1. Shri Brij Bhushan Sharma-petitioner herein, an accused in case FIR No. 35/2005 under Sections 5(1) (c) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949 read with Sections 120-B, 419,420,468 and 471 RPC, with respondents 4 and 5, through medium of instant petition under Section 561-A Cr. P.C seeks quashment of the charge-sheet pending against him before Special Judge And Corruption, Srinagar. The petition has been filed against the following backdrop. 2. Shri Mohammad Shafi Dar, Chairman Cooperative House Building Society, Budgam—respondent no. 4 in the present petition and Shri, Mohammad Yousuf Kuchay—respondent No. 6 in the present petition (deleted vide High Court order dated 19th March, 2010), sometime in 1998 conceived a plan to develop a residential Housing Colony at Humhama, District Budgam. To execute their plan they approached one Sofi Mohammad Hussain, owner of large chunk of land measuring 139.18 Kanals for purchase of said land for setting up the proposed housing colony and after negotiations settled the price @ Rs. 1.87 lacs per kanal. However, as Mr. Sofi insisted on payment of the total consideration amount in one go, the duo approached petitioner—Managing Director J&K Cooperative Housing Corporation Limited (hereafter to be referred as Corporation) for financial assistance/loan, of Rs. 8.00 crores. 3. The Corporation declined to sanction any loan to the respondents 4 and 6 (deleted). The Corporation however, developed an interest in, on its own developing the proposed Housing Colony. The Corporation instead of extending loan facility entered into negotiations with the respondent No. 6 (deleted), whereby it agreed to purchase an area of land measuring 214 Kanals from the respondent No. 6 (deleted)—attorney holder of the land owners for an amount of Rs. 8.56 crores @ Rs. 4.00 lacs per kanal. 4. The Corporation accordingly took over possession of 214 Kanals of land and paid the consideration amount of Rs. 8.56 crores through payee's Account cheques to the respondent No. 6 (deleted) for onward payment to estate holders. The payee's Account cheques drawn from time to time in the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) were duly deposited by him in his account and after the amount was credited, respondent No. 6 (deleted) disbursed the payments to the estate holders/land owners. 5. The payee's Account cheques drawn from time to time in the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) were duly deposited by him in his account and after the amount was credited, respondent No. 6 (deleted) disbursed the payments to the estate holders/land owners. 5. Sometime after the transaction was completed, it surfaced that one payee's account cheque drawn by the Corporation in the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) in connection with the deal was deposited by respondent No. 4 in an account fictitiously opened in the name of respondent No. 6 in the State Cooperative Bank, Chanapora by resorting to impersonation and forgery and identifying one Mohammad Ayoub Reshi—respondent No. 5 in the petition as respondent No. 6 (deleted). The petitioner was allegedly found to have written the cheque in the name of Mohammad Yousuf (as payee) instead of "Mohammad Yousuf Kuchay" so as to facilitate the deposit of the aforesaid cheque account No. 949/16 later its transfer to respondent No. 4s account No. 4815/25 in Ellaquai Dehati bank, Hyderpora. 6. There were also allegations of purchase of the land for setting up the colony at higher price than the prevailing market price. The allegations as regards sale of land at exorbitant price to the Corporation by respondents 4,5, and 6 (deleted) and opening of fictitious account, prompted Police Station VOK to register a case— FIR No. 35/2005. The investigation conducted and the material collected during investigation, led the Investigating Officer to following conclusions; ' i) That the respondent No. 6 (deleted) hatched a criminal conspiracy with the petitioner and respondent No. 4 to sell the land for the proposed Housing Colony at exorbitant price of Rs. 4.00 lacs per Kanal, whereas the land was purchased by the respondents 4 and 6 @ Rs. 1.87 Lacs per Kanal and the petitioner and respondents 4 and 6 (deleted) by doing so conferred illegal benefit on petitioner and themselves and exposed the Corporation to the corresponding loss. ii) That the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 hatched a criminal conspiracy in execution whereof a fictitious account No. 949/16 was opened in the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) in State Cooperative Bank, Branch, Chanapora and payee account cheque bearing no. 906078 dated 14.10.1999 in the amount of Rs. ii) That the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 hatched a criminal conspiracy in execution whereof a fictitious account No. 949/16 was opened in the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) in State Cooperative Bank, Branch, Chanapora and payee account cheque bearing no. 906078 dated 14.10.1999 in the amount of Rs. 50.00 lac drawn by the petitioner in the name of respondent No. 6, omitting to write Surname "Kuchay" after the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) was deposited in the fictitious account No. 949/16 opened by the respondents 4 and 5 and thereafter the deposited amount was transferred to the account of respondent No. 4. iii) That the petitioner had intentionally omitted to write Surname "Kuchay" after the name of respondent No. 6 (deleted) to facilitate opening of the fictitious account so that the cheque in the amount of Rs. 50.00 lac was deposited in the said account and later the money transferred to the account of respondent No. 4 in Ellaquai Dehati Bank. 7. The investigation was accordingly concluded as proved against the petitioner and respondents 4, 5 and 6 and charge-sheet presented before the Special Anti Corruption, Judge, Srinagar on 28th May, 2007. 8. The Trial Court, on going through the material collected during investigation and after hearing the prosecution and the accused vide order dated 18.05.2009 discharged the respondent No. 6 (deleted) and formally charged the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 of the offences punishable under Sections 5(1) (c ) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949 read with Sections 120-6,419,420,468 and 471 RFC. 9. The Trial Court on scanning the material on record did not find any substance in the allegation that the accused (petitioner and respondents 4 to 6) had entered into a criminal conspiracy to sell the land, acquired by the respondent No. 6 @ Rs. 1.87 lacs per Kanal, from the estate holders at exorbitant price @ Rs. 4.00 lacs per Kanal to the Corporation, so as to confer illegal benefit on themselves and cause corresponding loss to the Corporation. 1.87 lacs per Kanal, from the estate holders at exorbitant price @ Rs. 4.00 lacs per Kanal to the Corporation, so as to confer illegal benefit on themselves and cause corresponding loss to the Corporation. However, the Trial Court found the material on the file to prima-facie indicate that the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 hatched a criminal conspiracy to deposit the cheque amount (Cheque No.906078) in a fictitious account and thereafter transfer it to the account of respondent No. 4 and in execution thereof opened a fictitious account in State Cooperative Bank, Chanapora deposited the cheque drawn in the name of respondent No. 6, in said account and later transferred cheque amount to the account of respondent No. 4 in Ellaqui Dehati Bank. The Trial Court therefore, on 18.05.2009 formally charged the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 of the offences punishable under Sections 5(1) (c) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949 read with Sections 120-6,419,420,468 and 471 RFC. However, the trial Court discharged the respondent No. 6. 10. The Trial Court order dated 18.05.2009, whereby the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 have been formally charged of the offences punishable under Sections 5(1) (c) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949 read with Sections 120-6,419,420,468 and 471 RFC, is questioned in the present petition and its quashment sought, in exercise of inherent powers, on the grounds that the allegations set out in the charge-sheet, do not disclose commission of any offence by the accused (petitioner and respondents 4 and 5) and that the Trial Court order whereby they have been formally charged of the aforesaid offences amounts to abuse of process of the Court and is liable to be quashed in exercise of inherent powers. 11. 11. It is urged that the Trial Court by discharging the respondent No. 6 (deleted) rejected the prosecution case that conspiracy was hatched by the accused (petitioner and respondents 4 to 6) to procure any illegal benefit from the deal entered into by the respondent No. 6 with the Corporation or to cause any loss to the Corporation; that the Trial Court after it found the deal between respondent No. 6 and the Corporation to be genuine and not motivated by any dishonest intention and discharged the respondent No. 6, who held power of attorney on behalf of the land owners/estate holders and executed the sale deed in favour of the Corporation, ought to have dismissed the charge-sheet in its entirety and discharged the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 of the offences punishable under Sections 5(1) (c) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949 read with Sections 120-6,419,420,468 and 471 RFC. 12. It is pleaded that the amount deposited in the account No. 949/16 and later transferred to the account of respondent No. 4, was meant to be paid to the estate holders/land owners in lieu of the land purchased from them by the respondent No. 6 and that as the amount was duly disbursed to the beneficiaries, there was no question of conferment of any illegal benefit on the petitioner and, therefore, no dishonest intention attributable to him or of respondents 4 and 5. It is urged that as the offence punishable under Section 468 RFC and other offences alleged against the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 have their edifice on "dishonest intention", no offence was made out against the petitioner or respondents 4 & 5. It is pleaded that as neither respondent No.6 (deleted) to whom the cheque amount was intended to be paid nor any estate holder came forward with the complaint that his/her amount was not paid, there was no evidence on the record to prima-facie disclose that the petitioner had obtained any illegal benefit for himself or any other person or caused loss either to respondent No. 6, to any of the estate holders to whom the consideration amount was to be paid or to the Corporation. 13. It is pointed out that, as the respondent No. 6 (deleted) during investigation admitted that the cheque amount of Rs. 13. It is pointed out that, as the respondent No. 6 (deleted) during investigation admitted that the cheque amount of Rs. 50.00 lac was received by him and disbursed to the land owners/estate holders and land owners also admitted to have received whatever was due to them, there was no occasion for the Trial Court or the Investigating Officer to rush to the conclusion that the commission of offences punishable under Sections 5(1) (c) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1949 read with Sections 120-6,419,420,468 and 471 RPC was disclosed against the petitioner and other respondents/accused. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the said background, insists that the charge and the proceeding emanating from the charge-sheet amount to abuse of process of the Court and are liable to be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. 15. I have gone through the petition as well as Trial Court record and have heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. The petitioner seeks quashment of the proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge, Anti-corruption, Srinagar, in case FIR No. 35/2005, titled, "VOK v. Mohd Shaft Dar and ors", primarily on the following two grounds: i) That the petitioner as a Managing Director of J&K Co-operative Housing Corporation is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 Ranbir Penal Code, Svt. 1989 and Section 2 of Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006 and, therefore, the criminal proceedings in question are not maintainable and further that even if, he is assumed to be a public servant, sanction was to be accorded by the Board of Directors of the Corporation and not by the State Government. ii) That the allegations set out in the charge sheet, in light of conclusion dawn by the trial court that transaction in question was genuine and did not cause any loss to the Corporation and resultant discharge of the accused Mohammad Yousuf Kuchay (Land Broker), do not make out commission of any offence. 17. Section 2, Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006 defines expression 'public servant' in the terms it has been defined under Section 21 RPC. 17. Section 2, Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006 defines expression 'public servant' in the terms it has been defined under Section 21 RPC. It however, extends the sweep of expression 'public servant, by including Sub Sections (a) (b) and (c), which read as under: a) a person who is or has been a member of either House of State Legislature or a Member (including Minister of State) of the Council of Ministers; b) every person who is or has been under the employment or Government whether on permanent, temporary or work-charge basis; c) every officer, servant or member (by whatever name called) of a Corporation or of a corporate or other body which is established by or under an Act of the State Legislature or of Parliament in force in the state. In the said background, we have to fall back upon the definition of 'public servant' as given in Section 21 Ranbir Penal Code. Section 21 of the code gives inclusive definition of expression 'public servant'. For the purpose of present controversy, we need to confine focus on clause fourteenth of Section 21 RPC, which reads as under: "Fourteenth-Every officer or servant employed by a Municipal Committee, Town Area Committee, Notified Area Committee, Panchayat, Co-operative Society or Cooperative Bank whether for the whole or part of his time, and every member of such committee, society or bank;" A bare look at the above definition would reveal that every official or servant employed by the Cooperative Society falls within the definition of 'public servant'. 18. In the present case, petitioner claims to be an official of the Corporative Society and Managing Duector of J&K Housing Corporation. He, therefore, is a public servant within the meaning of Section 2 of Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006 read with clause fourteenth Section 21 Ranbir Penal Code. The first limb of the ground urged by the petitioner in the circumstances must fail. 19. The question as regards grant of sanction before lodging prosecution against the petitioner does not arise in the present case, in as much as, the petitioner retired on superannuation much before the charge sheet was presented against him and cognizance taken by the Special Judge Anticorruption Srinagar. 19. The question as regards grant of sanction before lodging prosecution against the petitioner does not arise in the present case, in as much as, the petitioner retired on superannuation much before the charge sheet was presented against him and cognizance taken by the Special Judge Anticorruption Srinagar. It is well settled law that an accused facing prosecution for the offence(s) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, cannot claim any immunity on ground of absence of sanction, if he ceases to be a public servant on the date when court takes cognizance of the offence(s) alleged against him. Reference in this regard may be made to the law laid down in case, titled, "Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, reported in (2006)1 SCC 557 ." 20. In the said background, we are not to on embark on a debate on the question, as to whether State Government or Board of Directors of Corporation is competent to grant sanction for prosecution of the petitioner. 21. It has been held by the learned trial court while discharging the accused Mohammad Yousuf Kuchay land broker/accused No. 4 in charge sheet, who brokered the deal between estate holders and the petitioner, that the petitioner and for that matter any other accused did not cause loss to the Corporation while purchasing 214 kanals of land in question from the estate holders through Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4). Learned trial Judge on the other hand held that J&K Cooperative Housing Corporation ltd. headed by the petitioner was benefited to the extent of one lac per kanal (Rs. 2.14 crore). It would be apt to reproduce hereunder the observation made by the trial Court in its order dated 18.05.2009:- "The next allegation that accused No. 4 in connivance with he accused no. 2 alienated said land at exorbitant rate of Rs. 4.00 lacs per Kanal instead of actual rate of Rs. 1.87 lacs per kanal will not stop us here because record reveals that Assistant Commissioner. Budgam had issued a certificate No. 411/QS dated 3.10.1998 certifying therein that the market rate of the land was Rs. 5.00 lacs per kanal in village Rawalpora Humhama. Admittedly accused No. 4 has struck a deal with land owners processed the same resulting in the execution of sale deeds regarding the said land in favour of the Cooperative Society. Budgam had issued a certificate No. 411/QS dated 3.10.1998 certifying therein that the market rate of the land was Rs. 5.00 lacs per kanal in village Rawalpora Humhama. Admittedly accused No. 4 has struck a deal with land owners processed the same resulting in the execution of sale deeds regarding the said land in favour of the Cooperative Society. He has to earn something for the labour which he put and the time spent by him for making the two parties to enter in the deal. In the normal languages he as a broker was entitled to receive some benefit for all his efforts which he put for completion of the deal. Like any other business deal he is entitled to earn some thing for livelihood. Now the moot point here is whether by the act of accused No. 4 Corporation has suffered any loss. The certificate, on the file, issued by Assistant Commissioner Revenue, Budgam dated 3.10,1998, certifying the market value of land at village Rawalpora Humhama was Rs. 5.00 lacs at the relevant time. So as per this official document reval that accused Mohammad Yousuf Kuchay had alienated land at the rate of Rs. 4.00 lacs only when the market rate at the relevant time was Rs. 5.00 lacs. Therefore, by this act of the accused Mohammad Yousuf Kuchay the corporation was benefited to the tune of Rs. 1.00 lac per kanal. From the above discussion no dishonest criminal intention or any criminal conspiracy is made out against the accused No. 4. No prima facie case is made out against the said accused, therefore he is discharged." Order dated 18.5.2009 discharging Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4) has been allowed to go unchallenged by the State. Against the aforesaid backdrop, petitioner cannot be said to have conferred an illegal benefit on himself or any other person including co-accused and to have exposed the J&K Cooperative Housing Corporation to any loss by going for purchase of 214 kanals of land in question at the rate of Rs. 4 lacs per kanal. 22. The charge against the petitioner is that, he pursuant to a criminal conspiracy hatched with private respondents, facilitated opening of account No. 949/16 in the State Cooperative Bank, Channapora in the name of Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4), deposit of payees account cheque No. 906078 dated 14.10.1999 for an amount of Rs. 4 lacs per kanal. 22. The charge against the petitioner is that, he pursuant to a criminal conspiracy hatched with private respondents, facilitated opening of account No. 949/16 in the State Cooperative Bank, Channapora in the name of Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4), deposit of payees account cheque No. 906078 dated 14.10.1999 for an amount of Rs. 50.00 lacs in the said account and its transfer to account No. 4815/25 in the Ellaquai Dehati Bank, Hyderpora in the name of private respondent No, 4 (accused No. 1). It is alleged that petitioner omitted to add word "Kuchay" to the name of Mohammad Yousuf (accused No. 4) so as to facilitate, opening of the account No. 949/16 in the State Cooperative Bank, Channapora by respondent No. 5 (accused No. 3) on identification of Respondent No. 4 (accused No. 1) in the name of Mohammad Yousuf deposit of the cheque in said account and its transfer to the account No. 4815/25 of respondent No. 4 (accused No. 1) in the Ellaquai Dehati Bank, Hyderpora. The learned Trial Court accordingly charged the petitioner and private respondents of the offences punishable under Section 419,429,468,471 and 120-B RFC read with Section 5 (2) Prevention of Corruption, Act, Svt. 2006. 23. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the admitted position of the prosecution that opening of account did not result in wrongful gain to the petitioner and private respondents or wrongful loss to the corporation or any other person, there was no material before the trial Court to conclude that the charge-sheet and material submitted therewith prima facie disclosed commission of offences of which the petitioner and private respondents were charged. It is argued that once this Court finds the material available before the trial Court not to prima facie disclose the commission of aforementioned offences, the Court is required to quash the charge and the proceedings emanating there from in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.PC. The arguments advanced makes it necessary to examine whether the allegations set out in the chargesheet and the material submitted when taken on their face value constitute the offences of which the petitioner and private respondents have been formally charged. 24. The offence of cheating, as defined under Section 415 RFC, runs through weft and warp of offences punishable under Section 419,420, 468 & 471 RFC. 24. The offence of cheating, as defined under Section 415 RFC, runs through weft and warp of offences punishable under Section 419,420, 468 & 471 RFC. It is, therefore, to be seen whether the private respondents allegedly by opening a fictitious account in name of Mr. Kuchay (accused No.4) prima facie committed offence of cheating. To find the answer, we have to go to definition of cheating as given under Section 415 RFC. It reads: "Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act of omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'." A bare look at the definition would reveal that a set of facts may constitute offence of cheating even where dishonest or fraudulent intention is not present. Where a person by deceiving any other person, even without any dishonest or fraudulent intention, willfully induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, the person would be held to have committed offence of 'cheating' provided that act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the deceived person, in body, mind, reputation or property. 25. In the present case, the private respondents in execution of the criminal conspiracy hatched with the petitioner are alleged to have opened a fictitious account in State Cooperative Bank, Chanpora in the name of Mr. Kuchay (accused no.4), deposited cheque in question, in said account and transferred the cheque amount to the account of respondent no,4 (accused No.1). The respondents, therefore, allegedly deceived in the officers of State Cooperative Bank, Chanpora and intentionally induced them to open the fictitious bank account and the opening of the fictitious account was likely to cause harm to the bank officers, if not in body or property, but in mind and reputation. The petitioner allegedly facilitated the commission of offence of cheating by allegedly omitting to write word 'Kuchay' i.e. surname after the first and middle name of Mr. Kuchay (accused no.4). The petitioner allegedly facilitated the commission of offence of cheating by allegedly omitting to write word 'Kuchay' i.e. surname after the first and middle name of Mr. Kuchay (accused no.4). 26. The cheque in question admittedly was drawn by the petitioner as a part payment of the consideration amount of Rs. 8.56 crores to Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4) possibly for onward payment to estate holders unless he had already paid them. It is admitted case of the prosecution that neither Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4) in whose name the cheque was drawn, nor the estate holders to whom the cheque amount was to be paid, complained that they did not receive the cheque amount. Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4) did not complain that he had not received the cheque amount as part payment, against the total consideration amount of Rs. 8.56 crores or demanded said amount from the respondents-Corporation. Estate holders also, admittedly, did not raise any claim for recovery of the aforesaid amount. Investigating Officer has during the course of investigation recorded the statement of estate holders, namely, Sofi Javed Hussain, Sofi Jahangir Husssain, Mohd Akbar Malla, Abdul Gani Malla, All Mohd Malla, Ghulam Nabi Mir and Fayaz Ahmad Mir, who sold their land to the Corporation through Shri Kuchay-respondent no. 4. The witnesses admitted to have received payment from Shri Kuchay what ever was due to them on account of said transaction. 27. It appears that because of temporary non-availability of Mr. Kuchay (accused No. 4) -drawee of the cheque, account No. 949/16 was opened in the State Cooperative Bank, Channapora and payees account cheque No. 996078 for an amount of Rs. 50 lacs, drawn by the petitioner deposited in said account and later transferred to account No. 4815/25 of respondent No. 4 (accused No. 1) in the Ellaquai Dehati Bank, Hyderpora to ensure immediate encashment of the cheque amount for its disbursement to Mr. Kuchay (accused No.4) or the estate holders on his behalf. Had the account been opened and cheque deposited to defraud Mr. Kuchay (accused No. 4) or estate holders to whom the cheque amount was to be disbursed, Mr. Kuchay (accused No. 4) or estate holders would have complained misappropriation of the cheque amount. No such complaint, as is admitted case of the prosecution was ever filed by Mr. Kuchay (accused No.4), nor he had demanded cheque amount from the Corporation. Kuchay (accused No. 4) or estate holders to whom the cheque amount was to be disbursed, Mr. Kuchay (accused No. 4) or estate holders would have complained misappropriation of the cheque amount. No such complaint, as is admitted case of the prosecution was ever filed by Mr. Kuchay (accused No.4), nor he had demanded cheque amount from the Corporation. Shri Kuchay on the other hand by his conduct admitted to have received cheque amount. 28. The question arises whether allegations leveled against the petitioner and respondent Nos. 4 & 5 can be said to prima facie constitute offences punishable under Sections 419, 429, 468, 471 and 120-B RFC and offence punishable under Section 5 (2) Prevention of Corruption, Act Svt. 2006, of which, petitioner and private respondents are charged. 29. The respondent no.5 (accused no.3) allegedly cheated the officials of the State Cooperative Bank, Chanapora by pretending to be Mr. Kuchay (accused No. 4) i.e. drawee of the cheque and represented that he was a person other than he really was. The respondent no. 4 (accused No. 1) by identifying respondent No. 5 (accused No. 3) as Shri Kuchay (accused No. 4) or drawee of the cheque represented to the State Cooperative Bank, Chanapora that respondent No. 5 (accused No. 3) was Mr. Kuchay (accused No. 4) i.e. drawee of the cheque, whereas respondent No. 5 (accused No. 3) to his knowledge was not Mr. Kuchay (accused No.4). The petitioner and private respondents allegedly forged the documents by recording in the application/account opening form that the respondent no.5 (accused no. 3) was the drawee of the cheque in question, i.e. Mr. Kuchay (Accused No.4) for the purpose of cheating the officials of State Cooperative Bank, Chanpora. The material before the trial Court, therefore, prima facie discloses commission of offences punishable under Section 419, 420, 468 read with Section 120-B RFC against the petitioner (accused no.2) and respondent Nos. 4 and 5 (accused Nos. 1 and 3). 30. Let us now examine whether the material before the trial Court, discloses commission of offences under Sections 471 RFC and 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act by the petitioner or private respondents. 31. Section 471 RFC, of which, petitioner and private respondents are charged uses expression 'fraudulently and dishonestly' to define the offence of 'Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record punishable under the Section. 31. Section 471 RFC, of which, petitioner and private respondents are charged uses expression 'fraudulently and dishonestly' to define the offence of 'Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record punishable under the Section. Dishonest and fraudulent intention must be behind the act of making one to believe that a forged document is a genuine document. In present case, as already pointed out dishonest and fraudulent intention is missing. It is nobody's case and not of the prosecution that the fictitious account was opened and the documents forged to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person or to defraud any person. Therefore, material before the trial Court does not prima facie disclose commission of offence punishable under Section 471 RFC is made out. 32. Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act Svt.2006 prescribes punishment for offence of criminal misconduct. The trial Court has found the petitioner to have prima facie committed criminal misconduct defined under Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 2006, which read as under: (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (d) if he,, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage." A bare look at the above provision would reveal that dishonest and fraudulent intention is necessary to constitute offence of misconduct defined under Section 5(1) (c) of the Act and misconduct by obtainment of valuable things or pecuniary advantage for the accused or other persons as defined under Section 5(1) (d) of the Act. It may be pointed out, at the cost of repetition, that against petitioner and private respondents neither dishonest nor fraudulent misappropriation of any entrusted property is alleged, nor is there any allegation of conferment of illegal benefit on the petitioner or other co-accused. In the circumstances, petitioner having regards to the admitted case of the prosecution, cannot be prima facie said to have committed "criminal misconduct' within the meaning of Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) or entered into criminal conspiracy to facilitate such misconduct. In the circumstances, petitioner having regards to the admitted case of the prosecution, cannot be prima facie said to have committed "criminal misconduct' within the meaning of Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) or entered into criminal conspiracy to facilitate such misconduct. The petitioner and private respondents, therefore, in absence of any material cannot be held prima facie liable for commission of offence punishable under Section 5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006. 33. From the above discussion, it emerges that "dishonest" or "fraudulent" intention that forms edifice of the offences punishable under Section 471 RFC and 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt.2006 of which, the petitioner and private respondents are charged, is neither alleged in the charge-sheet nor discernable from the material submitted therewith. Once the fundamental ingredients are missing in the allegation set out in the chargesheet, the commission of said offences cannot be said to have been made out against the petitioner and private respondents within meaning of Section 251-A Cr. PC. 34. So Viewed, as the allegations leveled in the chargesheet and the supporting materials do not prima facie constitute ingredients of the offences punishable under Section 471 RFC and 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006. The petitioner and private respondents were not liable to be charged for the said offences. The charge framed against the petitioner and his co-accused to the said extent, is liable to be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.PC. While holding so, support is drawn from "State of Maharashtra v. L. Muniswamy" AIR 1977 SC1489 and "State of Haryana and Ore. v. Bajan Lal and Ors". 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. 35. This, however, does not clinch the matter. The respondent no. 4 (accused No. 1) and respondent No. 5 (accused No. 3) earlier filed petition under Section 561-A Cr. P.C registered as 561-A No. 84/2009 seeking quashment of order of Trial Court dated 18.05.2009 and the charges framed against them pursuant to said order, also impugned in the present petition. The present petitioner (accused No. 2) was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the said petition. The ground urged in the petition are almost identical to the grounds urged in the petition on hand. The present petitioner (accused No. 2) was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the said petition. The ground urged in the petition are almost identical to the grounds urged in the petition on hand. A Coordinate Bench of this court on 07.12.2009 dismissed the petition observing: "The order passed by the learned trial court for ordering framing of charges against the petitioners is well founded and it does not call for any interference, as prima-facie alleged offences have been committed by the petitioners and respondent No. 4". Conclusion drawn by this Bench after going through the material available before the trial court and upon hearing the parties, is different from one arrived at by the Coordinate Bench of this Court. 36. It is argued by learned counsel for the respondents that any view taken by this Court contrary to the view taken by the Co-ordinate Bench while disposing of petition under Section 561-A No.84/2009 would amount to review of the order dated 07.12.2009 and that such a course would not be permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 37. Repelling the argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as previous petition was not filed by the present petitioner, therefore, he as a matter of right, can invoke inherent power of the court on the ground that material before the trial court did not disclose commission of offences of which the petitioner has been charged and that his right cannot be defeated by the outcome of the earlier petition filed by the co-accused. It is argued that petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to file reply to the earlier petition (561-A no. 84/2009) and that he was not present in person or through his counsel on the date the matter was heard and petition dismissed. It is submitted that petitioner, in the said background, cannot be deprived of his right to seek quashment of order dated 18.05.2009 and the proceedings emanating there from and that this Bench is not debarred from dealing with and disposing of the petition. 38. It is submitted that petitioner, in the said background, cannot be deprived of his right to seek quashment of order dated 18.05.2009 and the proceedings emanating there from and that this Bench is not debarred from dealing with and disposing of the petition. 38. It is next argued that the coordinate Bench of this Court while dealing with the earlier petition (561-A No. 84/2009) concentrated only on the question whether the petitioners in the said petition were Public Servants, within meaning of Section 21 RFC and Section 2 Jammu and Kashmir Protection of Corruption Act, Samvat 2006 and did not deal with all other aspects, highlighted in the present petition. 39. There is no scope for any disagreement with learned counsel for the respondents that this Bench in exercise of inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.PC cannot review its order or that of Co-ordinate Bench as such recourse is expressly barred under Section 369 Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court in "Simrikhia v. Dolly Mukharji 1990 (2) SCC 437 , while dealing with the scope of inherent powers of the High Court under the Criminal Procedure Code has observed; "The inherent jurisdiction, of the High Court cannot he invoked to override bar of review under Section 362. It is clearly stated in "Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal" that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent pouter. We find that the impugned, order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so." It is, therefore, more than clear that this Bench cannot in the name of exercise of inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr. P.C, review its order or that of a Coordinate Bench. 40. However, the question in the present case is not one of review of the order passed earlier by this Bench in a petition under Section 561-A Cr.PC or that of such order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench. The question is whether a second petition under Section 561-A Cr.PC can be maintained by a co-accused seeking same relief as sought in the first petition. 41. It is well settled law that a petition under Section 561- A Cr. The question is whether a second petition under Section 561-A Cr.PC can be maintained by a co-accused seeking same relief as sought in the first petition. 41. It is well settled law that a petition under Section 561- A Cr. PC invoking inherent powers of the Court filed by the accused would be maintainable notwithstanding a similar effort made by his co-accused not having met any success. Even an accused can made successive applications at different stages, in view of the developments that take place after an earlier petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court in "Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Mohan Singh" AIR 1975 SC 1002 , where a second petition invoking inherent powers was filed by the same petitioner, observed; "The present case is not our where the High Court was invited to revise or review an earlier order made by it in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction finally disposing of a criminal proceeding....Section 561-a preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice and the high Court must, therefore exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent Jurisdication is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitles to entertain the subsequent application of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.." The law was reiterated in case titled, "S.M.S Pharmaceutical Ltd v. Neeta Bhalla", reported in (2007) 4 SCC 70 , where the Supreme Court observed; "30. It is, therefore, any authority for the proposition that the High Court is not completely denuded of its power to exercise inherent jurisdiction for the second time." There is, therefore, no reason to find fault with the maintainability of the petition on hand. The question remains that whether the petition can be allowed, unmindful of the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench on 07.12.2009 while disposing of 561-A No.84/2009. If argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the earlier judgment does not stand in the way of the Court to allow the present petition. 42. The stand projected by learned counsel for the petitioner, however, must not prompt this Court to ignore its duty to maintain and respect judicial discipline. If argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the earlier judgment does not stand in the way of the Court to allow the present petition. 42. The stand projected by learned counsel for the petitioner, however, must not prompt this Court to ignore its duty to maintain and respect judicial discipline. One of the facets of such discipline is to follow the judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench and in the event, for the reasons recorded, it feels persuaded to depart from the earlier view, to direct placement of the matter before the Chief Justice, so that it is referred to another Bench in terms of Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999. 43. In "Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others" 2008 (10) SCC 1 , Supreme Court expressing its anguish over violation of basic judicial discipline by different Benches of the High Courts in not following the Judgments/orders of the Coordinate Benches observed; "78. There have been several instances of different Benches of the High Courts not following the judgments/orders of coordinate and even larger Benches. In some cases, the High Courts have gone to the extent of ignoring the law laid down by this Court without any tangible reason. Likewise, there have been instances in which smaller Benches of this Court have either ignored or bypassed the ratio of the judgments of the larger Benches including the Constitution Benches. These cases are illustrative of non-adherence to the rule of judicial discipline which is sine qua non for sustaining the system. In Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B.53 this Court observed; (AIR p. 941, para 19) "19... If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another Single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another Single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all courts subordinate to the High Court would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgments of their own High Court."............................. 90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor difference in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed." 44. In "Bajrang Lal Aggarwal and others v. State of Bihar and another", 2000 (10) SCC 568, a Bench of Patna High Court did not follow the Judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench in "Parsuram Prasad v. State of Bihar" 1996 2 Pat LJR 56 (HO, observing; "Now coming to the decision of this Court as quoted above regarding Dal Mill owner, I am quite aware that as per judicial discipline and decorum, I am bound by the decision. But it appears that the disputed points have not been placed in their proper perspective before the learned Single Judge." The Supreme Court disapproved the observation made by learned Single Judge, holding:- "3. But it appears that the disputed points have not been placed in their proper perspective before the learned Single Judge." The Supreme Court disapproved the observation made by learned Single Judge, holding:- "3. Since the learned Single Judge was fully aware that he was bound by that decision, it was desirable, in the fitness of things to refer the matter to a Division Bench to set at rest the points on which the learned Judge had joined issue. On this score alone, we set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court with a request to the Chief Justice to constitute a Bench of not less than two Judges to hear the writ petition filed by the appellants." 45. Against the said backdrop, notwithstanding the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner including one that the petitioner, though im-pleaded was not heard in the previous petition and that all the matters agitated in the present petition were not dealt with by the Coordinate Bench, imperatives of judicial decorum and discipline require that the matter be directed to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for its reference to a Bench in terms of Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999. 46. For the reasons discussed, it is held that the chargesheet and the material submitted with the chargesheet, do not disclose and prima facie make out commission of offences punishable under Section 471 RFC and 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, Samvat 2006 against the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 and they do not deserve to be formally charged of said offences. The trial Court order Dated 18.05.2009 and the charge against the petitioner and respondents 4 and 5 to the said extent, must be quashed. The petitioner and private respondents, therefore, have to face trial on the charge of having committed offences punishable under Sections 419, 420, 468 RFC read with 120-B RFC. Once it is so held, the Special Judge Anti Corruption, Srinagar loses jurisdiction to try the case FIR No. 135/2005 titled "State v. Shri Mohd. Shaft Dar and others" and the case is to be transferred to CJM, Srinagar with a direction to try the case himself or transfer it to any other Magistrate at Srinagar, competent to try the case. 47. Shaft Dar and others" and the case is to be transferred to CJM, Srinagar with a direction to try the case himself or transfer it to any other Magistrate at Srinagar, competent to try the case. 47. Viewed thus, the matter is directed to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice, so that it is referred to an appropriate Bench in terms of Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999. 48. Disposed of alongwith connected CMA(s).