emphasis is mine. Therefore, there is difference between the private sale by judgment debtor and sale by court. In the present case, admittedly, the rent suit was decreed and put in execution and the defendants purchased the same in auction and sale certificate was issued in their favour. Delivery of possession was affected through court. Therefore, by this purchase, the defendants got title by operation of law. It may also be noted here that in this auction sale, the plaintiffs were not party and the court which auction sold the property had no knowledge about any attachment prior to judgment. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the rent suit was collusive rent suit. Therefore, it can be proved so in this proceeding. As stated above, the learned counsel has relied upon various decisions. 16. AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 (supra) has been relied upon on the ground that fraud avoids all judicial acts. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the rent suit was collusive rent suit. Therefore, it can be proved so in this proceeding. As stated above, the learned counsel has relied upon various decisions. 16. AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 (supra) has been relied upon on the ground that fraud avoids all judicial acts. No doubt, it is settled principles of law that fraud avoids all judicial acts. It is well known that “fraus et jus-nun-quam cohabitant” means fraud and justice never dual together. But on this ground, all the judgments and decree or auction sale cannot be held to be fraudulently obtained. The same fact has to be proved by the plaintiff in this case as he is seeking relief. In the decision before the Apex Court, it appears that the plaintiff, Jagannath had obtained preliminary decree by playing fraud on court which was established subsequently. Therefore, the Apex Court held that one who comes to the court must come with clean hand. A person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. This case is not applicable in the present case. There can be no presumption that the decree passed by the court or the auction sale held by the court in rent suit and execution case to be fraudulently obtained by the present appellants particularly when admittedly the appellants are the purchaser in auction sale. 17. The appellants relied upon (1995) 4 Supreme Court Cases 163 (Asharfi Lal vs. Koili(Smt.) Dead by LRS.). In my opinion, this case is also not at all applicable as it appears that in that case, the judgment was passed against minor. The Apex Court held that the judgment or decree can be avoided by the minor in the later proceeding on the ground of gross negligence or fraud or collusion. 18. The next decision i.e. Gowrishankar and another vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust and others (supra) is concerned also, will not be applicable as it relates to playing fraud on court. It has been held that order of High Court obtained by fraud is a nullity and open to challenge. Therefore, the order is obtained by fraud, it has to be challenged and one cannot ignore the same. It has been held that order of High Court obtained by fraud is a nullity and open to challenge. Therefore, the order is obtained by fraud, it has to be challenged and one cannot ignore the same. In the present case, the plaintiff is not challenging either the judgment or the decree passed in the rent suit or the auction sale held in the execution case or delivery of possession affected through court. 19. The next decision i.e. the case of Gram Panchayat of village Naulakha (supra) is concerned, has also got no application in the present case because in that case, the Apex Court considering Section 40 and 44 of the Evidence Act held that in order to contend in a later suit or proceeding that an earlier judgment was obtained by collusion, it is not necessary to file an independent suit for a declaration as to its collusive nature or for setting it aside, as a condition precedent because the property was public property. It may be mentioned here that Section 40, 41 and 42 are altogether different matters. Section 40 of the Evidence Act states about previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial. Therefore, the judgment can be relied upon in subsequent proceeding and the previous judgment will operate as resjudicata if the same was passed between the parties. Section 41 refers to the judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry. Section 44 speaks that any party to a suit or other proceeding may show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 or 42 and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion. In the decision before the Apex Court, the property was public property held by the Gram Panchayat of village Naulakha. Therefore, Section 44 was taken into consideration by the Apex Court. At paragraph 9, the Apex Court held that property of a public institution cannot be allowed to be jeopardized by persons who, at an earlier point of time, might have represented it. In my opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this decision is also not applicable. 20. At paragraph 9, the Apex Court held that property of a public institution cannot be allowed to be jeopardized by persons who, at an earlier point of time, might have represented it. In my opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this decision is also not applicable. 20. Likewise, the decision of Panta High Court in the case of Sukhi Sahu (supra) is also not applicable as that was a case of certificate sale. 21. In my opinion, therefore, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents are not at all applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Here, as stated above, it will not be out of place to reiterate that the judgment and decree was passed as far back as in the year 1956 and in execution case, the property was auction sold and the appellants purchased the same in the year 1956. 22. In AIR 1978 Kerala 11 (V.S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar v. S. Noordeen and another,) (supra), it has been held by the Kerala High Court that there is no difference between the attachment in execution of a decree and an attachment before judgment as is clear from Order 38 Rule 10. Such being the effect of attachment whether before or after decree, it does not bar a court shall in execution of another decree and with the court shall the interest of the judgment debtor passed to the auction purchaser and there is nothing left to be sold later at the instance of another decree holder who may have attached the property earlier. 23. In view of this decision coupled with the provision as contained in Order 38 Rule 10 read with Section 65 of the C.P.C., when there is no bar to auction sale by court the title passed to the present appellants in the auction sale by court in the year 1956. Therefore, whether there was attachment or no attachment, nothing remained to be sold either by the judgment debtor or by the court in auction sale in favour of the plaintiffs in the year 1957. As stated above, in the year when the appellants purchased the property by operation of law title passed on them. 24. So far Section 64 of the C.P.C. is concerned, it says about private alienation of property after attachment to be void. As stated above, in the year when the appellants purchased the property by operation of law title passed on them. 24. So far Section 64 of the C.P.C. is concerned, it says about private alienation of property after attachment to be void. It may be reiterated here that in this case, there is no private alienation. Section 65 of the C.P.C. provides that where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. 25. Admittedly, in the present case, the appellants purchased the property in the year 1956 in auction sale and sale certificate was issued and thereafter delivery of possession was also given in the year 1956. So far this is concerned, the plaintiffs-respondents never challenged the same. In this case, the plaintiffs only stated that those are void on the ground of fraud. 26. In the case of Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab & Anr., 2012(1) BLJ 42 Supreme Court, the Apex Court held at paragraph 12 to 14 as follows: – “12. However, the question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a party to treat the judgment and order as null and void without getting it set aside from the competent court. The issue is no more res integra and stands settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum.(Vide: State of Kerala vs. M.K.Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil(dead) & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 906 ; and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1240 ). 13. In Sultan Sadik vs. Sanjay Raj Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1377 , this Court held that there cannot be any doubt that even if an order is void or voidable, the same requires to be set aside by the competent court. 14. In M. Meenakshi & Ors. vs. Metadin Agrawal(dead) by Lrs. 13. In Sultan Sadik vs. Sanjay Raj Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1377 , this Court held that there cannot be any doubt that even if an order is void or voidable, the same requires to be set aside by the competent court. 14. In M. Meenakshi & Ors. vs. Metadin Agrawal(dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 470 , this Court considered the issue at length and observed that if the party feels that the order passed by the court or a statutory authority is non-est/void, he should question the validity of the said order before the appropriate forum resorting to the appropriate proceedings. The Court observed as under: – “It is well settled principle of law that even a void order is required to be set aside by a competent Court of law, inasmuch as an order may be void in respect of one person but may be valid in respect of another. A void order is necessarily not non-est. An order cannot be declared to be void in collateral proceedings and that too in the absence of the authorities who were the authors thereof.” Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sneh Gupta vs. Devi Sarup & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 194 . From the above, it is evident that even if a decree is void ab initio, declaration to that effect has to be obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent court. More so, such a declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.” 27. As stated above, the plaintiffs never challenged the said decrees and allowed the same to attain finality. Now, therefore, in view of the above settled proposition of law in this collateral proceeding, the correctness or otherwise of the said decree, auction sale, sale certificate and delivery of possession cannot be questioned after such a long period when the same has already attained finality. 28. In view of my above discussion of the evidences and the relevant laws, I find that there is no bar of auction sale of the property attached by an order of attachment before judgment to sale in auction by court in execution of a decree. Therefore, the appellants got good title in the auction purchase and came in possession over the suit property in the year 1956 itself. Therefore, the appellants got good title in the auction purchase and came in possession over the suit property in the year 1956 itself. Since no property was left to be sold subsequently in the year 1957 by the court in favour of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs did not acquire any title over the suit property subsequently as the title has already vested on the present appellants nor they came in possession of the same. The trial court has not considered the above settled proposition of law and the evidences were not properly examined. Therefore, the finding of the learned trial court is hereby reversed. 29. So far the question raised by the learned counsel for the respondents regarding possessory title, it may be mentioned here that I have already held above that the appellants derived title on the basis of auction sale through court and came in possession, no question of decreeing the plaintiff’s suit on the basis of possessory title arises. Moreover, there is rival claim of title and possession between both the parties. In such circumstances, on the basis of possession only title cannot be declared. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is not applicable here. In that case, it appears that no other person was claiming title on the dhab. 30. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, both the points are answered in favour of the appellants. 31. In the result, this First Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decrees are set aside and the plaintiff’s suit is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.