JUDGMENT : R.C. Chavan, J. This appeal is directed against the award passed by the Presiding Officer of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Margao whereby the Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 41,50,000/- with interest towards loss suffered by the claimants on account of death of Dr. Subhashchandra Nagzarkar in an accident which occurred on 26/12/1997 on National Highway No. 17 at about 9.30 a.m. 2. Respondents no.1 to 5/claimants claim that Dr. Subhashchandra was travelling in his own Car when his car was dashed by the truck bearing no. KA-20/1253 driven by respondent no.1 and owned by respondent no.2 and insured by respondent no.3 as shown in the claim petition. The victim died on the spot. The victim was stated to be having monthly income of Rs. 55,500/-. The claimants made claim of Rs. 1 Crore and 50 thousand. 3. The driver and owner of the vehicle i.e. respondents no.1 and 2 did not contest the claim petition. Respondent no. 3, the insurer of the vehicle contested the claim by filing written statement contending that respondent no. 1 did not hold a valid driving licence at the time of accident. Thus, there was violation of statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as also the policy and, therefore, respondent no. 3 was not liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle. The insurer also denied the allegation about earning of the victim and denied that a sum of Rs. 1 Crore and 50 thousand could be claimed by the claimants. 4. Learned Presiding Officer framed necessary issues and after considering the evidence tendered, held that respondents no.1 to 3 i.e. including present appellant insurer were liable jointly and severally to pay a sum of Rs. 41,50,000/-. Aggrieved thereby the insurer has filed this appeal. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellant as well as learned Counsel for the original claimants. With the aid of both, I have gone through the evidence on record. 6. The evidence discloses that there can be no serious dispute about the rash and negligent driving of the truck by respondent no.1 Ratnakar which led to death of Dr. Subhashchandra Nagzarkar on 26/12/1997. Thus, as far as the owner and driver of the truck are concerned, there can not be dispute that they are liable to compensate the claimants, who are widow and four minor children of the victim. 7. Subhashchandra Nagzarkar on 26/12/1997. Thus, as far as the owner and driver of the truck are concerned, there can not be dispute that they are liable to compensate the claimants, who are widow and four minor children of the victim. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is not liable to compensate the claimants since the driver of the vehicle did not hold a valid and effective licence at the relevant time. A copy of the particulars of driving licence at exhibit 59 shows that respondent no.1 had acquired the licence to drive light motor vehicle, medium goods vehicle and heavy goods vehicle on 10/12/1987 which was valid till 09/12/1990. It does not seem to have been renewed between 1990 and 1993. It was renewed on 23/03/1993 and was valid till 22/03/1996. It was again renewed on 09/02/1998 and was valid till 08/02/2001. Thus, on the date of accident i.e. 26/12/1997, the licence had not been renewed. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that since the driver was not holding valid and effective licence, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Malla Prakasarao v. Malla Janaki; reported in (2004)3 SCC 343 where the driving licence of the driver had expired and the driver had not applied for renewal within 30 days as required in Section 11 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of this, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the owner of the vehicle bearing C. A. No.1613/1996. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hear the other appeals and proceeded to decide them on merits. Though this judgment was reported in 2004, it was actually delivered on 06/08/2002. 8. Learned Counsel for the claimants submitted that the Supreme Court had in fact considered this judgment in National Insurance Company v. Swaran Singh and others reported in AIR 2004 SC 1531 . This was the judgment by three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 97 of the judgment, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment in Malla Prakasrao v. Malla Janaki. After considering the judgment, in paragraph 98 the Supreme Court observed as under : "98. This was the judgment by three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 97 of the judgment, the Supreme Court referred to the judgment in Malla Prakasrao v. Malla Janaki. After considering the judgment, in paragraph 98 the Supreme Court observed as under : "98. In that case, the Court presumably as in the case of Mandar Madha v. Tambe case reported in ( AIR 1996 SC 1150 ), was concerned with the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance. Before the Court, no occasion arose to consider the general terms and conditions of the contract of insurance vis-a-vis liability of insurance under the Motor Vehicles Act." 9. Learned Counsel for the claimants, therefore, submitted that the observations of the Supreme Court in the judgment in Malla Prakasrao's case (supra) as explained by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra), would hold the field and law as declared in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh (supra), would have to be followed. 10. I would come to the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 a little later. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant Insurance Company relied on the judgment of two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Ishwar Chandra v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd reported in (2007)10 SCC 650 : AIR 2007 SC 1445 which had considered the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra). It was contended in that case that the licence held by the driver of the tractor had expired on 27/08/1994 and since it was later on renewed, the Insurance Company was liable to reimburse the amount of compensation. The Court noted observations in paragraphs no.45 and 46 in Swaran Singh's case (supra) and also judgment in National Insurance Company Ltd v. Kusum Rai, (2006)4 SCC 250 : AIR 2006 SC 3440 commenting upon the judgment in Swaran Singh (supra) and then proceeded to dismiss the appeal. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of this judgment, if the driver did not hold valid and effective licence at the time of accident, the Insurance Company would not be liable. 12. He also referred to two Judge Judgment of Supreme Court in Ram Babu Tiwari v. United Insurance Co. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of this judgment, if the driver did not hold valid and effective licence at the time of accident, the Insurance Company would not be liable. 12. He also referred to two Judge Judgment of Supreme Court in Ram Babu Tiwari v. United Insurance Co. Ltd; (2008)8 SCC 165 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1264 where too, a similar question had been raised and the judgment of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra) as well as National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kusum Rai, AIR 2006 SC 3440 (supra) had been referred to. The Court relied on the judgment in Ishwar Chandra, AIR 2007 SC 1445 referred to above and proceeded to hold that there was no infirmity in the judgment which held that the Insurance Company was not liable to indemnify the insured. 13. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Vidyadhar Mahariwala reported in (2008)12 SCC 701 : AIR 2009 SC 208 which is the next judgment on which the learned Counsel for the appellant relied on, again a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the accident had occurred on 11/06/2004 and licence had not been renewed between 14/12/2003 and 16/05/2005. Relying on the judgments in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kusum Rai, AIR 2006 SC 3440 (supra) as also Ishwar Chandra v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, AIR 2007 SC 1445 (supra), the Supreme Court held that Insurance Company would have no liability in the case of this nature. Therefore, according to learned Counsel for the appellant, the Tribunal was in error in holding the appellant Insurance Company jointly and severally liable to satisfy the award. 14. Learned Counsel for respondents no.1 to 5/claimants submitted that the judgment of three Judge Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra) is very clear and leaving absolutely no doubt on the question of liability of Insurance Company when the driver of the offending vehicle did not hold valid and effective driving licence. In that judgment, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had carefully considered all the aspects of validity and affectivity of the licence as also the consequences of renewal. In that judgment, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had carefully considered all the aspects of validity and affectivity of the licence as also the consequences of renewal. The Court also considered the object of providing for compulsory insurance to motor vehicles. In paragraphs 15, 19, 26 and 31 of the said judgment the Court observed as under : "15. The intention of Parliament became further evident when in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, a new chapter being Chapter VII-A dealing with insurance of motor vehicles against third-party risks was introduced and the beneficent provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were further made liberal by reason of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the amendments carried out therein from time to time in aid of the third-party claims by way of grant of additional or new rights conferred on the road accident victims. ........... 19. Indisputably, such a benefit to a third party was provided under the statute keeping in view the fact that the conditions in the assured policy may not be of no or little effect in relation to a claim by a person to whom an assured was under a compulsorily insurable liability. 26. The right of the victim of a road accident to claim compensation is a statutory one. He is a victim of an unforeseen situation. He would not ordinarily have a hand in it. The negligence on the part of the victim may, however, be contributory. He has suffered owing to wrongdoing of others An accident may ruin an entire family. It may take away the only earning member. An accident may result in the loss of her only son to a mother. An accident may take place for a variety of reasons. The driver of a vehicle may not have a hand in it. He may not be found to be negligent in a given case. Other factors such as unforeseen situation, negligence of the victim, bad road or the action or inaction of any other person may lead to an accident. ... ... ... 31. Sub-section (1) of Section 149 casts a liability upon the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree "as if he were the judgment-debtor". Other factors such as unforeseen situation, negligence of the victim, bad road or the action or inaction of any other person may lead to an accident. ... ... ... 31. Sub-section (1) of Section 149 casts a liability upon the insurer to pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree "as if he were the judgment-debtor". Although the said liability is subject to the provision of this section, it prefaces with a non obstante clause that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy. Furthermore, the statute raises a legal fiction to the effect that for the said purpose the insurer would be deemed to be judgment-debtor in respect of the liability of the insurer." 15. The Court then considered the breach of specified conditions in policy particularly with reference to the words 'effective licence' and 'person duly licensed'. The Court noted that in Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the words used are 'effective driving licence' whenever a person drives the motor vehicle in public place, whereas in subsection (ii) of Section 149 of the M.V. Act, the words used are 'a person duly licensed'. Noting this difference, the Court observed as under : "36. However, clause (a) opens with the words "that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy", implying that the insurer's defence of the action would depend upon the terms of the policy. The said sub-clause contains three conditions of disjunctive character, namely, the insurer can get away from the liability when (a) a named person drives the vehicle; (b) it was being driven by a person who did not have a duly granted licence; and (c) driver is a person disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence. 37. We may also take note of the fact that whereas in Section 3 the words used are "effective licence", it has been differently worded in Section 149(2) i.e. "duly licensed". If a person does not hold an effective licence as on the date of the accident, he may be liable for prosecution in terms of Section 141 of the Act but Section 149 pertains to insurance as regards third-party risks. 38. A provision of a statute which is penal in nature vis-a-vis a provision which is beneficent to a third party must be interpreted differently. 38. A provision of a statute which is penal in nature vis-a-vis a provision which is beneficent to a third party must be interpreted differently. It is also well known that the provisions contained in different expressions are ordinarily construed differently. 39. The words "effective licence" used in Section 3, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be imported for sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We must also notice that the words "duly licensed" used in subsection (2) of Section 149 are used in the past tense. 40. Thus, a person whose licence is ordinarily renewed in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder, despite the fact that during the interregnum period, namely, when the accident took place and the date of expiry of the licence, he did not have a valid licence, he could during the prescribed period apply for renewal thereof and could obtain the same automatically without undergoing any further test or without having been declared unqualified therefor. Proviso appended to Section 14 in unequivocal terms states that the licence remains valid for a period of thirty days from the day of its expiry." 16. These observations seem to have been not brought to the notice of the two Judge Benches in the judgments on which the learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance. The Court had specifically observed that the words 'effective licence' would not be imported in the subsection (ii) of Section 149 of the M. V. Act. The implication is thus clear that if a person, who was authorised to drive the vehicle, holds valid licence and is not disqualified, then, even if the licence was not renewed at the time of accident, the Insurance company could not avoid its liability. The Court can consider the situations where the Insurance Company would refuse to indemnify the owner i.e. insured and recover the amount paid by the Insurance Company from the owner. The observations of the Court in paragraphs 45 and 46 can be usefully reproduced as under : "45. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, holding of a valid driving licence is one of the conditions of contract of insurance. Driving of a vehicle without a valid licence is an offence. The observations of the Court in paragraphs 45 and 46 can be usefully reproduced as under : "45. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, holding of a valid driving licence is one of the conditions of contract of insurance. Driving of a vehicle without a valid licence is an offence. However, the question herein is whether a third party involved in an accident is entitled to the amount of compensation granted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal although the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time might not have a valid driving licence but would be entitled to recover the same from the owner or driver thereof. 46. It is trite that where the insurers relying upon the provisions of violation of law by the assured, take an exception to pay the assured or a third party, they must prove a wilful violation of the law by the assured. In some cases violation of criminal law, particularly, violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act may result in absolving the insurers but, the same may not necessarily hold good in the case of a third party. In any event, the exception applies only to acts done intentionally or "so recklessly as to denote that the assured did not care what the consequences of his act might be." 17. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that these paragraphs have in fact been considered and reproduced in the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court on which he placed reliance i.e. Ishwar Chandra v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 1445 (supra). True, these paragraphs have been quoted in the judgment in Ishwar Chandra v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 1445 (supra), but reading of those paragraphs in isolation would not have conveyed the import of judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh., AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra). 18. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra), a three Judge Bench noted that insurer's liability arises both from contract as well as from the statute and it may not be proper to apply the rules by interpretation of a contract by interpreting the statute. Ltd v. Swaran Singh., AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra). 18. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra), a three Judge Bench noted that insurer's liability arises both from contract as well as from the statute and it may not be proper to apply the rules by interpretation of a contract by interpreting the statute. In paragraph 67 of the judgment, the Court observed that beneficent statute must receive liberal interpretation and specifically held in paragraph 70 that Insurance Company cannot shake off its liability to pay compensation only by saying that at the relevant point of time, the vehicle was driven by a person having no licence. 19. Learned Counsel for the claimants submitted that there can be no clearer exposition of law on this aspect and there could not be any doubt about the liability of the insurer in respect of the claim arising from the accident which occurs when the driver of the offending vehicle did not hold an effective driving licence, though he was having licence to drive that vehicle and licence was simply not renewed. The Court also noted in paragraph 73 of the judgment social need of the victim being compensated and then quoted the observations from previous judgment in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Kamala reported (2001) 4 SCC 342 : AIR 2001 SC 1419 . The Court observed that in such an eventuality because of breach of terms of the policy, the insurer would be entitled to recover the amount from the insured. In fact in paragraph 76 of the judgment, the Court considered the eventuality of the vehicle being driven by a person without the licence or even a fake licence. It may be usefully reproduced for ready reference as under : "76. The submissions made on behalf of the petitioner may now be noticed. According to the learned counsel, sub-section (4) of Section 149 deals with the situation where the insurer in the policy purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any condition other than those in clause (b) of subsection (2) of Section 149, and in that view of the matter no liability is covered for driving of a vehicle without licence or fake licence. The submission ignores the plain and unequivocal expression used in sub-section (2) of Section 149 as well as the proviso appended thereto. The submission ignores the plain and unequivocal expression used in sub-section (2) of Section 149 as well as the proviso appended thereto. With a view to construe a statute the scheme of the Act has to be taken into consideration. For the said purpose the entire Act has to be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word. See Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023 (para 33)." 20. In paragraph 78 of the judgment the Court considers a case where the liability of the Insurance Company may be zero, but it may carry the initial liability to satisfy the decree and then recover the amount from the insured. Even as far as this entitlement of recovery of amount from the insured is concerned, in paragraph 79 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed that such entitlement would arise where the driver of the vehicle did not hold any licence and the vehicle was allowed to be consciously driven by such person by the owner. The Court then noted this conclusion in paragraph 99 that the liability of the Insurance Company to satisfy the decree at the first instance and to recover the awarded amount from the owner and driver, has held the field for a long time. The Court held that doctrine of stare decision per added the Court not to deviate from the said principle. The Court then summed up its findings in paragraph 105 of the judgment. In clause (iii) thereof, the Court specifically observed that mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver from driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer either against an insured or third parties. In clause (vi), the Court observed that the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is so fundamental as is found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. In view of this categorical statement of law by three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, learned Counsel for the claimants is right in submitting that the appellant cannot avoid the liability to pay compensation, which was awarded. 21. In view of this categorical statement of law by three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, learned Counsel for the claimants is right in submitting that the appellant cannot avoid the liability to pay compensation, which was awarded. 21. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in National Insurance Company v. Parvathneni and another reported in (2009) 8 SCC 785 , two Judge Bench of Supreme Court had expressed a doubt as to how, when a person has no liability to pay at all, he could be compelled to satisfy the decree since it may take years for the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner of the vehicle. This is a mere doubt expressed by the two Judge Bench and reference was made which is yet not decided. Therefore, the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra), still holds the field. 22. Learned Counsel for the appellant also submitted that compensation, which is to be paid by the appellant the Insurance Company, can not be recovered from the insured in view of the judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in United Insurance Company Ltd v. Anubai Gopichand Thakare (First Appeal No. 827/2006 decided at Aurangabad on 04/08/2007) : 2008 (2) ABR (DOC) 27 (Bom.). In that case, learned Single Judge had held that the Tribunal has no statutory power to direct the insurer to pay an amount of compensation for which its liability excluded in view of fundamental breach of policy conditions and contract, and to direct that insurer may subsequently recover the amount from the insured. Learned Judge held that such directions had been issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction and, therefore, it may not be open for the Tribunal, or this Court, to issue any such directions. There is no need for either the Tribunal or this Court to comment on this issue since the judgment in National Insurance Company v. Swaran Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1531 (supra) is very clear and holds that even when an insurer is in the first instance not liable to pay, still it can be ordered to satisfy the decree and it can reimburs itself by taking appropriate action against the insured. These observations are not made in exercise of power of Supreme Court to do complete justice. These observations are not made in exercise of power of Supreme Court to do complete justice. Such a reading would make every claimant to rush to the Supreme Court. Therefore, these observations of the learned Single Judge made without the judgment in Swaran Singh's case (supra) being not brought to the notice of the Court, cannot be said to absolve the appellant Insurance Company from initially paying and to prevent it from recovering the amounts from the insured, after establishing the breach of terms of policy, which can be a matter between the insurer and insured. Further it may be noticed that what the learned Single Judge has held is in respect of fundamental breach of policy conditions. At the cost of repetition, it may be pointed out that the driver, whose licence to drive the vehicle of the type which he was driving at the time of accident had only expired, could not be said to be ineligible to drive the vehicle, simply because the licence was not renewed and, therefore, not effective at the time of accident. The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between in effectivity of licence referred to under Section 3 of the M.V. Act and the expression used in subsection (ii) of Section 149 of the M.V. Act, cannot be lost sight of. In view of the foregoing, there is no error in the finding of the Tribunal that the appellant Insurance Company shall be liable to satisfy the award in the first place. 23. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal had not passed any orders enabling the appellant to get itself reimbursed from the insured. If the appellant can make out a case of wilful breach of term of policy, namely that the insured permitted the vehicle to be driven by a driver, who did not hold a valid and effective licence, the appellant Insurance Company can get itself reimbursed from the insured of all the amounts which the appellant may pay to the claimants. Such a direction can be added to the award passed by the Tribunal. 24. This takes me to the question of quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. Against the claim of over Rs. 1 Crore, the Tribunal has awarded compensation quantified at Rs. 41,50,000/-. Such a direction can be added to the award passed by the Tribunal. 24. This takes me to the question of quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. Against the claim of over Rs. 1 Crore, the Tribunal has awarded compensation quantified at Rs. 41,50,000/-. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that this compensation was calculated by the Tribunal taking the income of the deceased to be Rs. 50,000/- per month. He submitted that this figure of Rs. 50,000/- was arrived at by the Tribunal without referring to the evidence tendered. He pointed out that income tax returns of the victim had been placed on record and those returns showed that the victim had declared the net annual income of Rs. 1,00,967/- only. He, therefore, submitted that the compensation should have been computed on the basis of this income of Rs. 1,00,967/- per annum. Learned Counsel for the claimants contested this contention and pointed out that the sum of Rs. 1,00,967/- has been arrived to compute the tax on the income i.e. chargeable income and not actual income of the victim. He pointed out from the annexures to the returns for the assessment year 1997-1998 show that gross professional receipt of the victim was Rs. 5,59,450/-. He, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal was right in taking the income of the victim to be Rs. 50,000/- per month. This is obviously not correct, since the gross earning of the victim was Rs. 5,59,450/-. The victim was running a hospital and a clinic and had to spend some amounts on the salaries of employees and incidental expenses like telephone, electricity bill, interest on loans taken etc. These overhead expenses shown in the annexures to the return totalled upto Rs. 2,14,907/-. Since these were the amounts, which the victim actually spent in order to earn income of Rs. 5,59,450/-, these amounts would have to be deducted from the gross receipt of the victim. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that depreciation, which the victim had claimed as well as the amount, which the victim had transferred to Capital Account, was also liable to be deducted, since the victim had claimed such deduction in his income tax return. This part of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Depreciation is shown for the purpose of computing tax, and is not the expenditure actually incurred. This part of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Depreciation is shown for the purpose of computing tax, and is not the expenditure actually incurred. Therefore, this depreciation or the amount, which was transferred to Capital Account which did not form actual expenditure incurred by the victim, could not be deducted from the victim's gross receipt. Therefore, deducting a sum of Rs. 2,14,907/- towards overheads from gross receipt of Rs. 5,59,450/-, the income would come to Rs. 3,44,543/-. Learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the victim's widow had admitted that she was receiving annual income for Rs. 24,000/- for running different facilities, which were used by the victim. The learned Counsel for the claimants submitted that towards these facilities, the claimants are required to pay an amount of Rs. 2400/- per annum. This income, which the claimants are thus deriving from these facilities would come to Rs. 21,600/- per annum. This amount would have to be deducted from the income of Rs. 3,44,543/-, since loss of the claimants would be an income of the deceased minus income from the properties left behind by him. Thus, net loss would come to Rs. 3,22,943/-. 25. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that ?rd of this amount would have to be deducted towards the victim's personal expenses. The learned Counsel for the claimants relying on the judgment in Sarla Varma v. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in (2009)6 SCC 121 : AIR 2009 SC 3104 submitted that this standard formula of deducting ?rd from the victim's income has not found favour with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that this would depend on the number of dependents of the victim. Paragraph 30 of this judgment may be usefully quoted as under : "30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra; (1996)4 SCC 362 , the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Paragraph 30 of this judgment may be usefully quoted as under : "30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra; (1996)4 SCC 362 , the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (?rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (?th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six." 26. Learned Counsel for the claimants submitted that since the deceased had five dependents in fact only th of the income would have to be deducted towards personal expenses of the victim. This comes to Rs. 80,735/- being th of Rs. 3,22,943/-. So, the net loss would come to Rs. 2,42,208/- per annum which is rounded up to Rs. 2,42,000/-. Learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has correctly applied the multiplier of 11. The compensation payable with this amount, would come to Rs. 26,62,000/-. The Tribunal had awarded a sum of Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expense, Rs. 2 Lakhs towards unquantifiable non-pecuniary damages and Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of consortium. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted the appellant has strong objection to the award of Rs. 2 Lakhs towards unquantifiable pecuniary damages. He submitted that there is no justification for awarding this amount. Again going by the judgment in Sarla Varma (supra), what would have been added is Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of estate, Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of consortium i.e. Rs. 20,000/- in all. The claimants would thus be entitled to compensation of Rs. 26,82,000/-. 27. In view of this, the appeal is partly allowed. The award passed by the Presiding Officer of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Margao is modified. The respondents in the claim petition i.e. respondents no.6 and 7 and the appellant herein shall jointly and severally pay to the claimants/ respondents no.1 to 5 herein a sum of Rs. 26,82,000/- with interest at the rate of 9 % per annum from the date of application till the deposit of the amount in the Tribunal. The respondents in the claim petition i.e. respondents no.6 and 7 and the appellant herein shall jointly and severally pay to the claimants/ respondents no.1 to 5 herein a sum of Rs. 26,82,000/- with interest at the rate of 9 % per annum from the date of application till the deposit of the amount in the Tribunal. The order as to apportionment of compensation shall remain as it is. 28. The appellant shall be entitled to have itself reimbursed from the insured the amount so deposited by initiating appropriate execution proceedings, since the insured had not participated in the proceedings to point out as to how there was no breach of term of policy, so that this issue need not be raked up again by the insured. 29. Registry shall calculate the amount payable to the claimants and pay the same to the claimants and refund balance to the appellant.