JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—This first appeal from order is preferred by the plaintiff/appellants challenging the validity and correctness of the order dated 24.12.2012, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bulandshahr in Original Suit No. 185 of 2011 whereby the application for ad interim injunction filed by plaintiffs-appellants had been rejected on merits. 2. Briefly culled out the facts of the case are that the plaintiff/appellants filed O.S. No. 185 of 20011 on 24.5.2011 before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bulandshahr for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant/respondent alleging that they are engaged in the business of sale and purchase of dismantled equipments of old and obsolete industries. The defendant/respondent, a company registered under the Companies Act, formerly known as Jindal Polyster had a factory, which had stopped functioning as such its machinery had become old and obsolete, therefore, the management had taken a decision to dismantle it and to sell its dismantled plant, machinery, equipment and structure etc. The plaintiff/appellants on coming to know about the said decision of the defendant/respondents contacted them. It was agreed between them that the plaintiffs/appellants would dismantle the plant, machinery, equipment and structure etc and after removal purchase the same for a consideration of Rs. 35 crores. The defendant authorized Sri Rajeev Gambhir, Director of M/s Raveesh Steel Rolling and Forging Pvt. Ltd. situated at B-8 Mayapuri Industrial Area, Phase-1, New Delhi, vide letter dated 14.5.2010. For this purpose the letter dated 14.5.2010 reads thus : “TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN We hereby authorise Sh, Rajiv Gambhir, Director- M/s Ravish Steel Rollong and Forging P. Ltd., B-8, Mayapuri Industrial Area, Phase-1, New Delhi, to act as our agent for dismantling of plant and machinery, lying at Gulaothi premises; situated at 19th KM, Hapur Bullandsher Road, U.P. The goods, so dismantled to be dispatched, subject to prior permission from authorised officials of the Co. .Authorised Signatory.” 3. Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has placed the averments of the plaint before us and submitted that the plaintiff/appellants have categorically asserted therein that inspite of the letter dated 14.5.2010, the defendants did not allow the plaintiff to pursue their work despite several requests; plaintiff/appellants in order to fulfill the condition of defendants paid them Rs. Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has placed the averments of the plaint before us and submitted that the plaintiff/appellants have categorically asserted therein that inspite of the letter dated 14.5.2010, the defendants did not allow the plaintiff to pursue their work despite several requests; plaintiff/appellants in order to fulfill the condition of defendants paid them Rs. one crore through the account of M/s D.D. Forging Pvt. Ltd, plaintiff/appellant No. 3 on 4.12.2010, thereafter the plaintiff/appellants were allowed to carry on dismantling work w. e. f. January, 2011. It was also in January, 2011 that it came to the knowledge of plaintiff/appellants that some of the equipments of the defendants industry worth Rs. Five crores were transferred to its Nasik Unit after 14.5.2010 and it would be adjusted in the sum of Rs. 35 crores. 4. It is urged that as per the agreement between the parties after the dismantling the plant, machinery and equipments etc. it would be weighed by the appellants before its removal from the premises of the defendant and the corresponding amount would be deposited by the plaintiffs with them. Accordingly, under this arrangement between them the dismantled equipment etc. worth Rs. 8 crores were removed and the amount was received by the defendant and adjusted and now only a sum of Rs. 18,30,000/- remains in balance to be paid. It is stated that the defendants unilaterally issued a letter dated 14.9.2011 in reference to letter dated 14.5.2010, revoking the authorization. This letter of revocation reads thus: “To, Mr. Rajiv Gambhir Director M/s Ravish Steel Rollong and Forging P. Ltd. B-8, Mayapuri Industrial Area, Phase-1 New Delhi Please refer to our letter dated 14th May, 2010, whereby you were authorized for dismantling of old plant & machinery lying at Gulaothi. Since the said work is no more required, hence aforesaid authorization as issued to you stands revoked. Authorised Signatory.” 5. Since the said work is no more required, hence aforesaid authorization as issued to you stands revoked. Authorised Signatory.” 5. Learned counsel then submits that the defendant/respondent had no reason to revoke the authorization and explanation provided by them that the work of plaintiffs is no more required is vague; plaintiffs had dismantled almost all the plant and machinery, and structure only of the erstwhile industry remained; that since the defendant was making efforts to sell the aforesaid plaint and machinery etc, the plaintiff/appellants were constrained to move the Court by filing suit No. 185 of 2011 aforesaid, praying for permanent prohibitory injunction along with an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C., praying that during pendency of the suit the defendant/respondent be restrained from entering into a contract with any third party, or to transfer the dismantled and undismantled plant, machinery, equipments etc. However, the Court only issued notices to the defendant and did not grant ex parte injunction to the plaintiff/appellants. After service of notice on the defendant, the Court below, vide its order dated 2.11.2011 granted ad interim injunction, directing the parties to maintain status-quo and also issue commission vide its order dated 4.11.2011, pursuant to which the Court Amin submitted its report on 17.11.2011. 6. The application for temporary injunction was contested by the defendant by filing objections on 15.10.2011, averring that the plaintiffs by letter of authorization dated 14.5.2010 were only authorised to dismantle the old and obsolete plant, machinery and equipments etc. only, but this authority was terminated/revoked vide letter dated 14.9.2011 by defendant as the plaintiffs had not started the work of dismantling as required. The plaintiff/appellants also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A C.P.C. claiming breach of injunction order dated 2.11.2011 by the defendant, hence another commission was issued by the Court on 14.12.2011. After visiting the spot on 22.12.2011 the Commission submitted its report before the Court below. 7. According to the plaintiffs the aforesaid two commission reports show that some of the dismantled scrap was removed by the defendant in violation of the order dated 2.11.2011; that his aforesaid application under Order 39 Rule 2-A is pending consideration; that on 12.1.2012 the defendants moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 C.P.C. to which objections dated 27.1.2012 were filed by the plaintiff’s and rejoinder was also filed by the plaintiff/appellants on 13.2.2012. It appears that one Naseem Rana son of Ayub Rana had also filed impleadment application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. (paper No. 50-A), which was dismissed by the Court vide order dated 21.11.2012. The Court below after appreciation of documentary evidence rejected the temporary injunction application through impugned order dated 24.12.2012. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed this first appeal on the ground that the Court below has failed to take into consideration that the prima facie case and balance of convenience lies in favour of plaintiff/appellants, therefore, if temporary injunction is not granted they would suffer irreparable loss and injury, hence prayed for setting aside the impugned order dated 24.12.2012 and further to restrain the respondent from creating any third party interest over the dismantled material lying in the industry premises and also restrain the defendants from interfering in the dismantling work or removing of dismantled material/scrap out of the factory premises during pendency of appeal. 8. Learned senior counsel for the respondent Sri Ravi Kant submitted that the defendant is a public limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at 19th K.M. Stone, Bulandshahr Road, Gulaothi, District Bulandshahr; that the plaintiff/appellant being interested in dismantling and removal of dismantled old and obsolete plant, machinery scrap, equipments fitted in the factory situated at 19 K.M., Hapur and Bulandshahr Road, U.P., approached the defendant company for this purpose for a consideration to be decided later on; pursuant to which letter dated 14.5.2010 was issued by the defendant authorizing plaintiff-appellant Nos. 1 and 2 to act as their agent for dismantling the plant and machinery which will be dispatched subject to prior permission of the authorized officers of the company and no agreement oral or in writing was entered into between the parties in this regard. It is agreed that in the aforesaid backdrop the letter of authority dated 14.5.2010 cannot be construed by any stretch of imagination to constitute as an agreement for sale; that the plaintiff-appellant Nos. 1 and 2 did not start the work of dismantling for a considerable period for the reasons best known to them. It is agreed that in the aforesaid backdrop the letter of authority dated 14.5.2010 cannot be construed by any stretch of imagination to constitute as an agreement for sale; that the plaintiff-appellant Nos. 1 and 2 did not start the work of dismantling for a considerable period for the reasons best known to them. They had kept postponing the same on one or other false pretext and assurances and on account of their conduct and in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the defendnat-respondent had themselves terminated the aforesaid agency given to plaintiff No. 1 vide its letter of authority dated 14.5.2010 by renouncing the business of agency on 14.9.2011. 9. It is stated that meanwhile, due to inability of the plaintiffs-appellant Nos. 1 and 2 to start the work assigned to them under the authorization letter dated 14.5.2010 and their having renounced the same, the defendant-respondent started the job of dismantling in or about August 2010 through its own labourers and on its own cost and expenses. By November, 2010, the dismantled material worth about Rs. 1 Crore was staked at the site of the factory. In the last week of November, 2010, the plaintiff No. 1, representing and claiming himself to be the Director of the plaintiff No. 3, approached the defendant-company to purchase the aforesaid dismantled goods worth about Rs. 1 Crore and also for the material to be dismantled by the defendant, against which plaintiff No. 3 had made a deposit of Rs. 1 Crore as an advance against the purchase of the material with the defendant company on 4.12.2010; that the dismantled or to be dismantled material was agreed to be purchased by the plaintiff No. 3 or through its nominees as per their requirement from time to time against the advance payment to be made by plaintiff No. 3 and/or its nominees to this defendant company; that the defendant-company had sold the dismantled material worth Rs. 2.33 Crore to plaintiff No. 3 and its nominees against which the defendant-company has received a sum of Rs. 2.64 Crore from them, which is duly reflected in the account filed before the Court below. 10. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the authority given by the defendant-respondent to plaintiff appellant Nos. 2.33 Crore to plaintiff No. 3 and its nominees against which the defendant-company has received a sum of Rs. 2.64 Crore from them, which is duly reflected in the account filed before the Court below. 10. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the respondent that the authority given by the defendant-respondent to plaintiff appellant Nos. 1 and 2 by means of letter of authority dated 14.5.2010 stood properly terminated on account of renouncing the work by not having started the work of agency. The authority/agency given by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 was also expressly and specifically revoked by letter dated 14.9.2011 of the defendant. 11. It is stated that the plaintiff in the Suit wherein letter dated 14.5.2010 was referred to be an agreement and that they had purchased the entire plant, machinery, equipment and structures which after dismantling would be removed by them for a total consideration of Rs 35 Crores out of which goods worth Rs. 16.70 Crores stood removed by the plaintiffs-appellants and as such the defendant/respondent may be restrained in creating obstacles from removing the said plant and machinery from the factory premises and the plaintiffs be permitted to remove the plant and machinery on payment of balance of Rs. 18.30 Crores to be paid on issuance of weighing slips; that an ex-parte interim injunction dated 2.11.2011 was passed by the Court below directing the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the dismantled goods and the goods which was yet to be dismantled and that these may not be transferred or sold to any other person; that the defendant in its written statement and objections has categorically denied existence of any contract for sale of any nature whether oral or written between the parties. The letter of authority dated 14.5.2010 could not be construed by any stretch of imagination to be an agreement. It was repudiated that the defendant company had agreed to sell the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, entire obsolete dismantled plant, machinery, equipment and structure for a consideration of Rs. 35 Crores or any other amount at all as alleged. No evidence was available to justify the false claim as stated in the plaint. The amount received by the defendant-company has been explained in paragraphs 13, 17 and 19 of the written statement. 12. 1 and 2, entire obsolete dismantled plant, machinery, equipment and structure for a consideration of Rs. 35 Crores or any other amount at all as alleged. No evidence was available to justify the false claim as stated in the plaint. The amount received by the defendant-company has been explained in paragraphs 13, 17 and 19 of the written statement. 12. It is also argued that the defendant-company has raised the issue that the plaintiff has not sought any relief with regard to the revocation letter dated 14.9.2011 or specific performance of the alleged contract dated 14.5.2010; that after revocation of authority by the defendant vide revocation letter dated 14.9.2011 and the said revocation having not been declared invalid by any competent Court of law, the plaintiffs cannot in law seek injunction from the Court when after revocation no right under authority existed with the plaintiffs. The conduct of the plaintiffs, apart from above deliberate and intentional actions/inactions, is for avoidance of paying Court fees; that by the impugned order dated 24.12.2012, the learned Court below dismissed the application for interim injunction by a detailed order. The learned Court below has examined the issue and gave a finding that by the letter dated 14.5.2010, plaintiff was appointed as an Agent for dismantling the goods and further for dispatch of the said goods, the permission of the defendant-company is needed. Thus, the letter dated 14.5.2010 is contact of agency; that Section 182 of the Contract Act describes Principal and Agent. Section 201 of the Contract Act provides for revocation of agency for various reasons. Section 2 (h) of the Contract Act defines contract as an agreement enforceable by law. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent then further argued that Section 2 (e) of the Contract Act provides act for every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other being an agreement. Section 10 of the Contract Act provides for essential ingredients of agreement which are essential for the contract. The learned Court below thereafter held that the requirement of proposal and acceptance along with proper consideration is relevant for contract. The plaintiffs could not show any evidence to demonstrate that the goods already dismantled or would be dismantled are to be given to them for a sum of Rs. 35 Crores. The contract of agency even otherwise stood revoked by the letter of defendant dated 14.9.2011. The plaintiffs could not show any evidence to demonstrate that the goods already dismantled or would be dismantled are to be given to them for a sum of Rs. 35 Crores. The contract of agency even otherwise stood revoked by the letter of defendant dated 14.9.2011. Thus, prima facie case of the plaintiff has to be examined at this stage. It is not clear whether the work of dismantling was done by the plaintiff or by the defendant. No evidence on record is available that the entire deal was fixed for a total consideration of Rs. 35 Crores. Section 41 (h) of Specific Relief Act provides when equally efficacious remedy can be obtained, injunction cannot be granted. In view of the aforesaid no irreparable loss or injury shall be caused to the plaintiffs as they are entitled for an adequate protection. In view of the aforesaid, no case for grant of injunction is made out and as such the injunction application was rightly rejected and the appeal is also liable to be dismissed. 14. It is lastly submitted that Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act provides for instances in which an injunction can be granted. The plaintiffs’ case does not fall under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act; that the Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act refers to the cases in which specific performance of contract is enforceable. The plaintiffs have themselves stated the total consideration of the deal at Rs. 35 Crores and have also alleged payment of Rs 16.70 Crores and further permission to remove plant and machinery on payment of balance of Rs. 18.30 Crores. Although these allegations have been denied by the defendant, but for the purpose of Section 10 of Specific Relief Act, actual damages have been quantified by the plaintiffs themselves, therefore, the remedy under the Specific Relief Act is not available to the plaintiff. In a breach of contract, the plaintiff can sue for damages, but he cannot get injunction, especially in this case, where the amount of damages has been calculated by the plaintiffs themselves; that there is a distinction between the contract of sale and contract of agency. The essence of contract of sale is the transfer of title of the goods for a price paid or promised to be paid. The essence of contract of sale is the transfer of title of the goods for a price paid or promised to be paid. The essence of agency is the delivery of goods to a person who has to sell them not as his own property, but as the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of goods and will, therefore, be liable to account for the sale proceeds. For constituting a sale, there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring the title in the goods and that agreement must be supported by consideration and that as a result of transaction, the title to the property must actually pass in the goods. 15. In support of his aforesaid contention he has relied upon 2009 (17) SCC 124 , wherein the Court has held that when a Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction, the appellate Court would be slow to interfere therewith unless sufficient cogent reasons exist thereof. The Court of appeal should not arbitrarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court below. 16. It is stated that the present appeal in itself is defective as the affidavit is sworn by one Ashok Kumar son of S.L. Das working as Manager with plaintiff No. 2. However, para 1 of the affidavit describes the deponent as the Director of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3, hence, the affidavit itself being defective, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed on this ground; that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, no case has been made out by the plaintiff appellant for interfering at this stage and the present first appeal from order challenging the order dated 24.12.2012 is liable to be dismissed. 17. Upon hearing the parties’ counsel at length and perusal of the documents filed by the plaintiffs-appellants along with the memo of appeal, we find that in a very recent judgment dated 24.1.2013 in Civil Appeal No. 678 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) 31559 of 2012) Mohd Mehtab Khan and others v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan and others, the Apex Court has observed, as under: “15. In a situation where the learned Trial Court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. The Apex Court took notice of the following observations of the Supreme Court given in the case of Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp (1) SCC 727 “9. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by the Court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court’s exercise of discretion.” Almost on similar lines is the law referred by the counsel for the respondent given by the Apex Court in the case of Sonu Babu Bhambid and others v. Dream Developers and others, (2009) 17 SCC 124 . Thus, we would examine the case in hand to find out whether the trial Court has exercised its discretion in judicious manner and has not been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or whether the trial Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. 18. It is trite law that before passing an order of injunction the Court must take into consideration three relevant fctors viz. Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. 19. On reading the plaint as a whole it appears that in pith and substance the plaintiffs want us to believe that in fact it was a contract of sale of the defendant’s old and obsolete machinery, equipments, structures etc. situated at the site in question for Rs. 35 Crores and the dismantling work was to be carried out by the plaintiffs. situated at the site in question for Rs. 35 Crores and the dismantling work was to be carried out by the plaintiffs. The relevant paras of the plaint are as under: ^^7- ;g fd izfroknh ds fu.kZ; dh tkudkjh oknh ua0 1 dks gksus ij mlds lUnHkZ esa oknh ua0 1 ,oe izfroknh dh l{ke vf/kdkfj;ks ds chp okrkZ ,oe i=kpkj gksus ij izfroknh dh bl bUMLVªh ds IykaV] e'khujh] bD;wdesUV] LVªSDpj dks fMLesaVy gksus vkSj mldks ogkW ls gVk;s tkus ds i'pkr mldks 35 djksM+ :i;s esa oknh ds }kjk dz; fd;k tkuk r; ik;k x;kA 10- ;g fd izfroknh ds i= fnukad 14 ebZ lu~ 2010 ds vUrZxr izfroknh us viuh mijksDr bUMLVªh ds IykaV] e’khujh] bD;wdesUV] LVªSDpj dks fMLesaVy djus ds i'pkr miyC/k dqy lkeku dks izfroknh ds vf/kÑr vf/kdkjh dh LohÑfr ls mldh osbZax fLyi izfroknh ds }kjk mldk ewY; tek djkus ds i’pkr gh ekSds ls mBk;s tkus ds fy;s oknh dks vf/kÑr fd;k x;kA 12- ;g fd izfroknh Loa; IykaV] e’khujh] bD;wdesUV] LVªSDpj dks fMLesaVy djkus esa vleFkZ Fkk] rks izfroknh ds }kjk mudks fMLesaVy djus vkSj mldks bUMLVªh ls vyx gVkus ds fy;s oknh dks vf/kÑr fd;k x;k ftl ifdz;k esa gksus okyk O;; Hkh dqy fu/kkZfjr ewY; 35 djksM+ :i;s esa gh lek;ksftr fd;s tkus ds fy;s vfèkÑr fd;k x;kA 13- ;g fd izfroknh ds }kjk bUMLVªh esa oknh ds fy;s vius bD;wdesUV yxokus vkSj muds lapkyu ds fy;s vius O;fDr;ksa dks dEiuh dh bUMLVªh esa izos’k nsus ls iwoZ ,d djksM+ :i;s dh /kujkf’k dEiuh esa tek djkus dh 'krZ j[kh tks /kujkf’k oknh ds }kjk oknh ua0 3 ds [kkrs ls izfroknh ds ;gkW 4 fnlEcj lu~ 2010 dks tek fd;s tkus ds i’pkr izfroknh us oknh ds bD;wdesUV ,oe mudks pykus ls lacaf/kr O;fDr;ksa dks bUMLVªh esa fMleasVy ls lacaf/kr dk;Zokgh djus ds fy;s ekg tuojh lu~ 2011 esa Lohd`fr fn;s tkus ij fMLesaVy dh dk;Zokgh tuojh lu~ 2011 esa 'kq: dj nh xbZ FkhA 20- ;g fd izfroknh ds vucU/k ds vUrZxr oknh ds }kjk izfroknh ds ;gkW vc rd 16 djksM+ 70 yk[k :i;s miyC/k dj;s tk pqds gSa vkSj vc flQZ oknh ds }kjk izfroknh ds ;gkW 18 djksM+ 30 yk[k :i;s gh tek fd;s tkus gS] ftl /kujkf’k dks oknh izfroknh dh bUMLVªh esa fMLesaVy gq;s lkeku dks mBkrs le; osbZax e’khu izfroknh ds }kjk osbaZx fLyi tkjh fd;s tkus ds le; igys dh Hkkafr yxkrkj tek djus ds fy;s rS;kj gSA vFkkZr tSls tSls eky osbZx e’khu dhs osbZx fLyi izfroknh ds }kjk tkjh dh tk;sxh] mldh dher izfroknh dks miyC/k igys dh Hkkafr gksrh jgsxhA^^ Averments made in para-7 show that the defendant agreed to sell its plant, machinery, equipments and structure etc. to the plaintiff No. 1 and 2 after dismantling them. The only basis of the suit for the plaintiffs’ claim is the letter dated 14.5.2011. The contents of this letter do not match with the case of the plaintiffs as in averred made in para-7 of the plaint. Although the plaintiffs have contended in this paragraph that after talks and exchange of correspondence with the defendant, the deal of sale and dismantling the plant was settled for Rs. 35 Crores, but they have not filed any other document or correspondence with the defendant leading to the issue of letter dated 14.5.2010. Thus, it is difficult to believe the version of the plaintiffs as given in para-7 of the plaint. 20. The defendant has admitted receipt of Rs. 2.64 crores from plaintiff No. 3 regarding sale of machinery etc. dismantled from their site, but the plaintiffs have not filed any documentary evidence in the shape of receipts or bank account to show that they have further paid Rs. 15.66 Crores i. e. Rs. 18.30 Crores minus Rs. 2.64 Crores to the defendant company. In order to prove their prima facie case, the plaintiffs were required to file the relevant documents to substantiate their claim as contained in the plaint. They have simply filed the letter of agency dated 14.5.2010, revocation letter dated 14.9.2011 and several weighing slips. These documents read together do not prima facie show that there was any contract of sale between the plaintiffs and defendant regarding machinery, equipments etc. fitted in the defendant’s company which were required to be dismantled. The plaintiffs have not prayed for specific performance of the alleged contract nor they have challenged the revocation letter dated 14.9.2011, rather they have pleaded and argued that work of dismantling had been completed. Thus, as per the requirement of letter dated 14.5.2010 only weighment of the dismantled machinery etc. was left. As per own case of the plaintiffs, they were required to make payment of remainder dismantled articles to the defendant amounting to Rs. 16.70 Crores, so no harm is apparently being caused to them by revocation letter dated 14.9.2011. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that in view of the provisions of Sections 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to any ad interim injunction. 16.70 Crores, so no harm is apparently being caused to them by revocation letter dated 14.9.2011. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that in view of the provisions of Sections 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to any ad interim injunction. In order to interpret and appreciate the intention of the legislature it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Sections 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act, which are as under:— “38. Perpetual injunction when granted. — (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiffs right to, or enjoyment of, property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, nemaly:— (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.” Section 41 of Specific Relief Act reads as under: “41. Injunction when refused.— An injunction cannot be granted - (a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which injunction is sought, unless such restrain is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings; (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; (c) to restrain any person from applying to any legislative body; (d) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter; (e) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced; (f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance; (g) to prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquissced; (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any usual mode or proceeding except in case of breach of trust; (i) When the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the Court; (j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter.” It is also necessary to reproduce clause (a) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act:— “Section 14. Contracts not specifically enforceable. - (1) _____ (a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money, is an adequate relief;” 22. Thus, according to clause (a) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money, is an adequate relief cannot be specifically enforced. According to Section 38(2) of the Act, when any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II and according to clause (e) of Section 41 of the Act, an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced particularly, when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust by resorting to clause (h). Certainly this is not a case of breach of trust because no contract was executed and entered into between the parties. 23. Certainly this is not a case of breach of trust because no contract was executed and entered into between the parties. 23. As stated earlier the Courts while issuing permanent or temporary injunctions, must take utmost care and act in conservative manner while granting relief except in situations which so clearly call for it so as to make its refusal work real and serious hardship and injustice. If the Court is satisfied that the circumstances of the case do not entitle the grant of a perpetual injunction, a temporary injunction has perforce to be refused. One of the pre-requisites for the grant of injunction is that the party seeking relief must establish the right that he claims. If a right is being asserted which prima facie is not established or is not justiciable, no injunctive relief can be given either temporarily or permanently. 24. In view of the above discussion, we find that the appellants have failed to make out any prima facie case for ad interim injunction. The balance of convenience also does not lie in their favour as the agency given to them by the defendant has already been revoked vide letter dated 14.9.2011. In our considered opinion the plaintiffs will not suffer any irreparable injury if ad interim injunction is not granted, while the defendant will be deprived of enjoyment of its own property which has not been transferred to the plaintiffs in any manner whatsoever. In these circumstances, the trial Court has not at all erred in rejecting the plaintiffs’ application for ad interim injunction. The appeal sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. Costs easy. —————