JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard Sri Prafulla Yadav, learned standing counsel on behalf of the petitioner and Sri I. B. Singh, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the claimant respondent. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been preferred by the State against the impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2006, passed by the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal Lucknow, reviewing its earlier judgment whereby, the claim petition preferred by the claimant respondent, was dismissed. Brief matrix of the present case is discussed hereinafter: 3. The claimant respondent was appointed as Police Constable in July, 1979. It is alleged that his work and conduct was satisfactory and no adverse entry was communicated to him during the service period. In 1986, the claimant respondent proceeded on 10 days sanctioned leave with effect from 28.12.1986. While reaching home, he found his wife ill and it is alleged that he remain busy in her treatment. According to pleading on record, the petitioner himself fell seriously ill on 26.2.1987 and remained under treatment till 15.12.1987. He approached the office to resume duty on 20.12.1987 alongwith fitness certificate dated 16.12.1987. He performed duty upto 26.1.1988. Thereafter the claimant respondent proceeded on 5 days sanctioned casual leave from 17.1.1988 but again he fell ill due to which departmental proceeding was initiated against him in absentia in view of the provision of U.P. Police Regulations. 4. During the course of inquiry, the factum of absence from duty was proved by the statement of Sukhpal Singh, Reserve Inspector. After inquiry, the petitioner was served two show-cause notices one dated 8.9.1988 and another dated 3/5.10.1988. In pursuance thereof, his services were dispensed with by the competent authority. The claimant respondent was dismissed from service. 5. According to counsel of the claimant respondent, the appeal preferred against the impugned order of dismissal before the D.I.G., was not decided in spite of reminders sent for the purpose. After waiting some time, the claimant respondent approached the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the claimant respondent stated that ‘’over stay’ was not without reason. Under compelling circumstances, he was over stayed. It is stated before the Tribunal that Superintendent of Police could not have entrusted the inquiry to an officer subordinate to him under para 490 of the U.P. Police Regulations. Before the Tribunal, the claimant respondent stated that ‘’over stay’ was not without reason. Under compelling circumstances, he was over stayed. It is stated before the Tribunal that Superintendent of Police could not have entrusted the inquiry to an officer subordinate to him under para 490 of the U.P. Police Regulations. The impugned order is not self speaking and is not in conformity with the provisions of para 490 (8) of the U.P. Police Regulations. It has further been pleaded before the Tribunal that the inquiry officer has not considered the factum with regard to serious illness of claimant respondents. It has further been pleaded that the departmental proceeding was held in absentia. 6. After exchange of affidavits and providing opportunity of hearing to parties, Tribunal had dismissed the claim petition for want of merit by the judgment and order dated 13.8.2003. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment and order, the claimant respondent preferred the Review Petition before the Tribunal which has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 21.11.2005. 7. While assailing the impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal, it has been vehemently argued by learned standing counsel Sri Prafulla Yadav, that the Tribunal has proceeded with de novo hearing of the case which is not permissible. 8. It is vehemently argued that every provisions contained in U.P. Police Regulations was considered by the earlier judgment of Tribunal and it was not open for the Tribunal while exercising power of review to reappreciate the evidence and record finding contrary to finding recorded by earlier judgment. 9. On the other hand, Sri I.B. Singh, learned Senior Counsel defended the impugned judgment on three grounds. Firstly, the Tribunal has rejected the objection of the petitioner vide order dated 21.11.2005 recording a finding that the review is maintainable. Secondly, the provisions of para 493 (c) have not been considered by the Tribunal while deciding the case and thirdly, the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the misconduct. 10. Coming to first limb of argument that the Tribunal had rejected the objection of the petitioner State vide order dated 21.11.2005 with regard to maintainability of review petition and makes out a case of non-interference by this Court. 11. There appears to be no room of doubt that the objection raised by the petitioners was rejected by the Tribunal, vide order dated 21.11.2005. 11. There appears to be no room of doubt that the objection raised by the petitioners was rejected by the Tribunal, vide order dated 21.11.2005. While passing the order dated 21.11.2005 the Tribunal had made the following observations : 9.We have gone through para-9 of the judgment under review. Regarding the provisions of Para 493 (c) of Police Regulations, it has been mentioned that the petitioner was not placed under suspension, therefore, there was no question of reinstating him under para-493 (c) of Police Regulations. It has been further added that the proceedings in the criminal Court of law and the disciplinary proceedings are two different proceedings and therefore the Superintendent of Police was well within his power to subject the petitioner to face his departmental trial under Section 7 of the Police Act and there is no legal flaw in it. It appears that later part of para-493 (c) was ignored according to which the Superintendent of Police may refer the matter to the Dy. Inspector General of Police and ask for permission to try the accused departmently for such negligence or unfitness. For Departmental proceedings permission of the Inspector General of Police should have been obtained but this was not done. This aspect was not considered by the Tribunal. It is clearly legal mistake or the mistake of law and apparent on record and on this ground by way of review the judgment and order dated 13.8.1993 can be corrected. 10.We have also perused para-10 of the judgment under review in which the provisions of para-490 (6) and 490 (8) have been discussed in which there is no mistake or error which can be termed as error apparent on the face of record, and can afford ground for review. 11.That what have been mentioned above, the review petition is partly allowed. Accordingly judgment and order dated 13.8.2003 is set aside. List the claim petition for final hearing on 9th December, 2005. Sd/- 21.11.2005 Sd/- 21.11.2005 (Ram Surat) (D.K. Verma) Hon’ble Judge Member (Admn.) Order signed, dated and pronounced in the open Court today. Sd/- 21.11.2005 Sd/- 21.11.2005 (Ram Surat) (D.K. Verma) Hon’ble Judge Member (Admn.)” 12. So far as the judgment and order dated 21.11.2005 is concerned, it merged with the final impugned decision of the Tribunal dated 24.11.2006. 13. It is trite law that question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage. Sd/- 21.11.2005 Sd/- 21.11.2005 (Ram Surat) (D.K. Verma) Hon’ble Judge Member (Admn.)” 12. So far as the judgment and order dated 21.11.2005 is concerned, it merged with the final impugned decision of the Tribunal dated 24.11.2006. 13. It is trite law that question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage. The decision taken and power exercised by the Tribunal while allowing the review petition and passing the impugned order, may be looked into while considering the final judgment. In case the Tribunal has decided the case under review while passing the impugned order against the provisions contained under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, then the validity of the impugned order, may be looked into by this Court, under power conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution. The supervisory power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, is unfettered and illegality committed by the Tribunal or subordinate authority, may be looked into and corrected at any stage. We are of the view that the writ petition seems to be maintainable even against the impugned order dated 24.11.2006. 14. Coming to the second limb of argument of the learned counsel for the claimant respondent that para 493 (c) was not taken into account while deciding the claim petition earlier. The argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of claimant respondent, seems to be misconceived and based on unfounded facts. While deciding the claim petition, pleading was raised and argument was advanced before the Tribunal with regard to provisions of para 493 (c). The Tribunal recorded a categorical finding with regard to applicability of para 493 (c). Para 9 of the Tribunal’s earlier judgment reveals that Tribunal has considered the provisions contained in para 493 (c) of the U.P. Police Regulations. For convenience, para 9 of judgment and order dated 13.8.2003, is reproduced as under : “9. The Tribunal recorded a categorical finding with regard to applicability of para 493 (c). Para 9 of the Tribunal’s earlier judgment reveals that Tribunal has considered the provisions contained in para 493 (c) of the U.P. Police Regulations. For convenience, para 9 of judgment and order dated 13.8.2003, is reproduced as under : “9. We have considered the argument with regard to non-observance of provisions of para 493 (c) of the Police Regulations which provides that if the accused has been judicially acquitted or discharged and the period for filing on appeal has elapsed and/or no appeal has been filed, the Superintendent of Police at once reinstate the person concerned, if he has been suspended; but should the finding of the Court not be inconsistent with the view that the accused has been guilty of negligence in, or unfitness for, the discharge of his duty within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act, the Superintendent of Police may refer the matter to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and ask for permission to try the accused departmentally for such negligence or unfitness. From the record available before us we find that since the petitioner was not placed under suspension, there was no question of reinstating him under Para 493 (c) of the Police Regulations. As has been stated in para 12 of the Rejoinder-affidavit, after submission of the final report in the case under Section 2 of the Police Act against the petitioner, action under Section 8 of the Police Act was taken against the petitioner under the order of the Superintendent of Police. The proceedings in the criminal Court of law and the disciplinary proceedings are two different proceedings and, therefore, the Superintendent of Police was well within his power to subject the petitioner to face his departmental trial under Section 7 of the Police Act and there is no legal flaw in it.” 15. The finding recorded by the Tribunal in earlier judgment (supra) with regard to para 493 (c) of the U.P. Police Regulations, cannot be looked into while exercising power under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. The Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC is reproduced as under : “ORDER XLVII REVIEW 1. The finding recorded by the Tribunal in earlier judgment (supra) with regard to para 493 (c) of the U.P. Police Regulations, cannot be looked into while exercising power under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. The Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC is reproduced as under : “ORDER XLVII REVIEW 1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved,— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (C) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.” 16. At the face of record, the Tribunal has considered the grounds raised by the claimant respondent while deciding the claim petition and dismissed by the judgment and order dated 13.8.2003 squarely on the same ground on which the claimant respondent preferred the review petition and Tribunal allowed the same. 17. Learned standing counsel relied upon the cases in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishah, AIR 1979 SC 1047 ; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Chowdhary, 1995 (1) SCC 170 ; Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi and others, 1997 (8) SCC 715 ; Hari Das v. Usha Rani Bonik and others, 1998 SCC (L&S) 562; 2006 (4) SCC 78 ; Niyas Ahmad Khan v. Mahmood Rahmat-Ulah Khan, 2008 (7) SCC 539 ; Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited v. Mawasi and others, 2012 (7) SCC 200 . 18. In case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra), their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held that power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review. 18. In case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra), their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held that power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent at the fact of record is found but it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. In the present case, there is no finding over the error apparent at the face of record and in consequence thereof, the power was exercised. 19. In the case of Meera Bhanja (supra), their lordships of Honble Supreme Court held that review must be confined to error apparent at the face of the record. Error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking of record without requiring any long drawn process of reasoning. 20. In the case of Parsion Devi (supra), their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted the law that error apparent at the face of record is one which is self evident and does not require a process of reasoning. Erroneous decision shall not warrant for rehearing of matter. 21. In the case of Hari Das (supra), their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court held that during the course of judicial review, it is not permissible to reappreciate the evidence on record. 22. In the case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited (supra), their lordhsips of Hon’ble Supreme Court while reiterating aforesaid principle held that it is not permissible for the Courts while exercising power of review to reappreciate evidence or review inquiry or de novo hearing. 23. Learned counsel for the claimant respondents submits that Tribunal has relied upon U.P. Police Regulations and held that earlier judgment and order called for review since it is not a case of absence from leave but it is a case of unfitness to resume duty. From the factual matrix of record it appears that the chargesheet was served on the claimant respondents with regard to absence from leave. It is not a case where relevant provisions relied upon by the Tribunal with regard to unfitness of employee is attracted. 24. From the factual matrix of record it appears that the chargesheet was served on the claimant respondents with regard to absence from leave. It is not a case where relevant provisions relied upon by the Tribunal with regard to unfitness of employee is attracted. 24. Coming to the last limb of argument of learned counsel for the claimant respondents that the punishment awarded to the claimant respondent is disproportionate to the misconduct committed. We are afraid to accept the argument of the learned Senior Counsel. We are deciding a writ petition preferred against the judgment and order of the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under review. Accordingly, we are of the view that while exercising power conferred under Article 226/227 of the Constitution scrutinizing the validity of order under review, the question with regard to proportionate of punishment cannot be looked into. More so, when we are of the view that the review was entertained and decided beyond the statutory limits provided under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. In view of the above, we are of the view that the Tribunal has exceeded jurisdiction while deciding the review petition and passing the impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2006. 25. Accordingly, we allow the writ petition and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 24.11.2006. As a natural consequence, the original judgment and order dated 13.8.2003 shall cover the field. 26. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No orders as to costs. —————