JUDGMENT 1. The instant appeal is directed against the concurrent judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dated 15.9.2011 passed by District Judge, Vidisha in Civil Appeal No.59-A/2010 confirming the judgment and decree dated 1.10.2010 passed by Civil Judge, Class-I, Kurwai, District Vidisha in Civil Suit No. 33-A/2009. 2. Facts necessary for disposal of this appeal as per plaint allegations are that plaintiff No.1-Gajraj Singh is father of plaintiffs No.2 to 5. Defendant No.1 is son of pre-deceased daughter of plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.2 is a purchaser of the suit land from defendant No.1. 3. A suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed in respect of the suit land described in para 2 of the plaint and situated in village Roshanpipariya, Tahsil Kurwai, District Vidisha (hereinafter shall be referred to as “suit land”). The suit land, falling in total area of 38.337 hectare, originally belonged to one Takhat Singh, father of plaintiff Gajraj Singh. After the demise of Takhat Singh, the aforesaid land was divided amongst his three sons viz. Gajraj Singh, Khilan Singh and Phool Snigh. On such division, land ad-measuring 12.779 hectare fell to the share and possession of Gajraj Singh. In the family arrangement dated 24.11.2000, entered amongst the plaintiffs, each got the equal share of 2.130 hectare and accordingly, names of four daughter, who are plaintiffs No.2 to 5, were mutated as Bhoomiswami in the revenue record along with father Gajraj Singh. Defendant No.1 Awadhesh Singh, son of predeceased daughter of Gajraj Singh, managed to get his name mutated over 2.130 hectare of land purportedly under an order of Tahsildar, Kurwai dated 28.9.2006 and transferred 2.130 hectare of land in favour of defendant No.2 Umabai. As the husband of Umabai threatened to take forcible possession, plaintiffs having no option, filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 4. Defendants No.1and 2 filed written statement and contended that the suit land is a property of Joint Hindu Family of which plaintiff No. 1 was Karta, alongwith plaintiffs No.2 to 5, his predeceased mother was also having a share in the suit land falling to the share of Gajraj Singh. He being the heir of his pre-deceased mother-Kamlesh Bai, has right to transfer 2.130 hectare land in favour of defendant No.2 by registered sale deed. The defendants also contended that the suit was under valued and therefore, Court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. 5. He being the heir of his pre-deceased mother-Kamlesh Bai, has right to transfer 2.130 hectare land in favour of defendant No.2 by registered sale deed. The defendants also contended that the suit was under valued and therefore, Court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. 5. The trial Court framed issues. Parties led evidence. The trial Court recorded findings to the effect that (i) there is no dispute that there was a partition amongst the three sons of Takhat Singh; (ii) there is also no dispute that the suit land fell into the share of Gajraj Singh and was divided amongst his four daughter alongwith him. Their names were duly mutated in the revenue records under family arrangement dated 24.11.2000; (iii) the defendant No. 1 claimed for so much of land 2.130 hectare on premise of the order passed by the Tahsildar dated 28.9.2006 (Ex.P/2) passed in case No.24-A/06/05-06; whereby, it was ordered to mutate the name of defendant No.1 in respect of the suit land. Tahsildar in its order dated 28.9.2006 has observed that Gajraj Singh did not want to give any share of suit land to the son of his pre-deceased daughter Kamlesh Bai at the time of family arrangement dated 24.11.2000, but at the same time it has been ordered that name of Kamlesh Bai was missed out in respect of suit land. Therefore, her name deserves to be mutated in the revenue records for the aforesaid land and since she is no more, therefore, her son-defendant No.1’s name should be recorded. 6. There is no provision under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter shall be referred to as “MPLRC”) which empowers he Revenue Authorities to declare share of an individual in respect of agricultural land. On the contrary under section 164 of MPLRC, the interest of Bhoomiswami shall be devolved on his death, pass by inheritance, survivorship or bequest, as the case may be subject to his personal law. It is settled law that mutation in the revenue records does not confer any right or title in favour of such a person in whose name land is mutated as mutation records are maintained only for the purposes of land revenue. It is settled law that mutation in the revenue records does not confer any right or title in favour of such a person in whose name land is mutated as mutation records are maintained only for the purposes of land revenue. The trial Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi and others v. Lalchand and others, (2006) 8 SCC 581 and judgment of this Court Ghanshyam v. Kanhaiyalal, 2007(4) MPLJ 418. 7. Gajraj Singh is the exclusive owner of the suit land.He is alive and he has partitioned the suit land amongst his four daughters-plaintiffs No.2 to 5 in family arrangement dated 24.11.2000. 8. Accordingly, trial Court held that defendant No.1, had no right to execute the sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 and therefore, such sale deed is inoperative against the plaintiffs and therefore, decreed the suit. The trial Court while considering the relief of permanent injunction, has discussed the evidence of defendant No.1 to the effect that in para 11, he himself has admitted that plaintiffs are cultivating the suit land and further on a suggestion put to Sushila Bai (PW 1), she denied that possession of the suit land is with Uma Bai (Defendant No.2). In view of the aforesaid, the relief of permanent injunction against defendants was granted restraining them not to interfere with the possession of the plaintiffs. 9. As regards objection relating to valuation of the suit, the trial Court in para 20 of the judgment has observed that suit is for declaration and permanent injunction and therefore, Court fees of Rs.600/- has rightly been paid. The trial Court has rejected the contention of the defendants that suit ought to have been valued on the sale value of Rs.5,23,000/- as evident from the sale deed and therefore, the Court did not lack the pecuniary jurisdiction. 10. The first appellate Court has confirmed the findings of the learned trial Court. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has advanced two fold submissions. The first submission advanced by learned counsel is to the effect that the plaintiffs were required to value the suit on the basis of the valuation of the suit/consideration mentioned in sale deed and since this was not done, the trial Court lack pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. This objection is absolutely misconceived and de hors facts on record. The first submission advanced by learned counsel is to the effect that the plaintiffs were required to value the suit on the basis of the valuation of the suit/consideration mentioned in sale deed and since this was not done, the trial Court lack pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. This objection is absolutely misconceived and de hors facts on record. A bare perusal of the plaint averments and the relief sought reflect that plaintiffs in the plaint averments have stated that they are owners of the suit land and are in possession thereof doing cultivation thereon. They apprehended forcible dispossession at the hands of defendants No.1 and 2 and therefore, filed a suit for the relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining defendants No.1 and 2 from taking forcible possession from them. In para 14 of the plaint they have stated that the cause of action arose on 28.9.2006 when the Tahsildar, Kurwai in case No.24-A/06/05-06 had ordered mutation of the name of defendant No.1 in respect of land recorded in the name of plaintiffs and further on 4.9.2008 when defendant No.1 sold the suit land of plaintiffs’ ownership to defendant No.2 as well as on 17.1.2009 when defendant No.2 managed mutation in her name in respect of suit land by denying the title of the plaintiffs and threatened the plaintiffs for taking forcible possession of the suit land. In para 15, the relief claimed is (i) for declaration that the order of Tahsildar dated 28.9.2006 be declared illegal and without authority and jurisdiction; hence, null and void; (ii) to declare the sale deed dated 4.9.2008 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No.2 to be null and void; and (iii) a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs. In view of the plaint averments and the relief sought, in the opinion of this Court, section 7(iv)(c) and (d) of Courts Fees Act are attracted. The law in this regard is well settled as question of Court fees and pecuniary jurisdiction is to be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and a decision cannot be influenced either by the plea in the written statement or by final decision of the suit on merits. The Courts need to see the real substance of the claim. The Courts need to see the real substance of the claim. In this behalf the Court begins with an assumption for the purposes of determining the Court fees payable on the plaint that the averments made therein by the plaintiffs are correct. However, the arbitrary valuation of the suit property having no basis at all and if such valuation is made so as to evade payment of Court fee, leads to a situation which may warrant interference by the Court. But not otherwise, I may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in this behalf viz. 2001(1) JLJ 81 = 2000 (4) MPHT 318 (FB) = 2000 (3) MPLJ 522 (FB) and 1977 (II) MPWN 480, 1980 (II) MPWN 102. 12. Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act provides for suit other than those mentioned in paragraphs 7 (v), (vi), (ix) and Clause (d) of paragraph (x), where, the Court fee is payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, the value or relief as mentioned in the plaint for the purpose of Court fee shall be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction. As such, any suit falling within paragraph (iv) of section 7, shall be governed by section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act and valuation put by the plaintiff on the relief claimed by a plaintiff for the purpose of Court fee shall also governed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, trying the suit. Cases falling within paragraph (iv) of section 7, a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation. It is settled law that Court normally accept the valuation put by the plaintiff if it is not too low or high i.e. arbitrary. 13. The basic distinction between the suit falling under section 7(iv) and 7(v) of the Suit Valuation Act is well explicit. If the suit is for a eclaratory decree and for an injunction, provisions as contained under section 7 (iv) (c) are attracted and the Court fees payable shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief is sought and is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal; whereas in a suit for possession of land etc. it has to be according to the value of the subject matter. it has to be according to the value of the subject matter. As no relief for possession either claimed or required to be claimed looking to the plaint averments, the question for valuation of the suit on the basis of value of the sale deed dated 4.9.2008 (Ex. P/3) was not at all required. Hence, the trial Court has not committed any error of law and fact while rejecting this objection. The judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants viz. Adhir Kumar Hul v. Ravindra Nath Vishwas, 1998 (2) Vidhi Bhasvar 100, Vishnu Dayal v. Mst. Budhwara and others, 2009 (5) MPHT 94 (CG), Laxminarayan v. Dariyabai, 1997(I) MPWN 72, Raj Kaur Randhawa v. M/s Kinetic Gallary and another, 2000(1) JLJ67, Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh v. Parasnath Singh and others, (2002)1 SCC 304 , Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and another, (1999) 3 SCC 573 , Mehar Chand Das v. Lal Babu Siddique and Ors. (2007) 14 SCC 253 , in fact are altogether on different factual matrix wherein suit was for declaration of sale deed null and void and for possession of the suit land with permanent injunction. Therefore, have no application. 14. As regard contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that without seeking the relief of possession, suit was hit by provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is misconceived as evident from the fact that the defendant No.1 himself has stated in para 11 of his deposition that plaintiffs are cultivating the suit land. Further PW 1, Sushila Bai has also denied the suggestion given to her as contained in para 11 of his cross-examination that defendant No.1 was in possession of the suit property. That being so, there was no need to seek any relief of possession. Further the factual matrix on record do not warrant that the plaintiffs ought to have claim the relief of possession. Hence, the contention that suit is hit by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is devoid of substance. 15. Further the contention of learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that Gajraj Singh has not entered the witness box and therefore, non-examination of plaintiff No. 1 is fatal to the suit because other plaintiffs No.2 to 5 have no right or possession on the suit land is absolutely misconceived. 15. Further the contention of learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that Gajraj Singh has not entered the witness box and therefore, non-examination of plaintiff No. 1 is fatal to the suit because other plaintiffs No.2 to 5 have no right or possession on the suit land is absolutely misconceived. Undisputedly, the suit land, falling to the share of the Gajraj Singh after partition amongst three brothers, was under family arrangement dated 24.11.2000 and was equally divided amongst Gajraj Singh and his four daughters/plaintiffs No.2 to 5. The land was duly recorded in their names. They are cultivating the land. The defendant No.1 on his own showing in his statement before the Courts below and has rightly been held by the Court below in para 9 of the judgment that in para 6 he admitted that his grant-father (Gajraj Singh) has told him that he has no share in the suit land. Hence, no land has been given to him. In para 7, he has admitted that his father Kunwar Singh in collusion with Tahsildar and Patwari had got the suit land mutated in his name. In para 14, he admitted that he has no right to the suit land except on the basis of mutation. That apart, the order of Tahsildar dated 28.9.2006 itself reflects that in the family arrangement between the plaintiff No.1 and plaintiffs No.2 to 5, Gajraj Singh did not want to give any share to defendant No.1, still the Tahsildar in his wisdom observed that the name of deceased daughter was missed out in mutation and therefore, ordered mutation in the name of defendant No.1 on so much of land. PW 1 Sushila Bai has categorically stated that she along with other plaintiffs is in possession of the suit land and their names over the suit land are duly recorded. Further she denied the suggestion that suit land is in possession of defendant No.2, as has been rightly found by the Courts below. 16. In view of these factual matrix, this argument is devoid of substance. Further submission of learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that suit land is ancestral property and therefore, the predeceased daughter had a right to the property is more of frustration than of substance. 16. In view of these factual matrix, this argument is devoid of substance. Further submission of learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that suit land is ancestral property and therefore, the predeceased daughter had a right to the property is more of frustration than of substance. Though the suit land was part of ancestral property but upon partition, Gajraj Singh became exclusive owner and Bhoomiswami of the land which he admittedly has given to his four daughter/plaintiffs No. 2 to 5 under family arrangement dated 24.11.2000, therefore, it is difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the suit land was an ancestral property. Furthermore, in view of section 164 of MPLRC, there is no question of claim by any heir muchless defendant No.1 the predeceased son of Gajraj Singh’s daughter, during his lifetime. As such, the defendant No.1 does not acquire any right to suit property and therefore, the sale deed executed by him in favour of defendant No.2 was null and void. 17. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the Courts below do not give any rise to any question of law much less substantial question of law warranting interference of this Court, appeal sans merit and is therefore, dismissed.