JUDGMENT Soumen Sen, J. 1. The petitioners initially filed an application on 2nd September, 2009 under section 152 read with Order 20 Rules 14 and 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which a prayer was made for amendment of final decree dated 17th February, 1998. The said application was filed on the ground that the final decree dated 17th February, 1998 is not executable as the pre-emption value of Rs. 34,000/- together with the cost is allowed to be deposited and such value is incorporated in the final decree on the basis of the report filed by the learned Commissioner in this regard. It was contended that the judgment-debtors/stranger purchasers purchased the said family dwelling house property from the proforma defendant Nos. 5 and 6 which resulted in a title suit being instituted being Title Suit No. 36 of 1985 in the said proceeding, a preliminary decree of pre-emption was passed on 31st August, 1988 which records as follows:- That the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for pre-emption under section 4 of the Partition Act and the defendants are directed to amicably partition the property by metes and bounds according to the share of the plaintiffs within 2 months from the date; failing which partition will be effected by a pleader Commissioner the cost of which is to be borne out by each of the parties. 2. Consequent thereupon, the Commissioner entered reference and filed a report in respect of the part and parcel of the dwelling house being Plot No. 3317 mentioning in Khatian No. 306 of Mouza, Burdwan with area of .09 acres in holding No. 41(old) 27 (new) at D.N. Sarkar Road, (Debendra Nath Sarkar Road) Mohalla, Post Office and Police Station - Burdwan (Sadar) District - Burdwan, West Bengal. 3. The report of the Commissioner specifically states as follows:- now for the determination of the valuation of the House copy of four Deeds were submitted before me by a plaintiff side, seen, the copy of the deeds No. 8601 of 1976, 8602 of 1976, 8603 of 1976, 8604 of 1974 of Burdwan Sadar, Sub-Registration Office and found that by the same deeds, the defendants purchased the suit property, so, the valuation given there may be taken as the market value of the same. Moreover, by this time the condition of the building has deteriorated much for want of proper care and maintenance. 4. Moreover, by this time the condition of the building has deteriorated much for want of proper care and maintenance. 4. Thereafter, on consideration of the report of the learned Commissioner, a final decree was passed on 17th February, 1998. The petitioners/decree-holders did not deposit the values of the pre-empted property at the time of institution of the suit and such amount became payable under Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The final decree is required to mention the said value of the pre-empted property. The final decree was, however, silent on the same and, accordingly, the said final decree became in-executable. On such plea, the aforesaid application was filed on 2nd September, 2009 for amendment of the decree. In the meantime, the plaintiff filed an execution application being Title Execution Case No. 4 of 1995 which, however, became infructuous as the decree remains in-executable in absence of the mentioning of the pre-emption value required to be deposited by the decree-holder. 5. The executing Court cannot go behind the decree which became final to amend the self-same decree by exercising inherent power and the executing Court has correctly refused to accept the contention of the plaintiff decree-holder. The plaintiff decree-holder also realized the limitation of the executing Court and, accordingly, filed the aforesaid application for amendment of decree. 6. The learned Trial Judge by an order dated June 7, 2011 dismissed the said application on the ground that the plaintiffs did not submit the said sale deeds before the Court while the preliminary decree was pronounced and, therefore, such omission cannot be termed as clerical mistake within the scope of section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said impugned order was challenged in a Civil Revision being C.O. 3459 of 2011. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the said civil revisional application held that the learned Judge of the Trial Court has rightly held that the correction sought for by the decree-holders/petitioners does not come within the scope of section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the said order of dismissal would not preclude the decree-holders/petitioners to seek correction of preliminary decree in accordance with law if at all it is legally permissible at this distant point of time. 7. On the basis of the said observation, an application was filed to rectify the final decree dated 31st August, 1988. However, the said order of dismissal would not preclude the decree-holders/petitioners to seek correction of preliminary decree in accordance with law if at all it is legally permissible at this distant point of time. 7. On the basis of the said observation, an application was filed to rectify the final decree dated 31st August, 1988. Such application was filed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In the said proceeding it was argued that the Court has inherent power to pass appropriate orders to do complete justice between the parties. The said application was rejected by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division on the ground of limitation. It was observed by the said petition, the petitioner prayed for reopening the preliminary decree for correction after 12 long years. 9. This order is under challenge. 10. The learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners in referring to Mahadeb Hazra & Ors. vs. Sm. Sisubala Sen & Ors. reported in 1985 (2) CHN 341 argued that if the Trial Judge in passing the said preliminary decree committed any mistake and if it was subsequently found to be an accidental omission, then it is duty of the learned Trial Judge to correct his own errors. It was held in the said decision that accidental errors in the judgment can very well be corrected in exercise of the inherent powers of the Court. 11. In Mahadeb Hazra (supra), the Division Bench found that there was an unfortunate accidental omission in the ordering portion of the judgment when the Court had failed to declare the plaintiffs share in decreeing the suit in the preliminary form and in directing the partition between the parties after the defence taken by the defendants as to the exclusivity of the property being the subject-matter of partition was overruled. The said mistake was realized at long last at the stage when steps were proposed to be taken for making the decree final. At that stage, the plaintiff filed an application under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correcting decree by incorporating declaration as to the plaintiffs share in the Ka lands. The said mistake was realized at long last at the stage when steps were proposed to be taken for making the decree final. At that stage, the plaintiff filed an application under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correcting decree by incorporating declaration as to the plaintiffs share in the Ka lands. This application was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the view that since the decree was in terms of the judgment or in other words the decree being in conformity with the ordering portion of the judgment, there is no scope for correcting the decree in exercise of power under section 152. 12. The plaintiff filed an application under section 151 read with section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correction of both the ordering portion of the judgment and the decree passed. The said application was dismissed which gave rise to the revisional application filed before the Division Bench. It would appear from paragraph 4 of the said decision that the Hon'ble Division Bench came to a definite finding that there had been an accidental omission in the ordering portion of the judgment dated 25th September, 1981 whereby the suit was decreed in the preliminary form and having found so, the learned Subordinate Judge did not take any necessary steps for correcting his own error but, on the other hand, went to dismiss the application filed for such correction on behalf of the plaintiffs in appreciating that if this defect is not removed, the position would lead to a stalemate because there would be a preliminary decree in a partition suit which can never be made final. 13. The learned Counsel has also relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 663 (Additional Income-tax Officer, Circle I, Salem & Anr. vs. E. Alfred) for the proposition that the Court always retains the power to correct the decrees and orders if the situation so demands. 14. The question is if there is a defect in the preliminary decree and on the basis of which a final decree was ultimately drawn up and remained in-executable almost 12 years, the plaintiff/decree-holder shall be permitted to file an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correction of the final decree. In order to appreciate this, the scope of a partition suit is required to be taken into consideration. In order to appreciate this, the scope of a partition suit is required to be taken into consideration. A partition suit contemplates passing of a preliminary and a final decree. There are multiple stages in the suit as observed in Shub Karan Bubna vs. Sita Saran Bubna & Ors. ( 2009 (9) SCC 689 ). 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shub Karan (supra) observed that in a suit for partition or separation of a share, the court at the first stage decides whether the plaintiff has a share in the suit property and whether he is entitled to division and separate possession. The decision on these two issues is exercise of a judicial function and results in first stage decision termed as "decree" under Order 20 Rule 18(1) and termed as "preliminary decree" under Order 20 Rule 18(2) CPC. The consequential division by metes and bounds, considered to be a ministerial or administrative act requiring the physical inspection, measurements, calculations and considering various permutations/combinations/alternatives of division is referred to the Collector under Rule 18(1) and is the subject-matter of the final decree under Rule 18(2). 16. Every application which seeks to enforce a right or seeks a remedy or relief on the basis of any cause of action in a Civil Court, unless otherwise provided, will be subject to the law of limitation. But where an application does not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to grant any fresh relief based on a new cause of action, but merely reminds or requests the Court to do its duty by completing the remaining part of the pending suit, there is no question of any limitation. Such an application in a suit which is already pending, which contains no fresh or new prayer for relief is not one to which the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply. 17. Once a Court passes a preliminary decree, it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the matter is referred to the Collector or a Commissioner for division unless the parties themselves agree as to the manner of division. This duty in the normal course has to be performed by the Court itself as a continuation of the preliminary decree. 18. This duty in the normal course has to be performed by the Court itself as a continuation of the preliminary decree. 18. On the other hand, in a partition suit the preliminary decree only decide a part of the suit and, therefore, an application for passing a final decree is only an application in a pending suit, seeking further progress. In partition suits, there can be a preliminary decree followed by a final decree, or there can be a decree which is a combination of preliminary decree and final decree or there can be merely a single decree with certain further steps to be taken by the Court. In fact, several applications for final decree are permissible in a partition suit. A decree in a partition suit enures to the benefit of all the co-owners and, therefore, it is sometimes said that there is really no judgment-debtor in a partition decree. Therefore, the concept of final decree in a partition suit is different from the concept of final decree in a mortgage suit. Consequently an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit is different from an application for final decree in partition suits. 19. Under the provisions of CPC, even as they stand at present, initiation of final decree proceedings does not depend upon an application for final decree for initiation (unless the local amendments require the same). Therefore, when a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit, the proceedings should be continued by fixing dates for further proceedings till a final decree is passed. It is the duty and function of the Court. 20. In suits for partition and other suits involving declaration of the right and ascertainment/quantification of the relief, the process of the suit should be continuous, consisting of the first stage of determination and declaration of the right, second stage of ascertainment/division quantification, and the third stage of execution to give actual relief. Shub Karan Bubna vs. Sita Saran Bubna & Ors. ( 2009 (9) SCC 689 ). 21. It is not in dispute that the claim based on pre-emption was allowed but the value was not specified. 22. The Court is required to consider if there has been an accidental omission in the preliminary decree or the final decree. A mistake of Court should not prejudice any party. ( 2009 (9) SCC 689 ). 21. It is not in dispute that the claim based on pre-emption was allowed but the value was not specified. 22. The Court is required to consider if there has been an accidental omission in the preliminary decree or the final decree. A mistake of Court should not prejudice any party. It is one thing to say that a decree could not be passed due to failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce relevant documents in order to ascertain the value of the property and to pass a decree for pre-emption in favour of the plaintiffs and it is completely different thing to contend that records were available and the Court by mistake did not mention the value that was required to be deposited in order to obtain a relief under the decree. The Preliminary decree records that the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree for pre-emption under section 4 of the Partition Act. The preliminary decree did not mention the pre-emption value. It needs to be ascertained when the preliminary decree was passed, the Court was in possession of such knowledge with regard to such value. It is also required to be ascertained if at the stage of drawing up a final decree, materials were produce before the Commissioner so as to ascertain the value and pass appropriate orders which should have formed part of the final decree. 23. In Biswapati Dey vs. Kensington Stores & Ors. reported in AIR 1972 CAL 172 , the learned Single Judge of this Hon'ble Court held that Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 has set a new deadline beyond which no application for execution of the decree can be made. The period of 12 years is long enough to execute a decree when it is enforceable and the intention of the legislature is quite apparent from the language used therein that the time to make the execution application is 12 years from the time when the decree or order becomes enforceable. 24. In Hameed Joharan (Dead) & Ors. vs. Abdul Salam (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. 24. In Hameed Joharan (Dead) & Ors. vs. Abdul Salam (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. reported in 2001 (7) SCC 573 it was held that suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one's own failure cannot but be said to be a fallacious argument, though, however, suspension can be had when the decree is a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous events have to happen on the fulfillment of which alone it could be enforced. It was held on the facts that furnishing of stamp paper was entirely in the domain and power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from acting in terms therewith and thus it cannot but be said that the decree was capable of being enforced on and from 20th November, 1970 and the twelve-year period ought to be counted therefrom. 25. In the said reported decision it would appear that the final decree upon acceptance of the Report of the Commissioner was passed on 20th November, 1970. The notice to furnish stamp paper was issued on 28th February 1972 and the time granted was up to 17th March, 1972. It was held that such direction by itself would not take it out of the purview of Article 136 as regards the enforceability of the decree. Furnishing of stamp paper was an act entirely within the domain and control of the appellant and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same cannot possibly be said to be putting a stop to the period of limitation being run since no one can take advantage of his own wrong. The stamp paper in the subject-matter was, in fact, filed on 26th March, 1984. That does not mean and imply, as Their Lordships have held, that the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 136 stands extended for a period of twelve years from 26th March, 1984. Their Lordships have approved in Biswapati Dey (supra) in paragraph 10 of the said report. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hameed Joharan (supra) are reproduced hereinbelow:- 9. As noticed earlier in this judgment, Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 being the governing statutory provision, prescribes a period of twelve years when the decree of order becomes enforceable. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hameed Joharan (supra) are reproduced hereinbelow:- 9. As noticed earlier in this judgment, Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 being the governing statutory provision, prescribes a period of twelve years when the decree of order becomes enforceable. The word "enforce" in common acceptation means and implies "compel observations of (vide Concise Oxford Dictionary) and in Black's Law Dictionary "enforce" has been attributed a meaning "to give force or effect to; to compel obedience to" and "enforcement" has been defined as "the act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate or command". In ordinary parlance, "enforce" means and implies "compel observance of". Corpus Juris Secundum attributes the following for the word "enforce": Enforce. - In general, to cause to be executed or performed, to cause to take effect, or to compel obedience to, as to enforce laws or rules; to control; to execute with vigor; to put in execution; to put in force; also to exact, or to obtain authoritatively. The word is used in a multiplicity of ways and is given many shades of meaning and applicability, but it does not necessarily imply actual force or coercion. As applied to process, the term implies execution and embraces all the legal means of collecting a judgment, including proceedings supplemental to execution. The past tense or past participle 'enforced' has been said to have the same primary meaning as 'compelled'. 10. The language used by the legislature in Article 136 if read in its proper perspective, to wit: "when the decree or order becomes enforceable" must have been to clear up any confusion that might have arisen by reason of the user of the expression "the date of the decree or order" which was used in the earlier Act. The intention of the legislature stands clearly exposed by the language used therein viz. to permit a twelve-year period certain from the date of the decree or order. It is in this context that a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Biswapati Dey vs. Kennsington stores where the learned Single Judge in no uncertain terms expressed his opinion that there cannot be any ambiguity in the language used in the third column and the words used therein, to wit; "when the decree or order becomes enforceable" should be read in their literal sense. We do feel it expedient to lend out concurrence to such an observation of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. The requirement of the Limitation Act in the matter of enforcement of a decree is the date on which the decree becomes enforceable or capable of being enforced - what is required is to assess the legislative intent and if the intent appears to be otherwise clear and unambiguous, question of attributing a different meaning other than the literal meaning of the words used would not arise. It is in this context, we also do feel it inclined to record our concurrence to the observations of the Bull Bench of the Bombay High Court in Subhash Ganpatrao Buty vs. Maroti. The Full Bench in the decision observed: It is the duty of the Court to interpret the language actually employed and to determine the intention of the legislature from such language and since there is no ambiguity about the language actually employed, neither the recommendation of the Law Commission nor the aims and object as set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons can be brought in aid or can be allowed to influence the natural and grammatical meaning of the Explanation as enacted by Parliament. 13. Article 136 of the Act of 1963 prescribes as noticed above, a twelve-year period certain and what is relevant for Article 136 is, as to when the decree became enforceable and not when the decree became executable. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Biswapati case has dealt with the issue very succinctly and laid down that the word "enforceable" should be read in its literal sense. In the contextual facts, the final decree upon acceptance of the Report of the Commissioner was passed on 20.11.1970, while it is true that notice to furnish stamp paper was issued on 28.2.1972 and the time granted was up to 17.3.1972 but that by itself will not take it out of the purview of Article 136 as regards the enforceability of the decree. Furnishing of stamp paper was an act entirely within the domain and control of the appellant and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same cannot possibly be said to be putting a stop to the period of limitation being run - no one can take advantage of his own wrong; as a matter of fact, in the contextual facts, no stamp paper was filed until 26-3-1984 - does that mean and imply that the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 136 stands extended for a period of twelve years from 26.3.1984? The answer if it be stated to be in the affirmative, would lead to an utter absurdity and a mockery of the provisions of the statute. Suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one's own failure cannot but be said to be a fallacious argument, though, however, suspension can be had when the decree is a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous events have to happen on the fulfillment of which alone it could be enforced - furnishing of stamped paper was entirely in the domain and power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from acting in terms therewith and thus it cannot but be said that the decree was capable of being enforced on and from 20.11.1970 and the twelve-year period ought to be counted therefrom. It is more or less in an identical situation, this Court even five decades ago in the case of Yeshwant Deorao Deshmukh vs. Walchand Ramchand Kothari has stated: The decree was not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen on the fulfillment of which alone it could be executed. The payment of Court fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed. 14. Needless to record that the engrossment of stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and imply, however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper - this is opposed to the fundamental principle on which the statutes of limitation are founded. 14. Needless to record that the engrossment of stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree executable but that does not mean and imply, however, that the enforceability of the decree would remain suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper - this is opposed to the fundamental principle on which the statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot but be the general policy of our law to use the legal diligence and this has been the consistent legal theory from the ancient times: even the doctrine of prescription in Roman law prescribes such a concept of legal diligence and since its incorporation therein, the doctrine has always been favoured rather than claiming disfavour. Law Courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity - the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent). As a matter of fact, lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right. Wood, V.C. in Man by vs. Bewicke (K & J at p. 352) stated: (ER p. 1144) The legislature has in this, as in every civilized country that has ever existed, thought fit to prescribe certain limitations of time after which persons may suppose themselves to be in peaceful possession of their property, and capable of transmitting the estates of which they are in possession, without any apprehension of the title being impugned by litigation in respect of transactions which occurred at a distant period, when evidence in support of their own title may be most difficult to obtain. 15. Recently this Court in W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. vs. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage (P) Ltd. (1999) 8 SCC 315 , had the occasion to consider the question of limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 and upon consideration of the decision in the case of Yeshwant Deorao held that under the scheme of the Limitation Act, execution applications like plaints have to be presented in Court within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. A decree-holder, this Court went on to record, does not have the benefit of exclusion of the time taken for obtaining even the certified copy of the decree like the appellant who prefers an appeal, much less can he claim to deduct time taken by the Court in drawing up and signing the decree. A decree-holder, this Court went on to record, does not have the benefit of exclusion of the time taken for obtaining even the certified copy of the decree like the appellant who prefers an appeal, much less can he claim to deduct time taken by the Court in drawing up and signing the decree. In fine, this Court observed that if the time is reckoned not from the date of the decree but from the date when it is prepared, it would amount to doing violence to the provisions of the Limitation Act as well as of Order 20 and Order 21 Rule 11 CPC, which is clearly impermissible. 31. Incidentally, the Calcutta High Court in one of its very old decision in the case of Kishori Mohan Pal vs. Provash Chandra Mondal (AIR 1924 Cal 351) while interpreting Article 182 under the Limitation Act of 1908 has been rather categorical in recording that the date of the decree under the article is the day on which the judgment is pronounced and limitation begins to run from that day although no formal decree can be drawn up in a partition suit until paper being a proper stamp under Article 45 of the Stamp Act is supplied to the Court. Richardson, J. with his usual felicity of expression stated as below: (AIR p. 352) In this Court the learned Vakil for the respondents has said all that could be said for his clients. He has in particular called our attention to the fact that, although the decree is dated 25.3.1914, it is expressed to be 'passed in terms of the Commissioner's report, dated 27.6.1914 which and the map filed along with it do form parts of the decree'. 25.3.1914 is, nevertheless, the correct date of the decree because that is they day on which the judgment was pronounced (Order 20 Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code). The report of the Commissioner appointed to make the partition had already been received, the report was adopted by the judgment subject to certain variations and, in connection with those variations, certain directions of a ministerial character were given to the Commissioner which the Commissioner had merely to obey. The order sheet shows that the Commissioner submitted a report on 27.6.1914. That report has not been placed before us. The order sheet shows that the Commissioner submitted a report on 27.6.1914. That report has not been placed before us. But I have no doubt that it did no more than state that the Commissioner had done what he was directed to do by the judgment of 25.3.1914. That judgment was the final judgment in the suit and it was so regarded by the Subordinate Judge who delivered it. The decree is in accordance therewith. The directions in the judgment were sufficient to indicate how the decree should be framed, and there was no need of any further judgment. The delay in signing the decree was due not to any fault of the Court or to any cause beyond the control of the parties but solely to the delay of the parties in supplying the requisite stamped paper. Any party desiring to have the decree executed might have furnished the stamped paper at any time leaving the expense of providing it to be adjusted by the Court in connection with the costs of the execution. The circumstances disclose no ground for saying that limitation did not run from the date of the decree as provided by Article 182 of the Limitation Act, and if authority be needed, reference may be made to Golam Gaffar Mondal vs. Goljan Bibi (ILR (1898) 25 Cal 109) and Bhajan Behary Shaha vs. Girish Chandra Shaha (1913 (17) CWN 959). I may add that much time and labour would be saved if the Court would resist such attempts as the present to go behind the plain words of a positive enactment. 34. Be it noted that the legislature cannot be subservient to any personal whim or caprice. In any event, furnishing of engrossed stamp paper for the drawing up of the decree cannot but be ascribed to be a ministerial act, which cannot possibly put under suspension a legislative mandate. Since no conditions are attached to the decree and the same has been passed declaring the shares of the parties finally, the Court is not required to deal with the matter any further - what has to be done - has been done. Since no conditions are attached to the decree and the same has been passed declaring the shares of the parties finally, the Court is not required to deal with the matter any further - what has to be done - has been done. The test thus should be - has the Court left out something for being adjudicated at a later point of time or is the decree contingent upon the happening of an event - i.e. to say the Court by its own order postpones the enforceability of the order - in the event of there being no postponement by a specific order of the Court, there being a suspension of the decree being unenforceable would not arise. As a matter of fact, the very definition of decree in section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code lends credence to the observations as above since the term is meant to be "conclusive determination of the rights of the parties". 40. In the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record an affirmative support to Mr. Manx's submission that section 35 read with section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 would overrun the Limitation Act of 1963 and thus give a complete go-by to the legislative intent in the matter of incorporation of Article 136. 26. In the light of the aforesaid decision, the Civil Judge is required to ascertain if it was really a mistake of the Trial Court while passing the final decree as it has been submitted before this Court that all the required sale deeds were furnished to the Commissioner and the Commissioner had filed a report taking into consideration such sale deeds. Ordinarily where on the date of application seeking amendment of decree, the decree is fully satisfied and has become dead it would not be possible nor desirable to allow amendment of that decree. It depends upon the stage and the nature of the decree. After preparation of final decree, no substantive change can be made resulting amendment in the judgment, but it does not take away the inherent power of the Trial Judge to make necessary amendment in the final decree in consonance with the judgment. It depends upon the stage and the nature of the decree. After preparation of final decree, no substantive change can be made resulting amendment in the judgment, but it does not take away the inherent power of the Trial Judge to make necessary amendment in the final decree in consonance with the judgment. If the Trial Court while drawing up the final decree overlooked and committed a mistake in not adverting to such report and requiring the plaintiff decree-holder to put in such money then it would be an obvious mistake. 27. The application of Limitation Act with regard to the enforceability of such a decree has already been clearly stated in Hameed Joharan (supra). It would be open for the learned Trial Judge to take into consideration the question of limitation as well if it was found that the decree was enforceable immediately on passing of the preliminary decree and the plaintiff was guilty of delay and laches. The petitioner has also submitted that the sale deeds were furnished before passing of the preliminary decree and in any event, the same formed part of the record in the final decree proceeding. If it appears to the Trial Court that the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps in furnishing all details before the final decree was drawn up and submitted all documents then it would be a mistake on the part of the Court in not passing a proper final decree in consonance with the judgment and the petitioners/decree-holders should not suffer. The execution proceeding was initiated in 2005. In view of that, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, First Additional Court at Burdwan is directed to rehear the said application upon notice to the opposite parties and pass a reasoned order without being uninfluenced by any observation made in the earlier order. It is made clear that the said Civil Judge, Senior Division would also taken into consideration the question of limitation in the light of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decided cases including Hameed Joharan (supra). 28. The revisional application, thus, succeeds. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking. Application allowed