JUDGMENT K. KANNAN, J. 1. The second appeal is at the instance of the 3rd defendant, who has suffered a decree in the two courts below. The suit had been filed by the 1st respondent contending that the order passed by the Superintending Canal Officer (for short, SCO) on 26.11.1975 was illegal and against the relevant rules and for an injunction restraining the defendants from digging khal through the lands of the plaintiff. The Court found that the mandatory rules in the manner of preparation of draft scheme with rough sketch and in the manner of publication, there had been serious breach of compliance of statutory provision and consequently, all the proceedings and the final orders made by the authorities were invalid. It is this decision which has come in challenge before this Court on a pointed question of the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudge on the validity of the order as whether the civil suit was barred by Section 30-G of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 (for short, the Act). 2. Consequent to an application given by the appellant-defendant to the Divisional Canal Officer (for short, DCO) on 26.12.1974 for sanctioning a watercourse on the southern line of Rectangle/Killa No. 8/21-8/10-11-20 on a plea that he would bear the entire cost, the Sub Divisional Officer, Fatehabad sanctioned the watercourse. A draft scheme was prepared under Section 30-A and it was published under Section 30-B of the Act. The draft scheme was filed as D2 and the publication was filed as D9. The draft sketch and plan were filed as D3 and a notice served on the plaintiff as a landowner of the property through which the canal was to be laid was served and the signed notice was produced as D4. The DCO had recorded statements of both parties on 10.04.1975, copy of which statement is available on the file and passed an order on 10.04.1975 (Ex.P1) sanctioning the watercourse through the field numbers agreed to by the plaintiff. The appellant-defendant had filed a revision against this order on 10.04.1975 under Section 30-B (3) of the Act before the SCO. The document revealed that SCO inspected the site on 26.11.1975 and allowed the revision on 26.11.1975 slightly modifying the alignment of the course from ABDEF to AFCBA on compensation basis. This order of the SCO remained final in the quasi judicial hierarchy. The document revealed that SCO inspected the site on 26.11.1975 and allowed the revision on 26.11.1975 slightly modifying the alignment of the course from ABDEF to AFCBA on compensation basis. This order of the SCO remained final in the quasi judicial hierarchy. The scheme was ordered under D2 under Section 39-C of the Act. The DCO acquired the land required for the watercourse AECBA vide order dated 21.12.1975 under Section 30-D of the Act. As per the undertaking, it was claimed by the defendant that he had deposited the compensation amount in a sum of Rs. 900.53 and subsequently the possession of the acquired land was said to have been delivered in the presence of the plaintiff with the police help on 17.04.1976, vide report dated DW8/B. The acquired land was also said to be mutated in favour of the appellant. 3. The order passed resulting in the publication was challenged by means of a suit by the plaintiff-1st respondent on 09.06.1976, that is, after the property was delivered with the police help on 17.04.1976. The trial Court, by a sweeping observation, found that the civil court had jurisdiction to decide on the validity of an order if the order was passed without jurisdiction or it had violated the procedure laid down by law in the manner of preparation and publication of the scheme. The Court was not prepared to go as far as to set out the actual violation and how the plaintiff, who had actually participated in the proceedings before the DCO and SCO had been prejudiced by alleged violations of the statutory procedures. The appellate Court went on at some length and discussed the issue from the point of view of how the statutory directions regarding the preparation and publication had not been followed. He referred to Section 30-A of the Act which required the scheme to be affixed in a conspicuous place in the village displaying sketch plan, the name of the distributory and RD of outlet, the date on which the scheme would be explained verbally by the DCO and the Lambardar concerned and the date of announcement by beat of drum. Ram Rakha, the Lambardar, was examined as PW2 and the Handu Ram, Chowkidar was examined as PW3. The Lambardar was to state in Court that there was nothing on the file to show that the scheme was affixed in a conspicuous place. Ram Rakha, the Lambardar, was examined as PW2 and the Handu Ram, Chowkidar was examined as PW3. The Lambardar was to state in Court that there was nothing on the file to show that the scheme was affixed in a conspicuous place. Section 30 of the Act required the publication requiring the shareholders to make contribution and when the scheme was modified by the SCO on 26.11.1975, it was not ordered in the manner required and, therefore, the impugned order was without jurisdiction. Against this evidence, the Patwari was examined as DW1 and he was reported to have admitted that the draft scheme had not been published in the village and that the scheme was not affixed in a conspicuous place. This, according to the appellate Court, was a clincher to sustain the judgment of the court below declaring the order of the SCO to be illegal and void. 4. The learned counsel points out that if there is a statutory bar for institution of a civil suit to challenge the order in an act which specifically provides for different machinery for redressal of grievance by appeal and revision, a civil court suit was incompetent. The counsel would read to me Section 30-G which reads as follows:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or other law for the time being in force, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or decide any question/relating to matters falling under Sections 30-A to 30-FF." This Section admits of no doubt that the civil court has no jurisdiction in respect of challenge to orders or actions taken under the relevant sections. The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would point out that a mere error in procedure cannot be a subject of challenge by means of a suit unless the failure to follow the procedure was so fundamental that the prejudice could be shown. The counsel refers me to the decision in State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar and Others, AIR 1995 SC 1955 that dealt with the maintainability of a suit before a civil court by a party complaining of violation of certain procedural requirement of publication and a declaration effected under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The counsel refers me to the decision in State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar and Others, AIR 1995 SC 1955 that dealt with the maintainability of a suit before a civil court by a party complaining of violation of certain procedural requirement of publication and a declaration effected under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court after detailing the relevant provisions held that the civil court's jurisdiction was barred from challenging a declaration under Section 6 or a validity of a notification under Section 4, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Having regard to the said law, I directed the counsel for the respondents to show to me as to how the alleged non-publication of a draft scheme in a conspicuous part of the village had any bearing to the merits of the scheme as approved or how he was in any way aggrieved by its non-publication when he had actually appeared both before the DCO and the SCO and the orders were passed in his presence. The publication is only to apprise the parties of the nature of order passed to enable the affected parties to state their objections before the DCO. The plaintiff had actually appeared and concurred in a particular formation of the canal on the basis of which the order was passed. The order reads as follows:- "The site has been inspected by me on 10.4.1975 today. Sh. Bhaga Ram has agreed to give water course through his land without compensation along Killa No. 24/1 and 25/2, and through Centre of Killa No. 17 and then towards West along Killa No. 17, 18 and will pass through road culvert and then towards North along pacca road in Killas No. 12 & 9 and then along below village boundary in Killa No. 10 & 9 of rectangle No. 8, land belonging to Sh. Bhaga Ram and this will touch the land of Sh. Nathu Ram applicant. This site is suitable for water course & sanctioned without compensation. Water course A, B, D, E, F is sanctioned." When it was the defendant-appellant, who had preferred the revision to the SCO, the order reads the presence of the plaintiff before him and a modification was issued. Nathu Ram applicant. This site is suitable for water course & sanctioned without compensation. Water course A, B, D, E, F is sanctioned." When it was the defendant-appellant, who had preferred the revision to the SCO, the order reads the presence of the plaintiff before him and a modification was issued. The order reads as follows:- "Out of the two possible alignments of watercourse suitable for the irrigation of the appellant, alignment AECBA is more suitable and it therefore, sanctioned on compensation basis. Appeal of Nathu Ram is thus accepted and decision of the Divisional Canal Officer is set aside." At every stage, therefore, the plaintiff had actually participated and as a matter of fact, the plaintiff's signature has been taken as Ex.D4 which is a notice after the formation of the scheme. The counsel is unable to show to me any particular prejudice about the alleged non- publication of the scheme in a conspicuous part of the village or not announcing the details of the scheme by beat of drum. 5. The counsel for the respondents refers to several decisions where in the challenges made through the writ petitions, courts have interfered with the orders passed by the respective authorities. In the Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle vs. Hukum Chand and Others, the Court was explaining the extent of power of the SCO in revision to include even a power to substitute of his own opinion for the DCO in revising the scheme. In Dongar Ram vs. Superintending Canal Officer, Ferozepur Canal Circle and Others, 1971 PLJ 544, the formulation of a new scheme by the SCO is also found to be competent. In Mohinder Singh and Others vs. Raghu Nath, 2002 (2) PLJ 33 , the Civil Court was interfering in a case where an order had been passed without issuing any notice whatsoever. I have pointed out to the fact that in this case the order was passed in the presence of the plaintiff after notice to him and how the plaintiff was not able to show any prejudice for alleged violation of procedure. In Gulzar Singh and Others vs. Sadhu Singh and Others, 1973 PLJ 334, this Court was explaining that even if an order was passed without issuing notice, the order was not a nullity or voidable one but the appropriate course would be to approach only the appellate authority for appropriate remedy. In Gulzar Singh and Others vs. Sadhu Singh and Others, 1973 PLJ 334, this Court was explaining that even if an order was passed without issuing notice, the order was not a nullity or voidable one but the appropriate course would be to approach only the appellate authority for appropriate remedy. The Court was ruling that a civil suit will not be competent and appeal to the higher authority alone would be the proper remedy. The bar of Civil Court was also held in relation to the proceedings passed under Haryana Canal and Drainage Act while dealing with the similar provisions contained in the Haryana Act in Nanhu and Another vs. Krishan Lal and Others, 1985 PLJ 608 . 6. The civil suit was simply incompetent and the violation of procedure pointed out are insignificant when the plaintiff had at all times participated in the proceedings before the authorities and if he was dissatisfied with the order passed by the SCO, the only ground of challenge could have been under the Act or by resort to a writ petition before this Court. 7. Since the second appeal was before this Court, I was even prepared to examine if any ground had been made in the plaint as to how the report of the SCO was prejudicial to his interest and whether there had been anything pointed out to justify quashing of his report. I do not find any specific objection in the plaint nor was the counsel able to point out to me at the time of arguments any prejudice than a contention that the proposed canal bisected his land in the middle and his offer to allow for the canal to be taken along the border through his land was not properly considered. I would have even allowed for such a consideration if there had been an objection taken in that regard in his pleadings. I do not find any such objection. On the other hand, the SCO has observed that the watercourse suggested by the plaintiff also divided his land but what was sanctioned later had less curves and caused least damage. 8. Under the circumstances, I hold that the civil suit for declaration and injunction was not competent and the suit ought to have been dismissed. On the other hand, the SCO has observed that the watercourse suggested by the plaintiff also divided his land but what was sanctioned later had less curves and caused least damage. 8. Under the circumstances, I hold that the civil suit for declaration and injunction was not competent and the suit ought to have been dismissed. I do not find that there was any bar against the plaintiff for challenging the order passed by the SCO but the manner of challenge through the suit was surely incompetent. The courts below were in error in characterizing the order of the Canal Officer to be illegal without actually setting forth any justifiable reasons for such a characterization. I do not propose to answer an objection taken by the counsel at the time of argument for which question of law had also been framed of whether the suit for declaration was competent without the consequential relief of possession. The suit had been filed for declaration and for injunction. It was not merely a suit for declaration as assumed by the counsel for the appellant at the time of arguments. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Counsels fee Rs. 10,000/-.