Order: 1. Writ petition No.5378 of 2005 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the fourth respondent, which has been confirmed by the third respondent and quash the same with a further direction to the fourth respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service with all attendant service benefits as available under Service Rules. Writ petition No.5379 of 2005 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the Vires of Rule 30 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline, Appeal) Rules, 1975 as illegal, null and void and unconstitutional and thereby to pass a writ of declaration. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that while the petitioner was serving as Assistant, BO Royapuram (presently Assistant, BO Redhills), the CBI registered a criminal case against the petitioner and three others under Sections 120-B r/w 420 IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After completing the investigation, the CBI charge sheeted the petitioner along with three others for the alleged offences committed by them under Sections 120-B r/w 420 IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in C.C.No.82 of 1997. The Principal Sessions Judge for CBI cases, Chennai by the judgment dated 02.01.2002 inter alia convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to undergo RI for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/- for the aforesaid offences. Aggrieved by the said judgment dated 02.01.2002, the petitioner filed a Criminal Appeal in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002 before this Court. This Court, by the judgment dated 17.3.2010 set aside the judgment delivered by the trial Court and acquitted the petitioner by rendering a specific finding that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the petitioner. When the order of acquittal was passed by this Court in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002, the respondent Department could not proceed further against the petitioner for the reason that he had already reached the age of superannuation on 31.8.2006 and they decided not to file an appeal. As a result, they passed a proceeding dated 04.1.2011 wherein, the competent authority has recommended the case of the petitioner on the following recommendations: "i) The dismissal order of the employee shall be recalled in view of the acquittal by the appellate Court. As a result, they passed a proceeding dated 04.1.2011 wherein, the competent authority has recommended the case of the petitioner on the following recommendations: "i) The dismissal order of the employee shall be recalled in view of the acquittal by the appellate Court. ii) To treat the exit of Sri.J.Stanislaus as superannuation from the date of his acquittal and the period from the date of conviction till superannuation shall be treated as service spent without pay. iii) Settle all the claims of PF, Gratuity and Pension with effect from the date of superannuation." 3. In view of the order of acquittal passed by this Court in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002, the respondents recalled the order of dismissal passed by them and subsequently, settled the petitioner's Provident Fund, Gratuity and Pension. 4. In the aforementioned background, the grievances of the petitioner are (i) the period of unemployment has been treated as service without pay, for which he has been denied payment of salary and other benefits, (ii) the leave encashment for a period of 272 days prior to the order of dismissal has not been settled and (iii) the contribution of Society Welfare made by the petitioner has not been disbursed to him. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, while relying upon Rule 22 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975, has submitted that when an employee, who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the competent authority, whose decision shall be final, may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty, the full pay and allowance which he would have been entitled to, for, when the employee has been acquitted from the proceedings, he is entitled to full pay and allowance by taking his period of dismissal or removal from service or under suspension as working day as if he has not been dismissed or removed or suspended from his service. 6. By relying upon Rule 22(a) and (b), the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that admittedly, the CBI has charge sheeted the petitioner along with three other persons. Even though the petitioner was convicted by the trial Court, this Court on 17.3.2010 acquitted the petitioner by the judgment rendered in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002 by setting aside all the charges finding that the respondents have failed to establish the case against the petitioner. Even though the petitioner was convicted by the trial Court, this Court on 17.3.2010 acquitted the petitioner by the judgment rendered in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002 by setting aside all the charges finding that the respondents have failed to establish the case against the petitioner. When the petitioner has been acquitted, according to Rule 22 (a) and (b), he is entitled to full pay and allowance, which he would have been entitled to if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended. Rule 22(a) and (b) read as follows: "When the suspension of an employee is held to be unjustified or not wholly justified or when an employee who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the Competent Authority, whose decision shall be final, may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty. (a) If he is honourably acquitted, the full pay and allowance which he would have been entitled to if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended, less the subsistence allowance; (b) If otherwise, such proportion of pay and allowance as the Competent Authority may prescribe. In a case falling under clause (a), the period of absence from duty will be treated as period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause (a), the period of absence from duty will be treated as period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause (b), the period of absence shall not be treated as period spent on duty, but the Competent Authority may as its discretion grant leave for the period to the extent admissible to the employee under the rules. Any period of absence which has not been treated as period spent on duty or on leave shall not count as service for any purpose under these rules but will not constitute break in service. No order passed under this rule shall have the effect of compelling any employee to refund the subsistence allowance payable under Rule 21." In the light of the above Rules, learned counsel for the petitioner finally pleaded that the petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowance, as if he was not dismissed from service, since he was reinstated in service, after Crl.A.No.12/12 filed by the petitioner ended in acquittal, by revering the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. 7. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents by filing a detailed counter has submitted that the petitioner along with three other persons were charge sheeted by CBI under Section 120B, 420, 511 r/w Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. As a result, the trial Court convicted the petitioner by its judgment dated 02.01.2002 in C.C.No.82 of 1997. Therefore, the respondent has passed an order of dismissal dated 25.6.2002 and thereby, the petitioner was kept away from the office permanently. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002 before this Court and this Court after 8 years by its judgment dated 17.3.2010 acquitted the petitioner from the charges on the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges framed against him. Unfortunately, before the acquittal order passed by this Court, the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation on 31.8.2006. The respondent Department has not given opportunity to the petitioner to proceed with departmentally for the reason that the dismissal order was passed 8 years ago i.e. on 25.6.2002 in view of the conviction order passed against the petitioner by the trial Court in C.C.No.82 of 1997 dated 2.1.2002. Therefore, when the respondent Department has not given sufficient time to proceed with departmentally, the petitioner was given all the benefits including Provident Fund, Gratuity and Pension with effect from the date of approval granted by the competent Authority. Rule 22(a) also makes it clear that if an employee is honourably acquitted, he is entitled to full pay and allowance but it is upto the competent Authority to pass appropriate order by exercising its discretionary power. Accordingly while granting Provident Fund, Gratuity, Pension and other benefits, the competent authority thought it fit not to grant salary for the period he had not worked on the basis of no work no pay. Therefore, when Rule 22 (b) clearly gives enormous discretionary power to the respondent Department, to give reinstatement, the petitioner sadly reached the age of superannuation before the order of acquittal was passed by this Court, however it was found that he was entitled to the statutory claims such as Provident Fund, Gratuity and Pension except the payment of salary for the period not worked. 8. 8. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in BANSHI DHAR VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER (2007 (1) SCC324), wherein, it has been held as follows: "It is now a trite law that judgment of acquittal itself would not have exonerated him of the charges levelled against him. He could have been proceeded against in a departmental proceeding. Departmental proceedings, however, could not be held as on the date of passing of the judgment of acquittal, he had already reached his age of superannuation." 9. The learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that even after the order of acquittal passed by this Court in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002 dated 17.3.2010, the respondent Department has very well proceeded against the petitioner. But, in the meantime, the petitioner on reaching the age of superannuation on 31.8.2006 retired from service of the respondent Department. Therefore, it is not fair and proper on the part of the respondents to once again initiate departmental proceedings as it is not legally permissible. However, in all fairness, the respondent Department finding no reason on the claim of the petitioner i.e. to pay for the period in which he was dismissed from service that too on the basis of conviction of sentence imposed by the trial Court in C.C.No.82 of 1997, has once again accepted the order of acquittal passed in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002 and settled all the claims namely, Provident Fund, Gratuity and Pension except the salary for the period, he has not worked since he was already dismissed by the order dated 25.6.2002, therefore, the petitioner has no legal basis to ask for salary for the period not worked. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents carries more merits for the reason that the petitioner was prosecuted by CBI for various offences under Section 120B r/w Sec 420 of IPC and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, for which, the trial Court in C.C.No.82 of 1997 found the petitioner guilty and thereby, convicted him by the judgment dated 2.1.2002. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service by the fourth respondent on 25.6.2002. Hence, the petitioner has filed Crl.A.No.12 of 2002. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service by the fourth respondent on 25.6.2002. Hence, the petitioner has filed Crl.A.No.12 of 2002. During the pendency of the said Criminal Appeal, the petitioner on reaching the age of superannuation four years before the order of acquittal passed by this Court, has completely gone away from the control of the respondent Department. As a result, the competent Authority was not in a position to proceed against him departmentally. Further, when the respondents 1 and 2 have come forward to accept the judgment passed by this Court, resultantly, the petitioner was issued with the proceedings dated 04.1.2011 giving the benefits namely (i) the order of dismissal passed against him was recalled in view of the acquittal order passed by this Court, (ii) the competent authority treated the exit of the petitioner as superannuation from the date of his acquittal and the period from the date of conviction till superannuation shall be treated as service spent without pay and (iii) settled all the claims of the Provident Fund, Gratuity and Pension with effect from the date of superannuation. 10. In the above said circumstances, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in BANSHI DHAR VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER (cited supra) and Rule 22(a) of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 make it clear that it is not necessary to give entire benefits to the petitioner by the respondents and when an employee who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the Competent Authority, whose decision is final, may grant full pay and allowance, which he would have been entitled to. 11. In the case on hand, the petitioner was not given full pay for the dismissal period for the reason that though the judgment of acquittal was passed by this Court in Crl.A.No.12 of 2002, admittedly, the petitioner on reaching the age of superannuation four years ago i.e., on 31.8.2006, naturally retired from service. As a result, the department could not proceed against him, as the order of conviction was reversed with order of acquittal in his favour by this Court in Crl.A.No.12/2002 dated 17.03.2010. 12. As a result, the department could not proceed against him, as the order of conviction was reversed with order of acquittal in his favour by this Court in Crl.A.No.12/2002 dated 17.03.2010. 12. In view of the above, if we look at Rule 22 (a) and (b), which clearly state that the competent authority may at his own discretion grant relief for the period of his absence from duty, but the above rule states that the competent authority may, at its discretion, grant leave for the period to the extent admissible to the employee under the rules. Any period of absence which has not been treated as period spent on duty or on leave shall not count as service for any purpose under these rules will not constitute break in service. Therefore, when Rule 22(b) gives discretionary power to the competent authority to pass appropriate order, it is not open to the petitioner to say that he will fall back on Rule 22 (a), which says that if he is honourably acquitted, he would have been entitled to full pay and allowance for the period he had been dismissed, removed or suspended. Therefore, the respondent Department is not able to give the reinstatement in service along with the service benefits including back-wages with effect from the date of order of acquittal by the Court, for two reasons. Firstly, when the trial Court convicted the petitioner in C.C.No.82/97, dated 02.01.2002, the respondent department dismissed him from service. Although the petitioner filed Crl.A.No.12/2002, challenging the conviction and sentence, during the pendency of the Criminal Appeal, the petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 31.08.2006. Therefore, the respondent department had not proceeded against him departmentally. Secondly, Crl.A.No.12/12 was allowed, acquitting the petitioner on 17.03.2010. In the meanwhile, the relationship of Master and Servant between the petitioner and the respondent had came to an end. As a result, the department could not proceed against him, although they are entitled to do so legally under the Pension Rules. Inspite of these reasons, the respondent department has settled the service benefits, except salary for the period he had not worked. Therefore, under this peculiar circumstances, the petitioner cannot ask for application of Rule 22(a). 13. In result, Writ Petition No.5378 of 2008 fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of Writ Petition No.5378 of 2008, Writ Petition No.5379 of 2008 is also dismissed. Therefore, under this peculiar circumstances, the petitioner cannot ask for application of Rule 22(a). 13. In result, Writ Petition No.5378 of 2008 fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of Writ Petition No.5378 of 2008, Writ Petition No.5379 of 2008 is also dismissed. There is no order as to costs. 14. At this juncture, it was stated that the petitioner is entitled to leave encashment for a period of 272 days prior to the order of dismissal passed by the competent authority along with Welfare Society Contribution made by the petitioner. It is open to the respondent Department to consider the said request whether the petitioner had applied for any other loan, if it is so, it is for them to work out and pay the balance amount to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.