JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Misra, J.—These four writ petitions based on similar facts and raising common questions of law, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, are being decided by a common judgment. 2. The facts, in brief, are that Rama Nand Ojha (the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 17548 of 2010 and the respondent No. 2 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 61687 of 2009), Radha Krishna Pal (respondent No. 2 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 61689 of 2009) and Anil Kumar (respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 9464 of 2010) were constables posted in 9th/24th Battalion, P.A.C., Moradabad. In the night of 27th/28.8.2006 they alongwith one Subodh Kumar Sharma consumed liquor in the barrack and under its influence entered into an altercation with fellow constables as a result, two constables namely, Bhajan Singh and Subodh Kumar Sharma, loaded their rifles and pointed at each other. With the intervention of other fellow constables, the situation was defused. Departmental proceedings followed with charge of gross indiscipline etc. against them. After a full-fledged departmental enquiry the charges were found proved by the Enquiry Officer, who, with a proposal for infliction of a punishment of reduction to the lowest pay-scale for a period of three years, forwarded the enquiry report to the disciplinary authority. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer, however, he expressed his disagreement on the punishment proposed and issued a show-cause notice, therewith enclosing the enquiry report, calling for explanation from the delinquent constables as to why a punishment of dismissal from service be not imposed on them on the basis of the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer. In response to the show-cause notice, the delinquent constables submitted their reply. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the reply of the delinquent constables, by a speaking order, passed orders of dismissal from service. The departmental appeal preferred against the order of dismissal was also dismissed. 3. Aggrieved by the orders, three claim petitions were filed before the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. Radha Krishna Pal preferred Claim Petition No. 715 of 2007; Rama Nand Ojha preferred Claim Petition No. 714 of 2007; and Anil Kumar preferred Claim Petition No. 1296 of 2007. All these three claim petitions were partly allowed by three separate judgments rendered by the Tribunal. Claim Petition Nos. Radha Krishna Pal preferred Claim Petition No. 715 of 2007; Rama Nand Ojha preferred Claim Petition No. 714 of 2007; and Anil Kumar preferred Claim Petition No. 1296 of 2007. All these three claim petitions were partly allowed by three separate judgments rendered by the Tribunal. Claim Petition Nos. 714 of 2007 and 715 of 2007 were partly allowed by two separate orders of the date 18.3.2009 whereas Claim Petition No. 1296 of 2007 was partly allowed by judgment and order dated 24.7.2009. The operative portion of the order of the Tribunal, in all the three petitions, was to the effect that the order of dismissal as well as the appellate order was set aside and the opposite parties therein were directed to reinstate the petitioners in service with all consequential service benefits except the back wages and it was left open for the opposite parties to make fresh enquiry, if so advised. 4. While allowing the Claim Petition Nos. 715 of 2007 and 1296 of 2007, two grounds were taken by the Tribunal to support its decision. The first being that the Charge-sheet was not under the signatures of the Appointing Authority/Disciplinary Authority therefore the whole enquiry proceedings pursuant thereto stood vitiated. The second was that since the Enquiry Officer had recommended punishment of reduction to the lowest pay-scale for a period of three years the Disciplinary Authority ought to have given opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before disagreeing with the proposal as was held by the Apex Court in the case of Yogi Nath D. Bagde v. State of Maharastra, (1999) 7 SCC 739 . Since that was not done, the principles of natural justice were violated which vitiated the order of dismissal. The Tribunal, however, affirmed the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer with respect to the guilt of the constables and while doing so it rejected the contention on behalf of the constables that the charges could not be said to have been proved in absence of medical examination of the constables to test that liquor was consumed by them. The contention that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges was rejected by the Tribunal. The contention that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the charges was rejected by the Tribunal. Claim Petition No. 714 of 2007 preferred by Rama Nand Ojha though was allowed but while writing the judgment it appears that the points that had weighed with the Tribunal for allowing the claim petitions of the other two constables were conspicuous by their absence in the judgment even though the operative portion reflected that the claim petition was partly allowed. Accordingly Rama Nand Ojha has preferred Writ Petition No. 17548 of 2010 with a prayer that the order of the Tribunal passed in Claim Petition No. 714 of 2007 may be made in consonance with the one passed in Claim Petition No. 715 of 2007. 5. We have heard the learned Standing Counsel for the State-petitioner in Writ Petition Nos. 61687 of 2009, 61689 of 2009 and 9464 of 2010, Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare for the contesting respondent in Writ Petition Nos. 61687 of 2009 and 61689 of 2009 and Sri Ambrish Chatterjee for the contesting respondent in Writ Petition No. 9464 of 2010. We have also heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 17548 of 2010 and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents in the said writ petition. 6. The learned Standing Counsel challenged the orders passed by the Tribunal on the ground that both the grounds taken by the Tribunal for partly allowing the claim petitions of the constables were not sustainable in law. It is contended that there was no requirement under the service rules governing the constables which may require issuance of charge-sheet under the signature of the disciplinary/appointing authority. Admittedly all the three constables were members of the U.P. Police Force and the disciplinary proceedings as against them were governed by statutory rules framed under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 46 read with Sections 2 and 7 of the Police Act, 1861 known as Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. By rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, the punishments that can be imposed on the police officers of the sub-ordinate ranks are provided for. Rule 5 provides the procedure for award of punishment. By rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, the punishments that can be imposed on the police officers of the sub-ordinate ranks are provided for. Rule 5 provides the procedure for award of punishment. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 provides that in case where major punishment is to be awarded, the procedure laid down in sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 would be followed. Rule 14 of the Rules provides as follows : “14. Procedure for conducting departmental proceedings.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in these Rules, the departmental proceedings in the cases referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 against the Police Officers may be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix 1. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) punishments in cases referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 may be imposed after informing the Police Officer in writing of the action proposed to be taken against him and of the imputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be taken and giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal. (3) The charged Police Officer shall not be represented by Counsel in any proceedings instituted under these rules.” 7. Appendix I to the Rules, 1991 lay down the procedure in detail, as follows : “APPENDIX I Procedure relating to the conduct of departmental proceedings against police officer [See Rule 14(1)] Upon institution of a formal enquiry such police officer against whom the enquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be used in the form of a definite charge or charges as in Form 1 appended to these Rules which shall be communicated to the charged police officer and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged police officer to the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the Inquiry Officer so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charged police officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish: Provided that the Inquiry Officer may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the ground thereof. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer.” As per Appendix I the charges have to be drawn in the manner as contained in the Form 1, which is being reproduced below: "FORM 1 Form of charge to be used in proceedings under Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861 Office of the To Dated:..........199 (Full name and designation of the police officer charged) You are hereby charged as follows: (1) that you on (or about) (or between) .............. and …............dated) while posted (as designation) (Facts of the case) and hereby committed a breach of rule.......................or, were guilty of failure to discharge your duty, or etc. Evidence which it proposed to consider in support of the charge— (I) + (II) + (III) + (2) that you * etc. (3) that you * etc. +(to be repeated as many time as there charges) *You are hereby required on or before................ to put in a written statement of your defense in reply to each of the charges. You are warned that if no such statement is received from you by the undersigned within the time allowed, it will be presumed that you have none to furnish, and order’s will be passed in your case accordingly. to put in a written statement of your defense in reply to each of the charges. You are warned that if no such statement is received from you by the undersigned within the time allowed, it will be presumed that you have none to furnish, and order’s will be passed in your case accordingly. You are further required simultaneously to inform the undersigned in writing whether you desire to be heard in person and, in case you wish to examine or cross-examine any witnesses to submit alongwith your written statement their names and addresses together with a brief indication of the evidence which each such witness shall be expected to give. (Signature and designation of Inquiring Officer) (For and on behalf of*) Certified that the charge has been read over and explained to................(party charged) in simple Hindi and a copy of the same was handed over to———————— Received a copy of charge. (Signature and Designation of Inquiring Officer) Signature of party charged.” 8. As per the form of the charge-sheet provided under the Rules, it is clear that the charge-sheet is to be issued under the signature and designation of the Inquiring Officer and not the Appointing/Disciplinary Authority. The learned counsel for the respondents could not show us any authority or Rule so as to justify that a charge-sheet relating to a disciplinary enquiry against a constable in the U.P. Police Force was required to be issued under the signatures of the disciplinary/appointing authority. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal committed manifest error of law by holding that the enquiry proceedings stood vitiated on the ground that the charge-sheet was not issued under the signature of the Disciplinary/Appointing Authority. It would be useful to note that in this case, there is no dispute that the charge-sheet was issued under the signature and designation of the Inquiring Officer. 9. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the second ground taken by the Tribunal for allowing the claim petition was also not legally justified. It would be useful to note that in this case, there is no dispute that the charge-sheet was issued under the signature and designation of the Inquiring Officer. 9. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the second ground taken by the Tribunal for allowing the claim petition was also not legally justified. It was submitted that although the Enquiry Officer had proposed punishment of reduction to the minimum pay-scale for a period of three years but the Disciplinary Authority while issuing a show-cause notice had expressed his disagreement with the proposed punishment on the strength of the proven misconduct and had called for explanation from the constables as to why they may not be dismissed from service. It was further submitted that the Tribunal wrongly placed reliance on the principle laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Yogi Nath D. Bagde (supra), which was with reference to dissent by the Disciplinary Authority with regard to a finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and not with regard to the punishment proposed by the Enquiry Officer. The learned Standing Counsel further submitted that although vide Appendix I to the Rules, 1991, it was permissible for the Enquiry Officer to make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officers but it is neither mandatory to make such recommendation nor any such recommendation is binding. Moreover, under sub-rule (2) of Rule 14, the disciplinary authority is required to inform the police officer concerned, in writing, of the action proposed to be taken against him on the basis of the charges proven against him and it is only after obtaining representation from the police officer concerned that the penalty is to be imposed. As in the instant case the disciplinary authority had not agreed with the punishment proposed by the Enquiry Officer and had mentioned that the proven misconduct of the police officer concerned constituted an act of gross indiscipline for which major penalty of dismissal from service was warranted and had thereby called for explanation in that regard, the police officers concerned were given full opportunity to address on the question of punishment of dismissal and, as such, the principles of natural justice were duly complied with. Accordingly, the Tribunal grossly erred in law by setting aside the order passed of the disciplinary authority, which was duly affirmed by the appellate authority. Accordingly, the Tribunal grossly erred in law by setting aside the order passed of the disciplinary authority, which was duly affirmed by the appellate authority. 10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the constables submitted that since the Rules, 1991 provided for opinion of the Inquiry Officer with regard to proposed punishment, the opinion rendered by the Inquiry Officer formed an integral part of the enquiry report, therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was under a legal obligation to disclose its tentative reasons to the constables before taking a decision to disagree with the punishment proposed by the Inquiry Officer and as, in the instant case, the Disciplinary Authority had, without disclosing his tentative reasons to disagree with the proposed punishment, directly disagreed with the punishment proposed, the principles of natural justice stood violated in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde (supra). 11. In the alternative, it was also submitted, on behalf of the constables, that the Tribunal had failed to properly examine various other pleas taken by the constables in their claim petitions such as: (a) that the enquiry report was a non-speaking/unreasoned report contrary to settled principles of service jurisprudence; (b) that none of the constables who had allegedly taken liquor were subjected to medical examination; and (c) that consumption of liquor was proved only on the basis of oral testimony of the other constables, which in absence of proper medical examination, ought not to have been relied. It was also submitted on behalf of the constables that admittedly the liquor was consumed at night within the confines of the barrack, away from public gaze and further, no untoward incident had happened and moreover the alleged altercation amongst the constables was defused and they had later returned to duty, therefore, the quantum of punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charge, particularly in view of the own opinion of the Inquiry Officer. 12. It was also contended that the allegation of pointing loaded rifles at each other was not attributable to the constables before this Court, but was attributable to Subodh Kumar Sharma and one Bhajan Singh. Relying on these facts, the learned counsel for the constables submitted that the Tribunal committed manifest error of law by not properly examining the plea of the constables with regards to the punishment being shockingly disproportionate. 13. Relying on these facts, the learned counsel for the constables submitted that the Tribunal committed manifest error of law by not properly examining the plea of the constables with regards to the punishment being shockingly disproportionate. 13. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not legally justified in setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority on the ground that the disciplinary authority had not invited comments from the charged officers on the tentative reasons for disagreement with the punishment proposed by the Inquiry Officer. The principle laid down in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde (supra) does not apply with regards to disagreement with proposed punishment. The contention that as the Rules provided for recommendation of the punishment by the Inquiry Officer, therefore, before disagreeing with the same, explanation should have been called on the tentative reasons for such disagreement, cannot be accepted for the reason that under the Rules applicable, it is not obligatory for the Inquiry Officer to propose punishment. It is only that such punishment may separately be proposed. Whereas by virtue of Rule 14(2) it is the authority competent to punish who has to call for explanation on the punishment proposed. In the instant case we find that the concerned authority had clearly expressed his disagreement in the show-cause notice with the punishment proposed by the Inquiry Officer upon consideration of the gravity of misconduct and had thereby called upon the charged constables to explain as to why on the proven charges they be not dismissed from service. Thus, in our considered view no prejudice was caused to the charged constables as they had full opportunity to address on the punishment of dismissal, which was proposed in the show-cause notice. We may add that in support of the contention the learned counsel for the contesting respondents (constables) placed reliance on certain observations of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra State Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. Haridas and another, AIR 2008 SC 1480 , so as to contend that as the Inquiry Officer was empowered to recommend punishment under the Rules, the punishing authority ought to have called for explanation from the delinquent employees before considering to alter the proposed punishment. As we have already found that in the instant case the punishing authority had expressed his disagreement with the proposed punishment and had called for explanation from the delinquent constables as to why the punishment of dismissal be not imposed on them, the principles of natural justice were duly complied with and as such the decision in the case of Maharashtra State Seeds Corp. (supra) is of no help. Thus we are of the considered view that the Tribunal was not legally justified in setting aside the punishment order on the ground that the punishing authority had violated the principle laid down in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde (supra). 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the constables that as the delinquents were not medically examined for consuming liquor the charge cannot be said to have been proved, cannot be accepted. The fact that they consumed liquor with its resultant effect was duly proved by testimony of fellow constables, who were witnesses to the incident. In a departmental enquiry the strict principles of proof as applicable to a criminal trial are not applicable. We, therefore, do not find any fault with the finding of the Tribunal on this score. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the constables that the enquiry report was not well reasoned and, therefore, should be discarded, cannot be accepted. The Enquiry Officer has taken note of the evidences led before him and he found that the charges were duly proved from statements of fellow constables who were witness to the incident. This being a finding of fact, based on appreciation of evidence adduced before the enquiry officer and there being no allegation with regard to any violation of the principles of natural justice during the course of the enquiry, we do not find any good reason to hold that the finding returned by the enquiry officer was either perverse or against the law. In this regard, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. 16. On the question of quantum of punishment, we have examined the matter in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the constables. In this regard, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. 16. On the question of quantum of punishment, we have examined the matter in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the constables. A careful examination of the charges leveled against each of the three constables reveal that against Rama Nand Ojha (the respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 61687 of 2009), the charge was that in the night of 27/28.8.2006, his duty was fixed from 20:00 hours to 05:00 hours, but instead of going on his duty as per the schedule, he was consuming liquor with the other constables inside the barracks. At page 111 of the paper book of W.P. No. 61687 of 2009, at the concluding portion of the enquiry report, it has also come that the character roll entries of Rama Nand Ojha revealed that he had been earlier also punished for consuming liquor. So far as Anil Kumar (the respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 9464 of 2010) is concerned, the charge was that while he was posted as constable in F-Dal of 24th Battalion, P.A.C., Moradabad, his duty was fixed as a Guard at MT Area from 00:30 hours to 05:00 hours, instead of going on duty he remained in the barrack of Dal D and was consuming liquor on the bed of Radha Krishna Pal alongwith other constables. Likewise the charge against constable Radha Krishna Pal (the respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 61689 of 2009) is that he, after completing his duty from 20:00 hours to 00:30 hours, handed over the rifle to his reliever Rama Nand Ojha and thereafter remained in the barrack and not only consumed liquor but also called all the other fellow constables for consuming liquor with him. It has also come at the concluding portion of the enquiry report at page 84 of the paper book of Writ Petition No. 61689 of 2009 that from the character record of Radha Krishna Pal, it was found that he was earlier also punished for consuming liquor. Further, the proven charge against all these constables is that they not only consumed liquor but under its influence entered into an altercation resulting in a situation where two constables pointed their rifles at each other. 17. Further, the proven charge against all these constables is that they not only consumed liquor but under its influence entered into an altercation resulting in a situation where two constables pointed their rifles at each other. 17. As the proven charge against Rama Nand Ojha and Anil Kumar is not only of consuming liquor in the barracks but also of doing so at the cost of duty, the gravity of the charge becomes serious. In a disciplined police force, not going on duty, and instead consuming liquor, is a very serious charge. Further in the case of Rama Nand Ojha, it has come on record that he was earlier also punished for consuming liquor. Likewise in the case of Radha Krishna Pal it has come in the inquiry report that he has also been earlier punished for consuming liquor. In the circumstances, the decision to impose the penalty of dismissal cannot be said to be unduly harsh, particularly, taking into account that all these persons were members of a disciplined force. 18. The decision with regard to the punishment to be imposed for a proven misconduct is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority. The writ Court cannot assume the role of an appellate authority while judicially reviewing an order of punishment. If the punishment is a possible punishment ordinarily the writ Court is not to substitute its own view with regard to the punishment to be awarded with the punishment already awarded. The Apex Court in the case of Charanjit Lamba v. Commanding Officer, Army Southern Command, (2010) 11 SCC 314 , in paragraph No. 20, observed as follows : “What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the writ Court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers the same to be more reasonable than what the disciplinary authority has imposed. It is only in cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a punishment that a writ Court may step in to interfere with same.” 19. It is only in cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a punishment that a writ Court may step in to interfere with same.” 19. In the instant case, we find that the disciplinary authority, after examining the matter, was of the view that the conduct exhibited by the constables, which was proven in the disciplinary proceedings, disclosed that they were not fit to be retained in a disciplined force. The view taken by the disciplinary authority is a possible view, based on appreciation of the material on record. In such circumstances, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the view taken by the Tribunal that the punishment awarded to the constables was not shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proven against them. We may note that the learned counsel for the respondents placed before us few decisions of this Court in the cases of Dayal Kushwaha v. State of U.P., 2003(5) AWC and Amarjeet Singh v. State of U.P., 2004 (1) AWC 208 ; as also a decision of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Daras Yadav, (2010) 2 SCC 236 , so as to contend that the punishment awarded to the respondent constables was excessive. Upon careful examination of these decisions we find that the facts of those cases were distinguishable from the case at hand. 20. For the reasons recorded above, we are of the view that the order passed by the Tribunal thereby setting aside the order of dismissal from service and directing reinstatement of the constables is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. Since we have taken the view that that the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable in law, the writ petition filed by Rama Nand Ojha for modifying the judgment of the Tribunal so as to make it in consonance with that passed by the Tribunal in Claim Petition No. 714 of 2007 is liable to be dismissed. 21. Accordingly, the writ petition Nos. 61687 of 2009, 61689 of 2009 and 9464 of 2010 are allowed. The orders dated 18.3.2009 passed in Claim Petition Nos. 21. Accordingly, the writ petition Nos. 61687 of 2009, 61689 of 2009 and 9464 of 2010 are allowed. The orders dated 18.3.2009 passed in Claim Petition Nos. 714 of 2007 and 715 of 2007 as also the order dated 24.7.2009 passed in Claim Petition No. 1296 of 2007 are quashed, the said claim petitions would stand dismissed. The writ petition No. 17458 of 2010 is dismissed. The interim orders are discharged. 22. There shall be no order as to costs. ——————