New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Bopanna & Ors.
2013-03-08
MANSOOR AHMAD MIR
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
1. Does the "Comprehensive Policy of Insurance" exempts the Insurance Company from its liability of paying compensation to the victim of a vehicular accident who is traveling in a vehicle which is covered under such policy, at the time of accident, is but the only important point, raised in the instant appeal which seeks setting aside of Award dated 26th April, 2012, for short as impugned Award, passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Samba, for short as Tribunal? 2. "No" is possibly the only answer for the reasons those would flow from the narration of events below. BRIEFFACTS 3. On 30th March, 2009, a vehicular accident caused at Vijaypur Chakpura, claimed the life of one Venkata Subramanyam Bopana. The accident had allegedly been caused due to rash and negligent driving of one Deepak Kumar, driver of offending vehicle, TATA SUMO GRANDY, bearing registration No. CH04E 6276. 4. Respondents 1 and 2, being the legal heirs of deceased viz. wife and minor son, approached the Tribunal seeking compensation from the insurer-appellant for the life of deceased having gone astray due to said accident. Respondents claimed compensation to the rune of Rs. 2.50 Crores along with 12% interest per annum, from the appellant. 5. Appellant/insurer and respondent 2 and 3, in claim petition, appeared before the Tribunal and filed objections. Tribunal after considering the pleadings of the parties framed as many as eight issues for determination. The said issues are verbatim placed on record, thus: 1) Whether deceased Venkata Subramanyam Bopanna died as a result of injuries sustained in a road traffic accident on 30.03.2009 at 7.15 A.M. near Chakpura, Vijaypur caused by respondent No. 2 while driving Vijaypur caused by respondent No. 2 while driving vehicle No. CH04E/6276 in a rash and negligent manner? O.P.P. 2) Whether respondent No. 2 was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of the accident? OPR1 3) Whether the respondent No. 1 is not liable to pay any compensation as the offending vehicle was driven in contravention of the terms and conditions of the insurance Policy and route perm it? OPR3. 4) In case issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative whether the petitioners are entitled to any compensation under Motor Vehicle Act and if so, from whom and to what extent? OPP.
OPR3. 4) In case issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative whether the petitioners are entitled to any compensation under Motor Vehicle Act and if so, from whom and to what extent? OPP. 5) In case issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative whether the liability of respondent No. 1 is limited to compensation of Rs. 1 lakh? OPR1. 6) Whether the deceased does not come within the definition of the term 3rd party. If so, what is its effect? OPR1. 7) Whether the risk of the alleged deceased being employee or member of the Insured is not covered under the insurance policy and thus respondent No. 1 is not liable to pay the compensation? OPR1. 8) Relief." 6. Respondent No. 1 herein after being asked to lead evidence produced and examined Rajesh Kumar, Lovely Bhagat and also appeared as her own witness to prove her claim. Besides in the shape of documentary evidence, she placed reliance on Photostat copy of FIR, Insurance Policy, postmortem report and appointment letter dated 5th March, 2008, and Form No. 16 detailing out the salary and tax statement of deceased. 7. Appellant also examined S. K. Gupta and S. S. Jaral, while as respondent No. 3 in the claim petition, examined Ramesh Sharma. 8. The witnesses produced and examined by the respondent No. 1 herein, lend support to the respondents' case and their statements establish the factum of respondents 1 and 2 herein, to be the legal heirs of deceased and having been deprived of their only dependency. The witnesses have deposed that deceased's gross monthly salary was Rs. 2,08,333/- and Rs. 184879/- after requisite tax deductions. The witnesses have also corroborated the stand of the respondent No. 1 vis-'-vis the rank and future prospects of deceased in the Company. One of the witnesses has deposed that he has witnessed the accident as he happened to be driving on a motorcycle on spot on the fateful day. He has deposed that offending vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently at high speed. 9. Insurer-appellant examined S.K. Gupta, Divisional Manager of New India Assurance Co, Ludhiana who deposed that Insurance policy exhibited as EXT-SKG covers the risk of the vehicle, 3rd party and six non-fare paying passengers upto Rs. 1,00,000/- per person.
He has deposed that offending vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently at high speed. 9. Insurer-appellant examined S.K. Gupta, Divisional Manager of New India Assurance Co, Ludhiana who deposed that Insurance policy exhibited as EXT-SKG covers the risk of the vehicle, 3rd party and six non-fare paying passengers upto Rs. 1,00,000/- per person. However, he has further stated that being the employee of the owner of offending vehicle, the victim was not covered; therefore, Company was not liable to pay compensation. In cross-examination he stated that insurance policy was comprehensive policy. 10. Mr. S. S. Jaral, investigator of the insurance company has stated that deceased was a top executive in Surya Pharmaceutical. The claim, as per him, under the personal claim policy comes under the personal accident for which additional premium was being charged. 11. The Tribunal after examining the entire record and scanning evidence returned issue-wise findings and the said findings vis-a-vis issue No. 1 and 2 have not been questioned, therefore, does not necessarily require to be adjudicated upon. However, I have gone through the findings and am of the considered view that respondents/claimants have proved the factum of rash and negligent driving at the hands of driver of the offending vehicle which resulted in accident. The validity of the driving is not disputed, therefore, findings returned on issues 1 and 2 are upheld. 12. The appellant is aggrieved of the impugned Award also for being on higher side. 13. Heard counsel for the parties and went through the insurance policy which on the face of it is a comprehensive policy and relates to private car and covers its occupant. It is beaten law of the land that when the policy is a conditional policy i.e. comprehensive policy, the Insurance company is to be saddled with the entire liability. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding insurer-appellant liable and saddling it as such. Another instance of it is given in case titled Smt. Jyoti and such another v. Geeta Devi and others decided by High Court of Punjab and Haryana bearing FAO No. 1593 of 2008, while referring to Delhi High Court decision in MAC. APP. No. 176 of 2009 titled Yashpal Luthra and another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and another; and it has been held therein that package policy covers the occupant in private car also.
APP. No. 176 of 2009 titled Yashpal Luthra and another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and another; and it has been held therein that package policy covers the occupant in private car also. The Delhi High Court has taken note of the circular also issued by Tariff Advisory Committee, for short as TAP, dated 18th March, 1978 in Yashpal Luthra case supra. 14. Apex Court also in case titled National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Balakrishnan and another reported as 2012 AIR SCW, 6286, has held that an Act Policy is different than "Comprehensive/Package Policy", and that it covers the risk of occupant in a car and pillion rider also. 15. Mr. Gupta the witness examined by appellant has deposed that insurance policy is a comprehensive policy, thus claim was impermissible. However, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case (supra) has discussed the mandate of Section 147 and 149 of Motor Vehicles Act. It is apt to reproduce Paragraphs 15, 16, 21 and 22 of the judgment herein, thus: 15. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to a two-Judge Bench decision in Bhagyalakshmi and others v. United Insurance Company Limited and another wherein the learned Judges took note of the contention of the learned senior counsel for the claimant-appellant which was to the effect that after the deletion of the second proviso appended to Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the 1988 Act, the liability of a passenger in a private vehicle must also be included in the policy in terms of the provisions of the 1988 Act. The Bench reproduced the policy, referred to Section 64-B of the Insurance Act, 1938, took note of the role of the Tariff Advisory Committee and referred to the decisions in Amrit Lal Sood and Another v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar and Others, Asha Rani (supra), Tilak Singh (supra), Jhuma Saha (supra) and Sudhakaran K.V. and Others (supra) and observed thus:- "Before this Court, however, the nature of policies which came up for consideration were Act policies. This Court did not deal with a package policy.
This Court did not deal with a package policy. If the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce its decision in regard to coverage of third-party risk which would include all persons including occupants of the vehicle and the insurer having entered into a contract of insurance in relation thereto, we are of the opinion that the matter may require a deeper scrutiny." On a perusal of the aforesaid paragraph, it is clear as crystal that the decisions that have been referred to in Bhagyalakshmi (supra) involved only "Act Policies". The Bench felt that the matter would be different if the Tariff Advisory Committee seeks to enforce its decision in regard to coverage of third party risk which would include an occupant in a vehicle. It is worth noting that the Bench referred to certain decisions of Delhi High Court and Madras High Court and thought it appropriate to refer the matter to a large Bench. Be it noted, in the said case, the Court was dealing with comprehensive policy which is also called a package policy. In that context, in the earlier part of the judgment, the Bench had stated thus:-"The policy in question is a package policy. The contract of insurance if given its face value covers the risk not only of a third party but also of persons traveling in the car including the owner thereof. The question is as to whether the policy in question is a comprehensive policy or only an Act policy." 16. Thus, it is quite vivid that the Bench had made a distinction between the "Act Policy" and "comprehensive policy/package policy". We respectfully concur with the said distinction. The crux of the matter is what would be the liability of the insurer if the policy is a "comprehensive/package policy". We are absolutely conscious that the matter has been referred to a larger Bench, but, as is evident, the Bench has also observed that it would depend upon the view of the Tariff Advisory Committee pertaining to enforcement of its decision to cover the liability of an occupant in a vehicle in a "comprehensive/package policy" regard being had to the contract of insurance. 21. In view of the aforesaid factual position, there is no scintilla of doubt that a "comprehensive/package policy" would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car.
21. In view of the aforesaid factual position, there is no scintilla of doubt that a "comprehensive/package policy" would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. There is no cavil that an "Act Policy" stands on a different footing from a "Comprehensive/Package Policy". As the circulars have made the position very clear and the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has commanded the insurance companies stating that a "Comprehensive/Package Policy" covers the liability, there cannot be any dispute in that regard. We may hasten to clarify that the earlier pronouncements were rendered in respect of the "Act Policy" which admittedly cannot cover a third party risk of an occupant in a car. But, if the policy is a "Comprehensive/Package Policy", the liability would be covered. These aspects were not noticed in the case of Bhagyalakshmi (supra) and, therefore, the matter was referred to a larger Bench. We are disposed to think that there is no necessity to refer the present matter to a larger Bench as the IRDA, which is presently the statutory authority, has clarified the position by issuing circulars which have been reproduced in the judgment by the Delhi High Court and we have also reproduced the same. 22. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the question that emerges for consideration is whether in the case at hand, the policy is an "Act Policy" or "Comprehensive/Package Policy". There has been no discussion either by the tribunal or the High Court in this regard. True it is, before us, Annexure P-1 has been filed which is a policy issued by the insurer. It only mentions the policy to be a "comprehensive policy" but we are inclined to think that there has to be a scanning of the terms of the entire policy to arrive at the conclusion whether it is really a "package policy" to cover the liability of an occupant in a car." 16. Having regard to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex court, Hon'ble High Courts of Delhi and Punjab and Haryana read with statement of the insurance official, S,K. Gupta, the appellant has rightly/been saddled with the liability. 17. Learned senior counsel for appellant contended claimants have shown the age of deceased as 49 years but postmortem report and other documents disclose his age as 51 years.
17. Learned senior counsel for appellant contended claimants have shown the age of deceased as 49 years but postmortem report and other documents disclose his age as 51 years. After noticing this fact, counsel for the appellant has sought leave to amend the appeal which was granted vide order dated 4th February, 2013. The amendment was sought only to show that Tribunal has fallen in error while applying multiplier 11 and making 30% addition to the income of the deceased on account of future prospects. 18. Now the question is whether 30% was to be added to the income of the ' deceased as his future prospects? 19. The thumb rule in case titled Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, reported as AIR 2009 SC 3104 , is that if the deceased is below 40 to 50 years of age, addition of 30% is to be made to his income provided the deceased had a permanent job and no such addition is to be made in a case where the age of the deceased was more than 50 years. The matter came up again for consideration before Apex Court in a case supra reported as 2011 (4) SCC 689 and their Lordships have held that there can be deviation of thumb rule in exceptional cases and where income of the deceased was bound to increase. 20. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that deceased was holding the post of vice president and was due to be promoted as Managing Director thereby his income would have raised to Rs. 5.00 lacs per month. Thus 30% had to be added to his income for future prospects and rightly done by the Tribunal. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 8 and 10 of the said judgment herein, thus:- "8. The law regarding addition in income for future prospects has been clearly laid down in Sarla Verma (Smt) & Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Another [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 ] and the relevant portion reads as follows: In Susamma Thomas this Court increased the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit the income was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah the income was increased by a mere 7%.
In view of the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. [Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words should be read as actual salary less tax. The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardize the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances; 10. The present case stands on different factual basis where there is clear and incontrovertible evidence on record that the deceased was entitled and in fact bound to get a rise in income in the future, a fact which was Corroborated by evidence on record. Thus, we are of the view that the present case comes within the 'exceptional circumstances' and not within the purview of rule of thumb Said down by the Sarla Verma (supra) judgment. Hence, even though the deceased was above 50 years of age, he shall be entitled to increase in income due to future prospects." 21. He also contended that as per the schedule appended with the (M. V. Act, multiplier 9 was to be applied. Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with a matter involving same question in a case titled K.R. Madhusudhan and others v. Administrative Officer and anr., reported as 2011 (4) SCC 689 and it was held that multiplier 11 is appropriate multiplier applicable in the given circumstances. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 14 of the judgment herein, thus: "14. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason.
It is apt to reproduce paragraph 14 of the judgment herein, thus: "14. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefore. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6." 22. Keeping in view the ratio laid down in the judgment supra, the Tribunal was right in applying multiplier 11 in the present case. 23. Having regard to the above discussion, I am of the considered view that Tribunalhas rightly awarded Rs. 1,68,09,089/-, Rs. 2500/-, Rs. 2000/- and Rs. 5000/-under the head i) loss of dependency, ii) loss of Estate, iii) Funeral expenses and loss of consortium respectively. The interest component awarded @ 6% is reasonable too. The cumulative effect would be that the impugned award is maintained and appeal is dismissed. 24. The sufferings, pain and agony of the family, consisting of a lady and a minor child, having lost its only earning member can just be imagined. The said sufferings have got multiplied by the conduct of appellant/insurer who has dragged them unnecessarily and kept them busy in litigation; therefore, I deem it proper to impose costs too. 25. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- payable to the respondents/claimants. 26. Send down the record.