JUDGMENT Mr. K. Kannan, J. (Oral):- The following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this second appeal:- i) Whether the defendant had discharged onus of proof on her to show that she was the lawful wedded wife of Lajpat Rai and she had inherited the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, who claimed right to the property as sisters of the deceased? ii) Whether the court below was in error in failing to appreciate an explanation given to an admission and the justification for resiling from the same? 2. The defendant, who was ordered to be ejected by the appellate Court decree, is in second appeal. The suit for ejectment was filed at the instance of plaintiffs as heirs of deceased Lajpat Rai. The defendant claimed herself to be the widow of Lajpat Rai. The plaintiffs were the sisters and they had a contention that Lajpat Rai had been married only to Parsini Devi and the defendant had joined his company even during the lifetime of the first wife and she was, therefore, not a heir at law. The plaintiffs principally relied on Ex.P2-a document to which the defendant was admittedly a party describing herself as wife of one Dev Raj and the written statement already filed by the defendant admitting her alleged marriage to Lajpat Rai as having taken place 8 years prior to the statement while admittedly Lajpat Rai’s first wife had died later on 06.09.1974, evidenced through P5. The trial Court examined the issues by raising three questions: (i) whether the defendant had been the wife of Dev Raj; (ii) whether the marriage was dissolved in order that she could be lawfully married to Lajpat Rai; and (iii) whether the first wife was alive at the time when the defendant was married to Lajpat Rai. Adverting to P2, the Court held that although the defendant had admitted to the thumb-impression found in the document, it was merely a statement relating to some accounting for income from 50% share from property that a person by name Boota Singh held and the document cannot be determinative of the marital status of the defendant to Dev Raj. Adverting to P2, the Court held that although the defendant had admitted to the thumb-impression found in the document, it was merely a statement relating to some accounting for income from 50% share from property that a person by name Boota Singh held and the document cannot be determinative of the marital status of the defendant to Dev Raj. Raising question of whether the defendant had been shown to have been married to Lajpat Rai even during the lifetime of the first wife, the Court reasoned that the most competent person Chet Ram as PW2, who was the brother of Parsini Devi, the 1st wife of Lajpat Rai was not prepared to state that the defendant was married even during the time when his sister was alive. On the other hand, he had merely denied knowledge as to when she was married to Lajpat Rai. The appellate Court reversed the finding and held that the defendant’s admissions were clearly damning her defence and her own statement that she had been married 8 years earlier, cannot simply be discarded to allow for a plea brought belatedly through an amendment to the written statement to contend that she had been married some time in May, 1975 i.e. after the death of the 1st wife in 1974. To him, the admission was the most key element to find that the defendant was not a lawful wedded wife of Lajpat Rai to claim as an heir to him and exclude the sisters, who were otherwise the heirs of Lajpat Rai. 3. The status of the defendant as a wife of Lajpat Rai was an issue that placed the onus of proof only on the defendant. The plaintiffs’ status as sisters is not denied nor is the fact that Lajpat Rai had a wife by name Parsini Devi, who died on 06.09.1974, denied in Court. While a long cohabitation will give rise to a presumption of marriage, a person, who is shown to have been already married to yet another person and that too lawfully, there is no presumption that can be raised that the second wife was taken after the death of the first wife. It is essentially a matter of proof of a fact which a person asserting to such status must establish. It is essentially a matter of proof of a fact which a person asserting to such status must establish. In this case, therefore, when the defendant was contending that she was the wife, who was married to Lajpat Rai after the death of his wife, she ought to have brought proof of her marriage. In this case, witnesses were examined on the plaintiff’s side, one of whom a resident of the village who stated that he had seen the defendant in the house of Lajpat Rai even during the lifetime of the first wife. There was simply no attempt to prove the marriage of the defendant by any independent witness, who could have attended the marriage and who had known that Lajpat Rai took the defendant as his wife through a lawful form of marriage after the lifetime of his first wife. The trial Court was looking for proof from the plaintiff and how plaintiff’s witness PW2 was not in a position to deny whether the defendant was married to Lajpat Rai. This manner of looking for proof was clearly wrong and correctly set aside by the appellate Court. 4. There is no difficulty in accepting as a proposition of law drawn from Section 23 of the Evidence Act that admissions are relevant to what they state but are never conclusive. The manner of explaining an admission must be convincing to relieve the party from the effect of such admission. In this case, the defendant had to explain two important pieces of evidence attributed against her interest. One was Ex.P2 which was a document to which she was a party that described her as a wife of Dev Raj. The trial Court was discarding it because a right given up by her to secure an accounting for 50% of the right which 3rd party had in respect of the property held along with Lajpat Rai could not determine the marital status. The trial Court omitted to notice that the document contained recitals which were relevant at that particular time. A third party having 50% share in a property which Lajpat Rai owned and the manner of how the income from the said property as regards the share of third party was to be accounted for, was required to be settled only with a person, who had in some way a right to demand such an accounting. A third party having 50% share in a property which Lajpat Rai owned and the manner of how the income from the said property as regards the share of third party was to be accounted for, was required to be settled only with a person, who had in some way a right to demand such an accounting. The third party was actually obtaining a document from a person, who could have created some problem and, therefore, it was necessary to state how the defendant could stake any claim to the property which Lajpat Rai had. It was in that context that there was a reference to the fact that she had been married to a person by name Dev Raj, but she broke up with him about 16 years earlier and that she later living with Lajpat Rai. The statement relating to the matrimonial status became relevant in that case and if it were not so, a person, who was married to Lajpat Rai, had no reason to state that she had been already married to one Dev Raj. The learned counsel wants to slight the inference possible from the document by stating that she was illiterate and she did not know the consequences of the recitals. 5. India has an unsavory reputation of having among the higher percentage of illiteracy in the world. That illiterate people could be untruthful people would be a crass generalization that will give no pride to the land of Mahatma Gandhi. I cannot accept a plea that since she was illiterate, she was unmindful of a wrong description of her matrimonial status as a wife of yet another man when the lawful husband according to him was Lajpat Rai. That was surely an occasion for the defendant to explain why there was a reference to a name Dev Raj. She made no attempt to explain the same but went to the other extreme of a denial that she was at any time ever married to Dev Raj. An explanation which ought to have been come at an appropriate time that could include even a plea of illiteracy for her wrong statement did not come. Anyone among the scribe or the witness to P2 must have been examined only by the defendant to show under what circumstances such a wrong recital to her matrimonial status was given. An explanation which ought to have been come at an appropriate time that could include even a plea of illiteracy for her wrong statement did not come. Anyone among the scribe or the witness to P2 must have been examined only by the defendant to show under what circumstances such a wrong recital to her matrimonial status was given. In my view, the recital in P2 derives the first nail to her own coffin. The statement filed by the defendant contending that she was married about 8 years earlier drives the second. This cannot also be taken to be a statement of a mere illiterate person. When a status of her marriage was in question and when she could have lawfully fended off a claim for recovery of possession at the instance of sisters of the deceased owner, the person having legal counsel to defend her cannot make some statement in a cavalier fashion to be altered later by means of an amendment to the written statement giving the year of marriage as May, 1975. This amendment was brought subsequent to the amendment in the plaint where the plaintiffs were contending that Parsini Devi-the first wife had died on 06.09.1974. They were not having any new plea. On the other hand, they were trying to make a definite inference possible to a contention raised by the defendant that she had been married 8 years before by showing that the defendant’s own marriage could not be lawful by the fact that Parsini Devi had died only within a period of 8 years which the defendant was referring to. When the amendment to the statement was given, this again definitely allowed for her to give an explanation as to how that 8 years period had been stated in the original written statement. Apart from saying that she withdrew the statement made earlier, the learned counsel for the appellant does not make any other argument as to how that details contained already in the statement was wrongly given. I cannot again take the defence that she was illiterate and, therefore, she made the statement. Illiterates still take the assistance of literate lawyers to state the defences. I cannot again take the defence that she was illiterate and, therefore, she made the statement. Illiterates still take the assistance of literate lawyers to state the defences. While answering the question raised by the counsel of whether admissions could not be explained and whether the court could bar a party of lawful claim to title to the property only by admissions, I would answer that it could always be explained but there was no valid explanation in the case to the damning admissions of the defendants in this case. The onus of proof that was ultimately on the defendant that she was a lawful wedded wife, who had been married after the lifetime of the first wife was not discharged for the Court to render a finding in her favour. 6. The decision of lower appellate Court reversing the judgment and allowing for a decree for recovery of possession was perfectly justified and I find no reason to interfere with the same. The substantial questions of law raised are answered as above. 7. The second appeal is dismissed. No costs. ————————