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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1405 (MP)

M. P. Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Co. v. Swati Singh

2013-11-19

G.D.SAXENA, S.K.GANGELE

body2013
JUDGMENT Gangele, J. -- 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellants against the order dated 3.10.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.5733/2013. Vide impugned order, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1 and quashed the order of transfer dated 12.8.2013. 2. Respondent No.1, who was working as Chief Engineer/Chief General Manager (W&P) was transferred vide order dated 29.6.2012 from Bhopal to Gwalior. Vide order dated 12.8.2013, which was challenged by respondent No.1 before the Court, she was transferred from Gwalior to Bhopal and in her place, respondent No.3 was posted. Respondent No.1 challenged the order of transfer on the ground that it was in violation of transfer policy. She was posted on the same place from where earlier she was transferred. It was further pleaded in the petition that the authority, who issued the transfer order, was not competent to issue the order of transfer and the order was mala fide. 3. In support of the allegation of mala fide, the respondent No.1 pleaded that one Mr. Subodh Ingle, Junior Engineer was terminated from service after conducting regular departmental enquiry on the ground that he was absent from service for a long time. Mr. Ingle filed an appeal to the Chief General Manager, Gwalior against the order, it was rejected vide order dated 11.4.2011. Thereafter, a second appeal was filed before the Managing Director, which was also rejected on 28.7.2011. Thereafter, a review petition was filed and it was rejected on 27.9.2011. Mr. Ingle again filed a review petition to the Managing Director. Aforesaid review petition was sent to the respondent No.1 by General Manager, H.R. and the respondent No.1 sent a letter on 23.7.2012 in regard to earlier rejection of review petition. Respondent No.1 specifically pleaded that the respondent No.3 was interested to take back Mr. Ingle in service, hence, he passed an order dated 4.6.2013 and made certain allegations. Then, respondent No.1 obtained legal opinion from the counsel who had opined that the second review is not permissible. Consequently, the respondent No.1 vide order dated 5.8.2013 refused to entertain the review petition, hence, thereafter the order of transfer of the respondent No.1 was passed on 12.8.2013. The order was passed under colourable exercise of power and mala fide. Then, respondent No.1 obtained legal opinion from the counsel who had opined that the second review is not permissible. Consequently, the respondent No.1 vide order dated 5.8.2013 refused to entertain the review petition, hence, thereafter the order of transfer of the respondent No.1 was passed on 12.8.2013. The order was passed under colourable exercise of power and mala fide. It was not passed in any administrative exigencies, but it was passed to teach a lesson to the respondent No.1. 4. Learned Single Judge rejected all the contentions of the respondent No.1 that the transfer order was in violation of transfer policy or it was issued by an authority, who was not competent to issue the order of transfer. However, the learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the respondent No.1 to the effect that the respondent No.1 was transferred because she had refused to entertain the review petition filed by Mr. Ingle. The writ Court further observed that the review petition was not maintainable and the authority had applied undue pressure on the respondent No.1 to take back Mr. Ingle in service and when respondent No.1 refused to act accordingly, she was transferred. Court recorded conclusive finding as under while allowing writ petition : “26. On the basis of aforesaid legal position, in the considered opinion of this Court, the transfer order is not arising out of administrative exigency or public interest. It is passed on irrelevant consideration and amounts to malice in law.” 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the management has contended that the respondent No.1 was transferred on administrative grounds. In the case of other employee review petition was entertained, hence, a letter was communicated to the respondent No.1, which was received from the Government that the review petition of Mr. Ingle could be entertained. Looking to the work at Gwalior an experienced person was required to be posted because the post, on which the respondent No.1 was posted at Gwalior, is an important post and there are only two posts of this cadre in the State of Madhya Pradesh, hence, on the recommendations the competent authority i.e. Managing Director issued order of transfer. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in holding that the order of transfer was malice in law. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in holding that the order of transfer was malice in law. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied on the following judgments : (i) Ratnagiri Gas and Power (P) Ltd. v. RDS Projects Ltd. [ (2013)1 SCC 524 ]; (ii) Girias Investment (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [ (2008)7 SCC 53 ]; (iii) Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2009)15 SCC 178 ]; (iv) Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. [ (2005)7 SCC 764 ]; (v) Mohd. Masood Ahmad v. State of U.P. [ (2007)8 SCC 150 ]; (vi) State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna [ (2001)2 SCC 330 ]; (vii) Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi [ AIR 2000 SC 256 ]. 6. Contrary to this, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1 has contended that the order of transfer of respondent No.1 was mala fide and it was passed under colourable exercise of powers. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order of transfer is in violation of transfer policy and it was issued by an incompetent authority. Respondent No.1 was punished because she belongs to SC category. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied on the following judgments : (i) Babulal Jain v. State of M.P. [2007(2) Vidhi Bhasvar (SC) 1= 2008(2) MPJR (SC) 71]; (ii) Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi v. U.P. Jal Nigam [(2003)11 SCC 740]; (iii) Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India [ (2009)2 SCC 592 ]; (iv) R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. [ AIR 2006 SC 2912 ]; (v) High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh [ (2003)4 SCC 239 ]. 7. Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition on the grounds quoted above in the order that the order of transfer was actuated by malice and the act amounts to malice in law. Other grounds that the transfer order was in violation of transfer policy and it was issued by an incompetent authority have been negativated by the writ Court, no appeal has been filed by respondent No.1 against the aforesaid findings, hence, in our opinion, it is not necessary to consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 in this regard. 8. The main question for consideration is that whether the order of transfer amounts to malice in law. 8. The main question for consideration is that whether the order of transfer amounts to malice in law. In arriving on the aforesaid finding, the learned Single Judge has considered the fact that the respondent No.1 rejected the review petition filed by Mr. Ingle, which was not maintainable and she was directed vide letter dated 4.6.2013 to consider the review petition filed by Mr. Ingle. The authority also observed that the order of termination was not proper and because the respondent No.1 refused to entertain the review petition. The act was in accordance with law, hence, the order of transfer was passed. 9. Management in its return filed before the writ Court denied the allegations of mala fides. Management pleaded that there are only two posts of CGM in the cadre namely CGM Gwalior Regional Gwalior and CGM Bhopal Region Bhopal. These are the important posts because the CGM has to supervise near about 5000 employees posted in nine different districts. The respondent No.1 had no experience of field posting, hence, she was posted at Gwalior Region, however, various lapses and shortcomings in her work were noticed while she was posted at Gwalior. She was subjected to six disciplinary proceedings and in consequence thereof three minor penalties had been awarded to her, all related to her working at Gwalior. A displeasure was also communicated to her vide order dated 21.7.2013, hence, the management had taken a decision to transfer the respondent No.1. 10. It is well settled principle of law that the transfer is an incident of service and no employee has a vested right to be posted on a particular post. There is no loss to an employee on account of his transfer. He used to get same salary and other benefits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically held that the order of transfer could only be interfered by the Courts if it is in violation of any statutory rule or passed by an incompetent authority or mala fide. 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.K. Singh v. Union of India, reported in (1994)6 SCC 98 , has held as under : “23. .... Transfer of a Government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.K. Singh v. Union of India, reported in (1994)6 SCC 98 , has held as under : “23. .... Transfer of a Government servant in a transferable service is a necessary incident of the service career. Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by the superiors taking into account several factors including suitability of the person for a particular post and exigencies of administration. Several imponderables requiring formation of a subjective opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of the hierarchical superiors to make the decision. Unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm of principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinised judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising all transfers and the Courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all Government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated.” 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. S.S. Kourav, reported in (1995)3 SCC 270 , has held as under : “4. .... The Courts or Tribunals are not appellate forums to decide on transfers of officers on administrative grounds. The wheels of administration should be allowed to run smoothly and the Courts or Tribunals are not expected to interdict the working of the administrative system by transferring the officers to proper places. It is for the administration to take appropriate decision and such decisions shall stand unless they are vitiated either by mala fides or by extraneous consideration without any factual background or foundation. In this case we have seen that on the administrative grounds the transfer orders came to be issued. Therefore, we cannot go into the expediency of posting an officer at a particular place.” 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev Ratan Pandey, reported in (2009)8 SCC 337 , has held as under : “10. .... In a matter of transfer of a Government employee, scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the Courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer.” 14. .... In a matter of transfer of a Government employee, scope of judicial review is limited and the High Court would not interfere with an order of transfer lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so because the Courts do not substitute their own decision in the matter of transfer.” 14. We would not like to quote other judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject because in our opinion, three judgments quoted above with the approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in High Court of Judicature of Madras v. R. Perachi and others, reported in (2011)12 SCC 137 , are sufficient to decide the controversy involved in this case. 15. We would also like to quote certain judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in regard to malice in law. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, reported in (2010)9 SCC 437, has held as under in regard to legal malice after considering the earlier judgments on the point : “25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice -- fact or in law. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill will or spite on the part of the State. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It means exercise of statutory power of “purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended”. It means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the art of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its injurious acts. (Vide ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja and W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray.) 26. Passing an order for an unauthorised purpose constituted malice in law. (Vide Punjab SEB Ltd. v. Zora Singh and Union of India v. V. Ramakrishnam.) 16. (Vide ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Goverdhanlal Pitti, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja and W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray.) 26. Passing an order for an unauthorised purpose constituted malice in law. (Vide Punjab SEB Ltd. v. Zora Singh and Union of India v. V. Ramakrishnam.) 16. Same principle has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, reported in (2012)14 SCC 407, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “47.This Court has consistently held that the State is under an obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice in fact or in law. Where malice is attributed to the State. “Legal malice” or “malice in law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite.” 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and others, reported in (2009)2 SCC 592 , has upheld the quashment of order of transfer by the High Court on the ground of malice in law. 18. We would like to examine the present case in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition. 19. Mr. M.K. Gupta, Additional Secretary, Government of M.P., Energy Department wrote a letter dated 5th February 2013, fileld as Annexure R-13, before the writ Court to the Managing Director of M.P. Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co.Ltd., Bhopal in regard to review application filed by Mr. Subodh Ingle under rule 29 of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1966). It is mentioned in the letter that Mr. Subodh Ingle was removed from service vide order dated 29.10.2010 on the ground of unauthorised absence. He submitted a review application under rule 29 of the Rules of 1966 on 17.1.2013. The Chief General Manager rejected the appeal or Mr. Ingle on the ground that he did not inform about his ill health during course of departmental enquiry and cognizance had been taken in regard to medical certificate submitted by him. Earlier reivew application filed by Mr. The Chief General Manager rejected the appeal or Mr. Ingle on the ground that he did not inform about his ill health during course of departmental enquiry and cognizance had been taken in regard to medical certificate submitted by him. Earlier reivew application filed by Mr. Ingle was rejected by CGM vide order dated 23.7.2012 treating it as an appeal on the ground that no second appeal was admissible. However, another employee Mr. L.K. Dubey, who was removed from service, filed an appeal and his case was reconsidered and an opportunity was granted to him to defend his case and his removal from service was quashed. Hence, Mr. M.K. Gupta directed CMD that CGM Gwalior be directed to submit explanation that why rules were not followed and his review application was not considered and the case of Mr. Ingle be reviewed by the CGM and a chance of personal hearing be afforded to him. Thereafter, the CMD passed an order on 4.6.2013 and observed that the appellate authority is CGM Gwalior and the authority can entertain the review petition and pass the order on review after considering the merits of the case. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 vide order dated 5.8.2013 rejected the review petition and informed the same to CMD observing that there is no provision of entertaining second review petition under the Rules of 1966. Earlier the review petition filed by Mr. Ingle was rejected vide order dated 23.7.2012. 20. The CMD in its order dated 4.6.2013, which was passed after receiving letter from Mr. M.K. Gupta, has observed in para 6 that because the case appears to be awarding disproportionate punishment, hence, the appellate authority -- CGM is directed that he/she shall review the order dated 11.4.2013 and pass the order in accordance with law after considering the merits of the case. The portion of the order is in Hindi, which is quoted verbatim as under : ^^mijksDr of.kZr rF;ksa ds izdk’k esa izdj.k vipkj@vuq’kklughurk ds lkis{k esa vlarqfyr (disappropriate) ltk nsus dk izdj.k gksus ds dkj.k vihyh; izkf/kdkjh eq[; egkizca/kd ¼Xok-{ks-½ dks funsZ’k fn, tkrs gSa fd os vius vihy vkns’k fnukad 11-4-2011 dk iqu% iqufoZyksdu djsa ,oa izdj.k esa xq.k&nks”kksa ds vk/kkj ij fof/klEer vkns’k ikfjr djsaA** 21. From the aforesaid order passed by the CMD, it is clear that the CGM was granted a liberty to pass order in the case on the basis of merits in accordance with law. It is clear that a liberty had been given to the CGM to pass an order on the merits of the case in accordance with law. It includes that the CGM could reject the review petition. Earlier in the order, the authority had only mentioned some observations that review be entertained and the CGM shall exercise discretion and that discretion was exercised by respondent No.1, hence, it could not be inferred that respondent No.1 was directed to pass a particular order because a discretion was left to the respondent No.1, hence, it could not be held that due to the act of non-entertaining review petition by the respondent No.1 she was transferred. Malice in law because the malice in law means something done without lawful excuse and it is a deliberate act in disregards to the rights of the others, an act taken with oblique or indirect object. The management in the return specifically pleaded that the respondent No.1 was assigned an onerous duty when she was posted at Gwalior because she had to supervise and look after work near about 5000 employees. During her posting at Gwalior she was subjected to six disciplinary actions and three minor penalties have been awarded to her. In fourth case displeasure was communicated to her. Copy of the order in regard to imposition of minor punishments have been filed as Annexure R-3, R-4 and R-5 before the writ Court. Vide order dated 2.2.2013 a warning was issued to her to be more vigilant in her work and duties and thereafter vide order dated 28.3.2013 punishment of censure was imposed against her. Vide another order dated 4.3.2013, again a warning was issued to her and vide another order dated 27.7.2013 displealsure was communicated to her and after considering the aforesaid facts, a decision had been taken to transfer her from Gwalior. The proposal was submitted by DGM (Est.) on 12.8.2013 and on the same date order of transfer was issued. Another order was issued that the respondent No.1 is posted in works in Planning and Procurement Section. The proposal was submitted by DGM (Est.) on 12.8.2013 and on the same date order of transfer was issued. Another order was issued that the respondent No.1 is posted in works in Planning and Procurement Section. Even after joining of respondent No.3 at Gwalior, the respondent No.1 did not joint at Bhopal, hence, another order dated 23.8.2013 was issued and work allotted to respondent No.1 was assigned to Raju Dehariya, CGM and A.K. Saxena. 22. Writ petition was filed on 16.8.2013. The writ Court did not grant any stay order in favour of the petitioner (respondent No.1 herein) and the petition was heard on 23.9.2013. Respondent No.1 was posted on an important post, it is next to CMD, as submitted in the return. In spite of the fact that the Court did not grant any stay order, the respondent No.1 did not join at the transferred place. It means that the respondent No.1 has no regards to the administrative orders. 23. Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Perachi (supra), held that the assessment of quality of man is to be made by the superior taking into account several factors including the suitability of a person for a particular post and exigency of administration. Looking to the fact that three minor penalties have been imposed against the respondent No.1 when she was posted at Gwalior, in our opinion, it could not be held that the respondent No.1 was transferred because she refused to entertain the review petition filed by Mr. Ingle, hence, the act of the management amounts to malice in law. The fact that the minor punishment were imposed against the respondent No.1 when she was posted at Gwalior has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 24. Writ Court relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India and others, reported in (2009)2 SCC 592 . In the above judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has up held the findings of High Court to the effect that the order of transfer would amount to malice in law. In the aforesaid case, the employee was transferred on the basis of an unanimous complaint, however, on enquiry it was frivolous that the complaint was filed, in spite of that it was noted in the file that the employee be transferred. In the aforesaid case, the employee was transferred on the basis of an unanimous complaint, however, on enquiry it was frivolous that the complaint was filed, in spite of that it was noted in the file that the employee be transferred. In such circumstances, Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the finding that the order of transfer amounts to malice in law. However, the facts of the present case are different as quoted above in the order. 25. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. Writ petition filed by the respondent No.1 is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.