Judgment :- 1. Four petitioners have jointly filed this single writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari, to call for the records relating to G.O.Ms.No.1177, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 29.12.81 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 2.2.82 in Supplement No.4A part Section 2 in issuing the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended therein and the G.O. (Nilai) No.283, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 10.7.2000 in issuing the declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the notice dated 22.4.2002 issued by the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Housing Scheme No.III, Coimbatore, the second respondent herein under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the said Act so far as the petitioners lands are concerned and situated in S.F.No.86/1A, Veerakeralam Village, Coimbatore Taluk and District in an extent of 1.22.0 Hectares of lands and to quash the same. 2. Mr. R.Sivaraman, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the punja land in question having an extent of 3.02 acres covered in S.F.No.86/1A, Veerakeralam Village, Coimbatore Taluk originally belonged to one Tmt. Nallakkammal, the mother of the third petitioner and grandmother of the other petitioners herein. After the purchase of the said property in the year 1938, she was in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the land till her death on 6.9.2002. During her lifetime, she had executed a registered Will dated 2.9.2002 in favour of the petitioners. While so, the first respondent issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act" for short) in G.O.Ms.No.1177, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 29.12.81 and the same was also published in the Government Gazette dated 2.2.82 stating that the lands comprised in various survey numbers belonging to the petitioners and others were needed for a public purpose to wit for the construction of houses under the Annanagar Neighbourhood Scheme. Even though the said late Nallakkammal participated in the enquiry conducted by the second respondent under Section 5-A of the Act and submitted her objections, the second respondent overruled the objections and recommended for further proceedings to acquire the land. Accordingly, the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, accepting the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.131, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 30.1.85 and the same was also published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 31.1.85. Accordingly, the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, accepting the recommendations of the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.131, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 30.1.85 and the same was also published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 31.1.85. Aggrieved by the land acquisition proceedings and complaining that the same were perverse, illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act, the late Nallakkammal filed W.P.No.18493 of 1991 before this Court. This Court, by order dated 13.7.99, clearly held that the particulars regarding Section 5-A enquiry showed that after communicating the remarks of the Housing Board to the petitioners on 4.10.82, there was no further enquiry as per Section 5-A(2) of the Act. Hence, the acquisition proceedings from the stage of 5-A enquiry were quashed, however, with liberty to the respondents to issue a fresh notice under Section 5-A of the Act. On the basis of such liberty, the respondents proceeded with the land acquisition proceedings by issuing a notice under Section 5-A of the Act calling upon the late Nallakkammal to submit her objections for the proposed acquisition and also to appear for the enquiry to be held on 31.3.2000. Even though detailed objections were submitted, the second respondent-Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), without applying his mind, by proceedings dated 22.6.2000, after rejecting the objections, recommended for the acquisition of the lands, and the first respondent also, accepting the said proposal, issued a notification under Section 6 of the Act in G.O.(Nilai)No.283, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 10.7.2000. In this background, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even after the notice issued under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act by the second respondent to participate in the enquiry on 10.5.2002 in his office, the said late Nallakkammal participated in the enquiry and also submitted her objections. Thereafter, nothing was heard from the respondents till this date and no award was also passed. Thereafter, nothing was heard from the respondents till this date and no award was also passed. Therefore, they were constrained to file the second writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari to call for the impugned proceedings issued by the second respondent, namely, in issuing the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, on the ground that the same is illegal, suffers from error apparent on the face of record and also contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. 3. Mr. R.Sivaraman, learned counsel, further pleaded that the entire acquisition proceedings which culminated in the issuance of impugned notification under Section 6 of the Act are wholly invalid and illegal, for the reason that the substance of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act was not published in the newspaper or in the locality. Further, the Apex Court also has clearly held that where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed by a Court, fresh declaration must be issued within the period prescribed under the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. Elaborating his argument, it was contended that admittedly the notification under Section 4(1) dated 29.12.81 was published in the Gazette on 2.2.82 and the Section 6 declaration was issued in G.O.Ms.No.131, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 30.1.85 and the same was also gazetted on 31.1.85. Under these circumstances, when the late Nallakkammal filed the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.18493 of 1991, this Court, by order dated 13.7.99, partly allowed the writ petition by retaining the Section 4(1) notification. Subsequently, after issuance of a fresh notice under Section 5-A of the Act on 10.3.2000, another notification under Section 6 of the Act in G.O.(Nilai)No.283, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 10.7.2000 was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette apart from the publication in the local newspapers on 12.7.2000. This will clearly speak of the illegality of the notification, for the reason that as per the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act, declaration shall be made within a period of three years from the date of publication of the Section 4(1) notification. In the present case, admittedly fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued on 10.7.2000 and the same is beyond the time limit prescribed in the said proviso. In the present case, admittedly fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued on 10.7.2000 and the same is beyond the time limit prescribed in the said proviso. Therefore, the entire land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents are liable to be quashed and in support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (2) CTC 55. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while dealing with a similar issue, has held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the publication of the notification under subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Act. 4. Adding further, it was heavily argued that when the respondents have issued the Section 4(1) notification on 29.12.81 and gazetted the same on 2.2.82, they have also issued Section 6 declaration on 30.1.85. The petitioners filed the writ petition in the year 1991 challenging the acquisition proceedings on the ground that there was no paper publication or affixure of the substance of the notification in the locality. It was also pressed into service that the respondents have failed to follow Rule 3(b) of the Rules,that is in view of the language used in Section 5-A of the Act read with Rule 3(b) of the Rules, after communicating the remarks of the requisitioning body, the second respondent ought to have conducted further enquiry. But the Court, after looking into the issue that without conducting further enquiry, the first respondent had passed a declaration under Section 6 and published the same on 31.1.85, held that the respondents have not complied with the procedure provided under Section 5A(2) read with Rule 3(b) of the Rules. When there was no further enquiry as per Section 5-A(2), the Court quashed the acquisition proceedings from the stage of Section 5-A enquiry and as a result, Section 6 declaration was also quashed. When there was no further enquiry as per Section 5-A(2), the Court quashed the acquisition proceedings from the stage of Section 5-A enquiry and as a result, Section 6 declaration was also quashed. Therefore, the point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that once Section 6 declaration was quashed on the ground of violation of the mandatory provisions, the first respondent cannot issue the second declaration, for the simple reason that in terms of the first proviso to Section 6(1), no declaration in respect of any land covered by a notification under Section 4(1) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification. The learned counsel also relied upon one another judgment of the Apex Court in Oxford English School v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1995) 5 SCC 206 to say that if a direction was issued by the Court after quashing the land acquisition proceedings so as to conduct fresh enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in accordance with law, and further if the Government decides to proceed with the acquisition and declaration is issued under Section 6 of the said Act within six months from the date of judgment, the same would be illegal, since the prohibition of issuance of declaration under Section 6 after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is absolute. On this basis, he further argued that the High Court also cannot give any such direction once again for issuance of declaration under Section 6, once the time of three years gets lapsed. 5. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the second respondent taking too many stands. Firstly, Mr. R.Govindasamy, learned Additional Government Pleader, contended that when the objections were submitted by the petitioners during the Section 5-A enquiry, the said objections were sent to the requisitioning body viz., the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. A reply to the said objections was filed stating that the land was situate in the vantage area of the scheme and therefore the same is essential for the scheme and that if the land was excluded, it would lead to failure of the scheme. On this basis, the order under Section 5-A(2) was passed on 22.6.2000. A reply to the said objections was filed stating that the land was situate in the vantage area of the scheme and therefore the same is essential for the scheme and that if the land was excluded, it would lead to failure of the scheme. On this basis, the order under Section 5-A(2) was passed on 22.6.2000. Secondly, after the conduct of enquiry under Section 11 of the Act, award was also pronounced on 27.5.2002 in Award No.1 of 2002 (LA 7/81). Hence, the land acquisition proceedings were conducted in a proper manner and without any deviation. 6. Further, by placing reliance upon a three judge bench of the Apex Court in N. Narasimhaiah and others v. State of Karnataka and others ( (1996) 3 SCC 88 ), he pleaded that limitation of one year provided under clause (ii) of first proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act for publication of Section 6 declaration would run from the date of receipt of the order of the High Court by the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore, if we apply the ratio of the Apex Court in Narasimhaiah's case, the previous Section 6 declaration issued in G.O.Ms.No.131, Housing and Urban Development, dated 30.01.1985, was quashed consequent to the quashing of proceedings initiated under Section 5(A) of the Act by order dated 13.07.1999, in W.P.No.18493 of 1991. After that, the Government further deciding that the land is required for public purpose issued Section 6 declaration in G.O.Ms.No.283, Housing and Urban Development, dated 10.07.2000, well within one year. Therefore, the impugned action of the respondent is fully in fine tune with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in N.Narasimhaiah's case (cited supra), hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order, which is nothing but following the law laid down in expressing the N. Narasimhaiah's case, is liable to be dismissed. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 8. For the purpose of understanding this issue, it is necessary to refer to the brief facts about the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, in particular to the issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and the subsequent declaration to be made under Section 6 of the Act. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 8. For the purpose of understanding this issue, it is necessary to refer to the brief facts about the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, in particular to the issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and the subsequent declaration to be made under Section 6 of the Act. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was enacted for the purpose of compulsory acquisition of land for public purpose or for the purpose of companies and also for determination of compensation to be paid for such acquisitions. The Land Acquisition Act contemplates that initially a notification should be issued under Section 4(1) indicating the intention of the Government to acquire the land or other property. The said notification under Section 4(1) shall be published in the Official Gazette. 9. The scheme of the Act further goes on to say that after the Section 4(1) notification is issued, Section 5(1) contemplates an enquiry into the objections to be filed by those who are interested in the land or property. This section refers to the filing of objections to the Collector, who has to give an oral hearing and thereafter he has to submit a report to the concerned Government which issued the Section 4(1) notification for taking further action. It must be also remembered that the procedure for hearing of objections can be dispensed with in case of urgency under Section 17(4) of the Act. If the enquiry is not dispensed with and a report is given after the enquiry, the Government has to apply its mind independently and decide whether to confirm the acquisition and go ahead. It must be also remembered that the procedure for hearing of objections can be dispensed with in case of urgency under Section 17(4) of the Act. If the enquiry is not dispensed with and a report is given after the enquiry, the Government has to apply its mind independently and decide whether to confirm the acquisition and go ahead. If it decides to go ahead, it has to make a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, which is, for better appreciation, extracted hereunder: "Declaration that land is required for a public purpose:-Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the Appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5-A, sub-section (2): Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, subsection (1)- (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. [Explanation 1.- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded." As stated above, the declaration that is made under Section 6 has to be published as per the procedure, which is similar to the procedure prescribed for publication of notification under Section 4(1). Initially under the Act of 1894, there was no time limit prescribed for the making of declaration under Section 6 after the publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. This has led to unreasonable delays. In cases where there was an unreasonable delay in the making of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the owner of the property was under the great disadvantage, because the market value would have to be determined on the basis of the Section 4(1) notification published several years earlier. These unreasonable delays were clearly deprecated by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad reported in AIR 1966 SC 1593 . Subsequently, in the light of the judgment, for the purpose of expediting the making of declaration under Section 6, the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Ordinance, 1967 was promulgated. The said ordinance also provided that no declaration under Section 6 should be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication and in cases where the notification under Section 4(1) has been published before the commencement of this ordinance, the declaration should not be made after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the ordinance. The provisions of the ordinance were later on incorporated into the Amendment Act, 1967 stating that the period of three years for making the declaration under Section 6 would apply to all notifications under Section 4(1) to be issued after the ordinance of 1967. Therefore, the period of three years between the Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration was treated by the Parliament as reasonable. 10. Therefore, the period of three years between the Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration was treated by the Parliament as reasonable. 10. But the Parliament, in its wisdom, in the year 1984 felt that this period of three years between the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 should be reduced to one year, as a result, the 1984 amendment provided that Section 6 declaration must be made within one year from the date of publication of Section 4(1) notification, where such notification under Section 4(1) was published after the 1984 Amendment Act. Therefore, in law, the result is, if Section 6 declaration was not made within one year as provided in the 1984 amendment, it would be invalid. Again the further result would be, once there was no valid Section 6 declaration made within one year as aforesaid, the Section 4(1) notification issued earlier also would lapse and the State would have to come forward with a fresh Section 4(1) notification, in which event the State will have to pay increased price for the lethargy of its officers since, in the meanwhile, the market value of the land in all probability would have increased. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, if we look at the unreported decision of a Full Bench of the Apex Court in A.S.Naidu and others v. State of Tamil Nadumade in S.L.P.(C) Nos.11353 to 11355 of 1988, it has been held that once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, a fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. The point, therefore, to be borne in mind is that, if by the date of quashing of the Section 6(1) declaration, the one year period had expired, the State would not be able to make a fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act. However, if the State was still interested in acquiring the said land, it would have to issue a fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, redoing the entire exercise carefully from the starting point no.1. This view was taken by another Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court in Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1995) 5 SCC 206 . This view was taken by another Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court in Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1995) 5 SCC 206 . Without reference to any of these views, totally taking a contrary view, another Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah and others, (1996) 10 SCC 619 , took a different view that the State would have a fresh period of one year from the date of communication of the copy of the judgment for the purpose of making a Section 6 declaration again. Again, a three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court in N.Narasimhaiah's case held that if by the date the Section 6 declaration was quashed, the period of one year had expired, the State could make a fresh Section 6 declaration within one year from the date of judgment. A similar view also was taken by the Apex Court in Venkata Swamappa v. Special Deputy Commissioner, AIR 1997 SC 503 reiterating the views expressed in N.Narasimhaiah and in D.C.Nanjudaiah cases that the State could make a fresh Section 6 declaration within one year of the judgment. This was holding the field from 17.01.1996 till 13.03.2002, when the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court settled this issue. Now in view of the apparent contradictory views taken in the two judgments, namely, N.Narasimhaiah and in D.C.Nanjudaiah cases, this conflicting issue came to be redressed by a Constitution Bench of five Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2002 (2) CTC 55, wherein the Constitution Bench, while interpreting Section-6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, held that the Court can only interpret the law and cannot legislate it; that if a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary; and that the legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. It was specifically observed therein that the language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous, hence, there is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah's case (Cited supra) and Nanjudaiah's case (cites supra), the period for issuance of Declaration under Section-6 was further extended to have the time period run from date of service of High Court's order. Such a view not being reconcilable with the language of Section 6(1), if accepted, it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1) but also by non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. Consequently, it was further held that once Section 6 declaration was quashed or set aside, if the period of one year had expired, by the date of the judgment of Court, then the Court could not under its judicial power, provide a fresh period of one year from the date of judgment for the issuance of fresh declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Ultimately, the Constitution Bench in its judgment dated 13.03.2002 has overruled the decision in N.Narasimhaiah's case and approved the principles laid down in A.S.Naidu's case and Oxford English School's case by making it clear that those matters attained finality shall not be reopened. Therefore today, we are bound by the judgment of the Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2002 (2) CTC 55, hence, it is more relevant to extract paragraphs 17 & 18 of the Constitution Bench judgment, holding as follows:- "17. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case, 1996 (3) SCC 88 and Nanjudaiah's case, 1996 (10) SCC 619 is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S.Naidu's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra) is affirmed. 18. There is, however, substance in the plea that those matters which have obtained finality should not be re-opened. The present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the compensations have been paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent Notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act are quashed." 11. The present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the compensations have been paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent Notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act are quashed." 11. A careful reading of the above observations made by the Apex Court clearly indicate what is the effect of the prospective overruling in the manner set out therein, that is where the State had initially issued a notification under Section 4(1) followed by a Section 6 declaration within one year and the said Section 6 declaration was quashed by a Court before 13.3.2002, namely, the date of judgment in Padmasundara Rao's case and if a fresh Section 6 declaration was made within one year after the judgment and an award had been passed and compensation had been paid before 13.3.2002, where all these events happened before 13.3.2002, then the owners or persons interested would not be able to fall back on the judgment given by the Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao's case and cannot seek for issuance of a fresh Section 6 declaration. 12. In the aforesaid background, if we look at the present case, only five chronological dates are essential. The Section 4(1) notification was issued in G.O.Ms.No.1177, Housing and Urban Development Department on 03.02.1982 and the Section 6 declaration was issued in G.O.Ms.No.131, Housing and Urban Development Department on 31.1.85. The writ petition No.18493 of 1991 challenging the acquisition proceedings filed after six years of delay was allowed on 13.7.99 quashing the acquisition proceedings from the stage of Section 5-A enquiry. Again after Section 5-A enquiry, once again the Section 6 declaration was issued in G.O.Ms.No.283, Housing and Urban Development Department on 10.7.2000 and finally the award was passed on 27.5.2002. From the above dates and events, it could be seen that a fresh Section 6 declaration was made within one year from the date of judgment. Again after Section 5-A enquiry, once again the Section 6 declaration was issued in G.O.Ms.No.283, Housing and Urban Development Department on 10.7.2000 and finally the award was passed on 27.5.2002. From the above dates and events, it could be seen that a fresh Section 6 declaration was made within one year from the date of judgment. This is the law propounded by the Apex Court in Narasimhaiah's case having attained finality, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Padmasundara Rao's case also made it abundantly clear that the same cannot be reopened as the ratio in Padmasundara Rao's case will operate prospectively from 13.03.2002, when the Section 6 declaration was already published on 10.07.2000 and the award also has been passed on 27.05.2002, which is well within two years from the Section 6 declaration as per Section 11 A of the Act. 13. Further, though the original notification under Section 4(1) was issued in G.O.Ms.No.1177, Housing and Urban Development, dated 29.12.1981, the same was published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 03.02.1982 for acquisition of land of the petitioner, therefore, the first Section 6 declaration was issued in G.O.Ms.No.131, dated 30.01.1985, is well within three years. But, three years period between 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration has been reduced to one year in 1984 by Act 68 of 1984 and at the same time, an outer limit has been fixed for passing award as two years i.e. entire land acquisition proceedings have to be completed within three years from the date of notification. It is also well settled that if any claimant has obtained an order of stay prohibiting the land acquisition authorities from publication of 6 declaration, the entire period has to be excluded in computing the period of one year for making 6 declaration from the date of last publication of notification under Section 4. Similarly, for the purpose of making an award within two years, exclusion of period of stay in computing the period of two years prescribed for making an award was also permitted. But, if Section 6 declaration has not been made within one year or once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the notification under Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. But, if Section 6 declaration has not been made within one year or once a declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period of the notification under Sub-Section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. The purpose for providing the period of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Therefore, the prescription of time limit in that background is peremptory in nature. This is for the reason that the interest of the person whose land is sought to be acquired cannot be lost sight of and he is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count. 14. In the aforesaid background, when Section 6 of the Act is plain and unambiguous that no declaration, in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section(1), published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification, undoubtedly, declaration made under Section 6(1) published in the official gazette on 31.01.1985, is clearly not beyond the statutory period of limitation prescribed under Section 6(1) of the Act. Further, the petitioners' mother-land owner failed to challenge the acquisition proceedings within the period of three years from 4(1) notification dated 03.02.1982, whereas after a huge delay of six years from Section 6 declaration i.e. with a huge delay of 9 years from 4(1) notification, a writ petition was filed in the year 1991. 15. The above dates and events recorded clearly show that the land was acquired in a proper manner adhering to the Rule provided under Land Acquisition Act. Now, therefore, the question is, whether the State is responsible for issuing belated Section 6 declaration either after the expiry of three years period under the Old Act or one year under the new amendment from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) dated 03.02.1982 and as a result, the entire land acquisition proceedings shall be quashed. 16. Now, therefore, the question is, whether the State is responsible for issuing belated Section 6 declaration either after the expiry of three years period under the Old Act or one year under the new amendment from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) dated 03.02.1982 and as a result, the entire land acquisition proceedings shall be quashed. 16. Again, the answer to the question is clearly in negative, for the reason that when 4 (1) notification was issued on 03.02.1982, after conducting 5-A enquiry, in which Late Nallakammal participated therein after submitting her objection for acquisition, Section 6 declaration was issued in G.O.Ms.No.131, Housing and Urban Development, dated 31.01.1985, which is well within three years time. Thereafter, the land owner, keeping quiet for six long years till 1991, filed a writ petition in W.P.No.18493 of 1991, wherein this Court allowed the writ petition, by quashing the acquisition proceedings from the stage of 5-A of enquiry, on 13.07.1999. Though, in the meanwhile, Section 6(2) was amended by Act 68 of 1984 reducing the period of three years between 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration to one year and at the same time, an outer limit has been fixed for passing award for two years, it has to be legally concluded that the period of one year for passing Section 6 declaration has not been expired, for the reason that the petitioners' mother-land owner came to this Court after a period of six long years from the date of Section 6 declaration and therefore, it has to be stated that one year period for passing declaration under Section 6 has been utilized by the respondent in passing Section 6 declaration on 10.07.2000 from the date of order passed by this Court in W.P.No.18493 of 1991, dated 13.07.1999, in fine tune with the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Narasimhaiah's case (supra), wherein it has been held that the limitation of one year for publication of Section 6 declaration runs from the date of the judgment of the High Court and further, that should be taken as date of issuance of 4(1) notification in view of amendment took place in the year 1984 fixing the time limit of one year for passing Section 6 declaration. Further, the award has been passed from the date of 6 declarations i.e. on 10.07.2000. Further, the award has been passed from the date of 6 declarations i.e. on 10.07.2000. Therefore, no fault can be found in view of the aforesaid reasons, hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners will fall back on the judgment in Padmasundara Rao's case (cited supra) cannot be legally accepted, inasmuch as the ratio laid down in Padmasundara Rao's case is completely distinguishable than the case of the petitioners. At the risk of repetition, it must be mentioned that in the case ofA.S.Naidu's case (supra), Oxford English School's case (supra) and Padmasundara Rao's case (supra), the question involved was that once Section 6 declaration has been quashed, fresh declaration cannot be issued beyond the statutory period as computed from notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. As highlighted earlier, when the petitioners' mother has not challenged the acquisition proceedings for about six long years from the date of declaration under Section 6, the question of expiry of time limit does not arise at all in the present case on hand. Even otherwise, since the respondents in the light of the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.18493 of 1991, dated 13.07.1999, had issued Section 6 declaration on 10.07.2000 in G.O.Ms.No.283 well within one year period, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in N.Narasimhaiah's case squarely covers the case of the respondent, as it was held in the said judgment that the State Government is having liberty to continue acquisition proceedings from the stage of 4(1) notification before the expiry of one year provided under class (ii) of first proviso to Section 6(1). This ratio laid down in N.Narasimhaiah's case and D.C.Nanjudaiah's case (cited supra) on 17.01.1996 and 26.08.1996 respectively was governing the land acquisition field for a long period of six years till the Constitution Bench judgment in Padmasundara Rao's case overruled this ratio on 13.03.2002. However, the Constitution Bench has saved all the validity of the acts said and done pursuant to the view of the Narasimhaiah's Case and Nanjudaiah's Case by applying the doctrine of prospective overruling that those matters which have attained finality should not be re-opened. However, the Constitution Bench has saved all the validity of the acts said and done pursuant to the view of the Narasimhaiah's Case and Nanjudaiah's Case by applying the doctrine of prospective overruling that those matters which have attained finality should not be re-opened. In view of the above, the petitioner, having slept over the matter from the date of issuance of Section 6 declaration, dated 10.7.2000, filed the writ petition only on 28.11.2002 seeking to get the benefit of Padmasundara Rao's case (cited supra), this Court, as stated above, having found that there is no fault at any stage on the part of the State Government in issuing either first declaration under Section 6 in G.O.Ms.No.131, dated 31.01.1985 within three years from the date of 4(1) notification as per the old provision or the second declaration under Section 6 in G.O.(Nilai) No.283, dated 10.7.2000 within one year under the new amendment and at the same time, the award also came to be passed on 27.05.2002 within two years time limit, cannot accept the prayer made by the petitioner. 17. In fine, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner fails and it is dismissed accordingly. No Costs.