JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. 1. This application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, has been filed for interim injunction restraining the respondents not to demolish the existing dwelling house and oil mill standing in survey No.33/2a, 2B, 2C, 2C2, 3B, 3, 4 more specifically described in the schedule to the application, pending arbitration proceedings. 2. It is pleaded case of the applicant, that he is retired teacher living in the house which stands acquired by the respondents for the purpose of expanding National Highway No.68. 3. In order to expand the road, the portion of the house of the applicant was demolished. 4. The case of the applicant is that the respondent did not pay reasonable compensation till date, and that he is still in possession of the acquired land, as no physical possession was handed over to the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana ( 2012(1) SCC 792 ), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under: "42. It is difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate as to why the State and its instrumentalities resort to massive acquisition of land and that too without complying with the mandate of the statute. As noted by the National Commission on Farmers, the acquisition of agricultural land in the name of planned development or industrial growth would seriously affect the availability of food in future. After independence, the administrative apparatus of the State has not spent enough investment in the rural areas and those who have been doing agriculture have not been educated and empowered to adopt alternative sources of livelihood. If land of such persons is acquired, not only the current but the future generations are ruined and this is one of the reasons why the farmers who are deprived of their holdings commit suicide." 6. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the applicant vehemently contends that as the applicant continues to be in possession, therefore, he has a prima facie case in his favour to seek injunction, pending arbitration proceedings, under section 3(g) of the National Highways Act, 1956. 7.
By placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the applicant vehemently contends that as the applicant continues to be in possession, therefore, he has a prima facie case in his favour to seek injunction, pending arbitration proceedings, under section 3(g) of the National Highways Act, 1956. 7. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that unless interim injunction is granted restraining the respondents from demolishing the remaining structure, it will not be possible for the applicant to prove the actual damages, to claim adequate compensation under the Act. Therefore, in terms of section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the property which is subject matter of arbitration is required to be protected pending arbitration proceedings. 8. On consideration I find that this application is totally misconceived. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act cannot be invoked against acquisition of land under National Highways Act, as provisions of section 3(g) of National Highways Act clearly stipulates that on award being passed, the land vests exclusively with the State free from all encumbrance. The applicant therefore ceased to have any interest in the land. 9. Merely because provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act have been made applicable for the purpose of determining the enhanced compensation by the District Collector, it cannot be said that the proceeding one under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act or provisions of section 9 would be applicable to seek interim injunction. 10 Injunction under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act can be granted only with regard to subject matter in dispute. 11. In view of provisions of National Highways Act, property vests with the State Government free from encumbrance therefore cannot be said to be subject matter, therefore no injunction can be granted as claimed by the applicant. This application under section 9 of the Act is being misconceived is not maintainable No merit, dismissed. No costs.