ORDER The petitioner, Anil Pratap Mewara, is aggrieved by the order dated 2-6-2012 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) and Metropolitan Magistrate No. 10, Jaipur Metropolitan whereby the learned Magistrate has allowed the application filed by the investigating agency seeking issuance of warrant of arrest under Section 37 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 (for short, the Act), against him. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the order dated 21-6-2013 passed by the Sessions Judge, Jaipur Metropolitan whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner and has upheld the order dated 2-6-2012. 2-3. The factual matrix of the case is that on 14-10-2010, one Mr. Ram Chandra Bairwa, Assistant Director (Prevention), Excise Prevention Station, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur received certain information. On the basis of this information, the departmental personnel reached Bagadia Bhawan situated at C-Scheme, Jaipur and found one Mr. Mool Singh. From his possession, they recovered a plastic bag containing eleven bottles of different liquors, namely Johny Walker, Black Label Scotch Whiskey, etc. They arrested him. On the basis of the statement made by him, the police personnel also reached the petitioner house, namely Flat No. 302, Shekhawati Enclave, C-Scheme, Jaipur. There they found Anil Mewara, the petitioner. They searched his room. They discovered seven bottles of Johny Walker, Black Label Scotch Whiskey. Thus, from both the searches, they recovered eighteen bottles of Indian Made Foreign Liquor. According to the department personnel, during the search of the petitioner house, he fled from the place. 4. On the basis of these recoveries, a formal FIR was chalked out against Mool Singh and against the petitioner. After completing the investigation, while the department submitted a charge-sheet against Mool Singh, it kept further investigation pending under Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. against the petitioner. During the course of further investigation, the department tried its level best to locate the petitioner. However, as he could not be found, the department moved an application under Section 37 of the Act for issuance of standing warrant of arrest against him. By order dated 2-6-2012, the learned Magistrate allowed the application and issued standing warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said order, he filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. However, by order dated 21-6-2013, the learned Judge has dismissed his revision petition. Hence, this petition before this Court. 5. Mr. By order dated 2-6-2012, the learned Magistrate allowed the application and issued standing warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said order, he filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. However, by order dated 21-6-2013, the learned Judge has dismissed his revision petition. Hence, this petition before this Court. 5. Mr. V. R. Bajwa, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court : firstly, the Excise Department is totally confused about the role of the petitioner. Initially, the petitioner was treated as a witness in the case as his statement under Section 161, Cr. P.C. was duly recorded on 22-3-2011. However, subsequently, the department claimed that he is an accused person in the present case. The sudden change in the conclusion drawn by the department is unjustified. 6. Secondly, they had claimed that at the time of the raid, the petitioner was readily available at his house; but subsequently, he ran away. If further claimed that the petitioner was sitting at the house of Mr. Prakash Choudhary, the present Congress MLA from Badi Sadadi, District Chittorgarh. 7. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed against Mool Singh, the department has clearly stated that the petitioner was not available at his house when the raid was carried out. The said conclusion remains unaltered. Moreover, there is no new evidence for seeking his arrest. Hence, the department was not justified in seeking standing warrant of arrest against the petitioner. 8. Fourthly, in the application filed by the Department, they have not shown any reason for wanting (sic) to arrest the petitioner. Under Section 173 (8), Cr. P.C. the department is permitted merely to carryout a further investigation. It can neither carryout a “fresh investigation”, nor a “reinvestigation” of the case. Once the department has concluded that the petitioner was not available at the time of the raid, it cannot wriggle itself out from the conclusion. In fact, it cannot claim that the petitioner is wanted by the department. 9. Fifthly, the order dated 2-6-2012 has been passed mechanically, as no reason has been assigned by the learned Magistrate for issuing the warrants of arrest. Similarly, the order dated 21-6-2013 has been passed in a mechanical fashion. Hence, both the impugned orders deserve to be set aside. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and examined the impugned orders. 11. Similarly, the order dated 21-6-2013 has been passed in a mechanical fashion. Hence, both the impugned orders deserve to be set aside. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and examined the impugned orders. 11. Investigation is a labyrinthine process. At times, the investigating officer may proceed in a particular direction, and may suddenly hit a wall. He may take a u-turn and try to find another lead, another clue for further investigating the case. Even while submitting a charge-sheet against a particular accused person, he may still want to further investigate a case against other co-accused persons. For, at the moment of submitting a charge-sheet against a particular offender, the picture with regard to the other co-accused persons may not be entirely clear. Any observation made by the investigating officer vis-a-vis other accused persons is merely tentative, and not final. It is only in order to clear his doubts that the investigating officer seeks permission for further investigation of the case against the other co-accused persons. Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. was enacted precisely for this purpose to permit the investigating agency to carryout further investigation against the offender(s). 12. Much emphasis has been placed by the learned counsel on the fact that during the course of investigation it was discovered that the petitioner did not run away from his house at the time of the raid. It was further discovered that at the relevant time, he was sitting with the present congress MLA, Mr. Prakash Choudhary. However, a bare perusal of the summary of the charge-sheet of Mool Singh clearly reveals that this is merely a fact narrated by the department. The ultimate conclusion of the department is given at the bottom of the summary wherein the department has clearly claimed that “since it is unclear whether the petitioner is involved or not in the present case, they are keeping the investigation pending under Section 173(8), Cr. P.C.”. Hence, a partial impression, which may have made during the course of investigation, has still left a lurking doubt about the involvement of the petitioner in the present case. Thus, the alleged conclusion drawn by the department, as stated above, does not help the case of the petitioner. The said conclusion neither wipes out the previous investigation into the case, nor pre-empts the department from further investigating the case. 13. Thus, the alleged conclusion drawn by the department, as stated above, does not help the case of the petitioner. The said conclusion neither wipes out the previous investigation into the case, nor pre-empts the department from further investigating the case. 13. It is, indeed, trite to state that under the garb of Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. the investigating agency is not permitted either to “re-investigate” the case, or to initiate a “fresh investigation” against the accused person. But, nonetheless, Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. does permit the investigating agency to further investigate the case. In the case of K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 223 : ( AIR 1998 SC 2001 : 1998 Cri LJ 2897), the Apex Court has defined the words “fresh investigation”, “reinvestigation” and “further investigation”, as under :- “24. From a plain reading of the above section it is evident that even after submission of police report under sub-section (2) on completion of investigation, the police has a right of further investigation under sub-section (8) but not fresh investigation or investigation..... The dictionary meaning of further (when used as an adjective) is additional; more; supplemental. Further investigation therefore is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. In drawing this conclusion we have also drawn inspiration from the fact that sub-section (8) clearly envisages that on completion of further investigation the investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports and not fresh report or reports regarding the further evidence obtained during such investigation. Once it is accused and it has got to be accepted in view of the judgment in Kazi Lhendup Dorji (supra) that an Investigation undertaken by CBI pursuant to a consent granted under Section 6 of the Act is to be completed, notwithstanding withdrawal of the consent, and that further investigation is a continuation of such investigation which culminates in a further police report under sub-section (8) of Section 173, it necessarily means that withdrawal of consent in the instant case would not entitled the State Police, to further investigate into the case.” 14. Recently in the case of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak & Ors. Recently in the case of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak & Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 762 : (AIR 2013 SC (Cri) 292 : 2013 Cri LJ 754), the Apex Court has expressed a similar opinion. 15. However, so far there is no evidence to show that the department is either re-investigating the case, or carrying out a fresh investigation against the petitioner. In fact, they seem to be seeking his co-operation in further investigation of the case. Hence, the contention raised by the learned counsel with regard to the power of the investigational agency under Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. is misplaced. 16. Although it is true that the department personnel had recorded the petitioner statement under Section 161, Cr. P.C. but mere recording of such a statement does not preclude them from adding the petitioner as an accused later on. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel that the department is confused about the status of the petitioner whether to treat him as a witness, or as an accused is untenable. There is nothing in law which prohibits the investigating officer from initially treating a person as a witness, and then subsequently classifying him as an accused. 17. Be that as it may, the moot question before this Court is whether the learned Magistrate was justified in issuing the standing warrant of arrest or not? The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there was no reason given by the department for seeking a standing warrant of arrest against the petitioner. However, a bare perusal of the application filed by the department clearly shows that according to them, “they had repeatedly tried to locate the petitioner, but despite their due diligence, they could not apprehended him”. Hence, a cogent reason was given by the department for seeking a warrant of arrest under Section 37 of the Act. 18. Similarly, the learned Magistrate had issued the standing warrant of arrest “after having gone through the case-diary” and after realizing that the department has repeatedly tried to find out the whereabouts of the petitioner. But he has been evading the law. An offender, who evades the law, cannot complain that the standing warrant of arrest should not have been issued against him. Thus, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 2-6-2012. 19. But he has been evading the law. An offender, who evades the law, cannot complain that the standing warrant of arrest should not have been issued against him. Thus, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 2-6-2012. 19. A bare perusal of the order dated 21-6-2013 also reveals that the learned Judge was justified in concluding that the order dated 2-6-2012 was an interlocutory one. Hence, the revision petition does not lie against an interlocutory order. Moreover, the learned Judge was justified in upholding the logic given by the learned Magistrate for issuing the standing warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Hence, the order dated 21-6-2013 is not a mechanical order. 20. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present petition. It is, hereby, dismissed. The stay application is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.