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2013 DIGILAW 1366 (MAD)

Indira v. Kuppu; the National Insurance Co. Ltd.

2013-03-18

S.MANIKUMAR

body2013
Order – S.Manikumar, J. On the question of Maintainability of a Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging an Award passed by the Lok Adalat-I, by a retired Judge of this Court, the matter is placed before me, for consideration. Earlier, by circulation, the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been returned by the Registry, stating that a writ petition would not lie and the petitioners have been asked to file a Civil Revision Petition. Now the Registry has raised objections to the maintainability of the Civil Revision Petition. 2. In an accident, which occurred on 23.01.2003, a 36 year old, Patrolling Officer and Ex-Military Havildar, died. His wife, aged 32 years, minor daughter, aged 2 years, claimed compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-. According to them, the deceased earned Rs.7,450/-, at the time of accident. Ex.P8 - Degree Certificate issued by Madras University, Ex.P9 - Transfer Certificate issued by Madras University, Ex.P10 - Military Department Discharge and Recommendation Certificate, Ex.P11 - Military Training Certificate, Ex.P12 - Computer Literacy Cadre Certificate, Ex.P13 - Bank Pass Book and Ex.P14 - Salary Certificate were produced to support avocation. As per Ex.P14 - Salary Certificate, the deceased was paid Rs.7,450/- as monthly salary. PW.2, is the Personal Manager of M/s.Force I Security Services and he has deposed that the deceased was working as a Patrolling Supervisor from 28.07.2001 to 25.01.2003. As per the entry in Ex.P13 - Pass Book, the Tribunal has noticed a sum of Rs.1,932/- had been received by the deceased as pension for his military services. Though Ex.P15 - Authorisation Letter has been given to the Personal Manager of M/s.Force I Security Services, to speak about the avocation and salary of the deceased, by observing that PW.2, was not the direct signatory of Ex.P14 - Salary Certificate and considering his testimony that he has no direct knowledge of the details of the said certificate and in the absence of production of Pay Register, the Claims Tribunal has fixed the monthly income at Rs.3,000/- and after deducting 1/3rd towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased, computed the loss of contribution to the family, by applying 15' multiplier and quantified the same at Rs.3,60,000/-. That apart, the Tribunal has awarded Rs.18,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.20,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs.10,000/- towards loss of love and affection and Rs.2,000/- for Funeral Expenses. That apart, the Tribunal has awarded Rs.18,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.20,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs.10,000/- towards loss of love and affection and Rs.2,000/- for Funeral Expenses. Altogether, the Tribunal has awarded Rs.4,10,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, from the date of petition, till the date of deposit. Out of which, a sum of Rs.50,000/- has already been deposited under 'No Fault Liability'. Not satisfied with the quantum of compensation, C.M.A.No.3342 of 2009. has been filed, for enhancement of compensation of Rs.5,90,000/-. 3. Material on record shows that the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been referred to the High Court Legal Services Committee, Chennai and taken up for settlement on 30th November, 2010. Mrs.ManjubharKavi, learned counsel on record and Mr.Vadivel, representing National Insurance Company Ltd., Thirumangalam, Chennai, were present. The terms of the settlement are as follows: "2. Aggrieved by the award, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. After due deliberation, both the parties have agreed to enhance the award to a sum of Rs.40,000/- over and above the award of the Tribunal with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of deposit. The 2nd respondent is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.40,000/- within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On such deposit, the appellants/claimants are entitled to withdraw the entire award amount with interest in the same ratio as apportioned by the Tribunal. The minor/2nd appellant's share shall be deposited in anyone of the nationalised banks in reinvestment scheme till she attain majority. On attaining majority, the 2nd appellant is entitled to withdraw her share on producing the certificate in respect of her age. Award is passed accordingly. 3. The Tribunal is directed to issue the cheque to the parties concerned on proper identification, in accordance with the terms of the award, without insisting on any formal permission petition. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is disposed of accordingly." 4. Thus, according to the Insurance Company, they have agreed to enhance the award by a further sum of Rs.40,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum and that the same has been directed to be credited in M.C.O.P.No.4157 of 2003 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Additional District and Sessions Court, Fast Track Court-V), Chennai. Apportionment has also been made, as between the claimants. Apportionment has also been made, as between the claimants. The Lok Adalat award has been passed in terms of settlement, stated supra. Thereafter, the legal representatives have filed M.P.No.1 of 2011 in C.M.A.No.3342 of 2009, before the Lok Adalat-I, High Court Services Committee, contending inter alia, that by production of Ex.P7 - Medical Bills, expenses to the tune of Rs.1,04,411/- has been proved, but the Claims Tribunal has awarded only Rs.20,000/- under the said head. 5. The Legal Representatives have further contended that though instructions were given to the Junior Advocate, to the learned counsel on record, to settle the claim made in the appeal between Rs.4,50,000/- and Rs.5,00,000/-, apart from the award amount of Rs.4,10,000/- with interest, awarded by the Tribunal, the same has been misunderstood by the Junior Advocate for settlement of full quit of only Rs.4,50,000/- and that the Junior Advocate has given consent erroneously for enhancement of Rs.40,000/- only, over and above, the award passed by the Tribunal. Contending inter alia that the Claims Tribunal has also failed to consider the future prospects of the deceased and the erroneous application of 16' multiplier for computing the loss of contribution to the family, consisting of wife and minor daughter, the legal representatives of the deceased have filed M.P.No.1 of 2011 in C.M.A.No.3342 of 2009 to set aside the Lok Adalat award, dated 30.11.2010. 6. Ms.N.Manjubharkavi, Junior Counsel, has also filed a supporting affidavit to the effect that the National Insurance Company Ltd., Thirumangalam, Chennai, has agreed for settlement of claim of Rs.4,50,000/- with interest, apart from the award made by the Claims Tribunal. 7. Mr.A.Shanmugaraj, learned counsel on record, has also filed a supporting affidavit, stating that on 30.11.2010, when the matter was posted before Lok Adalat-I, for settlement, he was not in station and therefore, he had instructed his Junior Counsel, Ms.N.Manjubharkavi, to attend the Lok Adalat for settling the claim, between a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- and Rs.5,00,000/-, apart from the award amount of Rs.4,10,000/- with interest, awarded by the Tribunal. He has also stated that the Insurance Company might have agreed for a settlement only for Rs.4,50,000/- with interest, and that his junior counsel has misunderstood the same and wrongly informed him that the National Insurance Company has agreed to settle the claim for a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- with interest, apart from the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Learned counsel on record, in his supporting affidavit, has further contended that in respect of settling the claim, on behalf of the minor, Order 32 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, would come into operation. The said provision is extracted hereunder: "7. Agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian for the suit.- (1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the court, expressly recorded in the proceeding, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian. (1A) An application for leave under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as the case may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor: Provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the court from examining whether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor. (2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor." 8. Material on record shows that that the matter has been again posted before the concerned Lok Adalat-I, presided over by a Retired Judge of Madras High Court. Adverting to the contentions stated supra, on 06.04.2011, the Lok Adalat-I, has passed the following orders, "2. The matter is posted today for clarification. On going through the Court records, it is revealed that the award has been passed only after the matter has been represented to have been settled between both the parties. But, however, the same is being disputed by the appellants now by stating that the appellants have not consented to the amount awarded. If that is so, it is open to the appellants to work out the remedy available under law." 9. But, however, the same is being disputed by the appellants now by stating that the appellants have not consented to the amount awarded. If that is so, it is open to the appellants to work out the remedy available under law." 9. Thereafter, wife and minor daughter has filed a Writ Petition to set aside the order made in C.M.A.No.3342 of 2009, dated 30.11.2010, by the High Court Legal Services Committee, Lok Adalat, Chennai-1, reiterating the averments made in the affidavits filed in the clarification petition, before the Lok Adalat-I. The Deputy Register, by order, dated 30.01.2012, while returning the petition, in the maintainability note, has stated that, "this petition is returned to the petitioner, enabling him to file CRP under Article 227." Hence, the legal representatives of the deceased have filed C.R.P.No.Sr.No.82262 of 2012. 10. Once again, the matter has been placed before this Court under the caption "Maintainability", in obedience of the order, dated 06.01.2013, put up by the Office. Earlier, while scrutinising the Civil Revision Petition, Registry has raised the question regarding maintainability of the said petition, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, stating that no appeal shall lie against any order, passed by Lok Adalat and by way of reply, the learned counsel on record, has endorsed as hereunder: "Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, returned with the endorsement to file CRP under Article 226. Hence, this CRP filed under Article 227 is maintainable." 11. The contentions of the learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased are that, (i) The Claims Tribunal has failed to give due credence to Ex.P7, Medical Bills, to the tune of Rs.1,04,011/- and awarded only Rs.20,000/- under the head, Medical Expenditure. (ii) The Claims Tribunal has also failed to consider the future prospects/income of the deceased, who was working as Patrolling Supervisor in M/s.Force-1 Security Services Private Limited and determined the monthly income of the deceased only at Rs.3,000/-. (ii) The Claims Tribunal has also failed to consider the future prospects/income of the deceased, who was working as Patrolling Supervisor in M/s.Force-1 Security Services Private Limited and determined the monthly income of the deceased only at Rs.3,000/-. (iii) The Tribunal ought to have considered the likelihood of increase in the income for the age group of persons upto 50 years and when in the case on hand, the age of the deceased was 36 years' old, there is a failure on the part of the Claims Tribunal to advert to the same, while determining the monthly income of the deceased for the purpose of computing the loss of contribution to the family. (iv)The Claims Tribunal has erred in applying 15' multiplier, instead of 16' for the purpose of computing the loss of contribution. (v)Enhancement was sought for on other grounds as well. 12. On the above grounds, inter alia, in the memo of appeal filed in C.M.A.No.3342 of 2010, the claimants/legal representatives have also contended that for a claim of Rs.10,00,000/- made in M.C.O.P.No.4157 of 2003, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Additional District and Sessions Court, Fast Track Court-V), Chennai, has failed to consider the abovesaid aspects, in proper perspective and denied a just and reasonable compensation and hence, when the appeal was filed for enhancement, under various heads, Ms.Manjubharkavi, Junior Counsel, attached to the Office of Mr.A.Shanmugaraj, learned counsel on record, has misunderstood the amount discussed for enhancement and that she has erroneously agreed to settle the award only for Rs.40,000/-, though the quantum of enhancement was intended to be settled between Rs.4,50,000/- and Rs.5,00,000/-, more than the amount awarded by the Tribunal. 13. According to the learned counsel, it was a pure misunderstanding by the counsel, who attended the Lok Adalat-I and in such circumstances, Lok Adalat-I, presided over by a Retired Judge, High Court, Madras, ought to have examined the memorandum of grounds, on merits and rescinded the order, dated 30.11.2010. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners/legal representatives of the deceased have further contended that when a Writ Petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to set aside the award, Registry ought not to have been returned the papers, stating that the writ petition is not maintainable. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners/legal representatives of the deceased have further contended that when a Writ Petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to set aside the award, Registry ought not to have been returned the papers, stating that the writ petition is not maintainable. Even taking it for granted that the Writ Petition as not maintainable, then the Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as per the Office Note, to be up by the Registry, ought to have been numbered and that the legal representatives of the deceased, cannot be denied a just and reasonable compensation, under various heads. According to the learned counsel, when a claim of Rs.10 Lakhs has been made, on payment of necessary Court fee, the Lok Adalat-I, itself could have re-examined the case, filed for enhancement, without driving the petitioners to work out the remedy under law. 15. When a remedy is sought for under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India, objections are being made by the Registry, regarding the maintainability of both the writ petition filed under Article 226, as well as the Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227of the Constitution of India and therefore, the petitioners are left without any remedy to seek for a ''just and reasonable compensation''. In the light of the above submissions, learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased have prayed for suitable directions. 16. Material on record discloses that when a Writ Petition was filed, praying for a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to quash the order, dated 30.11.2010, made in C.M.A.No.3342 of 2009, passed by Lok Adalat-I and consequently, direct the Lok Adalat-I, to return the case records, to this Court for disposal, Registry has made a return with the following endorsement, ''It may be stated how the Writ Petition is maintainable. When the award in C.M.A., was passed by the Lok Adalat.'' Learned counsel for the petitioners has re-presented the case papers, with the following endorsement, viz., ''As per the judgment of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 147 and unreported judgment dated 24.03.2011 in W.P.No.14956 of 2010, this Writ Petition is maintainable.'' Thereafter the Office has raised a doubt with regard to maintainability of the Writ Petition and solicited the orders from the learned Judge, as to whether W.P.SR.No.129370 of 2011, may be posted before the Hon'ble Court for maintainability. Material on record discloses that by circulation, an order, dated 31.01.2012, has been obtained, to file C.R.P., under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. At this juncture, this Court is of the view that an order, regarding the maintainability of any petition, is a judicial order and hence, if the Registry feels that a petition filed under some provision of law, is not maintainable, then an opportunity should be given to the party to represent. Opportunity of hearing should be given. An order regarding maintainability of the petition, is not an administrative order. It is a judicial order, open to judicial review and therefore, this Court is of the view that whenever, the question of maintainability arises, the Registry has to post the matter before the Court, instead of obtaining orders by circulating the cause papers. 17. The decision in Dhirendra Kumar Garg v. Smt.Sugandhi Bai Jain reported in AIR 1989 SC 147 , is a case of an appeal filed against eviction decree. During the pendency of the same, the landlord died and his legal representatives have been substituted as respondents. Minors were placed under guardianship of their mother and an application, purporting to be a compromise petition, has been filed, on behalf of all the parties, pursuant to which, the entire decree has been set aside and that the suit has been dismissed. Parties, who were respondents before the Supreme Court, challenged the compromise decree, by filing another suit in the lower Court and the trial Court dismissed the said suit. On appeal, the first appellate Court reversed the decision and set aside the compromise decree and directed the Civil Appeal before the High Court to be disposed of, for fresh consideration, in accordance with law. Thereafter, the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal. On appeal, the first appellate Court reversed the decision and set aside the compromise decree and directed the Civil Appeal before the High Court to be disposed of, for fresh consideration, in accordance with law. Thereafter, the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal. One of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that some of the party respondents in Civil Appeal No.7-A of 1965, filed before the 2nd Additional District Judge, Raipur, were minors and represented by an Advocate and in view of the provisions under Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was essential for the Court to have granted permission to enter into compromise and only after considering all the relevant circumstances, the decree should have been granted. After considering the compromise entered into between the parties, by which, permission has been granted under Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC, to the learned counsel appearing for the minor respondents to enter into a compromise, the Supreme Court, observed as follows: ''On the face of it, the compromise was one sided whereby the minors were giving up their right under the trial Court's decree both in respect to eviction as well as arrears of rent and damages. It is said that as a consideration for the compromise the appellants were giving up their right to claim costs which might have been decreed by the appellate Court in case of their success on merits. According to the respondents' case which has been accepted by the two Courts below the guardian of the minors was guilty of gross negligence in entering into the compromise by failing to take into account the interest of the minors. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that during the pendency of Civil Appeal No.7-A of 1965 the M.P. Accommodation Control Act was passed and the decree of the trial Court was likely to be set aside. In that view, it is urged, the minors' guardian through Mr.Mokasdar acted rightly in settling the dispute and thus saving a decree for costs which could have been passed against them. 5. In that view, it is urged, the minors' guardian through Mr.Mokasdar acted rightly in settling the dispute and thus saving a decree for costs which could have been passed against them. 5. According to the further case of the respondents the relevant circumstances and the terms of the compromise were never explained to the respondent No. 1 and Mr Mokasdar asked for the Court's permission to enter into the compromise on behalf of the minor without any instruction from their guardian in this regard. It is also urged that the language of the order whereby the Court granted its permission indicates that the Court did not apply its mind independently. However, we do not consider it necessary to decide these points as also several others raised by the parties as in our view the compromise decree must be set aside on the ground of gross negligence.'' 18. The Supreme Court, taking note of the submissions that the learned Advocate, appearing for the minors, has entered into a compromise, without proper instructions from the Guardian and also by observing that, ''neither the minors' advocate nor the Court appeared to have really considered the impact of the Rent Act, on the fate of the appeal, which came in force, during the pendency of the litigation'', set aside the compromise decree and directed the Civil Appeal to be restored on file and also directed the learned II Additional District Judge, Ranipur, to dispose of the same in accordance with law. 19. Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) has been enacted for the weaker sections of the society, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis of legal opportunity. Some of the relevant provisions in the said Act are extracted hereunder: ''19. Organisation of Lok Adalats. - (1) Every State Authority or District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or every High Court Legal Services Committee or, as the case may be, Taluk Legal Services Committee may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such Jurisdiction and for such areas as it thinks fit. Organisation of Lok Adalats. - (1) Every State Authority or District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or every High Court Legal Services Committee or, as the case may be, Taluk Legal Services Committee may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such Jurisdiction and for such areas as it thinks fit. (2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such number of- (a) serving or retired judicial officers; and (b) other persons, of the area as may be specified by the State Authority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee, or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee, organising such Lok Adalat. (3) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) for Lok Adalats organised by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (4) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) for Lok Adalats other than referred to in sub-section (3) shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. (5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of - (i) any case pending before; or (ii) any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of and is not brought before, any court for which the Lok Adalat is organised: Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. 20. 20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.- (1) Where in any case referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (5) of Section 19,- (i) (a) the parties thereof agree; or (b) one of the parties thereof makes an application to the court, for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if such court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances of such settlement; or (ii) the court is satisfied that the matter is an appropriate one to be taken cognizance of by the Lok Adalat, the court shall refer the case to the Lok Adalat: Provided that no case shall be referred to the Lok Adalat under sub-clause (b) of clause (i) or clause (ii) by such court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Authority or Committee organising the Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt of an application from any one of the parties to any matter referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matter needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the Lok Adalat, for determination: Provided that no matter shall be referred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the other party. (3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. (4) Every Lok Adalat shall while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and othe legal principles. (5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been receive under sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law. (5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been receive under sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law. (6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to see in a court. (7) Where the record of the case is returned under sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before such reference under sub-section (1). 21. Award of Lok Adalat. - (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, as order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, (7 of) 1870]. (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. 22. Powers of Lok Adalats.- (1) The Lok Adalat shall, for the purpose of holding any determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure (5 of) 1908, while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath; (b) the discovery and production of any document; (c)the reception of evidence on affidavits; (d) the requisitioning of any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any court or office; and (e) such other matters as may be prescribed. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in sub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powers to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in sub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powers to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it. (3) All proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code Act, (45 of) 1860 and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, (2 of) 1973.'' 20. As per the provisions of the Legal Services Act, 1987, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, as order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act. 21. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court, exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can issue a Writ of Certiorari, to quash the Award of the Lok Adalat-I, presided over by a Retired Judge of the High Court, Madras or in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, set aside the award passed by the Lok Adalat, on the ground that neither the Lok Adalat-I, nor the Advocate representing the interest of the minors, has considered their rights to receive a just and reasonable compensation, for the death of their father. 22. Reading of Article 227 of the Constitution of India makes it clear that the power conferred on the High Court is supervisory nature, over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories. The said Article 227 is extracted hereunder: ''227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. - (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The said Article 227 is extracted hereunder: ''227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. - (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2)Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.'' 23. In P.T.Thomas v. Thomas Job reported in 2005 (6) SCC 478 = 2006-1-L.W. 321, the Supreme Court, after tracing down the meaning of the word, ''Lok Adalat '', benefits and after considering the provisions under the Legal Services Authority Act, the scope and the finality of an award passed by the Lok Adalat, at Paragraphs 16, 18 to 27, held as follows: ''16. In our opinion, the award of the Lok Adalat is fictionally deemed to be a decree of court and therefore the courts have all the powers in relation thereto as it has in relation to a decree passed by itself. This, in our opinion, includes the powers to extend time in appropriate cases. In our opinion, the award passed by the Lok Adalat is the decision of the court itself though arrived at by the simpler method of conciliation instead of the process of arguments in court. The effect is the same. In this connection, the High Court has failed to note that by the award what was put to an end was the appeal in the District Court and thereby the litigations between brothers forever. The effect is the same. In this connection, the High Court has failed to note that by the award what was put to an end was the appeal in the District Court and thereby the litigations between brothers forever. The view taken by the High Court, in our view, will totally defeat the object and purposes of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and render the decision of the Lok Adalat meaningless. 18. What is Lok Adalat? ''The 'Lok Adalat' is an old form of adjudicating system prevailed in ancient India and its validity has not been taken away even in the modern days too. The words 'Lok Adalat' mean 'People's Court'. This system is based on Gandhian principles. It is one of the components of ADR system. As the Indian courts are overburdened with the backlog of cases and the regular courts are to decide the cases involve a lengthy, expensive and tedious procedure. The court takes years together to settle even petty cases. Lok Adalat, therefore provides alternative resolution or devise for expedious and inexpensive justice. In Lok Adalat proceedings there are no victors and vanquished and, thus, no rancour. Experiment of 'Lok Adalat' as an alternate mode of dispute settlement has come to be accepted in India, as a viable, economic, efficient and informal one. LOK ADALAT is another alternative to JUDICIAL JUSTICE. This is a recent strategy for delivering informal, cheap and expeditious justice to the common man by way of settling disputes, which are pending in courts and also those, which have not yet reached courts by negotiation, conciliation and by adopting persuasive, common sense and human approach to the problems of the disputants, with the assistance of specially trained and experienced members of a team of conciliators. '' 19. Benefits under Lok Adalat 1. There is no court fee and if court fee is already paid the amount will be refunded if the dispute is settled at Lok Adalat according to the rules. 2. The basic features of Lok Adalat are the procedural flexibility and speedy trial of the disputes. There is no strict application of procedural laws like the Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act while assessing the claim by Lok Adalat. 3. The parties to the dispute can directly interact with the judge through their counsel which is not possible in regular courts of law. 4. There is no strict application of procedural laws like the Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act while assessing the claim by Lok Adalat. 3. The parties to the dispute can directly interact with the judge through their counsel which is not possible in regular courts of law. 4. The award by the Lok Adalat is binding on the parties and it has the status of a decree of a civil court and it is non-appealable, which does not cause the delay in the settlement of disputes finally. In view of above facilities provided by ''the Act'' Lok Adalats are boon to the litigating public that they can get their disputes settled fast and free of cost amicably. Award of Lok Adalat 20. The Lok Adalat shall proceed and dispose the cases and arrive at a compromise or settlement by following legal principles, equity and natural justice. Ultimately, the Lok Adalat passes an award, and every such award shall be deemed to be a decree of the civil court or as the case may be, which is final. Award of Lok Adalat shall be final. 21. The Lok Adalat will pass the award with the consent of the parties, therefore there is no need either to reconsider or review the matter again and again, as the award passed by the Lok Adalat shall be final. Even as under Section 96(3) CPC ''no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties''. The award of the Lok Adalat is an order by the Lok Adalat with the consent of the parties, and it shall be deemed to be a decree of the civil court, therefore an appeal shall not lie from the award of the Lok Adalat as under Section 96(3) CPC. 22. In Punjab National Bank v. Laxmichand Rai ( AIR 2000 MP 301 at p. 304, para 9) the High Court held that: ''This provision of the Act shall prevail in the matter of filing an appeal and an appeal would not lie under the provisions of Section 96 CPC. Lok Adalat is conducted under an independent enactment and once the award is made by a Lok Adalat the right of appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act. Lok Adalat is conducted under an independent enactment and once the award is made by a Lok Adalat the right of appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act. When it has been specifically barred under provisions of Section 21(2), no appeal can be filed against the award under Section 96 CPC.'' The Court further stated that: (AIR pp. 304-05, para 14) ''14. It may incidentally be further seen that even the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for an appeal under Section 96(3) against a consent decree. The Code of Civil Procedure also intends that once a consent decree is passed by civil court finality is attached to it. Such finality cannot be permitted to be destroyed, particularly under the Legal Services Authorities Act, as it would amount to defeat the very aim and object of the Act with which it has been enacted. Hence, we hold that the appeal filed is not maintainable.'' 23. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that, in Board of Trustees of the Port of Visakhapatnam v. Presiding Officer, Permanent, Lok Adalat-cum-Secy., District Legal Services Authority [(2000) 5 An LT 577], the award is enforceable as a decree and it is final. On all force, the endeavour is only to see that the disputes are narrowed down and make the final settlement so that the parties are not again driven to further litigation or any dispute. Though the award of a Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest on merits just as a regular suit by a court in a regular trial is, however, it is as equal and on a par with a decree on compromise and will have the same binding effect and be conclusive. Just as the decree passed on compromise cannot be challenged in a regular appeal, the award of the Lok Adalat, being akin to the same, cannot be challenged by any of the regular remedies available under law, including by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution and challenging the correctness of the award, on any ground. Judicial review cannot be invoked in such awards, especially on the grounds as were raised in the revision petition. 24. The award of Lok Adalat is final and permanent which is equivalent to a decree executable, and the same is an ending to the litigation among parties. 25. Judicial review cannot be invoked in such awards, especially on the grounds as were raised in the revision petition. 24. The award of Lok Adalat is final and permanent which is equivalent to a decree executable, and the same is an ending to the litigation among parties. 25. In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [( 1956 SCR 72 ] the Constitution Bench held as follows: (SCR p. 82) A judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. (South American and Mexican Co., exp Bank of England, In re [(1895) 1 Ch. 37] & Kinch v. Walcott [1929 AC 482]) ''In South American and Mexican Co., exp Bank of England, In re, it has been held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J., Lord Herschell said (Ch p. 50): 'The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action.' To the like effect are the following observations of the Judicial Committee in Kinch v. Walcott (AC at p. 493): 'First of all Their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal.' '' 26. The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions. Reference need only be made to the cases of Secy. The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions. Reference need only be made to the cases of Secy. of State for India in Council v. Ateendranath Das ILR (1936) 63 Cal. 550 at p. 558; Bhaishanker Nanabhai v. Moraji Keshavji & Co. [ILR (1912) 36 Bom 283] and Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur v. Thatha Ramasamy Chetty [ILR (1912) 35 Mad. 75]. In the Calcutta case, after referring to the English decisions the High Court observed as follows: (Ateendranath Das case, ILR p. 558) ''On this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusions arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded. When we say 'every step in the reasoning' we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgment or the ultimate conclusion was founded. In other words the finding which it was necessary to arrive at for the purposes of sustaining the judgment in the particular case will operate as estoppel by judgment.'' 27. The Civil Procedure Code contains the following provisions: Order 23 Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit - where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, written and signed by the parties, the court after satisfying itself about the settlement, it can convert the settlement into a judgment decree. '' 24. In the above judgment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that if the Lok Adalat passes an award with the consent of the parties, no appeal shall lie therefrom, as provided under Section 96(3) CPC and furthermore, the same cannot be challenged any of the remedies available under law, including Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 25. In the above case, the Supreme Court held that Judicial Review cannot be invoked in such awards, especially on the grounds amounting to a challenge to the factual findings or appraisal of evidence. 25. In the above case, the Supreme Court held that Judicial Review cannot be invoked in such awards, especially on the grounds amounting to a challenge to the factual findings or appraisal of evidence. In a given case of this nature, when the learned Advocate representing the legal representatives of the deceased/claimants, as well as the claimants themselves have filed a separate affidavit, contending inter alia that when they preferred an appeal, for enhancement of Rs.5,90,000/-, particularly, claiming medical expenses, incurred, for which a lesser award has been made, a lesser contribution of the family, has been awarded, by application of a lesser multiplier and such other heads and also contended that there was no need for consenting for just Rs.40,000/- as enhancement before the Lok Adalat, when the appeal has been filed, seeking enhancement of Rs.5,90,000/-, it is just and necessary to consider the usage of the words, ''compromise '' and ''settlement '' in sub-Sections (3) (4) (5) and (6) of Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which are as follows: ''(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. (4) Every Lok Adalat shall while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and othe legal principles. (5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been receive under sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law. (6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to see in a court.'' 26. (6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advice the parties to see in a court.'' 26. In State of Punjab v. Ganpat Raj reported in AIR 2006 SC 3089 = 2007-2-L.W. 519, a Mandamus was sought for, directing the State of Punjab and others, to award interest on delayed payment of pension, arrears of pension, DCRG, computation of pension and arrears of GPF arrears and other retirement benefits. Being a pension matter, the Writ Petition was sent to Lok Adalat for settlement. Though the State of Punjab has filed a reply, the Lok Adalat awarded 12% interest for the delayed payment. A Writ Petition was filed by the State of Punjab, challenging the order, dated 04.02.2013, passed by the Lok Adalat in Civil No.943 of 2000. The same was dismissed, holding that the Writ Petition as misconceived. Though the High Court accepted that the disposal by the Lok Adalat was not the proper course, yet on merits, it held that the respondent therein (pensioner) was entitled to relief. Against the said decision, a Writ Appeal was filed by Ganapat Raj, Writ Petitioner. The matter was ultimately taken up to the Supreme Court, by the State of Punjab. In support of the appeal, it was contended that the matter ought not have been disposed of by the Lok Adalat, in view of the specific provision contained in Section 30 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. After extracting Section 20 of the Act, at Paragraphs 7 and 8, held as follows: ''7. The specific language used in sub-section G) of Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter by way of a compromise or settlement between the parties. Two crucial terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are "compromise" and "settlement". The former expression means settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Termes de la Ley, "compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy. The former expression means settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Termes de la Ley, "compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy. As per Bouvier it is "an agreement between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can agree upon". The word "compromise" implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total surrender. (See Re NFU Development Trust Ltd. (1973) 1 All ER 135(Ch.D). A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. "Settlement" is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent. The case at hand did not involve compromise or settlement and could not have been disposed of by Lok Adalat. If no compromise or settlement is or could be arrived at. no order can be passed bv the Lok Adalat. Therefore, the disposal of the Civil Writ Petition No. 943 of 2000 filed by respondent is clearly impermissible. 8. What was challenged in Writ Petition 16246 of 2004 to which this appeal relates related to the powers of disposal of cases by the Lok Adalat. In view of findings recorded that matter could not have been disposed of by the Lok Adalat, High Court ought to have directed restoration of writ petition filed by respondent, ie., Civil Writ Petition No.943 of 2000, for disposal in accordance with law.'' Thus, it could be seen from the latter judgment of the Apex Court in Ganpat Raj's case, the Supreme Court held that if there was no compromise, then the Lok Adalat ought not to have passed an award and such an award could be challenged by way of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But in the case on hand, the Writ Petition filed with a prayer to set aside the award passed by Lok Adalat-I, has been returned, with a suggestion to file a Civil Revision Petition and lateron, the maintainability of the same, has been questioned. Let me now consider the provision in the Civil Procedure Code, regarding "Review" jurisdiction and few case laws on the point. 27. Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with review and it reads as follows: ''114. Review. Let me now consider the provision in the Civil Procedure Code, regarding "Review" jurisdiction and few case laws on the point. 27. Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with review and it reads as follows: ''114. Review. - Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.'' 28. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC deals with application for review of judgment and the same is extracted hereunder: ''Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation.-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.'' 29. In Ajit Inder Singh v. Kuldip Kaur reported in 1995 AIHC 298, the power of review under Sections 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC can be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct an apparent error. 30. In M/s.Bharat Fritz Werners Ltd., v. Smt.Channawwa and Others reported in 1996 AIHC 1905, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court held that review can be allowed to rectify the inadvertent mistake. 31. In Grindlays Bank Ltd., v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal reported in 1980 (Supp.) SCC 420, the Supreme Court held that, ''The expression ''review'' is used in the two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debitio justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every court or Tribunal. The Tribunal's order setting aside its ex parte award amounts to a procedural review.'' 32. In M.M.Thomas v. State of Kerla reported in 2000 (1) SCC 666 , at Paragraph 14, the Supreme Court, held that, ''The High Court as a Court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A Court of record envelops all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court's power in that regard is plenary.'' 33. It is also worthwhile to extract paragraphs 15 to 17, in M.M.Thomas's case (cited supra), as follows: ''15. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 10, para 713) it is stated thus: ''The chief distinctions between superior and inferior courts are found in connection with jurisdiction. Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court. An objection to the jurisdiction of one of the superior courts of general jurisdiction must show what other court has jurisdiction, so as to make it clear that the exercise by the superior court of its general jurisdiction is unnecessary. The High Court, for example, is a court of universal jurisdiction and superintendency in certain classes of actions, and cannot be deprived of its ascendancy by showing that some other court could have entertained the particular action.'' (Though the above reference is to English courts the principle would squarely apply to the superior courts in India also.) 16. Referring to the said passage and relying on the decision of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar a two-Judge Bench of this Court in M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading (P) Ltd. has observed thus: (AIR Headnote) ''The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction .'' 17. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction .'' 17. If such power of correcting its own record is denied to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors its consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will dwindle down. Therefore, it is only proper to think that the plenary powers of the High Court would include the power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of the record. 34. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1967 SC 1 , a Nine Judge Bench of this Court has recognised the aforesaid superior status of the High Court, as a Court of plenary jurisdiction, being a court of record. 35. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertance. The words ''any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC '' must mean ''a reason sufficient on grounds atleast analogous to those specified in the rule. '' [Chajju Ram v. Neki [AIR 1922 PC 112= (1922) 16 L.W.37] and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [ AIR 1954 SC 526 ] 36. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. Such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. [T.C.Basappa v. T.Nagappa [ AIR 1954 SC 440 = (1954) 67 L.W. 613] and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque [ AIR 1955 SC 233 ] 37. In B.Dhanalakshmi v. M.Shajahan reported in AIR 2004 Mad. 512, at Paragraphs 11 and 12, held as follows: ''The power of review is available only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record and not on erroneous decision. If the parties aggrieved by the judgment on the ground that it is erroneous, remedy is only questioning the said order in appeal. 512, at Paragraphs 11 and 12, held as follows: ''The power of review is available only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record and not on erroneous decision. If the parties aggrieved by the judgment on the ground that it is erroneous, remedy is only questioning the said order in appeal. The power of review under O.47 R.1 CPC, may be opened inter alia only if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. The said power cannot be exercised as is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 're-heard and corrected'. A review application also cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'. Similarly, the error apparent on the face of the record must be such an error, which must strike one on mere looking at record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points, where there may conceivable be two options. '' 38. In Speed Ways Picture Pvt. Ltd., v. Union of India reported in 1996 (6) SCC 705 , the Supreme Court considered a case, as to whether an order passed on the basis of ''Minutes of order'' can be held a consent order and hence, whether it is appealable or reviewable. In the above case, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court passed an order, dismissing the appellant's Writ Petition, in terms of the ''Minutes of order'' tendered by learned counsel for the parties. It was the case of the appellant that the statement made in the first clause of the ''minutes of order'' was not correct, in that, the judgments mentioned therein were inapplicable to the facts of their case. Accordingly, the appellants filed a review petition and the High Court has taken the view that its order under review was passed on the basis of the consent of the parties which was recorded in the minutes of the order, duly singed by the learned counsel of the parties and therefore, the review petition was not maintainable. Accordingly, the appellants filed a review petition and the High Court has taken the view that its order under review was passed on the basis of the consent of the parties which was recorded in the minutes of the order, duly singed by the learned counsel of the parties and therefore, the review petition was not maintainable. On the above facts, the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 5 and 6, held as follows: ''As a courtesy to the Court, the practice of long standing is to put statements such as these in writing in the form of ''minutes of order'' which are tendered and on the basis of which the Court passes the order: ''Order in terms of minutes ''. The signatures of counsel upon ''minutes of order '' are intended for identification so as to make the order binding upon the parties' counsel represented. An order in terms of minutes is an order in invitum, not a consent order. It is appealable and may be reviewed. It would be a different matter if the order of the court was passed on ''Consent Terms'', ie., on a statement above the signatures of counsel which expressly stated it was ''by consent''. The order of the Court in such event would read: ''Order in terms of consent terms''.'' 39. In view of the above decisions and discussion, stated supra, this Court is of the view that a revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would not lie against the decree passed by the Lok Adalat, constituted under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987, as it is not a Court or Tribunal subordinate to High Court. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, conferred on the High Court is supervisory in nature over the Courts/Tribunals, throughout the territory of the High Court. A Lok Adalat constituted under the Act, presided over by a Retired Judge of this Court, cannot be said to be a Court subordinate to High Court. The award is passed in an appeal, which in the regular course, would be heard on merits and disposed of by a sitting Judge, but for the reference and settlement. The expression "for any other sufficient reason" in Section 114 CPC would be applicable to the facts of this case. The award is passed in an appeal, which in the regular course, would be heard on merits and disposed of by a sitting Judge, but for the reference and settlement. The expression "for any other sufficient reason" in Section 114 CPC would be applicable to the facts of this case. But at the same time, on the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that there is a miscarriage of justice and error apparent on the face of the record, that due to wrong understanding of the sum, agreed to be settled, a decree has been passed. High Court as the Court of record, has plenary jurisdiction to correct the error. When the appeal is filed for enhancement of compensation of Rs.5,90,000/-, on the grounds that the medical expenses claimed to the tune of Rs.1,04,411/-, has not been awarded, a lesser multiplier has been applied, contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court, for computing the loss of contribution to the family and other heads and in the light of the object of the Legal Services Authority Act,1987, this Court is of the view that if the order of the Lok Adalat is allowed to stand, then there would be a miscarriage of justice and it would be contrary to the intention of the beneficial legislation, to award just compensation, to the legal representatives of the deceased. Useful reference can be made to few decisions on 'Just Compensation', (i) In R.D.Hattangadi v. M/s.Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. , reported in AIR 1995 SC 755 , wherein, the Apex Court held as follows: "In its very nature whenever a Tribunal or a Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards." (ii) In Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India reported in 1999 (6) SCC 667 , at Paragraph 128, held as follows: ''The object of an award of damages is to give the plaintiff compensation for damage, loss or injury he has suffered. The elements of damage recognised by law are divisible into two main groups : pecuniary and non- pecuniary. The elements of damage recognised by law are divisible into two main groups : pecuniary and non- pecuniary. While the pecuniary loss is capable of being arithmetically worked out, the non-pecuniary loss is not so calculable. Non-pecuniary loss is compensated in terms of money, not as a substitute or replacement for other money, but as a substitute, what Mcgregor says, is generally more important than money: it is the best that a court can do. In Re: The Medianna (1900) A.C. 1300, Lord Halsbury L.C. observed as under: "How is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact sum of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident...But nevertheless the law recognises that as a topic upon which damages may be given." (iii) In yet another decision in Divisonal Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and another reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197 = 2004-2-L.W. 60, at Paragraph 12, the Supreme Court has held that, "Broadly speaking, in the case of death the basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses etc. and loss to the estate. The object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to the sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor should it be a source of profit for the person in whose favour it is awarded." At Paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held that, "Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just", a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness, and non-arbitrariness. If it is not so, it cannot be just." (iv) In Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S.Dhananka reported in (2009) 6 SCC 1 = 2010 ACJ 38 (SC) = 2009-4-L.W. 1, the Supreme Court, comprising of three Hon'ble Judges Bench was dealing with a case arising out of a complaint filed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. While enhancing the compensation awarded by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission from Rs.15 lakhs to Rs.1 crore, the Hon'ble Bench made the following observations which can appropriately be applied for deciding the petitions filed under Section 166 of the Act: ''We must emphasise that the court has to strike a balance between the inflated and unreasonable demands of a victim and the equally untenable claim of the opposite party saying that nothing is payable. Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not, come in the way of making a correct assessment, but if a case is made out, the court must not be chary of awarding adequate compensation. The ''adequate compensation '' that we speak of, must to some extent, be a rule of thumb measure, and as a balance has to be struck, it would be difficult to satisfy all the parties concerned....At the same time we often find that a person injured in an accident leaves his family in greater distress vis-'-vis a family in a case of death. In the latter case, the initial shock gives way to a feeling of resignation and acceptance, and in time, compels the family to move on. The case of an injured and disabled person is, however, more pitiable and the feeling of hurt, helplessness, despair and often destitution enures every day. In the latter case, the initial shock gives way to a feeling of resignation and acceptance, and in time, compels the family to move on. The case of an injured and disabled person is, however, more pitiable and the feeling of hurt, helplessness, despair and often destitution enures every day. The support that is needed by a severely handicapped person comes at an enormous price, physical, financial and emotional, not only on the victim but even more so on his family and attendants and the stress saps their energy and destroys their equanimity.'' (emphasis supplied) (v) In Reshma Kumari and others v. Madan Mohan reported in (2009) 13 SCC 422 , the Apex Court reiterated that the compensation awarded under the Act should be just and also identified the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below: ''The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the claimants are required to be compensated for the loss of their dependency, the same should not be considered to be a windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for determination of compensation as regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible should be based on certain principles. A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might have been chances of an immediate pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of employment was such that he might not have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. It is, rigid tests which should be applied in all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken into consideration including education of the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed societal conditions and global scenario, future prospects may have to be taken into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the multiplicand this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jashuben, 2008 ACJ 1097 (SC), held that even dearness allowance and perks with regard thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration. One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other developed countries in India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which may be taken into consideration for determining the actual ground reality. No hard-and-fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor." (emphasis supplied) 40. In the light of the above, this Court is of the view that the decision made by the Lok Adalat and consequently, the award made in C.M.A.No.3342 of 2009 has to be reviewed and hence, Registry is directed to number the petition as review petition and thereafter, place it before My Lord The Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders, regarding posting.