JUDGMENT 1. This Second appeal is focused by the plaintiff animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 01.08.2012 passed in A.S.No.23 of 2011 by the Principal Subordinate Court, Tiruvannamalai, reversing the judgment and decree of the Principal District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai in O.S.No.177 of 2009. 2. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this Second Appeal would run thus: (a) The appellant, who is the plaintiff, filed the suit for permanent injunction seeking the following reliefs, describing the schedule of property as under: "(i) To grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants from in any manner interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property for ever; and (ii) For costs." (extracted as such) SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY Tiruvannamalai R.D., Sub-D-I, Tiruvannamalai Taluk,At Vellanandal Village 01. New S.No.51/6 (old S.No.37/8) 0.02.0 hectare including a well and the oil engine fitted in the well." on the main ground that the suit property belongs to the plaintiff exclusively. (b) The suit property is situated in S.No.37/8 and this property along with other properties originally belonged to one Iyangar Gounder, who died six decades ago leaving behind his five sons namely (1) Sevi Gounder, (2) Narayana Gounder, (3) Manicka Gounder, (4) Duraisamy Gounder and (5) Arjunan Gounder, and they were in possession and enjoyment of those properties as co-owners. They orally partitioned the properties into five shares five decades ago. In the said oral partition, the shares in S.No.37/8 were allotted as under: 1. Sevi Gounder 19 cents 2. Narayana Gounder 19 cents 3. Manicka Gounder 12-1/2 cents 4. Duraisamy Gounder 13 cents 5. Arjunan Gounder 16-1/2 cents; and all those five sharers were allotted 1/5th share each in the well in S.No.37/8. The plaintiff being the son of the said Narayana Gounder, purchased the remaining four shares from the other co-sharers and deepened the well by spending huge amount. However, subsequently the defendants started interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. (c) Per contra, written statement was filed by the first defendant and the same was adopted by his sons/D2 and D3. A thumb-nail sketch of the same would run thus: There was no oral partition as alleged in the plaint. However, subsequently the defendants started interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. (c) Per contra, written statement was filed by the first defendant and the same was adopted by his sons/D2 and D3. A thumb-nail sketch of the same would run thus: There was no oral partition as alleged in the plaint. However, there was oral partition between the brothers namely Iyangar Gounder and Rama Gounder. Iyanger Gounder was allotted 80 cents in S.No.37/8 and only half right in the well in S.No.37/8. After the death of Iyangar Gounder, each of his sons were entitled to 1/10th share in the well and not 1/5th share in the well. Rama Gounder died leaving behind his three sons, namely (1) Vellaiya Gounder (2) Ayyasamy Gounder and (3) Ponnusamy Gounder and as such, they were irrigating their lands in S.No.37/2 and 37/7 by making use of their right over the half share in the said well. There was a court auction at the instance of the said Ponnusamy Gounder and in that the suit property was not mentioned as the one included in the property brought for sale. Samikannu Gounder happened to be the purchaser in the court auction sale and there is no specification about his right over the well situated in S.No.37/8. Subsequently, Samikannu Gounder sold the property to Ponnusamy Gounder. D1 is the son of Ponnusamy Gounder and D2 and D3 are the sons of D1. (d) There are other details also found set out in the written statement highlighting that there was a serious title dispute over the suit property. (e) The trial Court framed the relevant issues. (f) Up went the trial, during which the plaintiff/Raman examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.Ws.2 and 3 and Exs.A1 to A11 were marked; and the first defendant/Sivalingam examined himself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2/Elumalai and Exs.B1 to B5 were marked. 4. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit, as against which the appeal was filed by the defendants; whereupon the appellate Court allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the Original Suit. 5. 4. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit, as against which the appeal was filed by the defendants; whereupon the appellate Court allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the Original Suit. 5. Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, this Second Appeal has been focused on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in holding that the plaintiff prayed for declaration when the title to the property has not been denied by the defendants especially when the plaintiff have proved the title by producing sale deeds under Exhibit A.1 to Exhibit A.3? (2) Whether the Lower Appellate Court acting merely on revenue records which do not confer title on the defendant is correct in dismissing the suit? (3) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in holding that the Appellant should have filed an appeal against the adverse findings of the judgment of the trial Court especially when the plaintiff has succeeded in the suit and obtained a decree as prayed for? (4) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in reversing the well considered judgment of the trial Court in the absence of any right in favour of the defendants and as admitted by the defendants themselves that have not purchased any right in 2 cents of land in the suit property in which the well is situated? (5) Whether as the appellant has proved his 4/5th share right and title over the suit well could he maintain the suit against the respondents who have not right or title on the suit well and also admitted by themselves in their pleadings?" (extracted as such) 6. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would pyramid his argument, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: (a) The first appellate Court failed to consider the fact that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the entire property in S.No.37/8 and also the entire well. While so, without any valid reason, the Court simply set aside the order of the lower Court dismissing the original suit. Even now the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the entire suit well, as well as the property described in the schedule of the plaint. While so, without any valid reason, the Court simply set aside the order of the lower Court dismissing the original suit. Even now the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the entire suit well, as well as the property described in the schedule of the plaint. (b) Virtually the defendants in the written statement admitted the fact that the suit well is situated in S.No.37/8. As such, the appellate Court was erroneous in dismissing the original suit after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 7. At the outset, I would like to fumigate my mind with the recent decision of the Hon'ble Court reported in 2012 (8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]; an excerpt from it would run thus: "59. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 , this Court explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under: (SCC p.103, para 13) "13......The word "substantial" prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties ......any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law......There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case." (emphasis added) 8. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of one other precedent of the Hon'ble Apex reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 [Gian Chand and brother and another v. Rattan Lal alias Rattan Singh]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "23. The said aspect can be looked from another angle. My mind is redolent and reminiscent of one other precedent of the Hon'ble Apex reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 [Gian Chand and brother and another v. Rattan Lal alias Rattan Singh]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "23. The said aspect can be looked from another angle. Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order 8 form an integral code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. It is obligatory on the part of the defendant to specifically deal with each allegation in the plaint and when the defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. It is clearly postulated therein that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiffs but he must be specific with each allegation of fact (see Badat and Co. v. East India Trading co. [ AIR 1964 SC 538 ]). 24. Rule 4 stipulates that a defendant must not evasively answer the point of substance. It is alleged that if he receives a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received, and that if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances. Rule 5 deals with specific denial and clearly lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted against him. 25. We have referred to the aforesaid Rules of pleading only to highlight that in the written statement, there was absolutely evasive denial. We are not proceeding to state whether there was admission or not, but where there is total evasive denial and an attempt has been made to make out a case in adducing the evidence that he was not aware whether the signatures were taken or not, it is not permissible. We are not proceeding to state whether there was admission or not, but where there is total evasive denial and an attempt has been made to make out a case in adducing the evidence that he was not aware whether the signatures were taken or not, it is not permissible. In this context, we may profitably refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar wherein, while dealing with the pleadings of election case, this Court has held thus: (SCC p.693, para 73) "73. In our opinion, the approach of the High Court was not correct. It failed to apply the legal principles as contained in Order 8 Rules 3 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court had also not analysed the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant in this behalf in detail but merely rejected the same summarily stating that vague statements had been made by some witnesses. Once it is held that the statements made in Para 18 of the election petition have not been specifically denied or disputed in the written statement, the allegations made therein would be deemed to have been admitted, and, thus, no evidence contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith could have been permitted to be laid." We may state with profit that in the said case, reliance was placed on Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co." 9. Unless there is any substantial question of law is involved, the question of entertaining the second appeal would be a well neigh impossibility. 10. A mere running of the eye over the plaint, would reveal that the plaint itself refers to a very serious title dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff tried to project as though the suit property was allotted to the five sharers, namely (1) Sevi Gounder, (2) Narayana Gounder, (3) Manicka Gounder, (4) Duraisamy Gounder and (5) Arjunan Gounder, all sons of Iyanger Gounder. The defendants would specifically state that the suit well was divided into two parts, in which one half share was allotted to Iyangar Gounder and the other half share was allotted to Iyangar Gounder's brother, namely Rama Gounder, who had three sons, namely (1) Vellaiya Gounder (2) Ayyasamy Gounder and (3) Ponnusamy Gounder. D1 is the son of Ponnusamy Gounder; D2 and D3 are the sons of D1. D1 is the son of Ponnusamy Gounder; D2 and D3 are the sons of D1. When such is the factual position, there is nothing to indicate and exemplify that the defendants admitted the absolute ownership of the plaintiff over the well. In fact, tooth and nail the defendants fought the case and resisted it disputing the averments/allegations of the plaintiff that the entire well belonged to Iyangar Gounder. In the plaint also there is one reference to the said Samikannu Gounder having purchased some property in court auction sale. Similarly in the written statement there is one reference to Samikannu Gounder being described as the court auction purchaser, however, without referring to the suit well. As such, a mere reading of it would indicate and exemplify that there was complicate title dispute relating to the suit property. Without a prayer for declaration the suit should not have been decreed. Adding fuel to the fire, the trial Court after giving a finding as though the plaintiff is entitled to 4/5th share granted injunction. It is not known as to how one co-owner could get injunction as against another co-owner. 11. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the judgment of the Madurai Bench of this Court reported in 2007(4) CTC 70 [Chinna Nachiappan and another v. PL. Lakshmanan], an excerpt from it would run thus: "14. Not to put too fine a point on it, right at the outset, I may proceed to refer to the averments in the plaint at paragraph Nos.4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 which unambiguously and unequivocally referred to a serious title disputes between the plaintiff and the defendants. Paragraph No.8 is extracted hereunder for ready reference: "Though joint patta had been issued to the plaintiff and his pangalis have been and are in possession as per the partition among themselves. Thus the suit property continues to be in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff." 15. The above extract from the plaint itself, is sufficient to non-suit the plaintiff in view of having not prayed for declaration of title. It is trait proposition of law that if the plaint itself contains the averments relating to title disputes between the plaintiff and the defendants, the former cannot simply pray for protecting his alleged possession by filing a Suit for injunction. He should necessarily pray for declaration of his title. It is trait proposition of law that if the plaint itself contains the averments relating to title disputes between the plaintiff and the defendants, the former cannot simply pray for protecting his alleged possession by filing a Suit for injunction. He should necessarily pray for declaration of his title. In this connection, Order 2, Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure, could fruitfully be referred to and it is extracted hereunder for ready reference: "2. Suit to include the whole claim – Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the Suit within the jurisdiction of any Court." 16. Hence, in this view of the matter, the substantial question of law could rightly be decided to the effect that the original Suit is bad for absence of a prayer for declaration of title." 12. A mere reading of it would show that if there is serious title dispute, the bare injunction suit should be dismissed. Accordingly, the first appellate Court correctly au fait with law dismissed the original suit after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 13. The pertinent point to be noted here is that even though the trial Court did not accept the alleged absolute ownership of the plaintiff and his right to get permanent injunction as prayed for, yet no appeal was filed assailing the legal soundness of the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, but only the defendants filed the appeal and got set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and ultimately the original suit itself. 14. In such a case, I am at a loss to understand as to how a Second Appeal could be filed by the plaintiff claiming as though he is the absolute owner of the entire well including the suit property. As such, the Second Appeal is a misconceived one and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant would make an extempore submission after hearing this judgment pronounced, that liberty might be given to the plaintiff to file a regular suit with appropriate prayer. It is open for him to do the needful as per law, if law permits so.