JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari. J.- These four appeals have put to challenge the judgment of conviction, dated 7th May, 2008, and the order of sentence, dated 9.5.2008, passed, in Sessions Trial No. 1101/05 and 367/06/ Trial No. 345/06 and Trial No. 289/06, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. V, Bhagalpur. 2. By the impugned judgment, while all the appellants have been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149, under Section 148 and under Section 341 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "IPC"), two of the appellants, namely, Bhim Kumar Yadav and Nakul Yadav have also been convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. Following their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC, each of the appellants has been sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two years and for their conviction under Section under Section 148, IPC, each of the appellants has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and. for their conviction under Section 341 read with Section 149, IPC each of the appellants except Nakul Yadav, has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. Having regard to their conviction under Section 27 of the "Arms Act, 1959, two of the appellants, namely, Bhim Kumar Yadav and Nakul Yadav have also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- (two thousand) each and, in default of payment of fine suffer simple imprisonment for one year. All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 3. The case of the prosecution, as unfurled at the trial, may, in brief, be described as under: (i) Out of 13 decimals of land, belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of Upendra Yadav. 6-1/2 decimal of the land, which was adjacent to the house of Upendra Yadav, and which has had been in the possession of Upendra Yadav was mistakenly recorded, during survey proceeding, in the name of accused Sahdeo Yadav; Because of this error, which had been committed during survey proceeding, a dispute started between the parties inasmuch as 6-1/2 decimals of the land, though recorded in favour of the accused Sahdeo Yadav, had remained in possession of Upendra Yadav (since deceased). which Upendra Yadav was unwilling to part with. which Upendra Yadav was unwilling to part with. (ii) Because of the above land dispute, as a genesis, accused Sahdeo Yadav and his supporters, on the one hand, developed grudge and inimical relation with Upendra Yadav (since deceased) and his family, on the other. Consequent to the dispute, which had created enmity between the parties concerned, all the present appellants along with one Raju Yadav (since deceased), led by the appellant. Sahdeo Yadav, confronted, on 26.9.2004, at about 4.30 p.m., Upendra Yadav, while Upendra Yadav was proceeding towards the shop of Mushafir Sah (PW 11), whose house-cum-shop was situated nearby. Having heard some shouting, Upendra Yadav's younger brother. Fulchand Yadav, came out of his house. and saw the present appellants, along with accused. Raju Yadav (since deceased), armed with fire-arms and lathis and trying to catch hold of Upendra Yadav demanding to fmd out from Upendra Yadav as to whether Upendra Yadav would or would not part with the land which had been mutated in favour of Sahdeo Yadav. In order to escape the group. which the accused aforementioned had formed. Upendra Yadav ran and entered into the jewellery shop of Mushafir Sah; but at that point of time. on being asked by the appellant, Sahdeo Yadav, Raju Yadav (since deceased), opened fire by means of a rifle and the bullet hit the chest of Upendra Yadav, who fell down, whereupon the appellant. Bhim Yadav, fired from his pistol and the bullet hit Upendra Yadav's head rendering him lifeless at the spot. (iii) To prevent Upendra Yadav from being harmed, when his wife, Jaya Devi, was running towards her husband, the appellant, Fultesh Yadav, caught hold of a flock of hair of Jaya Devi, threw her on the ground and after she fell down appellant, Nakul Yadav, fired from his gun at Jaya Devi and the bullet hit her costal area including her ribs and she, too, died at the spot" (iv) An information, with regard to the occurrence, was accordingly lodged by Fulchand Yadav (PW 5) at Sanhaula Police Station. The said information was reduced into a fardbeyan and, treating the same as the First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as the "F.I.R."), Sanhaula P.S. Case No. 116/04, under Sections 147/148/149/341/302/504, IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, was registered against the present appellants and the said accused, Raju Yadav (since deceased). The said information was reduced into a fardbeyan and, treating the same as the First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as the "F.I.R."), Sanhaula P.S. Case No. 116/04, under Sections 147/148/149/341/302/504, IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, was registered against the present appellants and the said accused, Raju Yadav (since deceased). (v) During the course of investigation, police visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the said two dead bodies, prepared inquest reports and got the postmortem examination conducted on the said two dead bodies and, accordingly, post-mortem reports were prepared. One empty cartridge and blood stained soil were seized from the place of occurrence and, on completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was laid against all the appellants and accused Raju Yadav (since deceased) under Sections 147/148/149/341/302/504, IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 4. During trial, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against them under Sections 147, 148 and Sections 341, 504 and 302 read with Section 149, IPC. To the charges so framed, all the appellants including accused Raju Yadav (since deceased) pleaded not guilty. Even to the charge framed under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, against accused Nakul Yadav and accused Raju Yadav, both the said appellants pleaded not guilty. 5. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 13 (thirteen) witnesses including the doctor (PW 12), who had performed post-mortem examinations on the said• two dead bodies. 6. During the trial, accused Raju Yadav passed away and, hence, the remaining accused were examined under Section 313(1)(b), Cr PC and, in their examinations aforementioned, all of them denied that they had committed the offences, which they were alleged to have committed. While the defence adduced evidence by examining one witness, the learned trial Court examined one witness as the Court witness. 7. Having found all the accused guilty of the offences as indicated above, they have been convicted by the learned trial Court accordingly and sentences against them have been passed, which we have mentioned above. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentences, which have been passed against them, all the accused. as convicted persons, have preferred these appeals. 8. We have heard Mr. Neeraj Kumar @ Sanidh, learned counsel, appearing for the appellants and Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sinha, learned Additional Pubic Prosecutor, for the State. 9. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentences, which have been passed against them, all the accused. as convicted persons, have preferred these appeals. 8. We have heard Mr. Neeraj Kumar @ Sanidh, learned counsel, appearing for the appellants and Mr. Ashwani Kumar Sinha, learned Additional Pubic Prosecutor, for the State. 9. While considering the present appeals, two important factors, which need to be borne in mind, are that it had not been disputed at the trial nor has it been in dispute before us that all the accused, who had faced trial as well as the said two deceased, were relatives of the deceased and that there was a land dispute between the parties concerned. 10. What also needs to be borne in mind is that because of the fact that there was a land dispute between the parties concerned souring their relationship, both the parties maintained inimical relation with each other. Enmity is a double-edged weapon, which cuts both the ways. While enmity may be a reason for committing an offence, such as, murder, enmity may also be a reason for either falsely implicating an enemy as an accused or roping in an enemy, who may be innocent along with the guilty ones. 11. It is, therefore, incumbent, on the part of the Court, while dealing with such a case, as we have at hand, to be cautious, while appreciating evidence. 12. Bearing in mind the above prefatory considerations, we, first, come to the evidence of the doctor (PW 12), who had conducted post-mortem examination, on 27.9.2004, on both the said dead bodies. According to the evidence of the doctor (PW 12), he, upon performing post-mortem examination, on 27.9.2004 at 12.30 p.m., on the dead body of Upendra Yadav, found as follows :- "(i) One lacerated wound 1"x 1/2"x skin deep was present in the left side of head above left ear. One lacerated wound 1/2"x 1/2" x skin deep was present on the left side of forehead just above left eyebrow. On cutting skin over scalp underlying tissues were bruised. On opening the scalp cap, brain and its meninges were found pale. (ii) One wound of entry with inverted margin and charring around 1" x 3/4" was present on lower part of left side of chest wall at the level of 10th rib. On cutting skin over scalp underlying tissues were bruised. On opening the scalp cap, brain and its meninges were found pale. (ii) One wound of entry with inverted margin and charring around 1" x 3/4" was present on lower part of left side of chest wall at the level of 10th rib. The bullet after causing fracture of left 10th rib pierced diaphram entry abdominal cavity pierced right to be of liver stomach caused fracture of 12 thoracic vertebra and was lodged there in the soft tissue. (iii) One conical metallic bullet was recovered. The abdominal cavity was filled of blood and blood clots. All abdominal solid viscera were pale. The stomach contains pasty food." 13. In the opinion 6f the doctor, the injuries, were ante-mortem and caused by fire-arms, which were sufficient, in ordinary course of nature, to cause death and that the time elapsed was within 12 to 24 hours from P.M. examination. The doctor has proved the relevant P.M. report as Ext. 3." 14. On the same day, i.e., on 27.9.2004, the doctor (PW 12) had also performed, at about 1 p.m., post-mortem examination on the dead body of Jaya Devi and found as follows :- "(i) One lacerated wound 3" x 1/2" x skin deep was present on lower and outer part of left fore-arms. The margins were blackened. It was narrow at its upper end. (ii) One wound of entry with inverted margin 2" x 1/2"x 1/2" leading the left chest cavity was present in the upper part of the left axilla. Cartridge entered into left chest cavity pierced left lung. Pericardium, heart in its upper part and left lungs. (iii) Several pellets were recovered from the lungs. (iv) Both chest cavity were filled with blood and blood clots. Both the lungs were pale. Chamber of both the heart were empty." 15. In the opinion of the doctor, the injuries were ante mortem and caused by fire-arms. The doctor has also opined that the injuries would have resulted into death in the ordinary course of life. The doctor has further expressed the opinion that death had been caused due to haemorrhage and shock, time since death being 12 to 24 hours from the time, when the post-mortem examination had been conducted. The post-mortem report, in respect of Jaya Devi, has been proved as Exhibtt-3/1. 16. The doctor has further expressed the opinion that death had been caused due to haemorrhage and shock, time since death being 12 to 24 hours from the time, when the post-mortem examination had been conducted. The post-mortem report, in respect of Jaya Devi, has been proved as Exhibtt-3/1. 16. A close scrutiny of the medical evidence on record clearly shows that so far, as deceased Upendra Yadav was concerned, he had sustained, broadly speaking, three injuries, one being are lacerated injury 1" x 1/2" x skin deep on the left side of the head above the left ear and another lacerated wound measuring 1/2" x 1/2"x skin deep on the left side of the forehead just above the left eyebrow and upon cutting the skin over the scalp, the tissues, at the place of injury, were found bruised and, on opening of the scalp cap, brain and its meninges were found pale. The third injury, sustained by Upendra Yadav, was a wound having inverted margin and charring an area of about 1 "x 3/4" on the lower part of the left side of the chest wall at the level of 10th rib and the bullet, having caused fracture of the left 10th rib, pierced into the diaphragm and entered into the abdominal cavity somuchso that the bullet pierced the lever and caused fracture of 12th thoracic vertebra and was found locked in the soft tissues. The bullet, which had caused the injury and had remained stuck to the soft tissues, was extracted. 17. Coming to the injuries, which, according to the medical evidence on record, had resulted into the death of Jaya Devi, we notice that she had, according to the doctor, sustained two injuries, one being a lacerated wound measuring 3"x 1/2" x skin deep on lower and outer part of the left fore-arms with blacken margin and the other wound of entry with inverted margin measuring 2"x 1/2" x 1/2" in the left chest cavity where blood and blood clots were found present. 18. A cartridge, according to the doctor, was found to have entered into left chest cavity of Jaya Devi piercing left lung, pericardium and heart in its upper part and left lungs. 18. A cartridge, according to the doctor, was found to have entered into left chest cavity of Jaya Devi piercing left lung, pericardium and heart in its upper part and left lungs. That apart, several pellets were recovered from the lungs, both chest cavities were found filled with blood and blood clots and that both the lungs were found pale with chamber of both the heart having been found empty. 19. From a careful and patient analysis of the injuries, which had been sustained by the said two deceased, what clearly surfaces from the medical evidence, on record is that Upendra Yadav had sustained only one bullet injury on the lower part of the left side of his chest, which had its entry from the lower part of the left side of the chest wall, causing his death, while Jaya Devi had suffered two bullet injuries and out of the two such injuries, one proved fatal. 20. Keeping in view the above medical evidence on record, let us, now, turn to the eye-witnesses' account of the occurrence. 21. According to the evidence of PW 1, son of the said two deceased, who has claimed himself to be an eye-witness to the alleged occurrence, accused Raju Yadav had killed his father, Le. Upendra Yadav, by opening fire from a rifle; whereas accused Bhim Yadav had fired from a pistol on his father killing him on the spot. PW 1 has also deposed that accused Nakul Yadav killed his mother by shooting from his gun. 22. If the evidence of PW 1 is carefully considered, it becomes abundantly clear that if what PW 1 has deposed were true, then, Upensra Yadav ought to have sustained two bullet injuries and Jaya Devi would have suffered one bullet injury; whereas the medical evidence on record indicates that Upendra Yadav had sustained one injury on his chest and it is his wife Jaya Devi, who had sustained two bullet injuries one on the chest as described above and the other on her fore-arm. 23. Turning to the evidence of PW 2, one of the cousins of the deceased, Upendra Yadav we notice that according to his evidence he saw the accused persons chasing Upendra Yadav with their fire-arms and, out of fear. 23. Turning to the evidence of PW 2, one of the cousins of the deceased, Upendra Yadav we notice that according to his evidence he saw the accused persons chasing Upendra Yadav with their fire-arms and, out of fear. Upendra Yadav entering into the shop of Mushafrr Sah (PW 11), but the accused persons killed him there and when wife of Upendra Yadav tried to save him, accused Nakul Yadav opened fire with his gun killing her outside the shop of Mushafir Sah. 24. It is, however, important to know that while PW 1 claims that Upendra and his wife, Jaya Devi, had been killed on being asked by accused, Sahdeo Yadav, PW 2 does not support this piece of evidence inasmuch as he has not deposed that it was on being asked by accused Sahdeo that Upendra and his wife had been put to death. 25. Adverting to the evidence of PW 3, yet another son of the deceased, we notice that his evidence shows that on being asked by accused Sahdeo, accused Raju fired from a rifle and the bullet hit the chest of Upendra, whereas the bullet fired by accused Bhim hit the head of Upendra. This apart, according to PW 3. who, too, claims to be an eye-Witness, accused Nakul Yadav had fired from a pistol, which had hit Jaya Devi on her ribs. 26. Coupled with the above, it also surfaces from the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 that when Jaya Devi was running towards her husband to save him accused, Fultesh, caught hold of a flock of hair of Jaya Devi and threw her on the ground and it was thereafter that she had been shot by accused Nakul Vadav. 27. From a microscopic examination of PWs 1, 2 and 3, it becomes clear that if these three witnesses were deposing the truth, there ought to have been two bullet injuries, as has been indicated above, on Upendra Yadav, one on his chest and the other on his head. Belying, however, the description of the occurrence given by these witnesses, the medical evidence on record shows that Upendra had sustained only one bullet injury, the same having been caused on the left side of his chest. 28. Belying, however, the description of the occurrence given by these witnesses, the medical evidence on record shows that Upendra had sustained only one bullet injury, the same having been caused on the left side of his chest. 28. Coupled with the above, while PWs 1, 2 and 3 have given their evidence to the effect that Jaya Devi had been shot once and that was by accused Nakul, she is found by the doctor to have suffered two bullet injuries. 29. There is clearly, thus, a conflict between the eye-witnesses' account of the occurrence, on the one hand, and the medical evidence available on record, on the other. 30. What is, now, noticeable is that broadly in tune with the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3, the remaining witnesses, who have claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses including the informant have given their evidence describing the occurrence meaning thereby that these eye-witnesses, too, support the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 that Upendra had been shot on his chest as well as on his head; whereas the medical evidence on record does not reveal any bullet injury having been suffered by Upendra on his head. Similarly, so far as Jaya Devi was concerned, she was, according to the eye-witnesses' account of the occurrence, had been shot only once, but she had, in the light of the medical evidence on record, suffered two bullet injuries. 31. As can be clearly discerned from the above discussion of the evidence on record. when there is a conflict between the medical evidence, on the one hand, and the ocular evidence, on the other, the Court is required to determine as to which one between the two conflicting evidence is true and it is only when the Court is unable to determine as to who is telling the truth, whether the doctor or the eye-witnesses, that the benefit of unresolved and unsettled conflict would go to the accused. 32. In order to, therefore, determine if what the witnesses, such as, PWs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 have deposed were true one has to keep in mind that their descriptions of the occurrence stand belied by the medical evidence on record. 33. 32. In order to, therefore, determine if what the witnesses, such as, PWs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 have deposed were true one has to keep in mind that their descriptions of the occurrence stand belied by the medical evidence on record. 33. In the absence of any other evidence, supporting the description of the occurrence given by the eye-witnesses, one has no option, but to hold, and we do hold, that none of these witnesses, who have claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses, can be treated or held to be wholly reliable. Even if their evidence is not rejected by the Court as wholly unreliable, their evidence would fall, at best, in the category of those witnesses, who are neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 34. It is trite that the witnesses, ordinarily, fall into three distinct categories, namely. (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. If the witness is wholly reliable, his evidence can be implicitly relied upon and such a witness's testimony can be made basis for conviction of an accused. Similarly, when a witness is found to be wholly unreliable, no reliance can at an be placed on his evidence and his evidence has to be rejected outright. When, however, a witness is found to be neither wholly reliable, nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be accepted as true unless his evidence is found to have been corroborated by some credible independent evidence direct or circumstantial. 35. The evidence of the eye-witnesses, which the prosecution has adduced in the present case, cannot be safely relied upon unless the same is found to have been corroborated by some credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 36. It is also an undisputed position of law that one infirm witness cannot be treated to have corroborated the evidence of another infirm witness meaning thereby that witnesses of same brand cannot be taken to have corroborated each other. Thus, when a witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be taken to have been corroborated by a witness of the same brand, namely, a witness, who is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, for, evidence is not to be counted, but weighed. Thus, when a witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, his evidence cannot be taken to have been corroborated by a witness of the same brand, namely, a witness, who is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, for, evidence is not to be counted, but weighed. It is not the number of the witnesses, which determines the outcome of a trial; rather, it is the inherent falsity or truth of the evidence given by the witness, which decides the outcome of trial. If each one of a large number of witnesses is found to be wholly unreliable, their evidence cannot become acceptable as true merely because a large number of similar brand of witnesses has corroborated each other. 37. A reference, with regard to the above position of law, may be made to the case of Muluwa, S/o Binda and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 989 , wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "It is elementary that the evidence of an infirm witness does not become reliable merely because it has been corroborated by a number of witnesses of the same brand; for, evidence is to be weighed not counted. Since the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 suffered from the same infirmities as that of Smt. Jugatia, it cannot be said that the trial Judge had no basis, whatsoever, for stigmatising it as unreliable." (Emphasis is added) 38. Situated thus, it is clear that merely because some persons, claiming themselves to be eye-witnesses, have given evidence describing the occurrence in tune with each other, their evidence cannot be made basis for holding them truthful witnesses, when their evidence is belied by the medical evidence on record unless their evidence is found to have been corroborated by credible independent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 39. Apart from fact that the descriptions of the occurrence, given by the witnesses, who are claimed by the prosecution to be eye-witnesses, stand belied by the medical evidence on record, we notice that Mushafir Sah (PW 11), whose shop became the place of occurrence, has clearly deposed that some unknown outsiders had killed Upendra Yadav. This witness was not treated as a hostile witness by the prosecution and was not even cross-examined. His evidence, therefore, remained wholly un-impeached. 40. This witness was not treated as a hostile witness by the prosecution and was not even cross-examined. His evidence, therefore, remained wholly un-impeached. 40. Situated thus, it becomes abundantly clear that the independent witness, whom the prosecution had tendered at the trial, did not support the case of the prosecution. We, however, notice that the learned trial Court, except observing to the effect that PW 11 has not supported the evidence given by the other eye-witnesses, has not made any attempt to determine as to who had been telling the truth; whether it was PW 11, who had deposed the truth or PWs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 were the ones, who had deposed the truth. Moreover, the learned trial Court has also, as the impugned judgment reflects, not even taken notice of the fact that the ocular description of the occurrence, as given by the witnesses aforementioned, is not supported by the medical evidence on record; rather, the medical evidence on record belied the description of the occurrence, which the witnesses had given claiming themselves to be eye-witnesses. 41. It has also been brought to our notice by learned counsel for the appellants that according to the evidence, which has come on record, a large number of people, almost around 100, had gathered at the place of occurrence, but none of them has been examined by the prosecution. In this regard, we need to point out that since these people had gathered, according to the evidence on record, after Upendra Yadav and his wife, Jaya Devi, had been shot to death, they could not have been examined as eye-witnesses to the occurrence. At the same time, however, it was the duty of the prosecution to produce those witnesses, who had come immediately after the occurrence, so that it could have become known to the Court as to what the initial version of the occurrence had been given by those witnesses, who have claimed themselves to be eye-witnesses. Non-examination of any of those witnesses, who had gathered at or near the place of occurrence soon after the occurrence is a serious lapse on the part of the prosecution. Non-examination of any of those witnesses, who had gathered at or near the place of occurrence soon after the occurrence is a serious lapse on the part of the prosecution. Even if we ignore this lapse on the part of the prosecution, the fact remains that in the light of the above discussion of the evidence on record, it cannot be, confidently and boldly, held by this Court that the description of the occurrence given by the eye-witnesses is true. 42. Because of the nature of evidence, which is available on record, the least, which ought to have been done by the learned trial Court, was to accord benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused persons inasmuch as we are clearly of the view that in the light of the evidence on record, which we have discussed above, it was too hazardous to convict any of the accused-appellants, particularly, when we find that the evidence, which the prosecution has adduced, is an ad-mixture of half-truth and untruth and it is not only difficult, but wholly impossible to disengage the truth from the falsehood. The benefit of such a situation ought to have been given to the accused-appellants. 43. In the backdrop of what have been discussed and pointed out above, we are firmly of the view that the prosecution had failed, in the present case, to bring home the charges against the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt and that the accused-appellants were entitled to be accorded benefit of doubt. 44. In the result, and for the reasons discussed above, these appeals stand allowed. The impugned conviction of the accused-appellants and the sentences passed against them by the judgment and order, under appeal, shall accordingly stand set aside. All the accused-appellants are held not guilty of the offences, which they were charged with, and they are acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt. 45. As the accused-appellant, Nakul Yadav, is in jail custody, he is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case. As far as the remaining accused-appellants are concerned, they are already on bail. Their bail ponds are, therefore cancelled and their sureties shall stand discharged. 46. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the learned court below with a copy of this judgment and order. Appeal allowed.