JUDGMENT 1. The landlords are the revision petitioners. They are aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority whereby their application seeking for eviction of the respondent/tenant filed under Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act came to be rejected. 2. The petitioners filed R.C.O.P No. 899 of 1999 on the file of the XVI Small Causes Court at Chennai against the respondent herein under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, seeking for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. The case of the petitioners before the Rent Controller is that the second petitioner is carrying on the partnership business of medical equipments under the name and style of "Medifield Equipments Corporation" in the first floor of the subject matter building at No.278, Pycrafts Road, Triplicane, Chennai 5. The said premises originally belonged to one C.Thiruvengada Gupta. He died on 20.7.1994 leaving behind the petitioners as his surviving legal heirs. The first floor portion, which is in occupation of the second petitioner for running the medical equipments business, has become congested in view of employment of several persons and also by stocking of various medical equipments. Therefore, the second petitioner is in need of extra place to expand his business and to keep the stock of his medical equipments such as Operation Theatre lights, Operation Theatre Tables, Anaesthesia Machines, Orthopaedic implants, Lab equipments etc. Thus, the second petitioner bonafidely requires additional accommodation of the entire ground floor wherein the respondent is occupying as the tenant. 3. It is their further case that the respondent is their tenant in the ground floor at Door No.278, Pycrofts Road, Triplicane, Chennai and is carrying on textile business under the name and style of Sundaram Silks. The respondent is possessing several other buildings of his own and also carrying on textile business in the same area and therefore he can conveniently amalgamate, accommodate and shift his business within the same area. It is also specifically stated by the petitioners that they do not own any other building within the city and their requirement is a bonafide one. They also pleaded that additional accommodation, if granted, would be advantageous to the landlord for developing his business and no hardship would be caused to the tenant. 4. The said application was resisted by the respondent herein. They also pleaded that additional accommodation, if granted, would be advantageous to the landlord for developing his business and no hardship would be caused to the tenant. 4. The said application was resisted by the respondent herein. It is stated by him that he is carrying on business mainly on rented buildings only. He borrowed huge sum from Bank and stocked the goods in the premises. He had employed more than 15 people in the shop. He had invested huge sum on interior decoration, stocks and labourers. It is only out of vindictiveness, the petitioners are seeking eviction. The petitioners do not need the premises bonafidely. It is only with an intention to harm and hamper the development of the good business of the respondent, the petitioners have come forward with the eviction petition. 5. The learned Rent Controller after considering the facts and circumstances, pleadings and evidences of both parties, allowed the eviction petition by order dated 27.3.2008. The learned Rent Controller found that the requirement is bonafide and the relative hardship that would be caused to the tenant is lesser than the advantages that would be caused to the landlords. 6. Aggrieved against the order of eviction, the respondent/tenant filed an appeal in R.C.A.No. 393 of 2008 on the file of the Small Causes Court, VII (Appellate Authority), Chennai. The learned Appellate Authority found that the claim of the landlords seeking for additional accommodation is bonafide. However, while considering the question of relative hardship, the learned appellate authority found that the hardship that would be caused to the tenant is on the higher side than the advantages that would accrue to the landlord. Therefore, the appellate authority rejected the eviction petition and thereby allowed the appeal filed by the tenant, by his judgment dated 11.12.2009. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the landlords. 7. Heard Mr. P.B. Ramanujam learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. L. Chandrakumar, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the materials placed before this court. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Appellate Authority is not justified in rejecting the application for eviction, even though he concurred with the finding of the Rent Controller on the bonafide. In short, he justified the order of the Rent Controller. He also placed reliance on the following decisions:- 1. N.Andal and others Vs. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Appellate Authority is not justified in rejecting the application for eviction, even though he concurred with the finding of the Rent Controller on the bonafide. In short, he justified the order of the Rent Controller. He also placed reliance on the following decisions:- 1. N.Andal and others Vs. M.Salim and another ( 2000 (1) L.W. 608 ) 2. A.P. Abdul Rasheed v. Hotel K.K. Residency, (2010) 4 LW 871 3. Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through Lrs and Others ( 2008 (9) SCC 1 ) 9. Per contra, Mr. L. Chandrakumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the relative hardship is very much higher on the side of the tenant and the landlords have miserably failed to prove that the tenant owns any other building. He further submitted that all other buildings where the tenant is doing business are rented premises. He supported the order of the Apellate Authority with all force. 10. I have given careful consideration to their respective submissions. 11. The petitioners are seeking eviction of the respondent on the ground of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. It is the case of the petitioners that the second petitioner is doing a partnership business of medical equipments under the name and style of "Medifield Equipments Corporation" at the first floor of the subject matter building and premises. The respondent is the tenant and doing textile business under the name and style of "Sundaram Silks" in the ground floor of the said premises. 12. The second petitioner found that the first floor, which is in his occupation, is congested and hence in order to keep his stock of medical equipments, he requires additional accommodation of the entire ground floor which is in occupation of the respondent. Such requirement of additional accommodation by the petitioners under Section 10(3)(c) of the said Act was concurrently found as bonafide by the learned Rent Controller as well as the learned Appellate Authority. Admittedly, the respondent/tenant has not challenged the said finding before this court in a manner known to law. 13. Therefore, insofar as the question of bonafide is concerned as both the Courts below have concurrently found in favour of the petitioners/landlords, the same has become final, conclusive and binding on the parties. 14. Admittedly, the respondent/tenant has not challenged the said finding before this court in a manner known to law. 13. Therefore, insofar as the question of bonafide is concerned as both the Courts below have concurrently found in favour of the petitioners/landlords, the same has become final, conclusive and binding on the parties. 14. Thus, it leads me to consider the question of relative hardship next. The learned Rent Controller, after considering various facts and circumstances as well as the evidence of P.W.1 (2nd petitioner) and the evidence of R.W.1 (the respondent/ tenant), found that the hardship that would be caused to the tenant will be much lesser than the advantages that would accrue to the landlords, viz., the petitioners herein. The learned Rent Controller, for arriving at such conclusion has taken note of Ex.P.18 showing respondent as the proprietor of two other businesses viz., 'Sundaram Stores' and 'Sundaram Silks' etc., The Rent Controller has also taken note of the admission made by respondent in his cross examination that he is running a wine shop and also a guest house in the city of Chennai in a premises owned by him and that he is running various textile shops in the city of Chennai and one of his textile shop viz., Sundaram Stores and the Wine shop are situated within 2 to 6 shops from the petition building. The learned Rent Controller further noted that the respondent is in occupation of another two shops at Door No. 257. It is also noted by the Rent Controller that the respondent is owning premises at Door No. 44 at Oil Monger Street, wherein he is running the above said wine shop and guest house. 15. It is also admitted by the respondent in his cross examination that the premises at Door No.44, Oil Monger Street, where he is running a guest house, is comparatively larger in size than the petition premises. He also admitted that he had let out a portion in the ground floor of Door No. 44 at Oilmonger Street to a third party for running a fast food shop and another portion of the same building to another tenant for running a beetalnut shop. He also admitted that he had let out a portion in the ground floor of Door No. 44 at Oilmonger Street to a third party for running a fast food shop and another portion of the same building to another tenant for running a beetalnut shop. Considering all these admissions made by the respondent as R.W.1 in his cross examination, the learned Rent Controller found that the hardship that would be caused to the tenant will be lesser than the advantages that would accrue to the landlords. 16. Per contra, the learned Appellate Authority, while upholding the claim of bonafide in favour of the landlords, however found that hardship caused to the tenant would be on the higher side than the advantages that would accrue to the landlords. For arriving at such a conclusion, the learned Appellate Authority reasoned out as follows:- i. The second petitioner started the medical equipment business in the first floor on 5.12.1985 whereas the respondent occupied the ground floor premises as tenant much later i.e., in the year 1994. ii. The respondent had invested a sum of Rs. Ten lakhs towards interior decoration in the premises apart from having a stock of goods valued to the tune of Rupees Twenty Five lakhs. Even though the respondent did not produce any documentary proof towards such expenses, as the petitioners had not denied the same, the same is to be accepted. iii. The respondent is carrying on other business in other rented buildings only and he is also claiming so. The petitioners have to prove that the other buildings are owned by the respondent. There are no evidence let in by the petitioners to show that the respondent is running other business in the buildings of his own. Based on those reasonings, the learned appellate authority found that the relative hardship is very much higher on the side of the tenant. 17. I have given careful consideration to the orders passed by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in detail as well as the evidence let in by both the parties. On such consideration of all the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the learned Appellate Authority is not correct in holding that the relative hardship is very much higher on the side of the tenant than that of the advantages that would accrue to the landlord. 18. On such consideration of all the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the learned Appellate Authority is not correct in holding that the relative hardship is very much higher on the side of the tenant than that of the advantages that would accrue to the landlord. 18. The first reasoning of the learned Appellate Authority with regard to the subsequent commencement of the tenancy after starting of the business by the second petitioner in the first floor, is not justifiable. No doubt, the tenancy commenced in the year 1994 but that does not mean that the second petitioner's business cannot expand thereafter or he may not require the petition premises, as additional accommodation in pursuant to the expansion of the said business. Therefore, in my considered view, commencement of tenancy either prior or after the commencement of business of landlord has got no relevance for considering the relative hardship. 19. While coming to the next reasoning viz., the investment made by the tenant towards interior decoration and stocking of goods is concerned, I am of the view that it can not be a criteria to weigh the relative hardship, especially while considering the scope of Section 10(3)(c). If that could be the material consideration for deciding the relative hardship, each and every tenant who made improvements or investments in decorating the premises will have to certainly succeed in their attempt to defeat the eviction application under Section 10(3)(c). In fact, every tenant who is ordered to be evicted would certainly face certain amount of hardship, whether such eviction was made on the ground of additional accommodation or on other grounds. All such hardships are not to be treated alike as what is contemplated specifically under Section 10(3)(c) viz., "relative hardship". The hardship contemplated under this provision is not an "hardship" simplicitor but it has a relative effect on it. The relative effect of such hardship is to be gathered and considered not from the point of view of tenant alone but from the point of view of landlord also. Therefore, if the bonafide of the landlord is established and found proved, the materials to be considered for relative hardships are not what already suffered but what that would be put to sufferance, if eviction is ordered or refused. 20. Therefore, if the bonafide of the landlord is established and found proved, the materials to be considered for relative hardships are not what already suffered but what that would be put to sufferance, if eviction is ordered or refused. 20. In this case, it is found by the learned Appellate Authority that no documentary proof in support of the expenditure made by the tenant for interior decoration and stocking of goods were produced. However, he found that the same as proved as there was no denial by the petitioner. I am unable to agree with the said view. The person who claims to have made certain expenditure has to necessarily prove the same with material evidence. Even assuming that the respondent had proved the same, as I have already held that such expenditure cannot be a reason for considering the relative hardship, I am rejecting the said contention of the tenant. Hence, the finding of the learned Appellate Authority in this respect is unsustainable. 21. While considering the availability of alternative accommodation is concerned, the learned Appellate Authority found that there was no evidence produced by the petitioners to show that the tenant is owning other buildings and doing the business therein. The said observation of the learned Appellate Authority goes contra to the very admission made by the tenant as R.W.1 in his cross examination. The relevant portion of the cross examination is extracted hereunder:- VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED 22. When there is a specific admission by the respondent that he is owning other premises and especially the premises at Oil Monger Street, is larger than the petition premises, I find that the balance of relative hardship should undoubtedly tilt on the side of the petitioners only. 23. No doubt, the petitioners, even though, pleaded in their petition before the learned Rent Controller that they were not owning any other premises of their own, the 2nd petitioner as P.W.1 admitted that he owns a building at No.13, Nallathambi Street, Triplicane and the same is used as a residential premises. He also admitted that the ground floor of the said premises is used as godown. Apart from these facts, nothing is elucidated from the evidence of P.W.1 to establish that the petitioners own some other building of their own. He also admitted that the ground floor of the said premises is used as godown. Apart from these facts, nothing is elucidated from the evidence of P.W.1 to establish that the petitioners own some other building of their own. Moreover, when the eviction is sought for under Section 10(3)(c) for additional accommodation, any availability of premises either in other locality or even in the next street or within the same street cannot have a bearing on such consideration of relative hardship, as what is needed is the "additional" and not "further" accommodation. The word "additional" means something extra or supplementary to what is already present or available (Concise Oxford English Dictionary). The word "supplement" means a thing added to something else to enhance or complete it. (Concise Oxford English Dictionary). Thus, the additional accommodation intended under Section 10(3)(c) has to be confined only in respect of the accommodation which is sought within the same building and premises. If such be the position, the landlord cannot be thrown out of the Court on the ground that he owns some other building or buildings either near by or away from the subject matter building and premises. Therefore, by applying this principle, I hold that the petitioners are entitled to succeed even assuming that they own some other building some where. Certainly, when seeking of additional accommodation of the ground floor was found by both the authorities as bonafide, the relative hardship is also very much in favour of the landlord only, under the facts and circumstances of the case. In fact the Appellate Authority has specifically found that huge medical equipments cannot be shifted to the first floor of the premises, if done it can be done only with huge difficulty. By observing so, the learned Appellate Authority at paragraph 22 held as follows: “22. It is the specific case of the petitioners that it is hard for the 2nd respondent to shift huge medical equipment to the I floor of the premises and therefore he is in need of the premises in occupation of the respondent. It is true that huge medical equipments cannot be shifted to I floor of the premises and if done so it can be done only with huge difficulty. It is true that huge medical equipments cannot be shifted to I floor of the premises and if done so it can be done only with huge difficulty. Therefore, the advantage that would accrue to the petitioners is that if they are given the ground floor of the premises it would be easy for them to keep the medical equipments without difficulty." (Emphasis Supplied) Having found so, the learned Appellate Authority has come to an erroneous conclusion that the hardship caused to the tenant would be on the higher side than the advantages that would accrue to the landlord. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that the tenant while filing the appeal before the Appellate Authority raised various grounds in the grounds of appeal mostly questioning the bonafide of the landlords only except in ground No.26 regarding relative hardship, which also appears to be a general statement rather than making any specific contentions. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of this Court in N. Andal and others Vs. M. Salim and another ( 2000 (1) L.W. 608 ) in which it has been held as follows:- "22. When relative hardship is considered, the most important factor to be considered is, whether an alternative building is available for the tenant to continue his business. It need not necessarily be shown that the business could be carried on in the alternative building as profitably as in the original building, because, profit depends more upon economic factors than on anything else. Eviction on the ground of bona fide own use is not disallowed even if the tenant is not getting an alternative building in the same locality, in the same place. The Court also cannot presume that if the tenant shifts to another building, he will be put to great hardship and he will not be in a position to do business profitably. The Court also cannot recognise the fact that a particular area is suitable only for a particular kind of business. Merely because in a particular street or locality a particular business alone is carried on, it does not follow that other businesses cannot survive in that area." 25. The Court also cannot recognise the fact that a particular area is suitable only for a particular kind of business. Merely because in a particular street or locality a particular business alone is carried on, it does not follow that other businesses cannot survive in that area." 25. He further relied on the decision of this Court in A.P. Abdul Rasheed v. Hotel K.K. Residency, (2010) 4 LW 871 , at page 881 in which at paragraph 31, it has been held as follows:- "31. Here it is quite clear that the Rent Controller considered the pros and cons of the matter and the appellate authority also felt that the hardship of the tenant would not outweigh the benefit that would accrue in favour of the landlord. The tenant is doing textile business and it is common knowledge that it could be shifted to any place and there would be always demand for textile goods. However, the landlord who is already having restaurant in the first floor cannot be asked to engage a different building for the purpose of expanding its restaurant business and no more elaboration in this regard is required and in my opinion the requirement of the landlord is a bona fide one as correctly pointed out by both the Courts below warranting no interference." 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through Lrs. and Others ( 2008 (9) SCC 1 ) in which at paragraph 50 it has been held as follows:- "50. Regarding comparative hardship, nothing has been stated by the tenant as to whether any attempt has been made by him to get alternative accommodation and he failed to get such accommodation. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the appellate authority was right in observing that there was no evidence to show that no shop was available to the tenant. It is quite possible, as noted by the appellate authority, that the tenant might have to pay more rent. But that would not preclude the landlords from getting possession of the suit-shop once they had proved genuine need of the property." 27. In Rasi Silks v. T.A. Venkatachalam, (2007) 3 LW 61 ) the learned single Judge of this Court considered the question of burden of proof under Section 10(3)(c) of the said Act. But that would not preclude the landlords from getting possession of the suit-shop once they had proved genuine need of the property." 27. In Rasi Silks v. T.A. Venkatachalam, (2007) 3 LW 61 ) the learned single Judge of this Court considered the question of burden of proof under Section 10(3)(c) of the said Act. After elaborately discussing various case laws, the learned Judge has observed at paragraphs 20 and 21 as follows:- "20. Initial burden lies only on the landlords to establish their advantage. With the evidence of PW-1, initial burden was discharged. Then the Tenant ought to have adduced evidence to establish their hardships. In the absence of pleadings or evidence by the Tenants, Appellate Authority has rightly observed that the Tenants have not adduced evidence on the aspect of relative hardship. 21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, PW-1 has stated the open space cannot be utilized for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In 1999 (I) MLJ 233 [Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth [deceased] and others], this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the Tenant." Thus, from the said decision, it is seen that once the landlord establishes his advantage, the initial burden of proof is discharged. Thereafter, it is only the tenant who should adduce evidence to establish his hardship. It is also held by the learned Judge that the tenant cannot dictate terms as to which portion, the landlord should choose. 28. In another decision reported in South Eastern Bookings (Regd.) v. Haji V.K.M. Kuthubudeen, (2010) 2 MWN (Civil) 474 , the learned single Judge of this Court, while considering the issue with regard to relative hardship, has held at paragraph 11 as follows:- "11. ..... 28. In another decision reported in South Eastern Bookings (Regd.) v. Haji V.K.M. Kuthubudeen, (2010) 2 MWN (Civil) 474 , the learned single Judge of this Court, while considering the issue with regard to relative hardship, has held at paragraph 11 as follows:- "11. ..... "It is no doubt true that the Court will have to decide the relative hardship when an application is filed by the Landlord seeking a portion of the building in which he is doing business and the tenant is also doing his own business." 29. A perusal of the said decision of the learned single Judge would show that once the bonafide is proved by the landlord, such bonafide needs will overwhelm the hardship of the tenant while ordering eviction. In this case, the bonafide of the landlords are concurrently held in their favour by the courts below and such finding is not at all challenged by the tenant. 30. In another decision reported in A. Dharmaraj v. Kasturi, (2011) 5 CTC 591 ) the learned single Judge of this Court considered the question of relative hardship and observed at paragraph 44 as follows:- "44. But relative hardship, as the very expression suggests is relative. The proceedings for eviction actually commenced 10 years ago exactly in August 2001. Therefore, the hardship that the Petitioner had suffered in not being able to have the Respondents vacated, has also to be considered. The fact that one has to obtain license for running a business, is of universal application. Therefore, such an argument is open to every Tenant to raise. Hence, the same cannot be accepted." Thus, from reading the above decision of the learned single Judge, it could be seen that any hardship to be faced by the tenant in searching of another place or getting licence to run the business therein cannot be a ground to consider the question of relative hardship as contemplated under Section 10(3)(c) of the said Act. Further, we cannot lose sight of the fact that this litigation between the parties are prolonging for nearly 14 years and the petitioners bonafide requirement, though concurrently found in their favour, could not be fulfilled all these years. Certainly this also is an additional hardship being faced by the landlords while seeking the additional accommodation. 31. An eviction sought on the ground of "owners occupation" can not be equated with that of "additional accommodation". Certainly this also is an additional hardship being faced by the landlords while seeking the additional accommodation. 31. An eviction sought on the ground of "owners occupation" can not be equated with that of "additional accommodation". Availability of other buildings and suitability of the same for the landlord certainly assume significance and have relevancy for consideration of the claim in the case of the former, while it is not so in the case of latter. At the same time, such availability of alternate accommodation to the tenant certainly, has got relevance for consideration under both the grounds. 32. In this case, the 2nd petitioner, undisputably is running a business in medical equipments at the first floor. The expansion of such business is also pleaded and established. The tenant also not disproved it with any convincing evidence. On the other hand, the requirement was found by both authorities as bonafide. The appellate authority, in fact, noted the difficulty of the landlords in lifting certain medical equipments to the first floor. Availability of alternate accommodation to the tenant is also established by the landlords. 33. Thus, by considering all the facts and circumstances as well as by considering the above case laws of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court, I am of the firm view that the relative hardship is very much in favour of the petitioners and consequently the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Authority in rejecting the application for eviction are erroneous and liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the judgment and decree made by the appellate authority in dismissing the eviction petition are set aside. Consequently, the order of the Rent Controller is restored. The respondent/tenant is given three months time to vacate the premises from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs.