JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—Heard Sri Saurabh Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Ram Singh, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the impugned award. 2. By means of this First Appeal From Order the appellant challenges the judgment and award dated 25.8.2006, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/District Judge, Allahabad in MACP No. 300 of 2002, Mohd. Kamar Azam Siddiqui and another v. Kaushlendra Kumar Singh and another, whereby compensation of Rs. 9, 43,000/- together with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till final payment was awarded to the claimant-respondents. 3. Brief facts of the case are that an accident took place between the offending truck No. UP-70/K-9605 and the scooter, which was being driven by the husband of the deceased. MACP No. 300 of 2002 was preferred by the claimant for an award of compensation of Rs. 27,05,000/- on account of death of his wife in the accident on 15.2.2002, who succumbed in the hospital during treatment of the injuries. The opposite parties contested the claim petition by filing their written statements denying the averments made therein. 4. The Tribunal after appreciating the evidence on record partly allowed the claim petition awarding a sum of Rs. 9,43,000/- as compensation to the claimants payable by the appellant, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Tribunal has committed an error ignoring the fact the compensation should be just and fair by determining and balancing the loss caused to the legal heirs of the deceased due to death in the accident. According to him, the Tribunal has ignored the fact that claimant No. 1 was given compassionate appointment as Government teacher in a Primary School and prior to it he was earning Rs. 5,000-10,000/- by tutoring the children per month and as such he was not dependent upon the income of his deceased wife; that the Tribunal has also ignored the fact that the claimant No. 2, the son is getting Rs. 3100/- as family pension as such he has also been duly compensated. 5,000-10,000/- by tutoring the children per month and as such he was not dependent upon the income of his deceased wife; that the Tribunal has also ignored the fact that the claimant No. 2, the son is getting Rs. 3100/- as family pension as such he has also been duly compensated. According to him, it is well-settled principle of law that multiplier for arriving at a reasonable and just compensation has to be chosen taking into consideration the higher age either of the claimants or of the deceased as compensation is not only for those who are solely dependent upon the necessities of their life on the income of the deceased but not for those who are self earning. 6. According to him, since the husband of the deceased has been given compassionate appointment and son has been apportioned the family pension, therefore, both of them are independent earning members, hence they are not entitled to any compensation in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. In support of aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment in Divisional Controller KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and another, 2003(3) TAC 284 (SC), as well as upon the judgment in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kalpna and others, 2007(1) TAC 795 (SC) : 2007(3)SCC 538. 8. The judgment and award is further assailed on the ground that 11th amendment in the rule, which has come into force w.e.f 26.9.2011 provides for 50% enhancement in the compensation towards future prospects whereas the accident in this case took place on 15.2.2002, hence the claimants were not entitled to any compensation towards future prospect as this was not the law at the relevant time. In this regard he has placed reliance upon the judgment in Smt. Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009 AWC (3) 3138 (SC), wherein the Apex Court has held that— “as against the contention of the appellants that if the deceased had been alive, he would have earned the benefit of revised pay scales, it is equally possible that if he had not died in the accident, he might have died on account of ill health or other accident, or lost the employment or met some other calamity or disadvantage. The imponderables in life are too many.” 9. The imponderables in life are too many.” 9. He has also placed reliance upon the judgment in Sunil Sharma and others v. Bachitor Singh and others, 2011 (2) AICC 212, which is to the same effect. 10. It is then urged that the age of the deceased was below 40 years, therefore, according to paragraph 26 of the judgment rendered in Smt. Sarla Verma’s case wrong multiplier has been applied in the instant case. 11. He submits that in this view of the matter the amount of compensation of Rs. 9,43,000/- plus 6% interest thereon is too excessive, hence it requires reconsideration by this Court as an appellate Court or to remand the matter back to the concerned Tribunal for examining all the points in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and pass a fresh award. 12. Per contra, Sri Ram Singh, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor accident and he need not to be the wife, husband, parents and child. In this regard he has relied upon the judgment in Mrs. Hafizun Begum v. Md. Ikram Haque and others, 2007 (4) TAC 1. 13. He also submits that the amount of family pension and employment as Assistant Teacher on compassionate grounds is not deductible while calculating the compensation awarded to the claimants. In this regard he has placed reliance upon the decisions in Lai Dei and others v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and another, 2008,ACJ 1107 (SC); Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Urmila Devi and others, 2009 (4) AWC 4020 ; United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Geeta Devi and others, 2012 (2) AICC 478 and Delhi Transport Corporation v. Mrs. Meena Chaturvedi and others, 2006(1) TAC 60 (Del). 14. He has then argued that all the benefits should be considered otherwise the compensation would not be just and fair. In this regard he has relied upon the judgment in National Insurance Co. Meena Chaturvedi and others, 2006(1) TAC 60 (Del). 14. He has then argued that all the benefits should be considered otherwise the compensation would not be just and fair. In this regard he has relied upon the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava and others, 2008(70) ALR 323, wherein it has been held that— “The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of is monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. We may, however, hasten to add that from the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted.” 15. Regarding future prospect, learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the judgments in Smt. Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009(3) AWC 2138 (SC) and Sunil Sharma and others v. Bachitar Singh and others, 2011 (2) AICC 212 (SC), wherein it has been held that 50% of actual salary to actual salary income of the deceased is required to be added towards future prospects for coming to a just, equitable and fair compensation of person below 40 years of age. He has argued that age of the deceased being below 40 years, the Tribunal has therefore, rightly applied the multiplier of ‘16’ keeping into consideration the appointment of the dependent and age of the deceased and that the interest is in accordance with the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sarla Verma (supra). 16. He has lastly argued that cross-appeal/cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 C.P.C. is not maintainable . According to him, the amount awarded should be enhanced, if calculated in accordance with law thus : 17. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record we find that the Tribunal has framed following 3 issues for deciding the case. 1. Whether Smt. Nishat Masood died on 15.2.2002 due to the accident caused at about 3.00 p.m. near Andawa tri-junction due to rash and negligent driving of truck No. UP-70/K-9605 by its driver ?and its effect. 2. Whether the said offending truck was insured and its driver possesses valid driving licence ? and its effect. 3. 1. Whether Smt. Nishat Masood died on 15.2.2002 due to the accident caused at about 3.00 p.m. near Andawa tri-junction due to rash and negligent driving of truck No. UP-70/K-9605 by its driver ?and its effect. 2. Whether the said offending truck was insured and its driver possesses valid driving licence ? and its effect. 3. To what relief/compensation is the claimants entitled and from whom ? 18. The first two issues have not been addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant and as he has assailed the question of quantum of compensation only, we are examining this issue. 19. Deceased Smt. Nishat Masood wife of Mohd. Kamar Azam Siddiqui and mother of Mohd. Sharique Kamar Siddiqui was found to be 36 years of age by the Tribunal on the basis of post mortem report and record. She was a teacher in Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Hevleya, Vikas Khand Bahadurpur, Allahabad. She was working under the Basic Shiksha Adhikari as Assistant teacher earning salary of Rs. 10,500/- per month and was being paid Rs. 9664/- after statutory deductions. The claimants had proved her salary by documentary evidence i.e. salary certificate (paper No. 15-Ga/17) and pay slips (paper Nos. 22-Ga/1 and 22-Ga/2). 20. On the question of dependency the Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the father and son both were dependent upon the income of the deceased when she had died. Thereafter, Mohd. Kamar had installed a computer in his house and was some how managing the expenses of the family by earning from tuition fee in between Rs. 5,000-10,000/- per month. The appellant had emphasized before the Tribunal for applying lower multiplier in view of the fact that the husband of the deceased was later on given compassionate appointment and her son was given family pension of Rs. 3100/- per month whereas the case of the claimants was that the deceased was less than 40 years of age, hence according to the Second Schedule under the Motor Vehicles Act multiplier of ‘16’ would be appropriate and in accordance with law. Keeping in view the income of the husband from the computer and the family pension the Tribunal applied lower multiplier of ‘13’ and computed the compensation by applying annual income of the deceased less 1/3rd on her personal and living expenses with multiplier of ‘13’. Keeping in view the income of the husband from the computer and the family pension the Tribunal applied lower multiplier of ‘13’ and computed the compensation by applying annual income of the deceased less 1/3rd on her personal and living expenses with multiplier of ‘13’. The Tribunal also deducted the income which would have been payable by the deceased and calculated thus : 1.Salary of the deceased Rs. 10,403/- per month 2.Less statutory deductions Rs. 739.00 3.Actual salary paid Rs. 9664/- 4.Less income tax deducted Rs. 664/- 5.Actual salary paid Rs. 9,000/- 6.Annual income tax on this salary is Rs. 9000x12=Rs.108000/-. 21. Therefore, the Tribunal computed the compensation from salary of the deceased payable by the Insurance Company thus : 10800x1/3=Rs.36,000/-. After deducting 1/3rd for personal and living expenses by applying the multiplier of ‘13’ total some payable by the Insurance Company to the claimants comes to Rs. 9,36,000/-. We find that the question of future prospect was not taken by the appellant’s counsel before the Tribunal. The age of the deceased was below 40 years, therefore, the Tribunal has rightly taken into consideration the income of the dependents from other sources and has applied lower multiplier of ‘13’. No illegality or infirmity could be shown by the learned counsel for the appellant in the impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal, which is not excessive. We also find that bonanza calculated by the counsel for the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is highly excessive and fair and reasonable amount has been awarded in the facts and circumstances of the case. 22. As regards the two judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, there is no dispute that compensation awarded should be just and fair and not a bonanza & salary of compassionate appointment ought to be considered while fixing the compensation. 23. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed. —————