JUDGMENT Harish Tandon, J. 1. This revisional application is directed against an order dated July 3, 2012 passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), 1st Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 14 of 2008 by which an application for amendment of the plaint is rejected. The plaintiff/petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order in this revisional application, basically on the point that the Court below should not have dismissed the said application for amendment by invoking the provisions of Limitation Act. 2. The plaintiff/petitioner filed the aforesaid Title Suit for declaration of his title in respect of the property in question on the strength of the deeds of conveyance dated July 24, 2007 and August 16, 2007 respectively, and the deed of declaration executed on December 26, 2007 and registered on January 24, 2008 in the office of the Additional Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata. A decree for perpetual injunction was also sought restraining the defendants from disturbing the plaintiff/petitioner's right, title and interest in possession in respect of the said property and for recovery a possession. 3. The plaint case proceeds that the property in question was initially owned and comprised in the Estate of Maharaja of Burdwan. By virtue of a permanent settlement, one Bimal Krishna Mitra and Shailendra Nath Bhattacharya became the owner of the said property in the year 1953. Subsequently, the Shailendra Nath Bhattacharya died intestate leaving behind the defendant Nos. 3 to 6, opposite party Nos. 3 to 6 in this revisional application, as his surviving heirs and legal representatives. By virtue of a power of attorney claimed to have been executed by the aforesaid owners in favour of the opposite party No. 1, the said opposite party sold, transferred and conveyed the said property in such capacity in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner. It is alleged that the opposite party No. 8 was found to have made certain constructions on the said property and on inquiry, it appears that some cloud has been created over the title acquired by the plaintiff/petitioner for which the said suit was filed. 4. The written statement filed by the opposite party Nos. It is alleged that the opposite party No. 8 was found to have made certain constructions on the said property and on inquiry, it appears that some cloud has been created over the title acquired by the plaintiff/petitioner for which the said suit was filed. 4. The written statement filed by the opposite party Nos. 2 & 7 contains the assertion that by way of Bandobastyanama dated March 21, 1953, the Maharaja of Burdwan declared the said Bimal Krishna Mitra and Shailendra Nath Bhattacharya as joint owners of the property mentioned in Schedule 'A' relating to Khatian No. 61/1 under Mouza-Alipore Gram, District-South 24 Parganas which is presently known as Premises Nos. 2, 2/4 and 2/5. By another Bandobastyanama of the even date, the property described in Schedule 'B' to the plaint was settled in the name of Bimal Krishna Mitra, Shailendra Nath Bhattacharya and Basant Gupta, the opposite party No. 7, herein pertaining to Khatian No. 8/1 under Mouza-Alipore Gram, District-South 24 Parganas which is presently known as Premises Nos. 2, 2/4, 2/5, Judges Court Road, Alipore. It is specifically contended therein that the opposite party No. 1 was never empowered to sell, transfer and assign the said properties and the alleged special power of attorney was never executed at any material point of time. Since a forgery is committed, an FIR is lodged against a party No. 1 and a criminal case has been initiated which is under trial. 5. It is an undisputed situation that the opposite party No. 1 has not appeared before the Trial Court and, therefore, is undefended. 6. It is pertinent to record that the said suit was filed in the month of March 2008 and the opposite party Nos. 2 and 7 filed a written statement on November 20, 2008. The other defendants namely opposite party Nos. 9, 10 & 11 filed separate written statement and have more or less taken the same defence as narrated above. 7. On May 21, 2010, by filing an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, the plaintiff/petitioner seeks the leave of the Court to amend the plaint by incorporating the alternative prayer for recovery of money from the defendants. By the proposed amendment, the plaintiff/petitioner sought to incorporate the fact that they have paid Rs. 7. On May 21, 2010, by filing an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, the plaintiff/petitioner seeks the leave of the Court to amend the plaint by incorporating the alternative prayer for recovery of money from the defendants. By the proposed amendment, the plaintiff/petitioner sought to incorporate the fact that they have paid Rs. 26,02,000,00/- to the opposite party No. 1 at the time of execution and registration of the aforesaid deeds of conveyance and, thereafter, have invested a considerable amount of monies and also incurred expenses on account of Stamp Duty, Registration Fees and Municipality Taxes totally Rs. 89,28,48,871/-. The said application is basically opposed by all the appearing opposite parties on the plea that the proposed amendment is barred by the law of limitation and it would change the nature and character of the suit. The Trial Court dismissed the said application on the ground of limitation as well as on the ground that it would change the complexion of the suit. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner strenuously submits that the Court at the time of considering an application for amendment should not have held that it is barred by limitation, if the question of limitation requires a full fledged inquiry. He further submits that if the proposed amendment does not appear on the face of it, without doing or subtracting any word to be barred by limitation, this Court should allow the application for amendment permitting the party to amend the pleading and the point of limitation should be kept open to be decided at the time of the suit. To buttress the aforesaid submissions, he placed relied upon the following judgments: (i) Pirgonda Hongonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil reported in AIR 1957 SC 363 , (ii) A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd. vs. Damodar Valley Corporation reported in AIR 1967 SC 96 . (iii) ILR 33 Bombay 644, (iv) Ragu Thilak D. John vs. S. Rayappan & ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 472 , (v) Estralla Rubber vs. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 97 , (vi) Fritiz T.M. Clement & anr. vs. Sudhakaran Nadar & anr. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 605 , (vii) Jayanti Roy vs. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 175 . 9. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 472 , (v) Estralla Rubber vs. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 97 , (vi) Fritiz T.M. Clement & anr. vs. Sudhakaran Nadar & anr. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 605 , (vii) Jayanti Roy vs. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 175 . 9. He further submits that incorporation of an alternative claim does not change the nature and character of the suit and is, therefore, permissible. 10. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party Nos. 2 & 7, however, submits that if the relief claimed by way of a proposed amendment is barred by limitation, the Court shall not allow such amendment to be incorporated in the pleading. He strenuously submits that the Court while considering an application for amendment, finds that the suit, if filed on the basis of the proposed amendment is barred by the law of limitation, the amendment should not be allowed by the Court. Lastly, he submits that the suit simplicitor for title cannot be converted into a money suit by allowing an application for amendment. In support of the aforesaid contentions, he placed reliance upon the following judgments: (i) Ma Shwe Mya vs. Maung Mo Hnaung reported in 48 IA 214, (ii) M/s. Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd & anr. vs. M/s. Ladha Ram & Co. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 320 , (iii) T.L. Muddukrishana and anr. vs. Lalitha Ramchandra Rao reported in (1997) 2 SCC 611 and (iv) Bharat Karsondas Thakkar vs. Kiran Construction Company & ors. reported in (2008) 13 SCC 658 . 11. Mr. J. Kar, the learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party Nos. 9 to 11 adopts the submission made by Mr. Dasgupta and additionally submits that the proposed amendment is mala fide and mutually destructive. He further reiterates that if the relief by way of a suit on the basis of the proposed amendment is barred by law of limitation, then the application for amendment should not be allowed and placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Ravajeetu Builders & Developers vs. Narayanswamy & Sons & ors. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . 12. The learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party Nos. reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . 12. The learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party Nos. 3 to 6 also by contending that the proposed amendment if barred by the law of limitation should not be allowed placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Munilal vs. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. & anr. reported in (1996) 1 SCC 90 and Bharat Karsondas Thakkar vs. Kiran Construction Company & ors. reported in (2008) 13 SCC 68. 13. The dominant purpose for allowing the amendment of a pleading is to determine completely and effectually the real question and controversy between the parties to the suit. It is also intended to minimize the litigation and to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings. In Ma Shwe Mya (supra), it is held that the Court enjoins full power of amendment which should be exercised liberally but nonetheless, it does not imbibe the power to substitute one distinct cause of action for another by means of amendment. 14. The Court would be more circumspect and zealous in allowing an amendment if the limitations stand in the way. Section 3 of the Limitation Act bestowed the power upon the Court to dismiss the suit, even if, the limitation has not been set up as a defence. It is an additional defence available to the defendant. One of the important factors which must weigh to the Court dealing an application for amendment is that the suit based on the proposed amendment if barred under the Limitation Act, certainly the amendment should not be allowed. The bar under the Limitation Act should be culled out with certainty without any adding and/or subtracting the words or to find out between the words from the proposed amendment. In order to invoke the bar under the Limitation Act if something more than the bare reading of the proposed amendment is required, the amendment should be allowed keeping the point of limitation open and to be decided upon full fledged trial. In order to invoke the bar under the Limitation Act if something more than the bare reading of the proposed amendment is required, the amendment should be allowed keeping the point of limitation open and to be decided upon full fledged trial. The aforesaid proposition can be fortified from a judgment of the Apex Court in case of Pirgonda Hongonda Patil (supra) where the Supreme Court held that as a normal corollary, the Court should allow all amendments which are necessary for determination of the real disputes between the parties but where the fresh suit on the amended claim is barred by limitation on the date of the application, the Court should reject the said amendment in these words: 10. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the decision in Kisandas Rupchand vs. Rachappa Vithoba and placed great reliance on the observations of Beaman, J. at p. 655: "In my opinion, two simple tests, and two only, need to be applied, in order to ascertain whether a given case is within the principle. First, could the party asking to amend obtain the same quantity of relief without the amendment? If not, then it follows necessarily that the proposed amendment places the other party at a disadvantage, it allows his opponent to obtain more from him than he would have been able to obtain but for the amendment. Second, in those circumstances, can the party thus placed at a disadvantage be compensated for it by costs? If not, then the amendment ought not, unless the case is so peculiar as to be taken out of the scope of the rule, to be allowed." He contended that the first test laid down in the aforesaid observations was not fulfilled in the present case. We do not agree with this contention. First, it is not feasible nor advisable to encase a discretionary power within the strait jacket of an inflexible formula. Secondly, we do not think that the "quantity of relief", an expression somewhat difficult of appreciation or application in all circumstances, was in any way affected by the amendments allowed to be made in this case. What happened in the present case was that there was a defect in the plaint which stood in the way of the plaintiff asking for the reliefs he asked for; that defect was removed by the amendments. What happened in the present case was that there was a defect in the plaint which stood in the way of the plaintiff asking for the reliefs he asked for; that defect was removed by the amendments. The quality and quantity of the reliefs sought remained the same whether the reliefs should be granted or not is a different matter as to which we are not called upon to express any opinion at this stage. We think that the correct principles were enunciated by Batchelor, J. in his judgment in the same case viz. Kisandas Rupchand case when he said at pp. 649-650: "All amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties ... but I refrain from citing further authorities, as, in my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same doctrine. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same: can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not?" Batchelor, J. made these observations in a case where the claim was for dissolution of partnership and accounts, the plaintiffs alleging that in pursuance of a partnership agreement they had delivered Rs. 4001 worth of cloth to the defendants. The Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiffs did deliver the cloth, but came to the conclusion that no partnership was created. At the appellate stage, the plaintiffs abandoned the plea of partnership and prayed for leave to amend by adding a prayer for the recovery of Rs. 4001. 4001 worth of cloth to the defendants. The Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiffs did deliver the cloth, but came to the conclusion that no partnership was created. At the appellate stage, the plaintiffs abandoned the plea of partnership and prayed for leave to amend by adding a prayer for the recovery of Rs. 4001. At that date the claim for the money was barred by limitation. It was held that the amendment was rightly allowed, as the claim was not a new claim. 15. In case of A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. (supra), it is held that the Court has a power to allow the amendments in connection with the claim which had become time-barred if the special circumstances exist and for the interests of justice in Paragraph 36 thereof which reads thus: 36. It would appear from the various cases discussed above that an amendment which would enable a plaintiff to make a claim which has become time-barred is as a rule to be refused and that the Court would exercise its special power to allow such amendment only when there be special circumstances in the case. The nature of those special circumstances is to be gathered from those cases in which such an amendment was allowed. It appears to me that such special circumstances can be only when the amended claim was at least intended to be made by the plaintiff who had given in the plaint all the necessary facts to establish the claim but had due to clumsy drafting not been able to express himself clearly in the plaint and to couch his relief in the proper legal form. Such circumstances justify an amendment not really as a judicial concession to the plaintiff to save him from any possible loss but on the ground that the original claim in the plaint, though defectively stated, really amounted to the claim sought to be made by the amendment. Looked at in this way, the permission to amend does not in reality offend against the law of limitation and serves the interests of justice. 16. In Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) although, the Apex Court held that the parties can be allowed to make an inconsistent and alternative pleadings but rejected the application for amendment as it would displace the plaintiff completely from the admission made by the defendants in the written statement. 16. In Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) although, the Apex Court held that the parties can be allowed to make an inconsistent and alternative pleadings but rejected the application for amendment as it would displace the plaintiff completely from the admission made by the defendants in the written statement. What could be culled out from the said judgment is that a complete new case which was tried to be made out therein was disallowed to be incorporated by way of an amendment of the pleading. It has been held in case of Munilal (supra) that the Court would permit the parties to amend the pleading provided it does not cause any prejudice to the other side subject, of course, to the absence other disentitling factors or just circumstances. 17. The party cannot be allowed to alter the cause of action by introduction of the amendment in the pleading and more so, when it would change the complexion of the suit. It would certainly change the cause of action if the proposed amendment is taken out when the law of limitation intervenes and disentitles the party seeking amendment to the relief by way of an independent suit. It has been held in case of T.L. Muddukrishana & another (supra) that if an application for amendment of plaint came to be filed after expiry of 3 years, it certainly change cause of action as required to be specified in the plaint. 18. In Estralla Rubber (supra) as relied upon by Mr. Mukherjee, it does not lay down the proposition that the amendment should be allowed, even if, it is barred by the law of limitation but held that the alternative plea in defence which is subject to an exception may be allowed to be taken provided it does not cause serious injustice to the other side or to take away any admission made in favour of the plaintiff. 19. In case of Ragu Thilak D. John vs. S. Rayappan & ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 6999, the suit for decree for permanent injunction was filed and during the pendency of the suit, the other side forcibly entered the suit premises and demolished the compound wall and an application for incorporating the subsequent developments by way of an amendment was the matter for consideration before the Apex Court. reported in AIR 2001 SC 6999, the suit for decree for permanent injunction was filed and during the pendency of the suit, the other side forcibly entered the suit premises and demolished the compound wall and an application for incorporating the subsequent developments by way of an amendment was the matter for consideration before the Apex Court. It was sought to be argued by the other side that the aforesaid amendment would introduce new case and cause of action and the relief for recovery of damages is barred by limitation. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual matrix, it is held that when a point of limitation is debatable and cannot be find out with certainty, an application for amendment cannot be thrown on the point of limitation. 20. In case of Jayanti Roy (supra) and Fritiz T.M. Clement & anr. (supra), it is held that the approach of the Court in dealing an application for amendment should be liberal and possibility of prejudice to the other side is one of the consideration to be kept in mind. In the later case, the Apex Court found that there was a foundational fact in the plaint but the same was cryptic and lacking material and relevant particulars. The amendment was allowed for elucidation and elaboration of the fact already pleaded. 21. The ratio which could be deciphered from the above noted reports that the Court must adopt a liberal approach in dealing an application for amendment and should allow the amendment for complete and effective adjudication of the disputes involved in the suit and also to minimize the litigation and to avoid the multiplicity of the proceedings. The point of limitation is one of the cannon, on which, the application for amendment can be disallowed provided it could be weeded out with certainty on bare look of the proposed amendment. The disputed and arguable point of limitation cannot stand in the way of allowing an application for amendment but the Court should allow the application permitting the party to amend the pleading by keeping the point of limitation open and to be decided after trial. 22. The petitioner tried to wriggle out from the clutches of the law of limitation by contending that the plaintiff can certainly claim the alternative relief by the proposed amendment. The suit is based on title. 22. The petitioner tried to wriggle out from the clutches of the law of limitation by contending that the plaintiff can certainly claim the alternative relief by the proposed amendment. The suit is based on title. The petitioner claimed the title on the strength of the alleged deeds of conveyance and by so called introduction of the alternative relief wanted to incorporate the relief of recovery of money on breach of the express obligations embodied therein. The aforesaid deeds were executed in the year 2007 and the said suit was filed in the year 2008. By an introduction of the alternative relief, the complexion of the suit shall be completely changed as one cause of action would be substituted by another. The suit for declaration of title would be converted into a money suit. There is another aspect of the matter. The alternative relief can be claimed if it has some nexus with the original relief and is somehow dependent thereupon. By way of an alternative relief, the parties cannot be allowed to make a complete new claim divorced from the original. 23. In the instant case, the introduction of alternative by way of an amendment is completely foreign to the original claim and, therefore, cannot be allowed to be incorporated by way of amendment. 24. The Trial Court, therefore, does not commit any infirmity and/or illegality in passing the impugned order. 25. The revisional application is devoid of merit. The same is hereby dismissed. 26. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. Application dismissed