JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has filed the present writ petition against the order dated 22.3.2011 passed by the learned Additional Dist. Judge, Ratangarh in Appeal No. 2/2011, Ajay Kumar Saini v. Municipal Board , whereby the learned Additional Dist. Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order dated 3.2.2011 passed by the learned Civil judge (S.D.), Ratangarh in Civil Misc. Case No. 19/2010, Ajay Kumar v. Municipal Board, Ratangarh , whereby the learned trial Court dismissed the application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Vishwajeet Joshi submitted that there is no encroachment made by the petitioner on the public road in question and therefore, the Courts below have wrongly rejected the TI application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. without any evidence produced by the defendant- Municipal Board about the approved map of the land in question showing the width of the road there, which could establish the encroachment, if any, by the plaintiff-petitioner. 3. This Court while entertaining the writ petition had granted ex-parte interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo on 4.8.2011. The said stay order is still continuing and the main suit is also pending before the learned trial Court. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent-Municipal Board, Ratangarh, Mr. D.S. Rajvi however, vehemently opposed the writ petition and relied upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shlini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387 in which the Hon'ble Suprme Court has held as under: "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (1) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 5. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Court in the case of jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 , in Para 15 thereof, the Hon'ble Apex Court uses the words "the exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a Court of tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. 6. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that unless the Map of the Municipal Board is produced before the learned trial Court which could establish the width of the road in question, it cannot be ascertained that the petitioner-plaintiff has encroached over the road and has set up the shop in question on the public road. Since this Cott Rs. Since this Cott Rs. had granted stay order on 4.8.2011, which is continuing for last 2 years, it is considered appropriate to continue the same during the pendency of trial and with a request to the learned trial Court to expedite the trial of the suit itself and preferably decide the same within a period of one year from today. Till decision of the suit the interim order granted by this Court shall continue. However, continuance of interim order will not come in the way of learned trial Court to decide the suit on its own merits. 7. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is disposed of. No order as to costs. A copy of this order be sent to the parties concerned and the learned Court below forthwith.Petition Disposed of. *******