JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. This is plaintiffs first appeal directed against the judgment & decree dated 24/03/1990 of learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kishangarh Bas, District Alwar whereby, his suit for specific performance of the contract and perpetual injunction was dismissed. In the plaint, it was averred by the plaintiff that defendant No.1 was khatedar of land bearing Khasra No.34 measuring 3 bighas 12 biswas situated at Village Kirwari. He entered into an agreement with plaintiff on 01/07/1986 for sale of this land to him for consideration of Rs. 72,000/-. Defendant No.1 accepted Rs. 16,500/- as advance money and delivered possession of the land to the plaintiff as part performance of the contract. Agreement to sale (Exh.5) was reduced into writing on a stamp paper in the presence of witnesses and got attested by the Notary Public. Defendant No.1 also gave a receipt on the same document (Exh.5) and also signed both the documents. As per agreement to sale, defendant No.1 was required to get the registered sale-deed executed upto i July, 1987. plaintiff-appellant approached defendant No.1 many a time asking to execute the registered sale-deed but he refused to perform his part, whereas the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of performance and to pay the remaining amount of sale consideration. The money was tendered to him within the contract period. Though defendant } No.1 continued to give assurance to the plaintiff to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff but he did not actually ever execute the registered sale-deed. plaintiff on 08/08/1987 gave a registered notice (Exh.1) to defendant No.1 to execute the sale-deed and to accept the remaining amount. Defendant No.1 gave reply (Exh.3) to the notice (Exh.1) on 5 17/01/1987, wherein he asserted that (i) plaintiffs brother Shakti Singh has disputed the right of way over land bearing Khasra No.34 to be sold to Shakti Singh on 30/9/1985, (ii) agreement was lost & (iii) he got an agreement to sale executed on 10/07/1986 for sale consideration of Rs. 72,000/-. He denied having handed over possession of the disputed land to the plaintiff. It was to further pleaded that plaintiff went to consult his lawyer at Alwar regarding the notice and its reply. He lost his bag in the train while returning from Alwar to Khairtal, which contained many documents and the original agreement to sale. 72,000/-. He denied having handed over possession of the disputed land to the plaintiff. It was to further pleaded that plaintiff went to consult his lawyer at Alwar regarding the notice and its reply. He lost his bag in the train while returning from Alwar to Khairtal, which contained many documents and the original agreement to sale. He immediately reported the matter to the Station Master of Railway Station and at his instance got a public notice published in a newspaper 35 Aranadh dated 10/01/1988 but the agreement could not be traced out. However, photostat copy thereof, which he had got prepared earlier, was filed with the plaint, which is Exh.5. Specific prayer was made to direct defendant No.1 to execute the sale-deed in his favour after obtaining remaining amount of sale consideration and further for injunction that defendants be restrained 40 by perpetual injunction from interfering into the possession of the plaintiff over the disputed land or otherwise directing them not to alienate the same to any one. 2. Defendant No.1 Harnam Singh filed written statement, wherein he admitted having replied to the notice and accepted the execution of agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986. It was further stated by defendant No.1 that he returned the money to the plaintiff on 09/04/1987 in the presence of Deen Dayal, Karmu and Nabi Khan and the deal between plaintiff and defendant No.1 was cancelled. Since plaintiff refused to perform his part of the contract, the deal was cancelled. Defendant No.1 thereafter executed a fresh agreement for sale of the land in dispute in favour of defendants No.2 & 3 for consideration of Rs. 75,600/-. 3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court framed as many as five issues, which are as under:- (1) Whether the document agreement to sale was lost by plaintiff on 7/1/1988? (2) Whether plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part as per condition of agreement to sale? (3) Whether the disputed land is in possession of the plaintiff since 1/7/1986? (4) Whether defendant by offering the remaining sale consideration asked the plaintiff on several occasions to get the sale-deed registered and whether plaintiff expressed his helplessness to do so and returned the advance received by him to the plaintiff on 9/4/1987 and the plaintiff by cancelling the deal, burnt the agreement to sale? (5) Relief? 4. (4) Whether defendant by offering the remaining sale consideration asked the plaintiff on several occasions to get the sale-deed registered and whether plaintiff expressed his helplessness to do so and returned the advance received by him to the plaintiff on 9/4/1987 and the plaintiff by cancelling the deal, burnt the agreement to sale? (5) Relief? 4. plaintiff examined himself as PW1, Prahlad Dutt, Advocate as PW2, Birbal as PW3 and Karan Singh as PW4 and got exhibited six documents such as; notice dated 08/10/1987 as Exh.1, postal receipt of both the notices as Exh.2, reply to notice filed by defendant No.1 dated 17/10/1987 as Exh.3, notice published in newspaper regarding loss of agreement (Exh.5) dated 01/07/1986 as Exh.4, photostate copy of original agreement dated 01/07/1986 and receipt of Rs. 16,500/- as Exh.5 & previous statement of Bagga Singh as Exh.6, to substantiate the pleadings. Defendant No.1 Harnam Singh examined himself as DW1, Magh Singh as DW2, Nabi Khan as DW3 and Bagga Singh as DW4. No documentary evidence was produced on behalf of the defendants. 5. Learned trial court decided all the issues against plaintiff and in favour of the defendants and consequently dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 24/03/1990. 6. Shri R.K. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff-appellant has contended that when defendant No.1 admitted execution of the agreement to sale by accepting money of Rs. 16,500/- as advance towards sale consideration as part performance of the contract, there was no esape for the learned trial court except to decree the suit for specific performance. Plea of defendant No.1 that the agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986 was cancelled on 09/04/1987 was not substantiated. Learned trial court has erred in law by not framing the issue with regard to cancellation of deal, which has prejudiced the case of the plaintiff. It was argued that Issues No.1 and 4 have wrongly been decided against the plaintiff. Burden of proving Issue No.1 regarding loss of bag was upon the plaintiff and burden of proving Issue No.4 with regard to destroying/burning of the agreement to sale was upon defendant No.1, which he failed to prove. It was argued that there are material contradictions in the assertions of defendant No.1, between what he stated in reply to the notice served by the plaintiff upon him and what he pleaded in the written-statement. It was argued that there are material contradictions in the assertions of defendant No.1, between what he stated in reply to the notice served by the plaintiff upon him and what he pleaded in the written-statement. In reply to the notice, defendant No.1 alleged that no agreement was executed by him on 01/07/1986 nor any notice was received but in the written-statement, defendant No.1 has not only admitted execution of agreement to sale but also having received the sale consideration in part performance, however, by further stating that he returned the money to the plaintiff on 09/04/1987 in presence of Deen Dayal, Karmu (Sarpanch) and Nabi Khan and the deal between plaintiff and defendant No.1 was cancelled. He did not produce Deen Dayal and Karmu in his evidence but only produced Nabi Khan as DW3, who however pleaded ignorance as to for what purpose, money was returned by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff. It was argued that Nabi Khan was a chance witness. Defendant No.1 has neither produced him in his evidence nor has produced Chuttan and Baddan in evidence. They themselves appeared in the witness box by getting themselves impleaded in the suit on their application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC on 11/04/1988. 7. Shri R.K. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate argued that learned trial court has erred in deciding Issues No.1 and 4 against plaintiff on conjectures and surmises. Learned trial court has while recording the finding on Issues No.1 and 4 has also observed that the defendant has not approached the court with correct facts while replying to the notice. There were many contradictions in the assertions of defendant No.1, not only in what he stated in reply to the notice served by the plaintiff upon him and what he pleaded in the written-statement but also in his statement before the court as DW1. Further, the subsequent version that the money that was received by defendant No.1 in advance was returned by him to the plaintiff and deed was cancelled, is a palpably false plea. Even then, the learned trial court has concluded that the agreement to sale was burnt. Issues No.1 and 4 have also wrongly been decided against the plaintiff. In fact, burden of proving Issue No.4 regarding the fact of cancellation of deal and destroying the agreement to sale, was on defendant No.1, which he utterly failed to prove. Even then, the learned trial court has concluded that the agreement to sale was burnt. Issues No.1 and 4 have also wrongly been decided against the plaintiff. In fact, burden of proving Issue No.4 regarding the fact of cancellation of deal and destroying the agreement to sale, was on defendant No.1, which he utterly failed to prove. Learned trial court therefore erred in law in deciding Issues No.1 and 4 against the plaintiff and in favour of defendant No.1. Learned Senior Advocate argued that the trial court ought not to have disbelieved the plaintiff only because he did not lodge any FIR regarding loss of the bag in the train containing original agreement to sale and other important documents. Learned trial court committed gross error of law in dismissing the suit when material witnesses Deendayal and Kamru regarding cancellation of agreement were not produced. Nabbi Khan and Bhagga Singh have been produced to prove cancellation of agreement to sale. These witnesses cannot be relied because their names are not mentioned in the statements. Bhagga Singh has given contradictory statement regarding previous agreement to sale, wherein he has not mentioned about cancellation of agreement. Learned trial court has thus not correctly appreciated the evidence. plaintiff in his evidence has fully proved that defendant No.1 has admitted execution of agreement to sale in his favour, that he accepted Rs. 16,500/- towards sale consideration in part performance and that defendant No.1 delivered possession of the land to the plaintiff, that plaintiff tendered remaining sale consideration within time limit of agreement, that defendant No.1 refused to accept the money and that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract If all 5. flats were Proved socical conclusion that should have followed was to decree the suit in favour of the plaintiff. 8. Regarding non-registration of agreement to sale, Shri R K Mathur, learned Senior Advocate argued that per Section 49 of the Registration Act 1908, suit for specific performance could be maintained against the vendor even when agreement to sale was not registered. Section 17 thereof also at the relevant time did not provide for registration of agreement to sale for maintainability of the suit. Section 17 thereof also at the relevant time did not provide for registration of agreement to sale for maintainability of the suit. State of Rajasthan by adding clause (f) to Section 17(1) of the Act for the first time vide notification dated 18/09/1989 provided that agreement to sale of immovable property, wherein possession has been handed over to the purchaser, would require registration of the to Sale in the present case agreement to sale was executed on 01/07/1986, whereas suit for specific performance was filed on 25/01/1988. Thus, on the date when the suit was filed, Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 did not require the agreement to sale to be registered for the purpose of maintaining suit for specific performance. Such clause inserted vide notification dated 18/09/1989 cannot be retrospectively applied to the present case. Learned trial court therefore ought not to have dismissed the suit. It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed. 9. Per contra, Shri Sanjay Joshi, learned counsel appearing for : defendants argued that the learned trial court rightly decided Issues No.1 and 4 against the plaintiff. While burden of proving Issue No.1 was on the plaintiff burden of proving Issue No.4 was on defendant No.1, which he proved. Issue No.4 with regard to cancellation of agreement to sale was proved by defendant No.1. plaintiff served the notice dated 08/10/1987 on defendant : No.1. At that time, 15 days time was left with defendant No.1 to get the sale-deed registered but after receiving reply (Exh.3) to the notice (Exh.1), plaintiff did not want to get the sale-deed registered. After nine months, defendant No.1 sold the same land to defendants No.2 and 3. It was denied that plaintiff ever approached defendant No.1 to get the sale-deed registered. It was also submitted that if at all it assumed that the plaintiff approached him, it is not proved whether he offered money at that time. The last date on which the sale-deed could be registered was 01/07/1987, whereas plaintiff served the notice upon defendant No.1 on 08/10/1987 Birbal (PW3) has categorically stated that the plaintiff-appellant did not receive any money in front of him. Karan Singh (PW4) also has not stated that Subedar Kanwar Singh ever asked defendant No.1 to get the sale- deed registered. Case of the plaintiff that he was willing to perform his part of the contract was thus not proved. Karan Singh (PW4) also has not stated that Subedar Kanwar Singh ever asked defendant No.1 to get the sale- deed registered. Case of the plaintiff that he was willing to perform his part of the contract was thus not proved. Issue No.3 regarding possession has erroneously been decided by the learned trial court against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. 10. Shri Sanjay Joshi, learned counsel further argued that the time was essence of the agreement and plaintiff was required to get the sale-deed registered by making payment of remaining amount of sale consideration upto 01/07/1987 i.e. within the period of one year. plaintiff has not given any cogent and convincing evidence as to what steps he took to get the sale-deed registered. Moreover, when the original sale-deed was lost, how could the plaintiff get the photocopy of the sale- deed, has not been explained. Agreement to sale was unregistered and therefore was not admissible in evidence. The burden of proving all the issues was upon the plaintiff. It is, therefore, prayed for that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. 12. Although it is a fact that the original agreement to sale has not been produced by the plaintiff but it is equally a fact that the plaintiff produced photocopy of agreement to sale (Exh.5). Execution of the same can be held to have been proved in evidence particularly when it is also proved that plaintiff paid amount of Rs. 16,500/- to defendant No.1 in advance towards sale consideration. Kanwar Singh (PW1) in his statement has stated that he got the agreement to sale executed with defendant No.1 Harnam Singh (DW1) for purchase of land on 01/07/1986 and made payment of Rs. 16,500/-. Remaining amount was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the sale-deed. Agreement to sale was attested by the notary public in the presence of witnesses. plaintiff approached defendant No.1 many a time offering him to accept the remaining amount with the insistence that he should get the sale-deed executed. Defendant No.1 avoided doing so on one or the other pretext. He served a legal notice on defendant No.1, which is Exh.1. He replied to the notice, which is Exh.3. plaintiff approached defendant No.1 many a time offering him to accept the remaining amount with the insistence that he should get the sale-deed executed. Defendant No.1 avoided doing so on one or the other pretext. He served a legal notice on defendant No.1, which is Exh.1. He replied to the notice, which is Exh.3. He has stated that he served the notice on defendant No.1 within a period of one year aforesaid. Prahlad Dutt (PW2) is an Advocate, who served the legal notice on behalf of defendant No.1 upon plaintiff. He has admitted having been given such notice to plaintiff. Birbal (PW3) has also proved execution of agreement to sale and receiving of Rs. 16,500/- by defendant No.1 towards advance amount for the sale consideration. He has stated that he was witness to the agreement, which was executed in his presence. An amount of Rs. 16,500/- was also paid in his presence. Birbal (PW3) has also stated that plaintiff requested defendant No.1 to get the sale-deed registered but he does not exactly remember the date when such request was made. 13. Issue No.1 on which the learned trial court has recorded finding against plaintiff, also observed that he has failed to prove that agreement to sale was lost by him. Issue No.4, which was decided along with Issue No.1 was to the effect that whether defendant No.1 had returned the money received from the plaintiff on 09/04/1987 and cancelled the deal and document i.e. agreement to sale was burnt pursuant thereto. While burden of proving Issue No.1 regarding loss of bag was upon the plaintiff, burden of proving Issue No.4 was upon defendant No.1. Prahlad Dutt (PW2), who is an Advocate has proved giving reply to notice to the plaintiff and has also proved his signatures on such reply (Exh.3). Defendant No.1 has not cross-examined this witness. Learned trial court has in the impugned-judgment while deciding this issue, observed that defendant No.1 did not in reply to the said notice set-up a plea that original agreement to sale was burnt. This finding is based on complete misreading of reply to notice (Exh.3). Perusal of Exh.3 does not show any such assertion made by defendant No.1 in reply to that notice. This finding is based on complete misreading of reply to notice (Exh.3). Perusal of Exh.3 does not show any such assertion made by defendant No.1 in reply to that notice. It was further observed by the learned trial court that having received such reply to notice, plaintiff did not give any reply to defendant No.1 asserting that in fact agreement to sale was not burnt and assertion made by him in Exh.3 to that effect was factually correct. Finding to this effect recorded by the learned trial court is, therefore, wholly unfounded and without any basis and is not supported by any evidence on record. It rather reflects non-application of mind. There is no justification for further finding by the learned trial court that since three months time was taken by the plaintiff in filing the suit during which period defendant No.1 executed the sale-deed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 on 12/01/1981, which falsify version of the plaintiff. In the opinion of this court, there was no warrant for such an inference. Reply to the notice Exh.3 was sent by defendant No.1 through his Advocate to the plaintiff on 17/10/1987, whereas the suit for specific performance has been filed by the plaintiff on 25/01/1988. If defendant No.1 has in the meantime sold the disputed land to defendants Nos.2 & 3, that could not in any manner scuttle the right of the plaintiff to enforce agreement to sale and get the sale-deed executed in his favour by defendant No.1. Even otherwise, limitation for filing of the suit for specific performance is three years. Defendant No.1 cannot be non-suited on that ground. 14. Coming now to the plea set up by the plaintiff that agreement to sale was lost by him while travelling in train from Alwar to Khairthal, Kanwar Singh (PW1) in his statement has stated that learned trial court even on this aspect of the matter proceeded to give finding adverse to the plaintiff on misreading of reply to notice Exh.3. Learned trial court has observed that while in that reply it was clearly stated by defendant No.1 that original agreement to sale-deed dated 01/07/1986 was burnt because deal was cancelled, plaintiff did not give any response to that reply. Learned trial court has observed that while in that reply it was clearly stated by defendant No.1 that original agreement to sale-deed dated 01/07/1986 was burnt because deal was cancelled, plaintiff did not give any response to that reply. He has not pleaded anywhere in the plaint as to where this agreement to sale was lost by him except stating that a notice was published by him in a local newspaper Aranadh on 10/01/1988 copy of which was produced as Exh.4. The document Exh.4 reveals that it was notified for information of the general public that a black coloured bag was lost by plaintiff while he was travelling in train from Alwar to Khairthal on 07/01/1988 containing agreement to sale with regard to 3 bighas 12 biswa of land of Harnam Singh, some Government papers and certain clothes. Insistence of the learned trial court that notice should have indicated in which train the bag was lost is difficult to understand and that if it was lost in train, he should have given information to the Station Master in writing plaintiff rather orally complained to him and did not make any written report. Then, the learned trial court has assumed that had the written complaint been made to the Station Master, bag could have been located in the next railway station. Then, a very strange reason has been given by the learned trial court while observing that if the bag was left in the train, it cannot be taken to have been lost and plea with regard to loss of bag in the train could not have been raised. A perusal of the plaint indicates that plaintiff in para 10 of the plaint made categorical assertion about loss of the bag on 07/01/1988 and publication of the notice in the newspaper and production of photocopy of the original thereof. There did exist an agreement to sale, which is proved from acceptance of the existence of agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986 by defendant No.1 in reply (Exh.3) to his notice (Exh.1). Such a plea cannot be termed as vague or unspecific. Besides, plaintiff in his statement has proved all these facts quite categorically and has stood the scrutiny of cross-examination. He has stated that original agreement to sale was misplaced and that he had taken photocopy thereof. Such a plea cannot be termed as vague or unspecific. Besides, plaintiff in his statement has proved all these facts quite categorically and has stood the scrutiny of cross-examination. He has stated that original agreement to sale was misplaced and that he had taken photocopy thereof. He had carried original agreement to sale in a bag to his advocate at Alwar for consultation. While returning back to Khairthal by train in the evening, he lost this bag in train between Alwar to Khairthal. He approached the Station Master and informed about the same. Birbal (PW3), who is his neighbour, has stated that agreement to sale was executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 for sale of this land for consideration of Rs. 72,000/-. Though PW3 was not witness to the execution of agreement to sale and has admitted that agreement to sale was not lost in his presence but most important factor is that service of notice (Exh.1) by the plaintiff through his advocate and then reply (Exh.3) given by defendant No.1, wherein he admits execution of agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986 and also sale consideration of Rs. 72,000/-. He has however come out with a different explanation in this reply stating that agreement to sale was executed in favour of Shakti Singh, brother of the plaintiff and subsequent agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986 was got executed from him by the plaintiff on the pretext that earlier agreement has been lost somewhere. Even though no money was paid to him at the time of its execution, this agreement was prepared under pressure. 15. Surprisingly, learned trial court while arriving at the finding that plaintiff has failed to prove that agreement to sale was lost by him, has not taken note of all these contradictions between what defendant No.1 stated in reply (Exh.3) to the notice (Exh.1) and what he has stated in the written statement. The trial court has misread reply to the notice. It has nowhere been stated in reply to notice that Shakti Singh, brother of the plaintiff burnt the agreement but he states that no money was paid to defendant No.1 as per agreement. But in his statement before the court, defendant No.1 has stated that plaintiff himself burnt agreement to sale and money was returned. In the written statement, it is mentioned by defendant No.1 that deal was cancelled and the money was returned. But in his statement before the court, defendant No.1 has stated that plaintiff himself burnt agreement to sale and money was returned. In the written statement, it is mentioned by defendant No.1 that deal was cancelled and the money was returned. In support of this plea taken in the written statement, defendant No.1 has produced three witnesses i.e. Magh Singh (DW2), Nabi Khan (DW3) and Bagga Singh (DW4) while all of them stated that agreement to sale was burnt, money was returned and deal was cancelled. When however, comparison of what defendant No.1 stated in the written statement and what he stated in reply to the notice is made, falsity of his version gets exposed. It may be noted at the cost of repetition that in reply to the notice, defendant No.1 has stated that agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986 was got written from him by the plaintiff for sale consideration of Rs. 72,000/- in lieu of earlier agreement to sale dated 30/09/1985 executed in favour of his brother Shakti Singh on the pretext of same being lost (earlier one) but no money was paid to him at the time of execution either of the agreements. In para 3 of the written statement, defendant No.1 pleaded that though he was ready to perform his part of contract but the plaintiff expressed his inability to perform his part and got the deal cancelled at his instance asking the money back and burnt the original agreement to sale. In paras 2 and 6, he pleaded that the deal was cancelled on 09/04/1987, therefore, defendant No.1 sold the disputed land to defendants No.2 and 3. In para 7, again same plea as taken in para 3 was reiterated. In para 10, he asserted that when deal was cancelled, original agreement to sale was burnt by plaintiff by his own hands. Defendant No.1 when he appeared as DW1 before the court has supported what he has pleaded in the written statement viz. cancellation of the deal, refund of the money to the plaintiff and burning of the agreement to sale. Reply (Exh.3) to notice (Exh.1) sent by the plaintiff to defendant No.1, contains a plea on entirely different facts, wherein there i was no mention of cancellation of the deal, burning of the agreement to sale and refund of the money. 16. cancellation of the deal, refund of the money to the plaintiff and burning of the agreement to sale. Reply (Exh.3) to notice (Exh.1) sent by the plaintiff to defendant No.1, contains a plea on entirely different facts, wherein there i was no mention of cancellation of the deal, burning of the agreement to sale and refund of the money. 16. Inescapable conclusion that emerges from all this discussion is that defendant No.1 does not deny execution of agreement to sale dated 01/07/1986 for sale consideration of Rs. 72,000/-, having admitted so, not only in reply to the notice, but also in the written statement and in his court statement. Furthermore, his assertion in the written statement and in his statement as DW1 before the court is that he returned the money to the plaintiff, carries his implicit admission that he received the advance amount of Rs. 16,500/-. His statement with regard to refund of money and cancellation of deal and burning of agreement to sale though was supported by Magh Singh (DW2), Nabi Khan (DW3) and Bagga Singh (DW4) produced by him, but it does not inspire any confidence in view of stand taken by him in reply to the notice by plaintiff earlier in point of time. All this clearly proves that he has come out with a concocted story only to frustrate the earlier agreement to sale. Defendant No.1 executed agreement to sale in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 and also when plaintiff served a notice upon him, he did not reply to the notice. Defendant No.1 yet executed sale-deed in favour of respondents No.2 and 3. This clearly proves that despite plaintiff-appellant having lost the original agreement to sale has yet to prove existence of such agreement by defendant No.1 with the plaintiff and once existence of the primary document is proved, its secondary evidence in terms of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has to be held admissible in evidence. 17. Coming now to the question whether plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract of agreement within the period of one year, learned trial court on Issue No.2 has held that plaintiff has not given any particulars as to when he approached defendant No.1 with money asking for executing the sale-deed. 17. Coming now to the question whether plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract of agreement within the period of one year, learned trial court on Issue No.2 has held that plaintiff has not given any particulars as to when he approached defendant No.1 with money asking for executing the sale-deed. In recording that finding, learned trial court has referred to the statement of Birbal (PW3) that plaintiff did not offer money to defendant No.1 in his presence. Karan Singh (PW4) has also nowhere stated that plaintiff ever asked defendant No.1 to get the sale-deed executed. But the learned trial court has completely overlooked the statement of Harnam Singh (DW1), who himself in his cross-examination has admitted that nine months after deal was struck, plaintiff approached defendant No.1 and asked him to get the sale-deed executed. It was a day of summer when plaintiff came to his house at 8.00 a.m. in the morning and said that on the following day, he went to the plaintiff. On that day, he went alone. But then the plaintiff at that time told him that he would not get the sale-deed executed and that defendant No.1 should return his money. Agreement to sale contained a stipulation that sale-deed shall be executed by defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff within one year. The date of agreement is 01/07/1986. That would mean that sale-deed was sought to be executed much before 01/07/1987 when defendant No.1 himself admits that plaintiff approached him nine months after execution of the sale. In the context of attending circumstances where defendant No.1 has adopted all kind of tactics and made every effort to frustrate agreement to sale, it can safely be inferred that defendant No.1 when in later part of the statement, he states that on the next day he went to the plaintiff asking him to get the sale-deed executed, plaintiff refused saying that defendant No.1 should return his money, he is not speaking the truth. Besides, learned trial court has not correctly appreciated the statement of plaintiff (PW1) that he requested defendant No.1 several times and even went to him with remaining amount of sale consideration asking him to execute the sale-deed but defendant No.1 avoided in doing so on one or the other pretext. Besides, learned trial court has not correctly appreciated the statement of plaintiff (PW1) that he requested defendant No.1 several times and even went to him with remaining amount of sale consideration asking him to execute the sale-deed but defendant No.1 avoided in doing so on one or the other pretext. Moreover, learned trial court has overlooked an important aspect that defendant No.1 in para 2 of his written statement has stated that agreement to sale was cancelled on 09/04/1987 and the money was returned in the presence of Nabi Khan, Karmu and Deendayal, whereas defendant No.1 has withheld two important witnesses Karmu and Deendayal. These witnesses were very important witnesses. He has rather produced two additional witnesses Magh Singh and Bagga Singh, whereas those two witnesses were not named in the written statement. These witnesses are apparently planted witnesses. Bagga Singh contradicted his own previous statement Exh.6, wherein he has not mentioned anything regarding cancellation of agreement on 09/04/1987, Exh.6 and the affidavit sworn by him on 18/04/1988. This witness is thus apparently not speaking truth. 18. It must, therefore, be held that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement and defendant No.1 avoided doing so. 19. The Supreme Court in Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram, (2010) 5 SCC 401 while dealing with the issue that unregistered sale-deed is not admissible in evidence in view of provisions of Section 17(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 when plaintiff is asserting that possession of the land was already transferred to him and submission to that effect was made in the agreement to sale, held that unregistered sale-deed tendered not as evidence of completed sale but as proof of oral agreement of sale, can be received in evidence by making endorsement that it was received only as evidence of oral agreement of sale under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, where in a suit for specific performance of alleged agreement of sale, plaintiff tendered in her evidence unregistered sale-deed, trial court ought to have marked the same and proceed with the suit accordingly. Admission of unregistered sale-deed in evidence in such case, is not hit by Section 3(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 20. Admission of unregistered sale-deed in evidence in such case, is not hit by Section 3(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 20. This Court in Jagdish v. Smt. Deep Shika Garg, 2013 (3) WLC (Raj.) 242 while relying on the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court held that unregistered and deficiently stamped agreement would be admissible and that unstamped document cannot be questioned after being marked exhibit. 21. The Supreme Court in Pandurang Ganpat Tanwade v. Ganpat Bhairu Kadam and others, (1996) 10 SCC 51 while dealing with the similar issue held that averments of the plaint proved when plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, whereas defendant failed to comply with his part under agreement. 22. The Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and others, (1974) 1 SCC 242 held that admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions in comparison with evidentiary admissions, are admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It was further held that admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong. 23. The Supreme Court in Inder Sain Bedi (Dead) by LRs v. Chopra Electricals, 2004(2) WLC (SC) Civil 734 : (2004) 7 SCC 277 held that averments in a plaint, accepted as substantially correct in the written statement, amount to admission. This Court in Narayan and another v. Madan and others, 2001 AIR(Raj) 378 held that an unregistered document affecting immovable property can be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance. 24. Therefore, in the present case, admissions of execution of agreement to sale in written statement though qualified by defendant No.1 with the further averment that it was cancelled by refund of advance, which has to be accepted as admission of execution of the sale-deed. 24. Therefore, in the present case, admissions of execution of agreement to sale in written statement though qualified by defendant No.1 with the further averment that it was cancelled by refund of advance, which has to be accepted as admission of execution of the sale-deed. 25. Contention that since the suit for specific performance for execution of agreement to sale also contained stipulation as to transfer of possession, therefore, it would not be admissible in evidence being unregistered, has to be rejected in view of the fact that agreement to sale was executed on 01/07/1986 and the suit was filed on 25/01/1988. Proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 provides that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act. Section 17 thereof also at the relevant time did not provide for registration of agreement to sale for maintainability of the suit. State Legislature of Rajasthan by adding clause (f) to Section 17(1) of the Act for the first time vide notification dated 18/09/1989 provided that agreement to sale of immovable property, wherein possession has been handed over to the prospective purchaser, would require the registration of agreement to sale. In the present case, agreement to sale was executed on 01/07/1986, whereas suit for specific performance was filed on 25/01/1988. When the suit was filed, Sections 17 & 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 did not at the relevant time require that agreement to sale to be registered for the purpose of maintaining the suit for specific performance, therefore such clause inserted vide notification dated 18/9/1989 cannot be retrospectively applied to the present case. 26. Coming lastly to the question whether defendants No.2 and 3 can be said to be the bonafide purchasers to Claim protection with reference to Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 on the premise that they 1 purchased the disputed property for value in good faith without notice of the original contract, it should be noted that those defendants have filed their written statement contending that defendant No.1 executed an agreement to sale in their favour on 12/01/1988 with respect to the disputed property for consideration of Rs. 75,600/- and they paid a sum of Rs. 75,600/- and they paid a sum of Rs. 12,100/- as advance to defendant No.1. Thus, stating in para 2 of the written statement, they have not denied knowledge of the previous agreement to sale but have rather stated that the said agreement to sale was cancelled on 09/04/1987, defendant No.1 refunded the money to the plaintiff and plaintiff himself burnt the agreement to sale indicating cancellation thereof. Similar plea has been taken in paras 8 and 9 of the written statement. Defendants No.2 and 3 have however did not produce any evidence. 27. Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 protects the bonafide purchaser in good faith for value without notice of the original contract. This protection is in the nature of an exception to the general rule. Hence the onus of proof of good faith is on the subsequent purchaser, who takes the plea that he is an innocent purchaser. Good faith is a question of fact to be considered and decided and pre-supposes due care, attention and honesty in relation to good faith. In the facts of the case, when defendants No.2 and 3 have not adduced any evidence to prove their good faith and rather set up a plea similar to the one taken by vendor defendant No.1, which has been found to be not proved by this Court, purchase of the disputed property by defendants No.2 and 3, cannot be said to be bonafide. It cannot be accepted that they purchased the same property in good faith. 28. Since the execution of agreement by defendant No.1 in favour of plaintiff was also accompanied by possession, Explanation II of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 would be attracted with respect to actual and constructive knowledge to the subsequent purchasers in such a situation. In the ordinary course, the purchaser for setting up a plea of bonafide purchase in good faith, has to prove the same by evidence or else, he shall be deemed to have an actual or constructive knowledge of previous agreement to sale accompanied by transfer of possession by virtue of Explanation II to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In the present case, however, defendants No.2 and 3 have admitted the knowledge of execution of agreement to sale but have pleaded that the same was cancelled, which the defendants failed to prove and, therefore, purchase by defendants No.2 and 3 cannot be accepted as bonafide. 29. In view of aforesaid discussion, this first appeal deserves to succeed and same is accordingly allowed. The judgment & decree passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kishangarh Bas, District Alwar dated 24/03/1990 is set-aside. Original Suit No.5/1988 filed by the plaintiff-appellant for specific performance is decreed in terms of the prayer. plaintiff-appellant on payment of remaining amount of consideration viz : 72000-16500 = 55,500 would be entitled to get the sale-deed executed from the defendant-respondents. In case, defendants fail to execute the sale-deed within the said period, plaintiff would be entitled to get the sale-deed executed after deposit of such money through the executing court. Fresh decree be prepared accordingly. 30. Parties to bear their respective cost. Record be sent back to the trial court. Appeal Allowed.