M.M. Kumar, C J.;— 1. The present bunch of appeals under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent by the State and its Officers is directed against the judgment dated 26.08.2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Following the aforesaid judgment and orders similar relief has been granted in other cases and some appeals have been filed against judgments dated 22.10.2009 and 23.09.2010 and 13.12.2010. The learned Single Judge has taken notice of the facts that appointment to the post of Sub Inspector were made in pursuance to the statement made by the learned Advocate General before Hon'ble the Supreme Court. It has been held that those appointed to the post of Sub Inspector on the basis of the statement were lower in merit than the writ petitioner-respondents. Therefore, they have been held entitled to be considered for appointment. Accordingly, a bunch of writ petitions relatable to these appeals have been allowed. 2. Background Facts 2.1 First round of litigation and decision of Special Leave Petition by Hon'ble the Supreme Court: 2.2 The appellant-State issued an advertisement notice on 25.02.1999 for appointment to the post of Sub Inspector of Police in J&K Police (Executive). The advertisement specified all the necessary requirements, viz; educational qualifications, age and physical standard for the post. There is no indication in the advertisement that the merit list for the Provinces of Jammu and Kashmir was to be drawn separately. It was thus a State cadre and only one list was required to be prepared. After the selection process was completed, a select list of 252 candidates was prepared and issued by the Police Head Quarters on 23.04.2000. It did not disclose-that separate merit for the provinces of Jammu and Kashmir had been prepared. On facts, however, it was conceded in the earlier round of litigation that separate merit list for the two provinces were prepared which resulted in filing of a batch of writ petitions by some candidates on the primary ground that preparation of separate merit in respect of two provinces of Jammu and Kashmir was wholly impermissible. They argued that the post of Sub Inspector was a State cadre post. Therefore, selection was required to be made by treating the State as a unit and not on the basis of the residence of the candidates of Jammu or Kashmir Provinces. The writ petition bearing SWP no. They argued that the post of Sub Inspector was a State cadre post. Therefore, selection was required to be made by treating the State as a unit and not on the basis of the residence of the candidates of Jammu or Kashmir Provinces. The writ petition bearing SWP no. 567/2000 along with others was decided on 16.10.2000 because it was conceded by the appellant-State that the last selected candidate from Jammu province had secured 56 marks whereas that of Kashmir province had secured 50 marks. The writ petitions were allowed by a learned Single Judge and following directions were issued:- i) That the selection process is held to be in accordance with the law except that the merit should have been determined State wise and not province wise; ii) That the respondents would give a fresh look to the matter. They would determine the merit State wise and after this exercise, all those petitioners who come high up in the merit, they would be issued with the letter of appointment. This would be done without disturbing the selection already made; iii) That so far as reserved categories are concerned the respondents would take notice of the observations made in this regard in SWP no. 609/2000 and connected petitions and which observations stand reproduced above; iv) That the claims of all those candidates who obtained 50 or more than 50 marks be considered for appointment. This would be after preparing the list State wise: v) That the whole exercise would be completed by the respondents within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order from the petitioners and thereafter, the appointment orders, if any, could be passed in favour of those petitioners who come high up in the merit, within a further period of two months, vi) That so far as the argument of the State that State wise selection was not possible due to difficult situation prevailing in the State is concerned. It be seen that this matter can conveniently be taken care of. An undertaking can be had from the candidates belonging to Jammu province to the effect that they would be joining at the place as per their merit. Therefore, this argument of the State counsel is rejected. It be seen that this matter can conveniently be taken care of. An undertaking can be had from the candidates belonging to Jammu province to the effect that they would be joining at the place as per their merit. Therefore, this argument of the State counsel is rejected. vii) Petitioners to also supply a copy of order passed in SWP No. 609/2000 and connected matters along with a copy of this order to the respondents. This bund of petitions, mention whereof is made at this order having similar nature of controversy are accordingly disposed of vide this common judgment in the manner indicated above." (Emphasis added) 2.3. It is thus evident that the selection process was kept intact except the preparation of merit. According to the directions issued the merit was required to be determined by treating the State as a Unit and not province wise i.e. Jammu and Kashmir provinces. Accordingly, all those petitioners who were to come in the merit were to be issued the letter of appointment without disturbing the selection already made. The claims of all those candidates who obtained 50 or more than 50 marks were to be considered for appointment after preparing the merit list State wise. 2.4. The appellant-State preferred a bunch of Letters Patent Appeals against the judgment and order dated 16.10.2000 rendered by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench, while disposing of the letters patent appeals on 19.08.2002 modified the judgment of the learned Single Judge by observing that the High Court could not have issued directions for appointment exceeding the number of the vacancies advertised or available at the time of recruitment. In fact it would result in financial implications for the State. The Division Bench left it open to the Government to take a decision in that regard. The view of the Division Bench of this High Court is discernible from the penultimate para of the judgment which is set out below in extenso:- "......In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was well justified in directing the official respondents to prepare State-wise merit list. The view of the Division Bench of this High Court is discernible from the penultimate para of the judgment which is set out below in extenso:- "......In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was well justified in directing the official respondents to prepare State-wise merit list. We, however, find merit in the submission of learned counsel for the State and also counsel for some of the writ petitioners that the learned Single Judge while giving direction to the official respondents to re-draw the State-wise merit list should have set aside the impugned selection/appointments. In our view, the High Court has no power to direct the State Government to make appointment more than the vacancy available for selection at the relevant point of time, as this involves financial implication and so decision, if any, in this regard can be taken by the State Government. No other point is urged." 2.5. The appellant-State preferred a Special Leave Petition which was dismissed on 10.02.2004. In its order Hon'ble the Supreme Court has noticed the contention of the State counsel praying for some more time to implement the directions issued by the Division bench and accordingly the appellant-State was given three months further time for the aforesaid purpose and the proceedings in contempt pending before this High Court were also stayed for a period of three months. 2.6. The appellant-State undertook the exercise of preparing a composite merit list by taking the whole State as a single Unit and 259 candidates were appointed on the basis of the merit. As a result 47 candidates were edged out because they did not find their names in the select list who had earlier been shown selected in the select list dated 23.04.2000 based on two separate provinces. It is, however, pertinent to mention that all of them were working as they had already been issued appointment orders. 3. 2nd round of litigation and the statement of Advocate General before Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 3.1 Those who were excluded from selection filed SWP no. 798/2004 in the Srinagar Wing of this High Court (decided on 30.01.2012). On 24.05.2004 interim directions were issued in that petition, directing the State to allow those 47 candidates to continue in service. Simultaneously COA (LPASW) no. 3.1 Those who were excluded from selection filed SWP no. 798/2004 in the Srinagar Wing of this High Court (decided on 30.01.2012). On 24.05.2004 interim directions were issued in that petition, directing the State to allow those 47 candidates to continue in service. Simultaneously COA (LPASW) no. 22/2004 was also bejngpursued and on 03.12.2004 a Division Bench of this High Court issued detailed directions that those who did not come within the zone of merit in the re-drawn merit list were not to be allowed to continue and if any such person was being so continued then he was to be removed as already directed by order dated 19.05.2004. The view of the Division Bench dated 03.12.2004 expressed in the Contempt proceedings is discernible from the following observations which read as under:- "It would appear that a fresh merit list having been drawn in the light of directions of this Court, the order stands complied with. A grievance is made that as many as 47 persons who did not come in the merit zone in the said list are allowed to continue. Their names have not been disclosed. Mr. Anil Sethi, learned AAG stated that in absence of specific instance, the allegation of the petitioners cannot be answered. In the above view of the matter, we dispose of this case with an observation that those who did not come within the merit zone the re-drawn merit list cannot be allowed to continue and if any such person is being so continued, he will.be removed as already directed by the order dated 19.5.2004(supra). The contempt petition stands disposed of." 3.2. Against the order of 03.12.2004, those 47 candidates filed Civil Appeal no. 4758/2006 before Hon'ble the Supreme Court by impleading only two official respondents. However, 22 more candidates sought their impleadment by filing different applications before Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Civil Appeal no. 4758/2006 was decided on 10.05.2007 on the basis of a concession given by the learned Advocate General of the State. The order passed on 10.05.2007 makes an interesting reading which is set out below in extenso:- "I. A. No. 49 of 2006 is allowed. Applicants Surinder Vir Singh Chib S/o Shamsher Singh Chib and Joginder Singh S/o Thoru Ram are permitted to be impleaded as respondents. Mr. The order passed on 10.05.2007 makes an interesting reading which is set out below in extenso:- "I. A. No. 49 of 2006 is allowed. Applicants Surinder Vir Singh Chib S/o Shamsher Singh Chib and Joginder Singh S/o Thoru Ram are permitted to be impleaded as respondents. Mr. Altaf H. Nayak, learned Advocate General fairly submits that all the 47 petitioners who are likely to go out of job as a result of the impugned order passed by the High Court and 22 respondents herein will be accommodated on the post of Sub-Inspector. He further submits that all the 47 petitioners who were selected on account of impugned selection and are presently working will be allowed to continue on their posts. In view of this statement made by learned Advocate General, we do not think we need to determine any legal question involved in this matter. Consequently, the Appeal stands disposed of in view of the statement made by learned Advocate General." 3.3. A perusal of the order passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court would reveal that the order is based on the concession given by the learned Advocate General. It is evident that the persons who had initiated the contempt proceeding before this High Court were to be accommodated without disturbing 47 candidates sought to be ousted from service on the basis of redrawn merit list State wise. Obviously the order was passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court without determining the legality of the order passed by the Division Bench on 03.12.2004 in COA (LPASW) no. 22/2004. It is apparent that on the basis of the directions issued by the Division Bench in contempt proceedings the aforesaid 47 candidates were likely to lose job. That apart, the learned Advocate General also rescued 22 other persons who had joined as respondents before Hon'ble the Supreme Court. These 22 candidates had very poor merit. All of them were far lower in merit in redrawn merit list. It is also a fact that the question with regard to their merit was neither highlighted nor considered. 4. Follow-up action leading to issuance of appointment orders to 22 candidates with far inferior merit 4.1. As a follow up action, the Police Head Quarters, J&K, issued an order, namely PHQ Order no. It is also a fact that the question with regard to their merit was neither highlighted nor considered. 4. Follow-up action leading to issuance of appointment orders to 22 candidates with far inferior merit 4.1. As a follow up action, the Police Head Quarters, J&K, issued an order, namely PHQ Order no. 685 of 2008 dated 23.02.2008, in purported compliance to the directions issued by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, appointing 22 candidates who were far less in merit then the writ petitioners-respondents in the present batch of appeals" It is, however, appropriate to mention that the first round of litigation had already culminated in the order dated 19.08.2002 passed by a Division Bench which had approved the view of the learned Single Judge dated 16.10.2000 with one exception. Even the Special Leave Petition was dismissed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 5. The present litigation: 5.1 On the basis of being more meritorious then those 22 candidates who were given appointment vide order bearing No. PHQ 685 of 2008 dated 23.02.2008, the writ petitioner-respondents preferred a bunch of writ petitions claiming their fundamental right to equality in matters of public employment which has been completely violated by appointment of those who had secured far less marks while competing with them. They obtained information under the Right to Information Act in respect of the merit of those 22 newly appointed candidates. On comparison they found that all those 22 candidates who were covered by the statement made by learned Advocate General, were far inferior in merit then the writ petitioner-respondents. Accordingly, they preferred a batch of writ petitions which have been disposed of by the impugned judgment. The learned Single Judge has issued directions to appoint the writ petitioner-respondents as they had secured higher marks in the same selection process of Sub Inspectors than the 22 candidates who have been appointed on the basis of the concession given by the learned Advocate General. The learned Single Judge has issued directions to appoint the writ petitioner-respondents as they had secured higher marks in the same selection process of Sub Inspectors than the 22 candidates who have been appointed on the basis of the concession given by the learned Advocate General. The aforesaid directions issued to the appellant-State and its officers would read as under: - "(a) to consider the merit of the petitioners vis-a-vis those candidates who have been selected on the basis of the concession granted by the learned Advocate General; (a) In case the merit of the petitioners is higher than those persons who came to be appointed on the concession given by the then learned Advocate General, in that eventuality the petitioners shall be appointed against the post of Sub Inspectors from the date the said persons have been appointed as per their merit position; (b) The merit of the petitioners shall also be considered vis-a-vis the candidates who even though not selected on the basis of concession given by the then learned Advocate General but otherwise and have secured lesser marks than the petitioners after redrawing the merit on State-wise basis; and (c) In case any of such selected candidates' have secured lesser marks vis-a-vis petitioners, in that eventuality the petitioners shall be given the same benefit as has been given to the said candidates who are lesser in merit than the petitioners." 5.2. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid directions of the learned Single Judge the State and its officers have preferred these appeals. 5.3. During the course of arguments it transpired that certain candidates had approached this Court in the year 2000 whereas the others filed writ petitions for the first time in the year 2008 or thereafter. It would be appropriate to carve out the categories of candidates who challenged the initial selection in the year 2000. The total number of such petitioners who had approached this Court in the year 2000 by challenging the initial selection is 16 (Table 2), whereas those who have filed writ petitions for the first time in the year 2008 or thereafter is 31 (Table 1). It would be appropriate to incorporate the names of 31 persons whose names figured in various letter patent appeals and same are being summed in a tabulated form, which is as under: - TABLE-1 S.No. LPA's pending adjudication Writ petitions in question Petitioner/Respondents 01. It would be appropriate to incorporate the names of 31 persons whose names figured in various letter patent appeals and same are being summed in a tabulated form, which is as under: - TABLE-1 S.No. LPA's pending adjudication Writ petitions in question Petitioner/Respondents 01. 01/2011 1556/09 1. Anoop Singh Jamwal S/o Sh. Chain Singh R/o 88/3 Rajput Mandi, Akhnoor. 2. Rakesh Singh Jamwal S/o Sh. Chain Singh R/o 88/3 Rajput Mandi, Akhnoor. 02. 02/11 1084/08 3. Pankjeshwar Sharma S/o Mani Ram Sharma R/o Budhi Kathua. 4. Vijay Kumar S/o Sh. Revti Prashad Sharma R/o W. No.1 Bhour Camp; Jammu. 5. Rajinder Kumar S/o Sh. Rattan Chand R/o W. No. 10 Kathua. 6. Neeraj Sangra S/o Ramesh Chander ' Sangra r/o Shiv Nagar Kathua. 7. Ganshyam Sharma s/o Sh. Mukh Raj Sharma R/o ward No.1 Kathua. 8. Harpal s/o Sh. Puran Chand r/o Nagri Parole Kathua. 9. Devinder Singh s/o S. Gurmukh Singh r/o lane no. 3, W. No. Kathua. 10. Manmohan Sharma s/o Sh. Lal Saheja Sharma r/o Prem Nagar Miran Sahib Jammu. 11. Rohit Chibber s/o Sh. Badri Nath r/o H.No. 968 Peermitha Jammu. 12. Raj Kumar s/o Sh. Banarsi Dass r/o w. no. 3, Kathua. 13. Sudesh Kumar Raina s/o Sh. Dev Raj r/o Railway Colony Buggar Marh, R. S. Pura. 14. Ajay Kumar Basotra s/o Sh. Ganshyam Basotra r/o W. No. 5, Billawer Kathua. 15. Navneet Sudan s/o Sh. Krishan Lal r/o Bhour Camp W. No. 2, Jammu. 03. 04/11 (not listed) 1145/08 16. Dev Raj s/o Sh. Dhani Ram r/o Ambaran Akhnoor. 17. Satish Kumar s/o Sh.Tirath Ram r/o Radhwal Ghagwal, Samba. 04. 05/11 1622/08 18. Anoop Singh s/o Sh. Nasib Singh r/o H. No. 196 W. No. 8 Akhnoor. 19. Ajay Chib s/o Sh. S. K. Chib r/o plot no. 272 Rehari Colony Jammu. 05. 07/11 821/09 20. Mukesh Kumar s/o Sh. Om Parkash r/o Krishna Nagar, Miran Sahib, Jammu. 06 12/11 1540/08 21. Vinod Kumar s/o Sh. Kundan Lal Bhagat r/o Kotli Shah Doula, R.S.Pur. 22. Rampal s/o Sh. Charan Dass r/o Bishnah, Jammu. 07 14/11 689/09 23. Kuljeet Singh s/o Sh. Nanak Chand r/o Bdiala Chak Bomel Akhnoor. 08. 15/11 1500/09 24. Dewaker Sharma s/o Sh. Dharam Prakash r/o 29 Vinayak Bazar, Jammu. 09 17/11 800/09 25. Kuljeet Singh s/o Sh. Sangat Singh r/o Tarafsanji Jaral Hatli Morh Kathua. 10 20/11 136/09 26. Madho Dass s/o Sh. Mohan Dass r/o Purkharni Akhnoor. 07 14/11 689/09 23. Kuljeet Singh s/o Sh. Nanak Chand r/o Bdiala Chak Bomel Akhnoor. 08. 15/11 1500/09 24. Dewaker Sharma s/o Sh. Dharam Prakash r/o 29 Vinayak Bazar, Jammu. 09 17/11 800/09 25. Kuljeet Singh s/o Sh. Sangat Singh r/o Tarafsanji Jaral Hatli Morh Kathua. 10 20/11 136/09 26. Madho Dass s/o Sh. Mohan Dass r/o Purkharni Akhnoor. 11 24/11 877/09 27. Surinder Kumar Nandan s/o Sh. Manga Ram r/o Premo Chak Rathana R.S.Pura. 12 43/11 2231/10 28. Rajinder Kumar s/o Sh. Karam Chand.. 13 D-97/11 (not listed) 2871/10 29. Babu Ram Sharma s/o Sh. Subash Chander. 14. D-71/11 (not listed) 2247/10 30. Amit Saraf s/o Sh. Bharat Bhushan Saraf. 15. D-2/12 (not listed) 1385/11 31. Inderjeet Singh s/o Fateh Singh. Likewise the names of 16 persons who have challenged the selection in the year 2000 itself is also extracted in the form of a table, which is as under: - TABLE 2 S.No LPA No. SWP No. Name of petitioners Date of decision 01. 08/2011 1934/2000 Janak Raj S/o Sh. Kartar Chand r/o Raipur Satwari Tehsil & Distt. Jammu. 16.10.2000 02. 06/2011 818/2000 Vikram Thapa s/o Lt. Sh. M. L. 16.10.2000 Thapa r/o H. No. 303 Jawahar Nagar New Plot, Jammu. 03. 52/2011 818/2000, 1255/04 Raman Pardeep s/o Sh. Shiv Kumar r/o Nagri Doda. 16.10.2000 04. 21/2011 1818/2000 Amarpal Singh s/o Sh. Manohar Singh r/o M. H. Road Udhampur. 27.08.2001 05 18/2011 1818/2000 Yogesh Joshi s/o Sh. K. K. Joshi r/o 93-Peer Mitha Jammu 27.08.2001 06. 18/2011 1818/2000 Gulshan Singh Shan s/o Sh. P.C. Kotwal r/o Doda presently M. H. Road Udhampur 27.08.2001 07. 18/2011 1818/2000 Fiaz Ahmed s/o Sh. Abdul Razak r/o Chinnar Tehsil & Distt. Udhampur 27.08.2001 08. 23/2011 862/2000 Reyaz Ahmed s/o Sh. Nazir Ahmed r/o Salwah Mendhar Poonch. 05.09.2000 09. 12/2011 1452/2000 Raj Kumar Thapa s/o Sh. Naseeb Ram P.O. Gurah Slathia. 28.08.2000 10. 12/2011 608/2000 Naresh Kumar s/o Sh. Gean Chand r/o Ward no. 1 Kathua 28.08.2000 11. 22/2011 1923/2000 Bhavnesh Kumar s/o sh. J. N. Khajuria r/o Talab Tillo Jammu 16.10.2000 12. 13/2011 895/2000 Ishtkar Ahmed Khan s/o Sh. Mohd. Khalil Khan 28.08.2000 13. 10/2011 2167/2000 Ajay Kumar s/o Sh. Satpal r/o Karyal Brahmana Bishnah 17.11.2000 14. 32/11 1194/2000 Chanderbhan Slathia s/o Sh. Ujjagar Singh r/o Mandi Andral Samba 16.10.2000 15. 19/11 2020/2000 Rakesh Kumar Sharma s/o Tirath Ram Sharma 16. 32/11 2302/2000 Vikas Sharma s/o Sh. Vijay Kumar r/o Plot no. 13/2011 895/2000 Ishtkar Ahmed Khan s/o Sh. Mohd. Khalil Khan 28.08.2000 13. 10/2011 2167/2000 Ajay Kumar s/o Sh. Satpal r/o Karyal Brahmana Bishnah 17.11.2000 14. 32/11 1194/2000 Chanderbhan Slathia s/o Sh. Ujjagar Singh r/o Mandi Andral Samba 16.10.2000 15. 19/11 2020/2000 Rakesh Kumar Sharma s/o Tirath Ram Sharma 16. 32/11 2302/2000 Vikas Sharma s/o Sh. Vijay Kumar r/o Plot no. 91, Hari Singh Nagar, Jammu 14.12.2000 6. Submissions on behalf of the State Mr. Gagan Basotra, learned Sr. AAG, has made following submissions before us:- 6.1. That the learned Single Judge could not have issued directions to appoint the writ petitioner-respondents on the post of Sub Inspector as it would amount to adding to the cadre strength of Sub Inspectors and it would have wide financial implications. According to Mr. Basotra the matter stood concluded by virtue of order dated 10.05.2007 passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court which, in turn, was based on a policy decision reflected in the statement made by the learned Advocate General. A statement in favour of those 47 candidates was made in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir and moreover they had been serving the department for about seven years. Therefore, the writ petitioner-respondents, who are fence sitter, could not claim parity with those who have been covered by the statement made by the learned Advocate General. 6.2. The writ petitioner-respondents cannot be permitted to invoke extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court in respect of selection process which had commenced in the year 1999 and the matter was concluded on 10.02.2004 when the Special Leave Petition was dismissed directing the State government to implement the judgment of the Division Bench by re-drawing the merit list on the basis that the State is one unit and no relief could have been claimed by the writ petitioner-respondents as against 47 candidates who had filed SWP no. 798/2004 in the Srinagar Wing of this High Court. Therefore, there is a huge delay on the part of the writ petitioner-respondents who have filed the writ petitions in the year 2008,2009, 2010 and 2011. In that regard our attention has been drawn to the first table mentioned in the preceeding para. 798/2004 in the Srinagar Wing of this High Court. Therefore, there is a huge delay on the part of the writ petitioner-respondents who have filed the writ petitions in the year 2008,2009, 2010 and 2011. In that regard our attention has been drawn to the first table mentioned in the preceeding para. In support of his submission learned State counsel has placed reliance on para 54 to 60 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors v. State of West Bengal and ors, (2009) 1 SCC 768 . 6.3. That provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution confers ample powers arming the Supreme Court to pass any order to do complete justice. Such an order cannot be made basis for re-opening the issue to plead a state cause of action and rights based on Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. In that regard reliance has been placed on para 11 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and ors, AIR 1994 SC 1808 , para 24 to 26 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd, (2006) 5 SCC 72 and para 26 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Col. B.J. Akkara v. Government of India and ors, (2006) 11 SCC 709 . 6.4. That the rights of many such young candidates who have become eligible from the year 2000 to 2010 would be adversely affected to compete for those posts if the directions by the learned Single Judge are implemented. All such candidates who have attained eligibility in the interregnum would never be able to compete for those posts. 7. Submissions on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondents: 7.1. Mr. Abhinav Sharma along with other learned counsel, appearing for the writ petitioner-respondents, has vehemently argued that the statement made by the learned Advocate General must be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution which constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution. According to the learned counsel the society must be governed by rule of law and in case the statement of Advocate General is given extra constitutional status then there is inherent danger of shelving the basic structure. 7.2. According to the learned counsel the society must be governed by rule of law and in case the statement of Advocate General is given extra constitutional status then there is inherent danger of shelving the basic structure. 7.2. That there is no delay in approaching this Court because persons lower in merit then those of the writ petitioner-respondents were given order of appointment on 23.02.2008 when the Police Head Quarters issued Order no. 685 of 2008. It has been maintained that the writ petitions were filed by various candidates in the year 2008 itself or within a period of three years from the aforesaid order, therefore, the question of delay would not arise in the instant case because the cause of action had arisen in 2008 itself. 7.3. That the Constitution does not permit waiver of any fundamental right and the Courts should favour a view which upholds the fundamental rights then the one which negates it. 8. We have bestowed our thoughtful consideration on the rival contentions and have perused the paper book with the able assistance rendered by learned counsel for the parties. 9. On facts, it is clear that the selection process was initiated by issuance of advertisement notice on 25.02.1999 and a select list of 252 candidates was issued by the Police Head Quarter on 23.04.2000 which was prepared on the basis of two different provinces of the State, namely, Jammu and Kashmir. The litigation culminated in to the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court delivered on 10.02.2004. The follow up action was taken and the merit list was prepared by treating the whole State as one unit which resulted in edging out 47 candidates. The aforesaid 47 candidates along with 22 candidates who were impleaded as party before Hon'ble the Supreme Court became the beneficiary of the statement made by the learned Advocate General. According to Mr. Basotra the statement was necessitated on account of the fact that 47 candidates had served the State for a considerable period of 7 years and in order to put an end to the whole controversy, the learned Advocate General, as a policy matter, has granted concession to 22 candidates also. It was in some what similar facts and circumstances that in Tridip Kumar Dingal's case (supra) Hon'ble the Supreme Court had the opportunity to lay down the law. It was in some what similar facts and circumstances that in Tridip Kumar Dingal's case (supra) Hon'ble the Supreme Court had the opportunity to lay down the law. Following the principles laid down in Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat and ors, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591, Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and ors v. Abahi Kumar and ors, (2001) 3 SCC 328 and M.S. Mudhol and ors v. S. D. Halegkar and ors, (1993) 3 SCC 591 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it would be inequitable if the appointment of the candidates selected, appointed and working for a considerable period, are set aside. Therefore, there is nothing extra ordinary in the statement made by learned Advocate General in respect of 47 candidates. Likewise, the statement made in favour of 22 candidates has also been accepted by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The acceptance of statement would not constitute declaration of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution but a disposal of a lis granting relief for the larger interest of public in a particular case. In that regard we may place reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in Indian Bank's case (supra) on which reliance has rightly been placed by learned Sr. AAG. The view of Hon'ble the Supreme Court is discernible from para 26 of the judgment which read thus:- "One word before parting, Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that courts have followed not the law declared, but the exception/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that courts have followed not the law declared, but the exception/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Court's repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court, The courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decider di, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. One solution to avoid such a situation is for this Court to clarify that a particular direction or portion of the order is in exercise of power under Article 142......" (Emphasis added) 10. A perusal of the aforesaid para would explicitly show that number of times the Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 grant the relief which is granted by Hon'ble the Supreme Court on the basis of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution for doing 'complete justice' between the parties, whereas the Courts are required to follow those principles of law which have been declared as such by the Court. Such an error is committed on account of the fact that by granting the relief it is not delineated that Hon'ble the Supreme Court is exercising its power under Article 142. Therefore, what is binding and required to be followed by the High Court and other Courts or authorities is the law laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and not the relief given by exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution. In this regard consistent view has been taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as is evident from para 10 and 11 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Narinder Mohan's case (supra). In that case the argument to regularise the services of ad hoc appointees was repelled because it was de hors the statutory rules. The argument was that appointment must be considered valid because such a relief has been granted by Hon'ble Supreme Court in some other cases. In that case the argument to regularise the services of ad hoc appointees was repelled because it was de hors the statutory rules. The argument was that appointment must be considered valid because such a relief has been granted by Hon'ble Supreme Court in some other cases. Reversing the view taken by this High Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in para 11 as under:- "11. This Court in Dr. A.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCR 335 , gave directions under Art. 142 to regularise the services of the ad hoc doctors appointed on or before October 1,1984. It is a direction under Article 142 on the peculiar facts and circumstances therein. Therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the PSC to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142 -power is confided only to this Court. The ratio in Dr. P. P.C. Rawani v. Union of India (1992) 1 SCC 331 , is also not an authority under Art. 141. Therein the orders issued by this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution to regularise the ad hoc appointments had become final. When contempt petition was filed for non-implementation, the Union had come forward with an application expressing its difficulty to give effect to the orders of this Court. In that behalf, while appreciating the difficulties expressed by the Union in implementation, this Court gave further direction to implement the order issued under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is more in the nature of an execution and not a ratio under Art. 141. In Union of India v. Dr. Cyan Prakash Singh, 1993 (5) JT (SC) 681 this Court by a Bench of three Judges considered the effect of the order in A.K. Jain's case and held that the doctors appointed on ad hoc basis and taken charge after October 1,1984 have no automatic right for confirmation and they have to take their chance by appearing before the PSC for recruitment. In H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 295 : (1991 Lab 1C 235), this Court while holding that the appointment to the posts of clerk etc. In H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, AIR 1991 SC 295 : (1991 Lab 1C 235), this Court while holding that the appointment to the posts of clerk etc. in the subordinate courts in Karnataka State without consultation of the PSC are not valid appointments, exercising the power under Art. 142, directed that their appointments as a regular, on humanitarian grounds, since they have put in more than 10 years service. It is to be noted that the recruitment was only for clerical grade (Class-Ill post) and it is not a ratio under Art. 141." (Emphasis added) 11. When we examine the statement of the Advocate General made before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the statement was accepted by virtue of power under Article 142 of the Constitution because their Lordships specifically observed that no legal question was required to be determined on account of the statement made by the learned Advocate General. By no stretch of imagination it could be regarded as material to conclude that all persons meritorious then the 22 persons were also required to be given appointment on the post of Sub Inspector lest it would violate Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Once the statement is considered basis for passing the order by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it must be regarded that the order has been passed by exercising power under Article 142 and such an order cannot be made basis for concluding that it has created discrimination or has violated the fundamental rights within the meaning of Article 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. 12. Even otherwise, we are of the view that a large number of writ petition-respondents would be hit by delay and laches. In that regard reliance has been rightly placed on the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal's case (supra). In para 55 their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealt with the application of some candidates who had never approached the Tribunal nor the High Court or Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The selection there pertained to the year 1993 which was challenged before High Court of Calcutta and eventually reached Hon'ble the Supreme Court in 2008. Hon'ble the Supreme Court refused to set aside appointments of selected candidates who were appointed and were working since 1998-99. The selection there pertained to the year 1993 which was challenged before High Court of Calcutta and eventually reached Hon'ble the Supreme Court in 2008. Hon'ble the Supreme Court refused to set aside appointments of selected candidates who were appointed and were working since 1998-99. Those who approached the Supreme Court by moving interlocutory applications also sought similar relief and the argument raised was that fundamental right cannot be waived. The aforesaid argument was raised in para 55 in the following manner- "55. Those candidates who had not approached the Tribunal, High Court or this Court have now filed Interim Applications in this Court. The learned counsel appearing for those applicants submitted that they may also be granted similar benefits. It was urged that equals must be treated equally which is the fundamental right enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was vehemently argued that it is settled law that fundamental rights cannot be waived. Hence, even if the applicants had not approached this Court earlier, they can come to this Court claiming similar relief by invoking Part III of the Constitution." 13. The argument was rejected by placing reliance on its earlier judgments by Hon'ble the Supreme Court by observing in para nos. 56,57,58 and 59 as under:- "56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,226,227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ-Court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ-Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ-Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of state claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. V. Bhailal Bhai, Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a Court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the Court depending on and vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. 59. We are in respectful agreement with the following observations of this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (SCC p. 154, para 2) "2........It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward state claims and try to unsettle settled matters".(Emphasis supplied)" 14. The proposition of law has been made absolutely clear in the aforesaid paras, holding that a fence sitter cannot succeed in securing the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Courts come to rescue of those who are vigilant about their rights. The proposition of law has been made absolutely clear in the aforesaid paras, holding that a fence sitter cannot succeed in securing the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Courts come to rescue of those who are vigilant about their rights. For the abundance of legal authority on the proposition that delay and laches play a significant part in the grant or denial of relief to a writ petitioner, we have no option but to adversely comment upon the conduct of the writ petitioner-respondents particularly when an order passed in 2008 would not constitute the cause of action nor would it confer any right as it has genesis in the order passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court which was issued in pursuance of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. Therefore, even on the basis of delay and laches the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioner- respondents were required to be dismissed. 15. We would have separately dealt with LPASW no. 52/2010 relatable to SWP no. 1255/2004 because that petition may not be hit by the delay and laches. However, such an exercise has been obviated in view of the law that an order passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, granting relief in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, would not constitute basis for concluding that such an order violates fundamental right under Article 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. Such an order would have to be given its proper status as an order passed for doing complete justice. Therefore, we are not inclined to deal with the aforesaid appeal separately. 16. As a sequel to the above discussion these appeals are allowed.. The judgments of the learned Single Judge are set aside. The writ petitions filed by the writ petitioner-respondents are dismissed. However, keeping in view the peculiar situation, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 17. A copy of this order be placed on the record of each file. S.No. Case No. Title 1. LPASW no. 1/2011, CMA no. 1/2011 State of J&K and ors. v. Anoop Singh Jamwal and ors. 2. LPASW no. 14/2011, CMA no. 15/2011 State of J&K v. Kuljeet Singh and ors. 3. LPASW no. 15/2011, CMA no. 16/2011 State of J&K v. Dewakar Sharma and ors. 4. LPASW no. 8/2011, CMA no. S.No. Case No. Title 1. LPASW no. 1/2011, CMA no. 1/2011 State of J&K and ors. v. Anoop Singh Jamwal and ors. 2. LPASW no. 14/2011, CMA no. 15/2011 State of J&K v. Kuljeet Singh and ors. 3. LPASW no. 15/2011, CMA no. 16/2011 State of J&K v. Dewakar Sharma and ors. 4. LPASW no. 8/2011, CMA no. 8/2011 State of J&K v. Janak Raj and ors. 5. LPASW no. 19/2011, CMA no. 20/2011 State of J&K v. Rakesh Kumar Sharma and ors. 6. LPASW no. 7/2011, CMA no. 7/2011 State of J&K v. Mukesh Kumar and anr. 7. LPASW no. 20/2011, CMA no. 21/2011 State of J&K v. Madho Dass and ors. 8. LPASW no. 16/2011, CMA no. 17/2011 State of J&K v. Yogesh Joshi 9. LPASW no. 18/2011, CMA no. 19/2011 State of J&K v. Gulshan Singh and ors. 10. LPASW no. 23/2011, CMA no. 24/2011 State of J&K v. Rayaz Ahmed and ors. 11. LPASW no. 24/2011, CMA no. 25/2011 State of J&K v. Surinder Kumar Nandan and ors. 12. LPASW no. 17/2011, CMA no. 18/2011 State of J&K v. Kuljeet Singh and ors. 13. LPASW no. 5/2011, CMA no. 5/2011 State of J&K v. Anoop Singh and ors. 14. LPASW no. 13/2011, CMA no. 14/2011 State of J&K v. Istkhar Ahmed Khan and anr. 15. LPASW no. 6/2011, CMA no. 11/2011 State of J&K v. Vikram Thappa and ors. 16. LPASW no. 10/2011, CMA no. 11/2011 State of J&K v. Ajay Kumar and ors. i 17. LPASW no. 21/2011, CMA no. 22/2011 State of J&K v. Amar Pal Singh and ors. 18. LPASW no. 32/2011, CMA no. 33/2011 State of J&K v. Vikas Sharma and ors. 19. LPASW no. 22/2011, CMA no. 23/2011 State of J&K v. Bhavnesh Kumar and ors. 20. LPASW no. 12/2011, CMA no. 13/2011 State of J&K v. Raj Kumar Thappa and ors. 21. LPASW no. 52/2010, CMA no. 82/2010 State of J&K v. Raman Pardeep and anr. 22. LPASW no. 43/2011, CMA no. 44/2011 State of J&K v. Rajinder Kumar and ors. 23. LPASW no. D-97/2011, CMA no. D-114/2011 State of J&K v. Babu Ram and anr.