JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11.11.2004 rendered by the learned District Judge, Shimla in Civil Appeal No.52-S/13 of 2002. 2. “Key facts” of the case are that appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiff” for convenience sake) filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to as the “defendant” for convenience sake). It is not disputed that the plaintiff-Board has leased a plot measuring 67 square yards comprising of Khasra No. 184 old in favour of the defendant on 27.12.1983 at the monthly rent of ` 35/-. The lease deed was made for a period of 11 months for the purpose of his residence by erecting a temporary shed. However, defendant started illegal and unauthorized construction of a pucca house on the leased plot without any regularization of his tenancy and also without getting ‘no objection certificate’ from the plaintiff Board. Defendant was also alleged to have not got approved the plan from the Town and Country Planning Department and Municipal Corporation, Shimla. According to the plaintiff, act of the defendant of raising the construction of a pucca house on the leased plot was illegal and unauthorized. It is in these circumstances, plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and in the alternative relief of mandatory injunction by pulling down the structure likely to be raised against the defendant in the event of the defendant being successful in raising the construction of the house during the pendency of the suit. 3. Suit was contested by the defendant. Defendant denied the allegation that he was raising any construction on the disputed plot. He was in possession of a two storeyed house since 1984 and the house was damaged in the years 1987. The house was reconstructed by the defendant in the year 1987 with the help of the Government. 4. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class framed the issues on 28.6.2001. He dismissed the suit on 16.3.2002. Plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28.6.2001 before the District Judge, Shimla. He also dismissed the appeal on 11.11.2004. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. 4. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class framed the issues on 28.6.2001. He dismissed the suit on 16.3.2002. Plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28.6.2001 before the District Judge, Shimla. He also dismissed the appeal on 11.11.2004. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. “Whether in view of the notification No. REV-C(E) 4-1/97 dated 1.12.2001 issued by the Government of H.P. constituting Wakf Tribunal, Shimla for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to Wakf or Wakf property under the Wakf Act, 1995, the suit initially filed before the learned trial court on 25.8.2000 ought to have been transferred to Wakf Tribunal as the learned trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed further in view of the aforesaid notification? 2. Whether in view of the notification dated 1.12.2001 issued by the State Government of H.P. constituting Wakf Tribunal, Shimla (District Judge, Shimla) for determination of any dispute relating to the Wakf property, the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are sustainable in the eyes of law? 3. Whether the respondent/defendant who has been allotted suit land vide allotment order dated 27.12.1983 only for the purpose of raising temporary construction, could raise permanent/pucca three storeyed house on the suit land, without any no objection/permission from the plaintiff/appellant Board or without any legal and valid sanction from the statutory authorities, i.e. Municipal Corporation, Shimla and Town and Country Planning Department? 4. Whether even if the provisions of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 are applicable in the area where the property in dispute is situated, the plaintiff/appellant Board is within its rights to seek permanent prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction against the respondent/defendant against his illegal acts of raising unauthorized construction on the land of the plaintiff/appellant Board especially when the proprietary rights of the appellant/plaintiff board over the suit land are being adversely affected by the defendant? 5. Whether the learned first appellate court has committed an error by holding that although pucca construction has been raised on the suit land by the defendant/respondent without no objection of the plaintiff/appellant Board, still the relief of mandatory injunction can be refused to the plaintiff in the given circumstances? 5. Mr. 5. Whether the learned first appellate court has committed an error by holding that although pucca construction has been raised on the suit land by the defendant/respondent without no objection of the plaintiff/appellant Board, still the relief of mandatory injunction can be refused to the plaintiff in the given circumstances? 5. Mr. B.S. Attri has strenuously argued that in view of notification dated 1.12.2001 issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh whereby the Tribunal has been constituted, the suit initially filed before the learned trial court on 25.8.2000 ought to have been transferred to the Tribunal. In other words, according to him, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. He then contended that the defendant could not raise the construction without seeking no objection/permission from the plaintiff and without valid sanction from the statutory authorities, i.e. Municipal Corporation, Shimla and Town and Country Planning Department. Mr. Attri has further argued that the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are without jurisdiction. 6. Mr. Dinesh Kumar has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records and pleadings carefully. 8. Though the Regular Second Appeal was admitted on all five substantial questions of law, but the parties have restricted their submissions only to substantial questions of law No.1 to 3. Substantial Questions of Law No.1 and 2: 9. Initially, the suit was instituted by the Punjab Wakf Board, Shimla through its Estate Officer. However, subsequently, an application under order 1 rule 10 read with order 22 rule 10 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed for impleading Himachal Pradesh Wakf Board through its Executive Officer. The application was allowed by this Court on 29.11.2005 and the Punjab Wakf Board was substituted by the Himachal Pradesh Wakf Board. The plaintiff has also filed an application for placing on record the copy of notification dated 1.12.2001 issued by the State of Himachal Pradesh. 10. The Wakf Act, 1995 has come into force on 1.1.1996. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on 25.8.2000. The Tribunal has been constituted by the State Government on 1.12.2001. The Court is of the considered view that since the Tribunal has only been constituted on 1.12.2001, the suit filed by the plaintiff on 25.8.2000 was maintainable before the Civil Court. 11. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on 25.8.2000. The Tribunal has been constituted by the State Government on 1.12.2001. The Court is of the considered view that since the Tribunal has only been constituted on 1.12.2001, the suit filed by the plaintiff on 25.8.2000 was maintainable before the Civil Court. 11. The Division Bench of Andhra High Court in P. Rama Rao and others versus High Court of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2000 (1) ALD 298 has held that the scheme of the Act contemplates and unfolds the intention of the Legislature in clearest terms that the obliteration of the jurisdiction of the civil court and the creation of the Tribunal to take over the exclusive jurisdiction confided to its simultaneous process. No vacuum or hiatus could have been intended by the Legislature. The delay in the constitution of the Tribunal would not have been foreseen by the Legislature. It could not have been the intention of the legislature that the existing remedy or recourse to civil court should be extinguished as a first step and that remedy should be made available only when the Tribunal is set up. What should be the remedy of the aggrieved party or institutions of Wakf during the intervening period? Should they indefinitely wait in order to pursue their remedy till the State Government issues a notification constituting the Tribunal? The Division Bench of Andhra High Court has refused to transfer the case of the Tribunal by holding that the Civil Court could deal with the matter. The Division Bench has held as under: “3. Then, the question is what is the position of the suits or other proceedings instituted between 1-1-1996 and 30-6-1997? The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that in view of the express bar created by Section 85 of the Act, the civil Court cannot proceed with the matter because its jurisdiction has been taken away by that provision and therefore either plaint should be returned for presentation in the proper Court or if that cannot be done, the suit will have to be dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction and the plaintiff will have to institute a fresh suit in the Wakf Tribunal. It is therefore submitted that the plaints/petitions instituted after 1-7-1997 involving disputes or questions relating to Wakf or Wakf property or other allied matters, should be returned to the parties to enable them to present them in the Wakf Tribunal and that the circular issued by the High Court is contrary to Section 85 of the Act. The Counsel for the 3rd respondent supports the circular of the High Court and submits that the suits or proceedings instituted in the City Civil Court even if they relate to matters pertaining to Wakf or Wakf property should only be presented in the civil Court in the absence of Wakf Tribunal and such suits or proceedings will continue to be dealt with by the civil Court. He also questions the bona fides of the petitioners in taking up an objection after the trial commenced and plaintiff's evidence was adduced. 5. It is true as pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate-General and also the learned Counsel for the petitioners, on the plain language of Section 85, the bar against the entertainment of suit seems to arise on and from the date of the commencement of the Act. The moment the Act came into force, the bar operates, prima facie. The fundamental postulate of Section 85 read with the other relevant provisions is that the Wakf Tribunal shall be a substitute for the civil Courts in respect of matters required to be dealt with by the Tribunal under the Act. The Scheme of the Act contemplates and unfolds the intention of the Legislature in clearest terms that the obliteration of the jurisdiction of the civil Court and the creation of the Tribunal to take over the exclusive jurisdiction confided to it is a simultaneous process. No vacuum or hiatus could have been intended by the Legislature. The delay in the constitution of the Tribunal just as it has happened in this State, would not have been foreseen by the Legislature. Surely, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that the existing remedy or recourse to civil Court should be extinguished as a first step and that remedy should be made available only when the Wakf Tribunal is set up. What should be the remedy of the aggrieved party or Institutions of Wakf during the intervening period? Surely, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that the existing remedy or recourse to civil Court should be extinguished as a first step and that remedy should be made available only when the Wakf Tribunal is set up. What should be the remedy of the aggrieved party or Institutions of Wakf during the intervening period? Should they indefinitely wait in order to pursue their remedy till the State Government issues a notification constituting the Tribunal? In the instant case, the Tribunal was constituted 1 1/2 years after the Act came into force which is fairly a long period. If the aggrieved persons or Institutions are left without any remedy to move the Court or a judicial body during this period, absurd and unintended results would follow. Such consequences are manifestly contrary to the legislative intention. Not only that, even the provision i.e.. Section 85 would be vulnerable to attack on the ground of infringement of Article 14 inasmuch as a particular class of litigants would be left without remedy to prevent invasion of their rights recognised by law on account of sheer delay in constitution the Tribunal. Obviously, such construction should be avoided. Literal interpretation should yield to purposive construction and a construction which preserves the Constitutionality of the provision. The fact that the provision for transfer of cases from the civil Court to the Wakf Tribunal is not provided for in the Act is also a pointer to the legislative intention that the suits filed earlier to the constitution of the Tribunal shall continue to be dealt with by the civil Court. We are therefore of the view that in the interests of imparting rationality to the provision and accomplishing the Legislative object, Section 85 has to be qualified by the words "after the constitution of the Tribunal" immediately after the words "should lie". No doubt by doing so, the literal construction is eschewed and certain words which are really implicit are read into the section. But such reading and interpretation is not an impermissible exercise. As long back as in 1955, the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, laid down that in order to avoid absurd and anomalous consequences, there could be addition or modification of the words. 7. But such reading and interpretation is not an impermissible exercise. As long back as in 1955, the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, laid down that in order to avoid absurd and anomalous consequences, there could be addition or modification of the words. 7. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we uphold the circular of the High Court and hold that the plaint in the suit referred to above need not be returned, nor the suit be transferred to Wakf Tribunal. It can be dealt with by the civil Court. The writ petition is therefore dismissed. No costs.” 12. In the instant case also, the Tribunal has been constituted on 1.12.2001 and the suit was filed on 25.8.2000. 13. The Full Bench of the Andhra High Court in Badarla Suryakumari vs. Badarla Vamana Murthy and others, AIR 2010 Andhra Pradesh 209 held that P. Rama Rao’s case (supra) required no consideration. The Full Bench has held as under: 28. In view of the above judgment and in view of the clear language employed in S. 85 of the Act, the bar operates only to fresh suits and it will not affect the pending suits. 29. Further, as already noted above, there is no specific provision under the Act for transferring the pending suits to the Tribunal, unlike the provisions in other enactments viz., Railway Act, A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 etc. For example, S. 33 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 deals with exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and S.34 deals with transfer of pending cases to the special Tribunal. The said provisions for the purpose of illustration, are extracted as under: 33. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts- On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable by the Tribunal in relation to service matters under this Act, no Civil Court shall have, or be entitled to exercise, such jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to those service matters. 34. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts- On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable by the Tribunal in relation to service matters under this Act, no Civil Court shall have, or be entitled to exercise, such jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to those service matters. 34. Transfer of pending cases-(1) Every suit, or other proceedings pending before any Court including a High Court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, if it had arisen after such establishment within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal stand transferred on that date to such tribunal. (2)……… 30. In the present statute, as already noted above, there is no specific provision dealing with transfer of the pending proceedings after the constitution of Tribunal, unlike the above extracted provision, which clearly indicated that the matters stand transferred from the date of establishment of Tribunal. The Division Bench in P. Rama Rao’s case (supra) has rightly considered the aspect relating to transferring of pending proceedings, by referring to S. 29 of the administrative Tribunals Act, S. 8 of the Family Courts Act, S. 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, etc. Generally such transfer provisions will be inserted in a new enactment, when the jurisdiction of one forum is taken away and is conferred on the other. 32. Therefore, the quintessence of the above judgments is that if there is any special enactment creating a new forum or Tribunal to deal with matters under that special enactment and which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, in the absence of any clear indication that such enactment is retrospective and in the absence of any provision for transferring of the pending proceedings on the file of Civil Court to such new forum or Tribunal, the pending cases need not be transferred and they shall have to be dealt with by the Civil Court. In case if the new law bringing a change in the forum intends to affect even the pending matters, the statute must enact an express provision to that effect. 33. In case if the new law bringing a change in the forum intends to affect even the pending matters, the statute must enact an express provision to that effect. 33. The other contingency in the present set of facts, as already noted above, is that the Act came into force with effect from 1-1-1996 and for about a period of one and half year, no Tribunal as envisaged under S. 83 of the Act, was constituted and the Tribunal was constituted only on 1-1-1997. Therefore, even if the provisions of the Act is taken to have prospective effect, after the commencement of the Act also, no forum as envisaged under the Act is created. It is well settled that where statutory enactments only create right or liability without providing forum for remedy, any person having a grievance that he has been wronged, or his right is being affected, can approach a Civil Court on the principle that ‘wherever there is right, there is remedy’ (ubi jus ibi remedium). Therefore, we are of the considered view that in the intervening period i.e., after the commencement of the Act and before the Constitution of Tribunal, the Civil Court will definitely have jurisdiction, since the aggrieved party in the absence of forum, will be rendered remediless and this not object of the Act. It is to be noticed that when all the litigants under common law and also under special enactments are having forums to ventilate their grievances and only the litigants of wakf property are left with no forum, it amounts to violation of their fundamental rights and S. 85, , which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, will be vulnerable to attack. The Division Bench of this Court (supra), has rightly considered this aspect and the relevant portion, is quoted as under, once again with approval: “6…….The delay in the constitution of the Tribunal just as it has happened in this State, would not have been foreseen by the Legislature. Surely, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature that the existing remedy or recourse to Civil Court should be extinguished as a first step and that remedy should be made available only when the Wakf Tribunal is set up. What should be remedy of the aggrieved party or Institutions or Wakf during the intervening period? Surely, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature that the existing remedy or recourse to Civil Court should be extinguished as a first step and that remedy should be made available only when the Wakf Tribunal is set up. What should be remedy of the aggrieved party or Institutions or Wakf during the intervening period? In the instant case, the Tribunal was constituted 1 ½ years after the Act came into force which is fairly a long period. If the aggrieved persons or institutions are left without any remedy to move the Court or a judicial body during this period, absurd and unintended results would follow. Such consequences are manifestly contrary to the legislative intention. Not only that, even the provision i.e., S. 85 would be vulnerable to attack on the ground of infringement of Art. 14 inasmuch as a particular class of litigants would be left without remedy to prevent invasion of their rights recognized by law on account of sheer delay in constituting the Tribunal. Obviously, such construction should be avoided. Literal interpretation should yield to purposive construction and a construction which preserves the constitutionality of the provision……………” 34. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that even by literary interpretation of S.85 of the Act, The Tribunal will get jurisdiction on and from 1-7-1997, the date on which it is constituted and no matter pertaining to wakf and wakf property shall be filed before Civil Court on and from that date. There is no provision under the Act regarding transfer of wakf matters pending before the Civil Courts to the special Tribunal. Till the Tribunal is constituted, the Civil Court necessarily has to exercise the jurisdiction and the Civil Court’s jurisdiction cannot easily be presumed to have been ousted, in the absence of any clear language to that effect. The matters filed and pending before the competent Civil Court, which has jurisdiction to entertain the same, in the absence of the Tribunal, need not be transferred. However, such matters, which are filed on and from 1-7-1997 requires to be transferred to the Tribunal, as the special Tribunal was constituted for the specific purpose and, therefore, the Civil Court cannot exercise a parallel jurisdiction from that date. However, such matters, which are filed on and from 1-7-1997 requires to be transferred to the Tribunal, as the special Tribunal was constituted for the specific purpose and, therefore, the Civil Court cannot exercise a parallel jurisdiction from that date. Accordingly, the circular issued by the High Court directing transfer of pending matters filed subsequent to 1-7-1997, is valid and is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Division Bench (supra), has rightly considered the same. 37. Coming to the merits of the case, there is no serious dispute with regard to the nature of the property and the suit was filed on 23-12-1996 in O.S. No. 18/1999 on the filed of Principle Senior Civil Judge, Eluru, i.e., prior to the constitution of Tribunal on 1-1-1997 and the impugned order, without noticing the circular of the High Court dated 13-7-1999 and also the Division Bench judgment of this Court in P. Rama Rao’s case (supra), was passed on 13-12-2002. As per the above discussion, the matter is squarely covered by the Division Bench of this Court in P. Rama Rao’s case (supra). The C.M.A. is of the year 2002. In the usual course we would have directed the matter to be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal. But, in view of the above facts and circumstances and keeping in view the long pendency of the matter, we feel it appropriate to dispose of the matter.” 14. Learned Singh Judge of the Madras High Court in Rahmathullah (Died) through LRs vs. Kannan through LRs in S.A. No. 201 of 1995 has held that since the suit was filed before the constitution of the Tribunal on 24.10.1997, the jurisdiction of the civil court was not ousted. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “46. Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1995 speaks of 'Disputes regarding Wakfs'. As per the ingredients of Section 6 of the Wakf Act, the Board, the Mutavalli or in an individual interested therein to file a suit before the Tribunal for the decision of the issue whether a properties specified in the list of Wakfs is a Wakf property or not. The suit is to be filed within a year from the date of publication of the list of wakfs by the Wakf Board in the official Gazette. The suit is to be filed within a year from the date of publication of the list of wakfs by the Wakf Board in the official Gazette. The limitation of one year prescribed for filing of a suit challenging the list of wakfs is not a limitation period, but a condition precedent and the ingredients of Limitation Act have no application. Sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the Wakf Act refers to a bar in filing of any suit or other legal proceedings in a Court in respect of any question referred to in Sub-section (1) viz., the list of wakfs after the commencement of the Act. The Wakf Act has come into operation on 01.11.1996. As per G.O.Ms.No.458 dated 24.10.1997 the Tribunals have been established in Tamil Nadu. 47. It is relevant to point out that the Wakf Act, 1995 visualises filing of suits in the competent Court of Civil Jurisdiction as per Sections 68(6), 86, 89, 90, 92 and 93 of the Act. 48. Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 empowers the State Government to constitute as many Tribunals as it things fit for determination for any dispute, question or other relating to wakf or wakf property under this Act and local jurisdiction of each Tribunal. 49. Section 85 of the Wakf Act bars the filing of a suit in any civil Court in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any wakf, property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal. 50. As per Section 7(5) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the Tribunal established under Section 83 of the Act shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil Court under sub-section (1) of section 6 before the commencement of this Act or which is the subject matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case may be, as per decision Sardar Khan V. Syed Najmul Hasan, 2007 (3) MLJ 366 (SC). 51. 51. The plea of retrospective effect of Section 85 of the Wakf Act cannot be availed of in regard to suits or proceedings which have been initiated before the cut off date 01.11.1996 as per sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. 52. In the instant case, O.S.No.415 of 1987 has been filed before the Constitution of Tribunals date 24.10.1997. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court when the deceased Plaintiff filed the original suit before the trial Court is not ousted.” 15. The Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram (deceased by LRs.) vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, AIR 2010 SC 2897 has held that eviction suit against tenant of wakf property was not tenable before the Tribunal and the same would to have been filed in civil court. The Apex Court has held as under: “12. From a conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 (supra) it is clear that the jurisdiction to determine whether or not a property is a wakf property or whether a wakf is a Shia wakf or a Sunni wakf rests entirely with the Tribunal and no suit or other proceeding can be instituted or commenced in a Civil Court in relation to any such question after the commencement of the Act. What is noteworthy is that under Section 6 read with Section 7 (supra) the institution of the Civil Court is barred only in regard to questions that are specifically enumerated therein. The bar is not complete so as to extend to other questions that may arise in relation to the wakf property. 15. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to adjudicate upon disputes whether a particular property specified in the wakf list is or is not a wakf property or whether a wakf specified in list is a Shia wakf or a Sunni wakf is clear and presents no difficulty whatsoever. The difficulty, however, arises on account of the fact that apart from Section 6(5) which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to determine matters referred to in Section 6(1), Section 85 of the Act also bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any legal proceedings in respect of any dispute, question or matter relating to a wakf property. 24. Section 85 of the Act reads: "85. 24. Section 85 of the Act reads: "85. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts - No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any Civil Court in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any wakf, wakf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal. " 16. A plain reading of the above would show that the Civil Court's jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the matter in dispute is required under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The words "which is required by or under this Act to be determined by Tribunal" holds the key to the question whether or not all disputes concerning the wakf or wakf property stand excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Whenever a question arises whether "any dispute, question or other matter" relating to "any wakf or wakf property or other matter" falls within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court the answer would depend upon whether any such dispute, question or other matter is required under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. If the answer be in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be excluded qua such a question, for in that case the Tribunal alone can entertain and determine any such question. The bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 85 is in that sense much wider than that contained in Section 6(5) read with Section 7 of the Wakf Act. While the latter bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only in relation of questions specified in Sections 6(1) and 7(1), the bar of jurisdiction contained in Section 85 would exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts not only in relation to matters that specifically fall in Sections 6 and 7 but also other matters required to be determined by a Tribunal under the Act. There are a host of such matters in which the Tribunal exercises original or appellate jurisdiction. To illustrate the point we may usefully refer to some of the provisions of the Act where the bar contained in the said section would get attracted. Section 33 of the Act deals with the power of inspection by a Chief Executive Officer or person authorized by him. To illustrate the point we may usefully refer to some of the provisions of the Act where the bar contained in the said section would get attracted. Section 33 of the Act deals with the power of inspection by a Chief Executive Officer or person authorized by him. In the event of any failure or negligence on the part of a mutawalli in the performance of his duties leading to any loss or damage, the Chief Executive Officer can with the prior approval of the Board pass an order for the recovery of the amount or property which has been misappropriated, misapplied or fraudulently retained. Sub-section (4) of Section 33 then entitles the aggrieved person to file an appeal to the Tribunal and empowers the Tribunal to deal with and adjudicate upon the validity of the orders passed by the Chief Executive Officer. 18. Section 47 of the Act requires the accounts of the wakfs to be audited whereas Section 48 empowers the Board to examine the audit report, and to call for an explanation of any person in regard to any matter and pass such orders as it may think fit including an order for recovery of the amount certified by the auditor under Section 47(2) of the Act. The mutawalli or any other person aggrieved by any such direction has the right to appeal to the Tribunal under Section 48. Similar provisions giving powers to the Wakf Board to pass orders in respect of matters stipulated therein are found in Sections 51, 54, 61, 64, 67, 72 and 73 of the Act. Suffice it to say that there are a host of questions and matters that have to be determined by the Tribunal under the Act, in relation to the wakf or wakf property or other matters. Section 85 of the Act clearly bars jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any suit or proceedings in relation to orders passed by or proceedings that may be commenced before the Tribunal. It follows that although Section 85 is wider than what is contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts even under Section 85 is not absolute. It is limited only to matters that are required by the Act to be determined by a Tribunal. It follows that although Section 85 is wider than what is contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts even under Section 85 is not absolute. It is limited only to matters that are required by the Act to be determined by a Tribunal. So long as the dispute or question raised before the Civil Court does not fall within four corners of the powers vested in the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the former to entertain a suit or proceedings in relation to any such question cannot be said to be barred.” 16. Mr. B.S. Attri has placed strong reliance on Board of Wakf West Bengal and another versus Anis Fatma Begum and another, (2010) 14 SCC 588 . This judgment is distinguishable on the facts. It is true that once the Wakf Act has come into force, the matter is required to be filed before the Tribunal if the same relates to wakf or wakf property. However, since as noticed above, the Tribunal was constituted only on 1.12.2001, the civil court had the jurisdiction to decide the matters relating to wakf or wakf property filed before this date. There is no provision for transferring the pending cases in the Wakf Act, 1995. It would be apt to note that in few enactments, there is a specific provision for transferring the cases, i.e. Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. According to section 29 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, every suit or other proceeding pending before any court or other authority shall stand transferred on the date of establishment of the Tribunal . According to section 34 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, every suit or other proceeding pending before any court including a High Court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal under the Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based, is such that it would have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, if it had arisen after such establishment within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, stand transferred on that date to the Tribunal. 17. 17. State of Bihar has introduced section 85-A by Bihar Amendment in Wakf Act (43 1995) by providing for the deemed transfer of pending cases, which were pending before any court, after the commencement of the Wakf Act, 1995 and before the constitution of the Tribunal under the Act. 18. Patna High Court in Bihar State Sunni Waqf Board vs. Abdul Rauf and others, AIR 2012 Patna 137 has held as under: “13. By introducing Section 85A by Bihar Amendment in the year 2006, the legislature has provided for the deemed transfer of pending cases (any suit or other proceeding) which have been pending Patna before any court, after the commencement of the Wakf Act 1995 and before the constitution of Tribunal under the Act. But such deemed transfer has again been limited to only such suit or other proceeding which would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if such Tribunal would have been constituted. The provision of Section 85A (1)reads as follows:- 85A. Transfer of pending cases-(1) Any suit or other proceeding pending before any court immediately before the date of constitution of a Tribunal under this Act and after the date of the commencement of the Act (Act 43 of 1995), the cause of action of which is based on such facts that if the Tribunal would have been constituted, it would be within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall be deemed to be transferred to such Tribunal on the date of constitution of the Tribunal. 14. From a plain reading of the aforesaid Section 85A, it at once becomes clear that the purpose of its introduction is only to meet the eventuality arising due to the delay in the constitution and establishment of a Wakf Tribunal in the State of Bihar, as a full functional body. Further, it visualizes the transfer of only such suit or proceeding which would have been maintainable only before the tribunal, if it would have been constituted. Clearly, this Section 85A does not create any new jurisdiction in the Tribunal and does not exclude the jurisdiction of a civil court to continue with a suit or other proceeding which is not encompassed within the jurisdiction of the tribunal by virtue of other provisions of the Wakf Act specifically dealing with the subject of jurisdiction. Clearly, this Section 85A does not create any new jurisdiction in the Tribunal and does not exclude the jurisdiction of a civil court to continue with a suit or other proceeding which is not encompassed within the jurisdiction of the tribunal by virtue of other provisions of the Wakf Act specifically dealing with the subject of jurisdiction. No doubt, the submission that this Section 85A is supplementary to Section 83 of the Wakf Act is correct but it is correct only to that extent and cannot be stretched further as prescribing any further jurisdiction in the Wakf Tribunal and to exclude the jurisdiction of a civil court to the extent than what have been envisaged in other provisions of the Act. This Section 85A only provides for transfer of pending cases in view of the delay in the constitution of the Wakf Tribunal after the commencement of the Wakf Act, 1995 and is purely procedural in nature as are the provisions of Section 83. Thus, it is held that by introduction of Section 85A by Bihar Amendment, no new vista of exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court has been created and the law relating to the jurisdiction of the of the Wakf Tribunal and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court has remained unaltered. 20. As mentioned earlier, the present ten revision applications have been filed only by the defendant-Wakf Board challenging the order of the court below by which it has decided to continue with the eviction suits. The jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit is determined by the averments in the plaint and it does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendant in the written statement. Simply because the defendant-tenants have come out with the case that the plaintiffs are not their landlord rather it is the Wakf Board to whom they have been paying rent as landlord, the nature of the suit will not change as the plaintiffs have not sought the relief for declaration of their title against the Wakf Board. Further, even the addition of the Wakf Board as a party defendant in the eviction suits will also not change the nature of the suits, only because the Wakf Board has claimed the suit property as Wakf Property and an issue has been framed in that regard. Further, even the addition of the Wakf Board as a party defendant in the eviction suits will also not change the nature of the suits, only because the Wakf Board has claimed the suit property as Wakf Property and an issue has been framed in that regard. The defence of a tenant or a third party in an eviction suit under the Bihar Building [lease, Rent and Eviction] Control Act, 1982 cannot enlarge the scope of the jurisdiction of the court and will not ipso facto convert an eviction suit into a title suit. The primary issue in these eviction suits to be determined shall always be the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant as held by this Court in the order dated 08.05.2002 aforementioned, in earlier revision application between the parties. The further contention on behalf of the petitioner that by filing T.S. No. 299 of 1998, the plaintiff has accepted the inclusion of the suit property in the list of Wakfs which list is final under the provisions of the Act and therefore also the eviction suits now cannot proceed, has also got no force. The filing of T.S. No. 299 of 1998 by the plaintiffs seeking declaration of title and the relief against the inclusion of the suit property in the list of Wakfs, can never be taken to be the acceptance of the case of the defendants by the plaintiffs and the issues, regarding the nature of the property and the validity of its inclusion in the list of Wakfs are yet to be determined by appropriate forum in accordance with law. The jurisdiction of the court below, for that reason, to continue with the proceedings of the eviction suits cannot come to an end.” 19. In the instant case, the State Government has not carried out any amendment in the Wakf Act for transfer of pending cases before any court after the commencement of the Wakf Act, 1995 and before the constitution of the Tribunal. 20. Learned Single Judge of the Uttarakhand High Court in Waqf Masjid, Railway Station, Jwalapur vs. Ashok Sethi and others, AIR 2011 Uttarakhand 68 has held that the Tribunal was not competent to entertain suit pertaining to eviction and possession. The proceedings could only be decided by the civil court and not by the Wakf Board by relying upon AIR 2010 SC 2897 . The proceedings could only be decided by the civil court and not by the Wakf Board by relying upon AIR 2010 SC 2897 . Learned Single Judge has held as under: “12. Without entering into the merits of the case and considering the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents on the point of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, I am of the view that the revisionist-plaintiff should have filed a suit before the competent court for the eviction of the respondents and the Tribunal/District Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction and possession filed by the plaintiff revisionist. I am fortified in my view by the Apex Court judgment in the case of Ramesh Gobindram vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf [(2010) 8 SCALE, 698], wherein it was held that eviction proceedings can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the Wakf Tribunal.” 21. The Apex Court in Mohd. Idris and others vs. Sat Narain and others, AIR 1966 SC 1499 has held that the application for redemption under section 12 of the Act pending at the time of commencement of Abolition Act could not be affected. The Apex Court has held as under: “6. The Zamindari Abolition Act came into force with effect from July 1, 1952. It has undergone numerous amendments and it is somewhat difficult to find out at any given moment of time what the state of law exactly was, because most of the amending Acts are made partly retrospective and partly not and considerable time is spent in trying to ascertain which part of the original Act survives and to what extent. We are concerned with a number of sections which have undergone changes again and again and we shall now attempt to examine what the position vis-a-vis the suit pending before the Munsif was, as a result of the enacting of the Abolition Act and its numerous amendments. 7. This suit was filed on May 27, 1952 when the Abolition Act was not on the statute book. When the Abolition Act was passed it did not repeal the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act. Both the Acts, therefore, continued on the statute book till July 12, 1958. On that date Act XVI of 1953 was passed. Section 67 of that Act repealed the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act. When the Abolition Act was passed it did not repeal the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act. Both the Acts, therefore, continued on the statute book till July 12, 1958. On that date Act XVI of 1953 was passed. Section 67 of that Act repealed the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act. While repealing the Act it was not stated whether the repeal was to operate retrospectively or not but by S. 1(2) the amending Act itself was deemed to have come into force from the first day of July, 1952 that is to say, simultaneously with the Abolition Act. It may, therefore, be assumed that the U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act was also repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952. The question is; whether the right of the plaintiff to continue the suit under the old law was in any way impaired. Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act lays down the effect of repeal and it is stated there as follows:- "6. Effect of repeal, shall Where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- * * * * * (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accused or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or * * * * * (e) affect any remedy, or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceedings may be continued and concluded; and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." The question is whether a different intention appears in either the Abolition Act or the amending Act XVI of 1953, for otherwise the old proceeding could continue before the Munsif. There is nothing in the Abolition Act which takes away the right of suit in respect of a pending action. If there be any doubt, it is removed when we consider that the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act was repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952 only and it is not, therefore, possible to give the repeal further retrospectively so as to affect a suit pending from before that date. If there be any doubt, it is removed when we consider that the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act was repealed retrospectively from July 1, 1952 only and it is not, therefore, possible to give the repeal further retrospectively so as to affect a suit pending from before that date. The jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector was itself created from July 1, 1952 and there is no provision in the Abolition Act that pending cases were to stand transferred to the Assistant Collector for disposal. Such provisions are commonly found in a statute which takes away the jurisdiction of one court and confers it on another. From these two circumstances it is to be inferred that if there is at all any expression of intention, it is to keep S. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable to pending litigation. The doubt, if any be left, is further removed if we consider a later amending Act, namely, Amending Act XVIII of 1956. By that Act Schedule II, which created the jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector in suits for ejectment of asamis was replaced by another Schedule. The entry relating to suits for ejectment of asamis, however, remained the same. But S. 23 of the amending Act of 1956 created a special saving which reads as follows:- "23. Saving.- (i) Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, continue to be heard and decided by such court or authority. (ii) An appeal, review or revision from any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced before any court or authority prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, lie to the Court or authority to which it would have laid if instituted or commenced before the said commencement." The addition of this section clearly shows that by the conferral of the jurisdiction upon the Assistant Collector it was not intended to upset litigation pending before appropriate authorities when the Abolition Act came into force. Section 23 in terms must apply to the present case, because if it had remained pending before the Munsif till 1956, it is clear, the jurisdiction of the Munsif would not have been ousted. Although it was not pending before the Munsif it was pending before the appellate Court when the 1956 amendment Act was passed. It follows, therefore, that to such a suit the provisions of Schedule II read with S. 200 of the Abolition Act cannot be applied because the Legislature has in 1956 said expressly what was implict before, namely, that pending actions would be governed by the old law as if the new law had not been passed. In our judgment, therefore, the proceedings before the Munsif were with jurisdiction because they were not affected by the passing of the Abolition Act or the amending Act, 1953, regard being had to the provisions of S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act in the first instance and more so in view of the provisions of S. 23 of the amending Act, 1956 which came before the proceedings between the parties had finally terminated. The appeal must, therefore, fall. It will be dismissed with costs.” 22. The Apex Court in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (dead) by LRs and others vs. Mohd. Hanifa (dead) by LRs and others, AIR 1976 SC 1569 has held that when the Board contemplated by the Act was not constituted at the relevant time, bar under the provisions of section 55 (2) was not attracted and the non-compliance with section 55 (2) would not bar maintainability of suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Apex Court has held as under: “61. The Apex Court has held as under: “61. It was next contended by the appellants that the suit was barred by Section 55 (2) of the Wakf Act, 1954, which runs thus: "No suit to obtain any of the reliefs referred to in subsection (1) relating to a wakf shall be instituted by any person or authority other than the Board without the consent in writing of the Board : Provided that no such consent shall be required for the institution of a suit against the Board in respect of any act purporting to be done by it in pursuance of this Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder." The High Court has dealt with this aspect of the matter and has pointed out that at the relevant time when the present suit was brought, no Board contemplated by the provisions of the Wakf Act had, however, been constituted and therefore the provisions of Section 55 (2) were not at all attracted, nor were those provisions capable of being acted upon. In these circumstances, therefore, the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 55 (2) of the Wakf Act would not bar the maintainability of the present suit.” 23. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in T.M. Muhammed Sahib and another vs. Arakkal Mohammed Ibrahim, AIR 2007 (NOC) 1104 (Kerala) has held that the wordings used in section 85 of Wakf Act, “no suit shall lie”, means no fresh suit can be filed and will not affect pending suits, particularly, when there is no provision in the Act for transferring existing pending suits to the Tribunal. 24. In view of the law discussed hereinabove, the civil court had the jurisdiction to decide the matter which was filed before the constitution of the Tribunal. The matter cannot be transferred to the Tribunal as prayed for by Mr. B.S. Attri. Substantial Question of Law No. 3: 25. Since both the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, they are taken up together for determination to avoid repetition of discussions of evidence. 26. PW-3 Sahib Husain has deposed that the defendant was tenant of the Wakf Board since 1983 at monthly rent of ` 35/-. The copy of allotment order is Ex.PW-3/B. Defendant in the month of August, 2000 has constructed a three storyed pucca house on the land without the permission of the Wakf Board. 26. PW-3 Sahib Husain has deposed that the defendant was tenant of the Wakf Board since 1983 at monthly rent of ` 35/-. The copy of allotment order is Ex.PW-3/B. Defendant in the month of August, 2000 has constructed a three storyed pucca house on the land without the permission of the Wakf Board. No ‘NOC’ was obtained nor the map was got sanctioned from the Municipal Corporation. The matter was reported to the police vide Ex.PW-3/D. The map of the allotted spot is Ex.PW-3/E. 27. Plaintiff has also examined PW-1 Mohd. Mobin, PW-2 Mobin Malik, PW-4 Kutubdin and PW-5 Vijay Kumar. According to them, defendant in the month of August, 2000 after demolishing kucha structure has raised two storeyed pucca building and put roof on the third storey. 28. Defendant has appeared as DW-1. According to him, he was tenant of the Wakf Board since 1983. In the year, 1988, due to land slide, his house was damaged. He constructed house with the help of Government and the electricity meter has been installed in the year 1984. DW-2 Shiv Kumar and DW-3 Rajinder have supported the case of the defendant. According to them, defendant has constructed the house 13-14 years back. 30. A three storeyed house was standing on the disputed land and it was not stated by any of the plaintiff’s witness that defendant was raising any further construction. In view of this, both the courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the relief of injunction could not be granted to the plaintiff. 31. As far as the construction of house without the permission of the Municipal Corporation or Town and Country Planning Department is concerned, the Municipal Corporation, Shimla or the Town and Country Planning Department could initiate the action for demolition of the construction under the relevant Act or Bye-Laws. Plaintiff could not seek relief of mandatory injunction on the ground that the defendant has not got the approval of the building plan from the competent authority. Plaintiff’s case before both the courts below was that the defendant has not got the lease regularized before making construction and he has not sought permission from the plaintiff-Board before initiating construction. Defendant was granted a lease in respect of the disputed plot Ex. Plaintiff’s case before both the courts below was that the defendant has not got the lease regularized before making construction and he has not sought permission from the plaintiff-Board before initiating construction. Defendant was granted a lease in respect of the disputed plot Ex. PW-3/B. There is no stipulation that the lease was to be regularized and the defendant was required to obtain ‘no objection certificate’ from the plaintiff Board. Accordingly, both the courts below have correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence. 32. All the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 33. In view of observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in the Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.