1. In case petitions, common questions of law and fact are involved, therefore, are be again accused common judgment. 2. Petitioners through the medium of petitions under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. sought quashment of order dated 30.05.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge Reasi in five Criminal Revisions titled as "(1) Susheetal Abrol v. Rajesh Gandotra, (2) Susheetal Abrol v. Gopal Krishan, (3) Susheetal Abrol v. Sudesh Kumar, (4) Susheetal Abrol v. Harnarn Singh and (5) Susheetal Abrol v. Bodh Raj, which came to be allowed and orders passed in the complaints came to be set aside on the grounds taken in the petitions (for short impugned order). Brief facts: 3. Petitioners, namely, Harnam Singh, Bodh Raj, Sudesh Kumar, Gopal Krishan and Rajesh Gandotra filed complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, N.I.Act) against Susheetal Abrol, respondent No.1 hereinbefore Chief Judicial Magistrate, Reasi. After examining the complaints and statements of witnesses, trial Court i.e. Learned CJM Reasi has issued process against accused-respondent No.1 for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 N.I. Act. 4. Feeling aggrieved with the said order, respondent No.1 questioned the same before the Learned Sessions Judge, Reasi by medium of five separate Revision Petitions, which came to be disposed of by setting aside orders of drawing of cognizance and issuing process against accused-respondent No.1 on the following grounds:- (i) That trial Court was lacking territorial jurisdiction; (ii) That the statements of complainants were not recorded on oath; (iii) That the complaints were presented before the expiry of timeframe, i.e. 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Thus, same were premature. 5. It is profitable to reproduce Sections 138 of Chapter XVII of N.I. Act herein:- CHAPTER XVII OF PENALTIES IN CASE OF DISHONOUR OF CERTAIN CHEQUES FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNTS Section: 138. Thus, same were premature. 5. It is profitable to reproduce Sections 138 of Chapter XVII of N.I. Act herein:- CHAPTER XVII OF PENALTIES IN CASE OF DISHONOUR OF CERTAIN CHEQUES FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNTS Section: 138. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for "a term which may extend to two year", or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) The payee or the holder induce course of the cheque, as the ease may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer, of the cheque, "within thirty days" of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheques as unpaid, and (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Presumption in favour of holder It shall be presumed, unless the Contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability. 6. Presumption in favour of holder It shall be presumed, unless the Contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability. 6. While going through aforesaid Chapter XVII of N.I. Act, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that it provides a complete code and contains a mechanism as to how the complaints are to be presented, when notice is to be issued and which Court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance and issue process. 7. At this stage, the averments contained in the complaint read with preliminary statements are to be taken into consideration by the Court. Accused-respondent No. 1 has no role to play till process is issued. My this view is fortified by the judgment of Apex Court in cases titled Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar and another reported in AIR 1960 SC 1113 , Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and another reported in AIR 1963 SC 1430 , Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivlingappa Konjalgi and others reported in AIR 1976 SC 1947 , K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another reported in AIR 1992 SC 2206 , Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and others reported in AIR 2004 SC 4674 and case titled Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia and another v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel and others reported in 2012 AIR SCW 5314. It is apt to reproduce Para No. 14 of the judgment reported in AIR 2004 SC 4674 herein:- "14. But after taking cognizance of the complaint and examining the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with the complaint he can issue process by way of summons under section 204 of the Code. Therefore what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under section 204 is the satisfaction of the Magistrate either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under section 202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint hence issue the process under section 204 of the Code. Therefore what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under section 204 is the satisfaction of the Magistrate either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under section 202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint hence issue the process under section 204 of the Code. In none of these stages the Code has provided for hearing the summoned accused, for obvious reasons because this is only a preliminary stage and the stage of hearing of the accused would only arise at a subsequent stage provided for in the latter provision in the Code. It is true as held by this Court in Mathew's case before issuance of summons the Magistrate should be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint but that satisfaction is to be arrived at by the inquiry conducted by him as contemplated under sections 200 and 202, and the only stage of dismissal of the complaint arises under section 203 of the Code at which stage the accused has no role to play therefore the question of the accused on receipt of summons approaching the court and making an application for dismissal of the complaint under section 203 of the Code for a reconsideration of the material available on record is impermissible because by then Section 203 .is already over and the Magistrate has proceeded further to Section 204 stage." It is also apt to reproduce to para 24 and 25 of the judgment reported in 2012 AIR SCW 5314 herein:- 24. In Chandra Deo Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 1430 ), a four-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider Section 202 of the old Code. The Court referred to the earlier decision of this Court in Vadilal Panchal ( AIR 1960 SC 1113 ) and few previous decisions, namely, Parmanand Brahmachari v. Emperor, Radha Kishun Sao v. S.K. Misra and Anr., Ramkisto Sahu v. The State of Bihar, Emperor v. J.A. Finan. The Court referred to the earlier decision of this Court in Vadilal Panchal ( AIR 1960 SC 1113 ) and few previous decisions, namely, Parmanand Brahmachari v. Emperor, Radha Kishun Sao v. S.K. Misra and Anr., Ramkisto Sahu v. The State of Bihar, Emperor v. J.A. Finan. Baidya Nath Singh v. Muspratt and others and it was held that the object of provisions of Section 202 (corresponding to present Section 202 of the Code) was to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued or not and to remove from his mind any hesitation that he may have felt upon the mere perusal of the complaint and the consideration of the complainant's evidence on oath. It was Further held that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. 25. In Smt. Nagawwa ( AIR 1976 SC 1947 ), this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of the inquiry by the Magistrate under Section 202 of the old Code. This Court referred to the earlier two decisions in Vadilal Panchal ( AIR 1960 SC 1113 ) and Chandra Deo Singh ( AIR 1963 SC 1430 ) and in para 4 of the Report held as under: "4. It would thus be clear from the two decisions of this Court that the scope of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is extremely limited — limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or Falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint— (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not." 8. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not." 8. It is alleged in all the complaints that accused issued the cheques at Reasi and same were presented in J&K Bank at Reasi for payment, were sent to the concerned bank for payment, and received back by the said Bank with an endorsement "insufficient funds" and returned unpaid by the said Bank at Reasi. 9. The ingredients of offence punishable under Section 138 NI Act are:- (i) The cheque must have been issued in favour of the payee; (ii) The cheque must have been issued in discharge either in whole or in part for legally recoverable debt of liability; (iii) The cheque should be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (iv) The cheque is returned by the bank unpaid either because the amount of money is insufficient to draw the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account; (v) The payee/holder in due course makes a demand for the payment by giving a notice in writing to the drawee within fifteen days from receipt of information by him from the bank regarding return of the cheque; and (vi) The drawer fails to make payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice. 10. As per the mandate of Sections 138 to 147 N.I. Act, following Court has the jurisdiction. At a place where cheque is issued; where cheque is returned back as unpaid; where drawer resides or payee resides; or at the place where either of them carries on business. 11. Apex Court in case K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in 1999 (8) Supreme 608 , held herein in paras 12, 13 and 17. "12. We fail to comprehend as to how the Trial Court could have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. 11. Apex Court in case K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan reported in 1999 (8) Supreme 608 , held herein in paras 12, 13 and 17. "12. We fail to comprehend as to how the Trial Court could have found so regarding the jurisdiction question. Under Section 177 of the Code "every offence shall ordinarily he inquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed." The locality where the bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criteria to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them carries on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any particular locality as the place of occurrence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. 13. Even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177 itself has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary word 'ordinarily' to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a Court having jurisdiction over any of those localities. The provision has further widened the scope by stating that in case where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area the Court in either of the localities can exercise jurisdiction to try the case. Further again, Section 179 of the Code stretches its scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus: 179. Further again, Section 179 of the Code stretches its scope to a still wider horizon. It reads thus: 179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. -When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 17. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act." 12. This Court in Poonam Manshani v. J&K Bank Ltd. and others reported in 2008 (2) JKJ HC-352 held that the Court within whose jurisdiction the cheque is presented before the Bank for payment has also the jurisdiction. 13. Revisional Court has also held that recording of preliminary statements of complainant and witnesses on oath was mandatory; and cognizance drawn and process issued on the basis of the complaint read with the statements of complainant and preliminary statements of the witnesses without oath is illegal, is not correct view. 14. This Court in a judgment passed in Cr. Rev. Pet. No.26/2012 titled Sheikh Mohammad Amin and others v. Mst Rifat Farooq, incidentally, I am the author of the judgment, held that without recording statements on oath process can be issued and that cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings. It is apt to reproduce paras Nos.10, 11, 15 and 16 as under:- "10. While going through the provision of Section 142, it becomes clear that it has overriding effect and provides how to take cognizance. It is specifically provided therein that the court can take cognizance upon a complaint made in writing. Section 144 of the Act prescribes as to how the summon is to be issued. While going through the provision of Section 142, it becomes clear that it has overriding effect and provides how to take cognizance. It is specifically provided therein that the court can take cognizance upon a complaint made in writing. Section 144 of the Act prescribes as to how the summon is to be issued. The aforesaid provisions of the Act nowhere provide that recording of preliminary statement of the complainant or any witness at the time of taking cognizance or, otherwise while drawing the process; statements have to be recorded on oath. It is nowhere provided therein that preliminary statement of the complainant or witnesses has to be recorded. This Act is a special Act and has its purpose. The aim and object of the Act is to prevent commission of commercial offences and put a check on bouncing of cheques. The technicalities, mystic maybes, procedural wrangles and tangles have no role to play in dealing with complaints filed under the provisions of the Act. The apex Court in case titled M/s Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd., reported in AIR 2001 SC 676 , has laid down the same principle. It would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant paragraph of the judgment hereunder: "3. The Act was enacted and Section 138 thereof incorporated with a specified object of making a special provision by incorporating a strict liability so far as the cheque, a negotiable instrument, is concerned. The law relating to negotiable instrument is the law of commercial world legislated to facilitate the activities in trade and commerce making provision of giving sanctity to the instruments of credit which could be deemed to be convertible into money and easily passable from one person to another. In the absence of such instruments, including a cheque, the trade and commerce activities, in the present day would, are likely to be adversely affected as it is impracticable for the trading community to carry on with it the bulk of the currency in force. The negotiable instruments are in fact the instruments of credit being convertible on account of legality of being negotiated and are easily passable from one hand to another. The negotiable instruments are in fact the instruments of credit being convertible on account of legality of being negotiated and are easily passable from one hand to another. To achieve the objectives of the Act, the legislature has, in its wisdom, thought it proper to make such provisions in the Act for conferring such privileges to the mercantile instruments contemplated under it and provide special penalties and procedure in case the obligations under the instruments are not discharged. The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, required to be interpreted in the light of the objects intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviations from the general law and the procedure provided for the redressal of the grievances to the litigants. Efforts to defeat the objectives of law by resorting to innovative measures and methods are to be discouraged, lest it may affect the commercial and mercantile activities in a smooth and healthy manner, ultimately affecting the economy of the country." The Supreme Court in another case titled Rosy v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 2000 SC 637 , again, expressed a similar view. Paragraph 45 of the said judgment is fruitfully reproduced hereunder: 45. Further, the aforesaid interpretation would be in consonance with Chapter XXXV of the Cr. P.C. which deals with irregularities in the proceedings, which may or may not vitiate the proceedings. Sections 460 and 461 provide which irregularities would or would not vitiate the proceedings. In these sections, there is no mention of Section 202. For our purpose reference to Section 465 would suffice, which inter alia specifically provides that irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, order or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry shall not be a ground for reversing order passed by the competent Court, unless in the opinion of that Court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-section (2) further provides that in determining whether any irregularity in proceedings has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Sub-section (2) further provides that in determining whether any irregularity in proceedings has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Hence, the statute does not expressly provide for nullification of the order as a consequence of non-compliance of proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 202, but provides that unless prejudice is caused, the order is not to be set aside. This would mean that during inquiry under Section 202 when Magistrate examines the witnesses on oath, as far as possible proviso is to be complied with but the mandate is not absolute." 11. Then again, the apex Court, while dealing with a similar case titled K.M. Ibrahim v. K.P. Mohammad & anr., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 7500, read with other provisions contained in Chapter XVII of the Act, held that it is a special Act and the purpose cannot be defeated by mere technicalities or any other ground. 15. This Court also in a case titled Mohammad Yousuf Bhat v. Mohammad Maqbool Kumar, reported in 2010(1) S.L.J. page 171 : 2010 (2) JKJ HC-125, laid down that the proceedings drawn under Section 138 of the Act are special in nature and cannot be defeated on the ground which has lost significance. It would be useful to reproduce paragraph 5 of the judgement: "Chapter XVI Code of Criminal Procedure 19, deals with the procedure to be followed by Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence in a complaint. Section 200 requires the Magistrate to examine the complainant and the witness(s), if any, upon oath. The code does not define :Oath" not does it lay down the form or contents of "the oath". The ground urged in the petition thus makes it imperative to refer to the Judicial Oath's rules, 1950 Svt. (1894 AD). Rule 3 enumerates the authorities empowered to administer Oaths and affirmations in discharge of their duties. Rule 4 identifies the person who may be administered Oath or affirmation. Rule 5 lays down that a witness instead of making an Oath may make an affirmation. Rule 6 provides forms of Oaths and Aspiration. (1894 AD). Rule 3 enumerates the authorities empowered to administer Oaths and affirmations in discharge of their duties. Rule 4 identifies the person who may be administered Oath or affirmation. Rule 5 lays down that a witness instead of making an Oath may make an affirmation. Rule 6 provides forms of Oaths and Aspiration. Rule 12 of the Act provides that omission to make Oath or affirmation and irregularity in administering Oath or affirmation or irregularity in the form in which it is administered, does not invalidate proceedings or render inadmissible evidence. In the present case the complainant and his witness have made their statements on solemn affirmation. On taking holistic view of the Judicial Oaths Rules it follows that recording statement of the complainant or witness on solemn affirmation instead of Oath, does not have any negative fall out for the proceedings. Even if solemn affirmation may not be taken as substitute for oath, the omission or irregularity does not affect the validity of proceedings or the order taking cognizance of the offence on a complaint." In 1952 Supreme Court 54 (55) It has been held that omission to administer oath even to an adult goes only to credibility of the witness not his competence. The reliance placed on 2006 (11) 571 by learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced for the reasons that in the reported case the statement of the complainant and witness was seemingly not recorded on Oath and not even on solemn affirmation. It was held in the said background that the statement of the complainant and witness was not to form basis for issuance of process. In 1979, Allahabad Law Journal 880 (885), it has been held that where statement is recorded on solemn affirmation, it could not be assailed on ground that Oath was not administered in as much as omission to administer the Oath or make any affirmation does not invalidate the proceedings." 16. The same view has been taken by the apex Court in a case reported in AIR 2009 SC 422 , which has been discussed in detail by one of the Coordinate Benches of this Court while dismissing the 561-A Cr.P.C. petition No. 44/2009 filed by the petitioners herein." 15. Now coming to third point that complaints were premature. The same view has been taken by the apex Court in a case reported in AIR 2009 SC 422 , which has been discussed in detail by one of the Coordinate Benches of this Court while dismissing the 561-A Cr.P.C. petition No. 44/2009 filed by the petitioners herein." 15. Now coming to third point that complaints were premature. It is held by the revisional Court that complaints were premature for the reasons that those were presented before the expiry of timeframe. 16. Remedy under Section 138 to 147 of the N.I. Act is a special remedy and N.I. Act was enacted with a specified object of making a special provision by incorporation a strict liability so far as the cheque, a negotiable instrument, is concerned. 17. Keeping in view the purpose, aim and object of Sections 138 to 147 of the NI Act of Chapter XVII, complaint cannot be defeated on mere technicalities and others frivolous grounds. Even if complaint is presented before the expiry of statutory period and till objections are raised that period is over, it cannot be dismissed on the said ground. 18. The Apex Court in judgment titled Mis Dalmia Cement (Bharat Ltd.) v. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd., reported in AIR 2001 SC 676 has laid some guidelines. 19. Apex Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani and another reported in AIR 2000 SC 2946 has laid down some principals and held that mere presentation of the complaint in the Court cannot be held to mean that its cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate. If the complaint is found to be premature, it can await till expiry of timeframe or be returned to the complainant for filing later and its mere presentation at an earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed. 20. Apex Court in case titled as Sarav Investment and Financial Consultancy Private Limited and another v. Llyod Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund and another reported in (2007) 14 SCC 753 also held that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act contains a penal provision and creates vicarious liability. 21. 20. Apex Court in case titled as Sarav Investment and Financial Consultancy Private Limited and another v. Llyod Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund and another reported in (2007) 14 SCC 753 also held that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act contains a penal provision and creates vicarious liability. 21. Apex Court after noticing series of judgments in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey and another reported in AIR 2012 SC 2508 held that questions formulated in the said judgment require to be examined by a larger bench and, accordingly, direction was issued to the Registry to place the file before the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Bench. 22. It is apt to reproduce paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment reported in AIR 2012 SC 2508 . "12. It follows that a complaint filed before the expiry of the stipulated period of 15 days was not a valid complaint for purposes of Section 142 of the Act. To that extent, therefore, the view taken in the two decisions referred to above are at variance with each other. That apart, the decision in Narsingh Das Tapadia (supra) does not, in our opinion, correctly state the legal position and may require a fresh look by a larger Bench of this Court. The cleavage in the judicial opinion on the question does not appear to be confined to the judgments of this Court alone. 13. Judicial opinion on the question is split even among the High Courts in the country. For instance, the High Court of Calcutta in Sandip Guha v. Saktipada Ghosh 2008 (3) CHN 214 , High Court of Orissa in Niranjan Sahoo v. Utkal Sanitary, BBSR, [Crl. Misc. Case No.889 of 1996, decided on 13th February, 1998], High Court of Bombay in Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. NarayanDhondu Joglekar and Anr. 1994 (3) Bom CR 355, High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ashok Verma v. Ritesh Agro Pvt. Ltd. 1995 (1) Bank CLR 103 and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in N. Venkata Sivaram Prasad v. Rajeswari Constructions 1996 Cri.L.J. 3409 (A.P.) have taken the view that a complaint filed within 15 days of the notice period was premature and hence liable to be quashed. 14. 14. The High Court of Allahabad on the other hand has taken a contrary-view in Smt. Hem Lata Gupta v. State of UP & Anr. 2002 Cri. L.J. 1522 (All) and held that cognizance taken on the basis of a complaint filed within 15 days of the notice period was perfectly in order if such cognizance wastaken after the expiry of the said period. To the same effect are the decisions of High Court of Allahabad in Ganga Ram Singh v. State of UP. & Ors. 2005 Cri.L.J. 3681 (All), High Court of Gauhati in Yunus Khan v. Mazhar Khan, [2004 (1) GLT 652], High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in Mahendra Agarwal v. Gopi Ram Mahajan, [RLW 2003 (1) Raj 673], High Court of Delhi in Zenith fashions Makers (P) Ltd. v. Ultimate Fashion Makers Ltd. and Anr., [121 (2005) DLT 297], High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Benchin Bapulal v. Krapachand Jain, 2004 Cri. L.J. 1140, High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Rattan Chand v. Kanwar Ram Kripal and Anr. 2010 Cri.L.J. 706 and High Court of Madras in I.S.P. Solutions India (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Kuppuraj, 2006 Cri. L.J. 3711. 15. It is noteworthy that the same High Court has in certain cases taken different views on the subject. For instance the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has in Harpreet Hosiery Rehari v. Nitu Mahajan, 2000 Cri.L.J. 3625 held that dismissal of complaint on ground of that the same is premature is valid; while in S. Janak Singh v. Pritpal Singh, 2007 (2) JKJ HC-91, it has held that cognizance taken on a complaint filed before expiry of 15 days of the notice, after the expiry of the said period is permissible. A similar difference of opinion can also be seen in two decisions of the Karnataka High Court in Ashok Hegde v. Jathin Attawan, 1997 Cri. L.J. 3691 and Arun Hegde and Anr. v. M.J. Shetty, ILR 2001 Kar 3295. The conflict in the judicial pronouncements referred to above, therefore, needs to be resolved authoritatively. 16. The second question formulated earlier may arise only in case the answer to the first question is in the negative. L.J. 3691 and Arun Hegde and Anr. v. M.J. Shetty, ILR 2001 Kar 3295. The conflict in the judicial pronouncements referred to above, therefore, needs to be resolved authoritatively. 16. The second question formulated earlier may arise only in case the answer to the first question is in the negative. If no cognizance could betaken on the basis of a complaint filed prematurely, the question would be whether such a complaint could be presented again after the expiry of 15 days and beyond the period of one month under the clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act. Whether or not the complainant can in a situation like the one in the case at hand invoke the proviso to clause (b) and whether or not this Court can and ought to invoke its power under Section 142 to permil the complainant to file a complaint even after the expiry of period of one month stipulated under Section 142 are incidental questions that may fall for determination while answering question no.2." 17. In the light of the above, we deem it fit to refer the two questions formulated in the beginning of the judgment to a three-Judge Bench of this Court. The Registry shall place the file before the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Bench," 23. In the given circumstances, the orders taking cognizance and issuing process against the respondent in all the complaints are legal one. Thus, orders passed by the Sessions Judge, Reasi amount to abuse of process and, liable to be quashed. 24. In the given circumstances, all the five petitions filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. captioned above are allowed. Order dated 30.05.2012 passed by the revisional court i.e. Sessions Judge, Reasi being bad in law is hereby quashed. Trial Court is directed to proceed with all the complaints. Parties through their counsel shall cause their appearance before the trial Court on 18.03.2013. 25. Disposed of along with connected Cr.MAs. 26. Registry to send down the records along with copy of this order.