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2013 DIGILAW 1379 (RAJ)

Kalu Ram v. Panchayat Samiti, Degana

2013-07-30

P.K.LOHRA

body2013
Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—Petitioner, Kalu Ram, has laid this writ petition for imploring annulment of Resolution No. 2 dated 21st of May 2013 (Ex. 8) passed by the second respondent. Besides the aforementioned relief, the petitioner has also prayed for seeking a direction against the respondents to extent the term of contract for the year 2013-2014. 2. Succinctly stated, the factual matrix of the case is that an agriculture land measuring 261.72 bighas and 4 biswas situated at village Harsol in the Khatedari of Panchayat Samiti, Degana was auctioned by the second respondent in the year 2010 to one Lala Ram for its cultivation. Due to famine, the auctioned agriculture land did not yield the desired result and therefore at the request of Lala Ram, the first respondent Panchayat Samiti extended the term of contract for the next year, which was ultimately confirmed by the Zila Parishad, Nagaur. The petitioner has further averred in the writ petition that the Block Development Officer, Degana issued a Notification for auction on 26th of May 2010 and against this action a writ petition was preferred by Lala Ram and this Court was pleased to grant him interim protection. Taking shelter of the precedent of Lala Ram, the petitioner has inter-alia averred in the petition that when the said agriculture land was put to auction for cultivation for the year 2012-2013, he offered his bid and considering his bid to be highest, he was awarded the said contract for the year 2012-2013 for sum of Rs. 6,01,100/- only. After awarding of contract, as per the petitioner, he sowed the Gawar Crop and invested huge amount to the tune of Rupees six lakhs but due to famine and scarcity of water, the land has not yielded any agriculture produce. To support this assertion, the petitioner has placed on record Girdawari, wherein the Halka Patwari has certified that the said agriculture land has not yielded the crops by mentioning the word "Kharaba". Faced with this sort of awkward situation, as per the petitioner, applications were submitted by him before the Sub Divisional Officer, Degana and Bock Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Degana for extending him term of contract for the next year i.e. 2013-2014 and in turn the Sub Divisional Officer forwarded his application to Panchayat Samiti, Degana. Faced with this sort of awkward situation, as per the petitioner, applications were submitted by him before the Sub Divisional Officer, Degana and Bock Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Degana for extending him term of contract for the next year i.e. 2013-2014 and in turn the Sub Divisional Officer forwarded his application to Panchayat Samiti, Degana. The application submitted by the petitioner also found favour from the Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Degana and while concurring with his grievances, the Block Development Officer also recommended the first respondent to extend the term of contract. Making serious insinuations against the third respondent, the petitioner has pleaded in the writ petition that being Pradhan of Panchayat Samiti, Degana, he has conspired against the petitioner and with a view to dislodge him from the agriculture land manipulated and maneuvered the things and in utter disregard to the resolution of Gram Sabha took a decision in the meeting of Standing Committee on 21st of May 2013 for auctioning the agriculture land which was on contract for cultivation with the petitioner for the year 2012-2013. Subsequent to the Resolution dated 21st of May 2013, an auction notification was issued and as per the version of the petitioner, the entire auction proceedings are dehors the law and in clear violation of Article 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Precisely, for assailing the action of the respondents, the grounds urged by the petitioner hover around the case of Lala Ram. 3. Respondents contested the writ petition and submitted their reply. In the return, the respondents have refuted the allegation of the petitioner that agriculture land has not yielded agriculture produce during the year 2012-2013. As per the version of the respondents, during this period there was a bumper crop of Gawar on the agriculture land. Stoutly defending their action of putting the land to auction, the respondents have pleaded in the reply that the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Nagaur, vide its letter dated 21st of May 2013 has directed the Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, Degana to act in accordance with law and proceed with the auction of the agriculture land. Thus, according to the respondents, the auction proceedings were undertaken by the respondents in strict adherence of law and the same cannot be faulted in any manner whatsoever. Thus, according to the respondents, the auction proceedings were undertaken by the respondents in strict adherence of law and the same cannot be faulted in any manner whatsoever. In the return, the respondents have also clarified that the auction proceedings have already been undertaken but the same has not been finalized in adherence of the interim order granted by this Court. 4. The applicant, Simarta Ram, who has been allowed to intervene in the matter, has also shown his over enthusiasm and submitted reply to the writ petition countering the allegations contained in the writ petition. 5. After submission of reply by the respondents, the petitioner has made endeavour to submit additional pleadings in the form of rejoinder wherein the averments contained in the writ petition are reiterated. With his rejoinder, the petitioner has also placed on the record the report of the District Collector (Help), Nagaur dated 21st of February 2013 showing the details of the drought affected areas of district Nagaur, including village Harsol. Making scathing attack on Annex. R/1 filed by the respondents with their reply, the petitioner has urged in his rejoinder that the said document is false, and therefore is not worth any credence. In the rejoinder, the petitioner has also made an ambitious plea that the entire auction proceedings is void ab-initio as the same has not been carried out in accordance with law. Pointing out many infirmities in the auction proceedings, the petitioner has submitted in the rejoinder that entire proceedings were undertaken on 14th June 2013 in absence of Tehsildar and therefore no right whatsoever has been conferred on the highest bidder Simarta Ram. In his rejoinder, the petitioner has also made an attempt to prove nexus between the third respondent and the highest bidder Simarta Ram and has submitted that Simarta Ram is a benami bidder on behalf of the third respondent. 6. Learned Senior counsel, Mr. M.C. Bhoot, has strenuously argued that the case of the petitioner for extension of the term of contract has not been objectively examined by the respondents and while declining his request the respondents have acted in an absolutely arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Mr. 6. Learned Senior counsel, Mr. M.C. Bhoot, has strenuously argued that the case of the petitioner for extension of the term of contract has not been objectively examined by the respondents and while declining his request the respondents have acted in an absolutely arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Mr. Bhoot has contended that on earlier occasion when respondent Panchayat Samiti has granted indulgence to Lala Ram, why the same treatment has not been meted out to the petitioner is not at all clear, and therefore it is a clear case of malafide and the impugned resolution in such circumstances is not sustainable. Placing reliance on the interim order passed by this Court in Lala Ram's case, the learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that plight of a poor agriculturist deserves appreciation in light of famine during the subsistence of contract and the period of contract warrants extension for a year. Assailing auction proceedings, the learned counsel for the petitioner has made scathing attack on the role played by the third respondent and has argued that the entire auction proceedings is a sham and is a blatant attempt at the behest of third respondent to dislodge the petitioner from the disputed agriculture land. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents Mr. K.K.Bissa has argued that the term of contract of the petitioner was for a year and after expiry of the said term he has no right whatsoever to continue with the possession of the land and to cultivate the same. Mr. Bissa, learned counsel for the respondents, has invited attention of this Court towards Rule 173 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules 1996 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1996') and has urged that under the said rule, the term of contract is specified for one year with clarity and precision and as such beyond one year no extension is permissible and a Panchayati Raj Institution is well within its right to put the agriculture land for auction. Questioning the maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel Mr. Bissa has contended that there is no semblance of proof about violation of any of the legal rights of the petitioner much less fundamental rights, and therefore, the writ petition is not at all maintainable. Questioning the maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel Mr. Bissa has contended that there is no semblance of proof about violation of any of the legal rights of the petitioner much less fundamental rights, and therefore, the writ petition is not at all maintainable. The learned counsel for the respondents, while countering the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner on validity of the auction proceedings, would urge that the petitioner has no locus standi to question the auction proceedings because he has not participated in the bid process. 8. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. P.P. Choudhary, appearing for the intervener, Simarta Ram, has vehemently argued that the language employed in Rule 173 of the Rules of 1996 is clear and unambiguous and require no interpretation. According to Mr. Choudhary, the mandatory provisions contained under Rule 173 of the Rules of 1996 clearly envisage the term of contract for one year and therefore beyond one year extension of contract without auction is impermissible under the law. Invoking the principles of interpretation of statute, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that intention of the legislative provision is to be inferred from the language employed in the statute and the Court is not obliged to supply words which have been accidentally omitted in statute. The learned counsel for the intervener, in order to render assistance to this Court, has submitted that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner then it has to be done in that manner and no other manner. With these arguments, the learned counsel for the intervener has submitted that there is no infirmity much less infirmity in the auction proceedings. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 10. At the outset, from a bare perusal of the writ petition it is amply clear that the entire case of the petitioner is founded on Lala Ram's writ petition, which was earlier filed before this Court, wherein interim protection was granted by this Court. The coordinate Bench of this Court has granted interim protection to Lala Ram in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and the said interim order cannot be cited as a legal precedent to govern the lis involved in the present petition. The coordinate Bench of this Court has granted interim protection to Lala Ram in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and the said interim order cannot be cited as a legal precedent to govern the lis involved in the present petition. An incumbent approaching a writ Court is expected to show his legal foothold and cannot seek any relief under extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court on sympathetic considerations. The Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is under an obligation to decide the matter as per law and there is no room for benevolence and misplaced sympathy vis-a-vis a litigant in such adjudication. In the backdrop of the facts of the instant case, if the afflictions of the petitioner are examined then it will ipso facto reveal that the contract was awarded to him for a year and the said term has expired and in terms of contract the petitioner is having no right to seek extension of the contract. Moreover, Rule 173 of the Rules of 1996, which is per-se mandatory in character, clearly envisages the term of the contract for a year. The complete text of Rule 173 of the Rules of 1996 is reproduced as infra: 173. Agricultural lands.-(1) The Panchayati Raj Institutions having their own agricultural land, may lease out such lands through public auction. (2) The panchayats having mango trees or such other orchards shall also lease them out on annual contract basis through public auction. (3) The contractors shall be given only for a period of one years for Kharif and Rabi seasons. (4) Contractor shall vacate the farm and remove the agricultural produce latest by Akshaya Tritya. This fact may be mentioned in the terms of the contract. (5) A portion of the agricultural farm should be kept reserved for agricultural demonstration and social forestry. (6) Auction shall be held on a near 15th of May every year in the presence of an auction committee consisting of Chief Executive Officer, Tehsildar and Vikas Adhikari. (7) While allotting contracts, preference shall be given to Government Departments or organizations, like Rajasthan State Seed Corporation National Seed Corporation, NAFED etc. 11. The recitals contained in the above quoted rule provides a procedure for leasing out agriculture land owned by a Panchayati Raj Institution in a particular manner and the said prescribed manner cannot be deviated. (7) While allotting contracts, preference shall be given to Government Departments or organizations, like Rajasthan State Seed Corporation National Seed Corporation, NAFED etc. 11. The recitals contained in the above quoted rule provides a procedure for leasing out agriculture land owned by a Panchayati Raj Institution in a particular manner and the said prescribed manner cannot be deviated. It is a trite law that the subsidiary rule of interpretation of statutes is that emphasis should be given to the literal meaning and normally Court cannot supply words which have been accidentally omitted in a statute. This sort of situation may arise in exceptional cases where the Court may resort to supplying words so as to avoid rendering the meaning of the statute or part thereof as otios or absurd. There appears to be no reason to deviate from the basic principle of interpretation of statute in the present case because the language employed in the above quoted Rule 173 of the Rules of 1996 is clear and unambiguous. From the language employed therein, no other interpretation is possible and the only interpretation is that the contract for cultivation by a Panchayati Raj Institution can be awarded for one year only. 12. It is a settled principle of law that where a statute provides a thing to be done in a particular manner then it has to be done in the prescribed manner and any other manner for doing the things is forbidden by law. Reliance in this behalf can profitably be made to the verdict of Apex Court in case of Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Essar Power Ltd. ( (2008) 4 SCC 755 ). The Apex Court made following observations in this behalf in Para 35 of the verdict: 35. It is well settled that where a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner, and in no other manner, vide Chandra Kishore Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad (SCC para 17: AIR Para 12 12), Dhananjaya Reddy vs. State of Karnataka (SCC para 23: AIR para 22) etc. Section 86(1)(f) provides a special manner of making references to an arbitrator in disputes between a licensee and a generating company. Hence by implication all other methods are barred. 13. Section 86(1)(f) provides a special manner of making references to an arbitrator in disputes between a licensee and a generating company. Hence by implication all other methods are barred. 13. The challenge thrown to auction proceeding by the petitioner in the instant writ petition cannot be entertained for the simple reason that he has not participated in the auction proceedings and therefore there is no question of invasion of any of his legal rights much less fundamental rights. On examining the matter in its entirety, in my considered opinion, the petitioner has miserably failed to make out a case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and consequently I am disinclined to interfere in the matter. 14. Resultantly, I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.