JUDGMENT : M. C. Garg, J.:- This writ appeal has been filed with application for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal which is barred by 1128 days. To support the original application, fresh application for condonation of delay has been filed as LA. No. 4886/12. It is on this application, arguments were heard. 2. In this application, the ground which has been taken to explain the delay are as follows : (i) That on 28-2-2008, a letter has been sent by the Govt. Advocate, Indore to the SDO Neemuch informing the judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 9006/2003 on 13-2-2008 and thereafter in the matter an opinion of the Govt. Advocate, District Court Parisar, Neemuch dated 27-5-2009 was sent to the Collector, Neemuch stating the grounds for filing the writ appeal in the matter. Thereafter, the Collector District Neemuch had written a letter dated 8-6-2009 to the Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Bhopal for getting permission to file writ appeal stating the grounds of appeal. Thereafter, the Sub Divisional Officer, Sub-Division Neemuch also wrote a letter dated 12-6-2009 to the Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Bhopal for getting permission to file writ appeal in the matter. (This clearly shows that for more than a year, matter remained pending with the Government Advocate for giving opinion) (ii) Thereafter, a letter dated 17-7-2009 of Under Secretary was received in the Office of Collector District Neemuch which was addressed to the Collector stating that for getting permission to file writ appeal it is necessary that letter for getting permission should be sent through appropriate/ proper Govt. Revenue Department then permission will be granted. After receiving this letter the Collector District Neemuch had written a letter dated 29-7-2009 bearing Number 947/2009 Neemuch to the Secretary, State of M.P., Revenue Department, Maritralaya, Vallabh Bhawan, Bhopal for obtaining permission from the Law Department and again vide reminder letter No. 1275/2009 Neemuch dated 24-10-2009 for obtaining permission from the Law Department. (iii) Thereafter, the Collector, Neemuch after receiving the permission from the Law Department wrote a letter No. 1565/2009 dated 22-12-2009 along with permission letter dated 27-11-2009 of Law Department to the OLC (SDO) Revenue, Neemuch for taking necessary steps to file writ appeal in the matter. 3. (iii) Thereafter, the Collector, Neemuch after receiving the permission from the Law Department wrote a letter No. 1565/2009 dated 22-12-2009 along with permission letter dated 27-11-2009 of Law Department to the OLC (SDO) Revenue, Neemuch for taking necessary steps to file writ appeal in the matter. 3. The appellants also made the averments that the officials responsible with the file of the present case did not look into the matter or rather with ulterior motive did not take any action in the matter. They did not even inform the higher officials regarding the orders passed by the Hon'ble High Court in the Writ Petition. Thereafter, Contempt Petition No. 427/2009 was filed and same was decided vide order dated 10-11-2010 and after the decision in contempt petition the matter was traced, then for the first time it came to be known that Law Department vide its memo dated 27-11-2009 has granted permission to file writ appeal in the matter. (This shows that even though an opinion for filing of the appeal was granted by the Law Department somewhere in November, 2009, second exercise has been done for obtaining permission from the Law Department which clearly shows that there is utter negligence on the part of the department.) 4. List of dates on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant seeking condonation of delay shows that after 28th of February, 2008, legal opinion was received on 27th of May, 2009 i.e. after more than one year, thereafter, even though letter was written by the Collector, District-Neemuch to the Secretary on 8th of June, 2009 for the permission to file an appeal, permission was granted on 27th of November, 2009 i.e. after five months. It is also surprising that despite receiving notice of contempt in the year 2009 of which notices were issued to the concerned officials and an order was passed by this Court in the contempt petition on 10th of November, 2010, appeal has been filed on 2nd of May, 2011, which again reflects on the lethargy and utter negligence on the part of the government machinery. 5. 5. The appellants also submitted that after filing the writ appeal, the Collector, Neemuch immediately issued various show cause notices dated 2-4-2011, 8-4-2011, 29-4-2011 to the QIC and the concerning Dealing Clerk by name Shri Dilip Kumar Jangde, (2) Shri Kailash Chandra Upadhyaya (3) Shri Jamna Das Bairagi (4) Shri Vijay Kumar Jain (5) Shri Ajay Shukla (6) Shri Narendra Gangwal and QIC of the case Shri. N. S. Rajawat for explaining delay caused in filing the writ appeal as to why appeal could not be traced in time and presented before the Court. It is further submitted that against these persons, enquiry was initiated and still is going on. When the matter came to the knowledge of Shri Radheshyam Sharma, SDO (Revenue) OIC he immediately took necessary steps and collected the record of the case for filing the writ appeal. 6. It is also pertinent to mention here that at the time of filing of Writ Petition bearing No. 9006/2003 the show cause notices have also been issued against the then OIC of the Case (1) Shri L. P. Borasi, (2) Shri Virendra Singh Rawat (3) Shri Dipak Saxena for concealing the actual facts of judgment dated 1st October, 2002 passed in S.A. No. 401/2000. It is further submitted for this negligence and for concealing the actual facts of the case and the delay caused in the filing of this writ appeal, the enquiry was initiated against these persons and is still going on. It is also surprising that issuance of show cause started in April, 2011 which again shows the state of affairs of the Government. [Nothing has been done so far on any of the show cause notices. It is only stated that the inquiries are pending. Thus, it is apparent that no action has been taken against anyone responsible for the delay.] 7. Application though has been supported with an affidavit, but the averments made in the affidavit are similar to what has been stated in the application. It may be observed here that nothing has been brought on record as to whether any final order has been passed against any defaulting officer against whom show cause notice has been issued. It is apparent that despite initiation of action against the officials in the year 2003, even after nine years, nothing material has been done. 8. It may be observed here that nothing has been brought on record as to whether any final order has been passed against any defaulting officer against whom show cause notice has been issued. It is apparent that despite initiation of action against the officials in the year 2003, even after nine years, nothing material has been done. 8. A reply has been filed to the aforesaid application by the respondents who have submitted that the story to condone the delay is concocted story to cover total lethargy and total negligence on the part of each of the appellant. It has been submitted that the averments made by the appellant for condoning the delay are of without any merit. Lists of dates have been filed by the respondent to explain that how the delay has taken place on the part of appellant. 13-2-2008 W.P. No. 9006/2003 State of M. P. and three others vs. Virendra Shankar decided by this Hon'ble Court. This Hon'ble Court while affirming the order dated 26-11-2002 of Board of Revenues set aside the earlier order passed by subordinate revenue authorities. Proceeding before appellant No. 3 Case No. A 74/08-09 29-1-2009 Respondent submitted an application before Tehsildar, Neemuch with Xerox copies of order passed in W.P. No. 9006/2003 and other relevant documents with a request to record his name on the disputed land illegally removed from revenue records (Xerox copy of application and affidavit were submitted with earlier reply). 29-1-2009 Appellant No. 3 on the above application registered a case and directed publication. 17-2-2009 Respondent in person filed documents. Appellant No. 3 directed to seek instruction from appellant No. 1 in view of the order passed on 13-2-2008 by Hon'ble High Court as also invited objection by an advertisement. 17-3-2009 No one objected in response to advertisement again guidance sought by appellant No. 3 from appellant No. 1. 24-3-2009 Instructions not received from appellant No. 1 Issue reminder. 31-3-2009 Case adjourned. 24-4-2009 Case adjourned. 18-5-2009 On respondents application, opinion of Govt. Advocate sought. 12-6-2009 On the opinion of Govt. Advocate it was decided to file writ appeal in view of letter dated 08-6-2009 written by appellant No. 3 to Govt. of M. P. Xerox copies of certified copy of proceeding of case No. A-74/08-09 have been submitted with the earlier reply. 24-4-2009 Case adjourned. 18-5-2009 On respondents application, opinion of Govt. Advocate sought. 12-6-2009 On the opinion of Govt. Advocate it was decided to file writ appeal in view of letter dated 08-6-2009 written by appellant No. 3 to Govt. of M. P. Xerox copies of certified copy of proceeding of case No. A-74/08-09 have been submitted with the earlier reply. First Contempt Petition No. 427/2009 10-11-2010 Direction to appellant No. 1 to look into the matter and needful be done within 8 weeks. It was made clear by the Hon'ble Court that if for the same relief petitioners are required to approach this Court then the same shall be taken seriously. (Xerox copy of certified copy with earlier reply). Second Contempt Petition No. 417/2011 18-5-2011 Direction to comply with the order passed in W.P. No. 9006/2003 within eight weeks positively. (Xerox copy of certified copy submitted with earlier reply). 9. The respondents also submitted that for enforcing the order, contempt petition was filed on 10th November, 2010. Not only that, second contempt petition being Contempt Petition No. 417/2011 was also filed on 18th of May, 2011. It is also submitted that there had been constant correspondence between the appellant and the relevant government officers. A letter was written by Tehsildar. Some details of the correspondence between Tehsildar Collector and SDO and Nayab Tehsildar has been detailed as under:- Correspondence between appellants inter se 2-2-2009 Letter by Tehsildar appellant No. 4 to appellant No. 1 Collector, Neemuch 5-5-2009 Letter by Collector appellant No. 1 to Tehsildar appellant No. 4. 8-5-2009 Letter by SDO appellant No. 3 to Collector appellant No. 1. 12-5-2009 Letter by Naib Tehsildar to Collector appellant No. 1. 8-6-2009 Letter by appellant No. 1 to Secretary, Law and Legislative Deptt. (Xerox Copies of certified copies are submitted). 23-3-2011 Caveat filed by respondent before the Hon'ble Court. 10. It is thus submitted that even though the appellants were aware of the total proceedings and the order passed by the learned single Judge and were also aware of the contempt proceedings which were taken, they still did not file any writ appeal within time. This shows that the appellants were having callous approach even though they were disobeying the order dated 13-2-2008 of the writ Court as is apparent from the proceedings initiated by the Tehsildar, Neemuch and precipitated by other appellants. This shows that the appellants were having callous approach even though they were disobeying the order dated 13-2-2008 of the writ Court as is apparent from the proceedings initiated by the Tehsildar, Neemuch and precipitated by other appellants. It is submitted that the appellants have deliberately disobeyed the order passed by this Court in Contempt Petition and delay is of more than three years which does not call for any indulgence of this Court as the appellants did not deserve any sympathy from this Court. The delay is not bonafide in the facts of the case. The affidavit filed is also not specific and do not explain inordinate delay in filing the writ appeal, hence it is prayed that the application be dismissed. 11. We have heard the submissions from both the sides and also considered the facts of this case. It would be appropriate to take note of the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Writ petition was filed against the order dated 26th November, 2012 passed by the Board of Revenue, in Revision No. 1411/2000. By this order, revision filed by the respondent was allowed and in consequence thereof, order passed by the authority was set aside. Some relevant facts are : (i) One Laxman Prasad was allotted 0.281 hectares of land on patta basis by Naib Tehsildar Neemuch vide order dated 31st July, 1991. The possession of the land in question was handed over to the pattedar under the provision of M. P. Gramoki Dakhalrahit Bhumi (Vishesh Upabandh) Adhiniyam, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as 'Adhiniyam'). (ii) After taking over the land, he made the land cultivable by spending a huge amount thereupon. (iii) An application was moved by Tehsildar, Neemuch before the Sub-Divisinal Officer, Neemuch seeking review of the order dated 31st July, 1991, but without Issuing any notice of the said application to the pattedar, vide order dated 7th December, 1994, Sub-Divisional Officer granted the requisite permission to Tehsildar, Neemuch to review the order dated 31st July, 1991. On this, Tehsildar passed the order dated 16th of May, 1995 whereby the patta originally granted in favour of Laxman Prasad on 31st July, 1991 was cancelled on the ground that the said patta had been granted in violation of the provisions of the Adhiniyam. On this, Tehsildar passed the order dated 16th of May, 1995 whereby the patta originally granted in favour of Laxman Prasad on 31st July, 1991 was cancelled on the ground that the said patta had been granted in violation of the provisions of the Adhiniyam. The aforesaid order was challenged by the Pattedar by filing an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, but the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 14th July, 1995. (iv) Second appeal filed by the pattedar also met with the same fate, when it was dismissed vide order dated 19th of June, 2000. (v) After the pattedar died, a revision petition was filed before the Board of Revenue by his legal representatives. Board of Revenue on consideration of the matter allowed the revision petition vide order dated 26th of November, 2002 and consequently, set aside of the order passed by the authority. 12. It will be appropriate to take note of the following observations made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment which reflects upon the conduct of the petitioner and also goes to show that there was no hearing given to the writ petitioner before SDO and that authority which passed the impugned order had no right to do so. "A perusal of the impugned order AnnexureP/1 passed by the Board of Revenue (para 6 thereof) depicts that the Board of Revenue has noticed that at the time of grant of lease (patta), the pattedar Laxman Prasad, who was aged 95 years, did not know that Naib Tehsildar was not the competent authority to grant patta, but it was the Tehsildar. It has also been noticed that the land in question had been made cultivable by the pattedar and after expiry of few years the patta in question could not cancelled. Another ground noticed by the Board of Revenue is that there was no power of review available under the Adhiniyam and the order passed by the authorities could only be appealed against. On a specific querry put by the Court to the learned Government Counsel, it has not been disputed by Shri Gaiankush that there is no power of review in the Adhiniyam. 13. It was in these circumstances, the order passed by the Board of Revenue was upheld by the learned Single Judge of this Court. On a specific querry put by the Court to the learned Government Counsel, it has not been disputed by Shri Gaiankush that there is no power of review in the Adhiniyam. 13. It was in these circumstances, the order passed by the Board of Revenue was upheld by the learned Single Judge of this Court. One of the observations which is relevant in this case is that Annexure-P/3 had been passed by the SDO behind the back of pattedar without affording any opportunity of hearing given to him. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in this case, a suit was filed by pattedar with respect to the aforesaid land seeking declaration, but the said suit was dismissed, even an appeal filed by him was also dismissed. 14. Despite that, the appellants have neither filed any suit for recovery of the land. They have also not taken any stand before either of the authority i.e. Tehsildar or the Board of Revenue to grant any opportunity of hearing to the legal heirs of pattedar, even though it is conceded by the learned counsel that the order cancelling the allotment of the pattedar was passed on the back of the pattedar. Neither at any stage prior to coming to Board of Revenue nor before the Board of Revenue, the appellant took a stand that they would give an opportunity of hearing to pattedar/representatives of pattedar. Such course has not even been sought before us to seek condonation of delay and to support their application. The appellants have relied upon the following judgments. State of Bihar and another vs. Abhay Chand Bothra, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 292 ; Special Tehsildar Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma reported in (7995) 10 SCC 634; State of Karnataka vs. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead by LRs and others, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 192 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others, reported in AJR 1987 SC 1353; State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and others, reported AIR 1996 SC 1623 ; Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, reported in 2072(4) MPLJ (S.C.) 1 = (2012) 5 SCC 157 15. Katiji and others, reported in AJR 1987 SC 1353; State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and others, reported AIR 1996 SC 1623 ; Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, reported in 2072(4) MPLJ (S.C.) 1 = (2012) 5 SCC 157 15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent, while questioning the right of condonation of delay, has supported the order on merit, but even on the point of condonation, has submitted that the lethargy which has been shown on the part of the appellant shows that they have not been able to explain any sufficient cause for the purpose of seeking indulgence of this Court for condoning delay in filing of the appeal. The judgment cited on behalf of the respondents are produced hereunder : Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, reported in 2072(4) MPLJ (S.C.) 1 = (2012) 5 SCC 157 ; Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another, reported in (2072) 3 SCC 563; Oriental Aroma Chemical Industriesd Limited vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, reported in 2010(3) MPLJ (S.C.) 506 = (2010) 5 SCC 459 ; 16. We have gone through the judgments cited by the parties. 17. In the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and others (supra), it has been observed by the Apex Court that: "It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State -are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on the-buck ethos, delay on the pan of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay." 18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied emphatically on the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when an application is filed by the State, it must be considered that State is an impersonal machinery working through his officers or servants. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied emphatically on the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when an application is filed by the State, it must be considered that State is an impersonal machinery working through his officers or servants. In that case, considering that the delay was of only 109 days, the delay was condoned. 19. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others (supra), considering that there was a delay of only four days, the delay was condoned. However, in the matter the following principles were led down for interpreting words 'sufficient cause' as finds place in section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has been observed that: "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause " employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of O. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay. Every second's delay ? As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay. Every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State', which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause ". In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause ". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. 20. The next judgment relied upon is the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and another vs. Abhay Chand Bothra (supra). In the said case, taking into consideration the steps taken by the State including lodging of FIR against guilty officials, after two years, the delay in filing SLP was condoned. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder : 4. On 14th December, 1998, this Court, while issuing notice for final disposal of the SLP and directing an ad-interim stay of the impugned order, condoned the delay in filing of the SLP in view of "special facts and circumstances and, in particular, the statements made in the affidavit filed before the High Court." Subsequently, on 4th January, 2000, this Court made the following order :- The Letters Patent Appeal has been dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court as barred by time. We have perused the application filed in the High Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. It appears that the departmental authorities were deliberately trying to work against the interest of the Revenue. Mr. B. B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the State submits that against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur who had committed other irregularities also, proceedings were instituted. He refers to Page E of the list of dates and events in that behalf. It appears that the departmental authorities were deliberately trying to work against the interest of the Revenue. Mr. B. B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the State submits that against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur who had committed other irregularities also, proceedings were instituted. He refers to Page E of the list of dates and events in that behalf. He, however, is unable to tell us as to the nature of the proceedings or action, if any, has been taken against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur. Mr. B. B. Singh seeks six weeks' time to furnish the information. We have pointed to Mr. Singh that if no action has been taken against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur till date, an adverse inference may have to be drawn against the State. We are informed by Mr. B. B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the State that action has since been initiated against, the concerned official and even a First Information Report has been filed and investigation is in progress. 21. Another judgment relied upon by the appellants is the judgment delivered by the two Judges bench of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Karnataka vs. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead by LRs) and others (supra). In this case, while dealing with the delay in appeal filed by the State and considering the word 'sufficient cause', the Apex Court condoned the delay by imposing heavy costs of Rs. 10 lakhs on the exchequer. Some paragraphs relevant arising out of the aforesaid judgment are para Nos. 19 to 23. These paragraphs are reproduced hereunder: "On perusal of the explanation offered it is clear that the officials who were dealing with the matter have either deliberately or without understanding the implications dealt with the matter in a very casual and lethargic manner. It is a matter of concern that in very serious matters action is not taken as required under law and the appeals/petitions are filed after long lapse of time. It is a common grievance that it is so done to protect unscrupulous litigants at the cost of public interest or public exchequer. This stand is more noticeable where vast tracts of lands or large sums of revenue are involved. Even though the Courts are liberal in dealing with the belated presentation of appeals/applications, yet there is a limit upto which such liberal attitude can be extended. This stand is more noticeable where vast tracts of lands or large sums of revenue are involved. Even though the Courts are liberal in dealing with the belated presentation of appeals/applications, yet there is a limit upto which such liberal attitude can be extended. Many matters concerning the State Government and the Central Government are delayed either by the nature of bureaucratic process or by deliberate manipulation of the same by taking advantage of loopholes in the conduct of litigation. Several instances have come to the notice of this Court where as noted above appeals have been filed where the revenue involved runs to several crores of rupees. It is true that occasionally delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances. The case at hand is a classic example where the circumstances are the same. More than 4000 acres of land are involved out of which, according to the State, nearly 3500 acres constitute forest land. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skilful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. The expression 'sufficient cause' as appearing in section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the 'Limitation Act') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major etc. vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 . Para 8 of the judgment reads as follows : The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. (1899) 2 Ch. 629 at p. 673 observed, though in a different context: "Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them ". Keeping in view the importance of questions of law which are involved we are inclined to condone the delay subject to payment of exemplary costs which we fix at rupees ten lakhs to be paid within a period of 8 weeks to the respondents. The delay is condoned subject to the payment of the aforesaid amount as costs. After making the payment the receipt thereof shall be filed before this Court along with an affidavit. Only after the payment is made the special leave petitions shall be listed for admission. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case." 22. After making the payment the receipt thereof shall be filed before this Court along with an affidavit. Only after the payment is made the special leave petitions shall be listed for admission. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case." 22. In that case, the land involved in question was more than 4000 acres and there was delay of 14 years. It was a case of playing a fraud relating to non-surrender of the land. Other judgments referred to above was also discussed in this case. 23. Other judgments cited by the appellants which has also been relied upon by the respondents and does not support the case of the appellant is the judgment delivered in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (supra). 24. In this judgment, all the previous judgments have been considered. Relevant observations which show the mind of the Apex Court in having discussed the various submissions made are as follows : Shri A. S. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years and 3 months delay in filing the appeals are legally unsustainable and the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the explanation given by the Corporation lacked bona fides and was wholly unsatisfactory. Learned counsel emphasized that in the absence of any denial by the Corporation that it has a battery of advocates to deal with the litigation, the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar in January, 2004 to Miscellaneous Court and, thereafter, to other Courts has no bearing on the issue of delay because the suits filed by the appellants had been decided in May, 2003 and no explanation has been given as to why applications for certified copies could not be filed for 7 years and 5 months. Shri Bhasme submitted that even if one advocate/law officer was transferred from one department/division to another, nothing prevented the Corporation from taking steps to apply for certified copies of the judgment. Shri Bhasme submitted that even if one advocate/law officer was transferred from one department/division to another, nothing prevented the Corporation from taking steps to apply for certified copies of the judgment. Shri Bhasme further submitted that the story of misplacement of papers was concocted by the Corporation and the same ought to have been rejected by the High Court because the assertion made in that regard was vague to the core and no indication was given as to when the papers were traced and by whom. In support of his argument, Shri Bhasme relied upon the judgments of this Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459 . The expression "sufficient cause" used in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points: a) The name of the person who was having custody of the record has not been disclosed. b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed. c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered and name of the person who found the same have not been disclosed. d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial Court were not filed till 23-8-2010 despite the fact that Shri Sirsikar had given intimation on 12-5-2003 about the judgments of the trial Court. e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against. 22. e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against. 22. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the cause shown by the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 25. Thus as per the aforesaid judgments, if explanation furnished by the appellants seeking condonation of delay is not proper, then the Court will be well within its right to refuse the application for condonation of delay. 26. Now coming to the judgment cited on behalf of the respondent, we find that the respondent in addition to relying upon the judgment delivered in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (supra) is also relying upon the judgment delivered in the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another. Relevant discussions which appears in this case stands incorporated in paragraphs No. 25-30 which have been reproduced hereunder: 25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA Nos. 418 and 1006 of 2007 as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. 418 and 1006 of 2007 as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied only on 8-1-2010, i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 30. In view of our conclusion on issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of the issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs. In this case also, since proper explanation was not furnished, the Court did not decree to condone the delay. 27. In the judgment delivered in case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industriesd Limited vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another (supra), paragraphs no 14 to 16 are relevant which are reproduced hereunder : 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 . 16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda vs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 , State of U. P. vs. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309 , State of Bihar vs. Ratan Lal Sahu, (1996) 10 SCC 635 , State of Nagaland vs. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 , and State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582 . 28. 28. In the light of the facts of this case and in the light of the principles which can be deduced and considering the delay which was of 1061 days in this case and explanation given by the State having not been found satisfactory, the Court refused to condone the delay. 29. Thus, the principles which have been laid down by the Apex Court right from the year 1996 are very specific and gives guidelines about exercise of discretion for the purpose of considering sufficient cause, on the basis of which, condonation of delay is sought to be condoned. 30. [Right from 1996, while there has been consistent stand that in the matter pertaining to the State where nobody is personally affected, but it is people at large affected and the machinery employed by the State is impersonal machinery, a liberal view should be taken, the Courts have clarified the position of the law by stating that the explanation furnished must be bona fide. The difference between short term delay and long term delay must be appreciated in the light of the submissions made and the circumstances brought on record in the form of explanation furnished by way of an affidavit. It should be also seen that the State was serious enough in having taken action against erring officers and in appropriate cases even heavy costs has been imposed even to the extend of Rs.10 lacs. In this case, show cause to guilty officials were allegedly issued. Soon after filing of writ petition in the year 2003, nothing has been brought on record to show this Court as to what are the consequence of such show cause issued and if any particular officials has been punished on account of negligence.] 31. Applying the aforesaid principles, when condonation of delay is sought of more than 1100 days and the explanation furnished is also not found to be sufficient and rather reflect lethargy and negligence on the part of the State as also considering the merit of this case which shows that the appellants have taken action against the respondents on their back, we find that this is not the case where indulgence should be granted in favour of the appellants. 32. 32. Even otherwise, even on merit, the appellants are not entitled to have indulgence of this Court, in as much as before Tehsildar, they have tried to take advantage on the back of the respondents. They have not cared to serve them. The authority who passed the order cancelling the Patta was admittedly not authorized to do so. Moreover even after, the suit filed by the respondents was dismissed and appeal was also dismissed, no action has been taken to seek possession of the suit property by filing a suit for possession or by granting fair opportunity of hearing to the respondents by taking his stand before the authority who proceeded ex-parte. 33. In view of the aforesaid observations, we find no merit in the application for condonation of delay and consequently, dismiss the same. Needless to say that this would also result in dismissal of this writ appeal. While doing so, we are not prohibiting the State to take appropriate action as may be available on the basis of the order passed by the Civil Court. Order accordingly.