ORDER Aparesh Kumar Singh, J: Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of suspension dated 13th May 2013 (Annexure-1) passed under Rule 49 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, on the charges that the petitioner had passed the order of mutation as a Circle Officer, Govindpur, Dhanbad in respect of Gair Abad land bearing khata no. 16 and 08, plot nos. 621, 623, 626, 627, 628, 629 and 630 having total area of 4.00 acres, in Mutation Case No. 12812 (VI) / 2011-12 without proper inquiry or examination of the relevant facts going beyond his jurisdiction, which has resulted in loss of Government Land. The petitioner was alleged to have acted in contravention of the rules and negligent and indisciplined manner. 3. One M/s Credence Dealcom Pvt. Ltd had made an application for mutation in their name in respect of Mouza No. 174 of Bandhdih in respect of the aforesaid plots in question. It is contended by the petitioner that the Circle Amin submitted his inquiry report indicating that 1.63 acres of land of khata no. 16 were raiyati lands, while 2.37 acres were Gair Abad land. The petitioner made physical inspection of the plots and upon oral inquiry, came to know that the lands in question belong to Bhagirath Chourasia, Bajrang Chourasia, Bhagwan Chourasia, Rajaram Chourasia and Rajesh Chourasia. Gair Abad land was transferred to the Ancestor of the vendor in the year 1932 by a Registered Sale Deed. The petitioner being the Circle Officer, had the duty to rectify the entries in the Jamabandi numbers allotted to the tenants on the basis of the documents produced by the land owner. Reference has been made to the provisions of the Bihar Tenants Holding (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973, now adopted by the State of Jharkhand as per which, the Circle Officer after following the procedure prescribed thereunder, such as after issuance of the general notice, inviting objections and giving reasonable opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, and after hearing and disposing of the said objections, is empowered to pass orders as may be deemed necessary in a mutation proceeding within a specified period. 4. 4. It is the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner being statutorily empowered to pass orders on an application in a mutation proceeding under the provisions of the Act of 1973, the order dated 29th March 2013 (Annexure-4) was passed directing mutation of the name of the applicants who was found to be in possession of the lands in question. Halka Karmachari was directed to carry out correction in the Jamabandi number 19 and 20 and issue correction slip. 5. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the action of the petitioner was fully within his jurisdiction and the provisions of section 15 of the Act of 1973 also provide a remedy of appeal against the said order of Circle Officer before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. However, the impugned order of suspension has been passed in the nature of punishment, as under Rule 49, the penalties prescribed also contain suspension as one of them in sub rule 5. It is submitted that such an order of suspension passed without good and sufficient reason is in the nature of a punishment. According to the writ petitioner, no departmental proceeding or charge sheet have been issued, though order of suspension dated 13th May 2013 contemplates initiation of such disciplinary proceeding against him. According to the petitioner, the impugned order issued without affording any reasonable opportunity to him, is in the nature of a punishment. The judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.R. Nayak vs. Union of India [AIR 1972 Supreme Court 554] Para-15, 16, 18 and 19 have been relied in support of the aforesaid contention. It is submitted that the respondents have also preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, as would be evident from the averments made in the counter affidavit. Under section 15 of the Act of 1973, once an appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority, suspension of the petitioner can not run concurrently and it is an abuse of the power in arbitrary manner being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The impugned order is passed on nonest facts and against the basic principles and is therefore arbitrary and unsustainable and must be struck down. 6. The impugned order is passed on nonest facts and against the basic principles and is therefore arbitrary and unsustainable and must be struck down. 6. Respondents have pleaded that the action of the petitioner in passing the order of mutation dated 29th March 2012 is contrary to the provisions of the Act, as there were no entry existing in Holding No. 19 and 20 of the Register-II in the name of the transferor or any one else, as is evident from the inquiry report of Halka Karmachari as also the Circle Inspector (Annexure-C series). It is submitted that the power to open new Jamabandi has been withdrawn from the Circle Officer / B.D.O. Vide Government Notification No. 5023 LR, dated 16th June 1966 and No. 4012/66-6308 LR dated 01st August 1966 which has been vested with the L.R.D.C. / S.D.O.. The petitioner knowingly passed the said order of creation of new Jamabandi no. 19 and 20 and illegally allowed alteration of the name of the vendee without any authority. It is submitted that the improper conduct of the petitioner was inquired into on complaints received and the matter was reported to the department by the Deputy Commissioner by order dated 05th April 2013. The order dated 29th March 2013 has also been challenged before the competent Appellate Authority under section 15 of the Act of 1973. 7. A separate counter affidavit has also been filed on behalf of respondent no. 3 - Principal Secretary, Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department, Government of Jharkhand affirming that the recommendation has been made to the department vide letter no. 966 dated 20th March 2013 of Revenue and Land Reforms Department. The department has concurred with the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih, containing details of irregularities of transfer of land during the posting of the petitioner earlier as a Circle Officer, Gandey, Giridih (Annexure-A to the counter affidavit). Subsequently thereafter, fresh charge has been received vide letter no. 1154 dated 15th April 2013 which indicates gross violation of the Government rules in mutation of a land resulting in loss of Government land by the petitioner while discharging his duty as a Circle Officer, Govindpur, Dhanbad which led to the issuance of the impugned order which is the subject matter of the present writ application. In the aforesaid circumstances, the conduct of the petitioner has been found to be against the interest of Government. In the aforesaid circumstances, the conduct of the petitioner has been found to be against the interest of Government. Therefore, it has been decided to place him under suspension with immediate effect by the impugned order dated 13th May 2013. The Headquarter of the petitioner was fixed at the office of Divisional Commissioner, Kolhan, Chaibasa during the period of suspension. However, instead of joining at the headquarter, he had submitted an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad who was not the competent authority in this regard after the order of his suspension. It has been further stated that a departmental proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner for the above charges vide resolution no. 4405 dated 21st May 2013. The aforesaid resolution and notice of the conducting officer has not been received by the petitioner as depicted vide letter no. 1197(A) dated 8th July 2013 (Annexure-D). At last, this letter was delivered at his parental house and he has been instructed to join the headquarter vide letter dated 24th July 2013. 8. In the aforesaid circumstances, learned counsel for the respondent State has submitted that the impugned action is fully in conformity with the law and is permissible under rules of 1930. It is submitted that a disciplinary proceeding can always be initiated for such negligence and acts of indiscipline committed by an officer of the State Government acting in quasi judicial capacity. He has relied upon a judgment passed in the case of Union of India & others vs. Duli Chand [2007 (1) J C R 145 (SC)]. Filing of an appeal against the order passed by the petitioner in no manner, prevents the State Government from initiating the departmental proceedings against the delinquent if his action have been found to be against the interest of revenue of the Government. In such circumstances, once the charge sheet has been issued and the departmental proceeding has been initiated, this Court would not interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction in the impugned order of suspension which would be governed by the fate of disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. In such circumstances, once the charge sheet has been issued and the departmental proceeding has been initiated, this Court would not interfere in exercise of writ jurisdiction in the impugned order of suspension which would be governed by the fate of disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. Learned counsel for the State has relied upon a judgment passed by this Court in the case of Niranjan Prasad Mandal vs. State of Jharkhand & Others [2010 (4) J C R 237 (Jhr) to submit that this Court may not examine the falsity or truthfulness of the charges at this stage when departmental proceeding is underway. He has also relied upon a judgment passed by this Court in the case of Arun Kumar Jha vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. [2010 (1) J C R 18 (Jhr) in support of his contention that the impugned order and the departmental proceeding has been issued by the competent authority under the orders of his Excellency The Governor of Jharkhand. It does not suffer from any lack of jurisdiction. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials on record including the impugned order. The contention of the petitioner is that under the relevant provisions of the Act of 1973, he has discharged his duties within his jurisdiction in ordering mutation in favour of M/s Credence Dealcom Pvt Ltd. on his application after due procedure, inquiry and notice. The order being appellable and against which, reportedly an appeal has also been preferred by the respondent, the petitioner cannot be punished by placing him under suspension. Secondly, the impugned order of suspension is in the nature of a punishment as contemplated under Rule 49(v) of Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 which enumerates penalties to be imposed upon such a member of the service in a departmental proceeding under the said Rules of 1930. 10. It is now well settled by a judgment rendered by the three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. K.K. Dhawan [(1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 56 that the disciplinary proceeding can be initiated against an officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial power if he has acted negligently and recklessly in discharge of his duties. The Court has listed instances where such an action could be taken. The Court has listed instances where such an action could be taken. The aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been quoted in the subsequent judgment rendered in the case of Union of India & others vs. Duli Chand i.e. 2007 (1) J C R 145 (SC). Para-5 thereof is quoted hereunder: “5. The law on the subject was considered in extenso in the three Judge Bench decision of Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 325: (1993) 24 ATC 1. wherein it was noted that the view that no disciplinary action could be initiated against an officer in respect of judicial or quasi judicial functions was wrong. It was further said that the officer who exercises judicial or quasi judicial powers acting negligently or recklessly could be proceeded against by way of a disciplinary action. The Court listed six instances when such action could be taken: (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of Government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) If he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.” 11. In such circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that during the pendency of the appeal against the order passed by him in the mutation proceeding, no order of suspension or departmental proceeding could be initiated against him, is fit to be rejected. The second contention of the petitioner that the order of suspension is in the nature of a punishment as conceived under rule of 49 of Rules of 1930 and cannot be passed in contemplation of departmental proceeding, is also misplaced in view of the specific provisions contained in Rule 49(A) of the same rules. The second contention of the petitioner that the order of suspension is in the nature of a punishment as conceived under rule of 49 of Rules of 1930 and cannot be passed in contemplation of departmental proceeding, is also misplaced in view of the specific provisions contained in Rule 49(A) of the same rules. Rule 49(A) clearly provides that the Appointing Authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the Governor by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension where disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or pending or where case against him in respect of a criminal case, is under investigation, inquiry or trial. Evidently, the order of suspension has been passed in contemplation of the disciplinary proceeding against him. The judgment relied upon by the petitioner therefore in the case of P.R. Nayak (Supra) therefore does not come to his aid. In the said case, rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 which provides for suspension during the disciplinary proceeding were under consideration. Having regard to the express provision of sub rule 1 of rule 3 thereof, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the legislative scheme underlying the rule 3 clearly indicate the intention of rule making authority to restrict its operation only to those cases in which the Government concerned is possessed of sufficient material whether after preliminary investigation or otherwise and the disciplinary proceedings have in fact commenced and not merely when they are contemplated to pass the order of suspension upon an employee. It was held that order of suspension before actual initiation or commencement of disciplinary proceeding would clearly be outside the ambit of rule 3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Sub rule 12 thereof provides that the Appointing Authority or any authority subordinate to it or empowered by the President may place a Government servant under suspension where the disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending. Comparing the aforesaid rule 12 of the CCS Rules, 1957 with Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the clear difference in the language reflect different legislative intention on the question of scope and effect of rule dealing with the suspension in two sets of rule. 12. Comparing the aforesaid rule 12 of the CCS Rules, 1957 with Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the clear difference in the language reflect different legislative intention on the question of scope and effect of rule dealing with the suspension in two sets of rule. 12. In the present case, Rule 49A clearly provides for passing of an order of suspension where disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or is pending against a Government servant. Therefore, the second contention of the petitioner is also worthy of being rejected. 13. Categorical statement have been made by the respondents, as is also evident from perusal of Annexure-C to the counter affidavit of the respondent no. 3 dated 21st May 2013 that the departmental proceeding has already been initiated against the petitioner for having allowed mutation in a illegal and unauthorized manner not only during his posting as a Circle Officer, Gandey, Giridih, but during his posting as Circle Officer at Govindpur, Dhanbad when he had passed the order dated 29th March 2013, the basis for issuance of the impugned order of suspension. In the case of Niranjan Prasad Mandal (Supra), the Court discreetly observed that at this stage, if the departmental proceeding has been initiated, this Court is not required to examine the falsity or truthfulness of the charge against the delinquent officer. The impugned order has been issued under the orders of His Excellency the Governor of Jharkhand who is competent authority. The impugned order therefore cannot be said to be issued without jurisdiction or lacking any authority. 14. Respondent in their counter affidavit as also through documents brought on record, have alleged that there are prima facie materials to show recklessness and misconduct in the discharge of duty by the petitioner which is unbecoming of a Government servant and that, he has acted negligently against the interest of the State in passing the orders of mutation in favour of certain person causing loss of Government land. At this Stage, this Court would be wise not to make any comment upon the merits of the allegation for which departmental proceeding has already been initiated against the petitioner. The impugned order therefore cannot be said to have been passed without jurisdiction or in the nature of a punishment against the petitioner, as alleged by him. At this Stage, this Court would be wise not to make any comment upon the merits of the allegation for which departmental proceeding has already been initiated against the petitioner. The impugned order therefore cannot be said to have been passed without jurisdiction or in the nature of a punishment against the petitioner, as alleged by him. This Court therefore, finds no reason to interfere with the same. The writ petition being devoid of any merit, is therefore dismissed.