JUDGMENT : K.K. Trivedi, J. 1. This second appeal by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.07.1998 passed in Civil Appeal No. 8-A/1998 by the I Additional District Judge, Damoh, arising out of judgment and decree dated 12.12.1995 passed in Civil Suit No. 21-A/1994 by the II Civil Judge, Class-II, Damoh and is admitted on the following substantial question of law: Whether the Court can exercise discretion not to grant specific performance of contract of sale inspite of finding that there was agreement to sale and part payment of sale price also and the suit was within limitation without any specific finding, it would not be legal and proper to order specific performance for sale? The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of agreement for sale of the land in suit on the ground that the appellant was ever willing and ready to get the sale-deed executed in terms of the agreement but even when the demand was made, the respondent/defendant refused to execute the sale-deed. It is the case of the appellant that respondent, who was owner in possession of the land in suit, was in need of money and approached the appellant and offered the land in suit for sale. Such an offer was accepted for a consideration of Rs. 3,000/- and immediately an earnest amount of Rs. 1,298/- was paid to the respondent/defendant. The agreement so written was duly signed and executed before the witnesses on a plain paper bearing a revenue stamp of 20 paise. Even when the notice was issued to the respondent, the same was not responded to and, therefore, the suit was required to be filed. 2. The respondent/defendant contested the claim made by the appellant on the specific plea that in fact no agreement for sale was executed by him in favour of the appellant. On the other hand, since the respondent/defendant was in need of some money, he has taken loan from the appellant and for the collateral security of the loan, such an acknowledgment was got written. There was no intention to sale the property, therefore, there was no out and out sale agreement executed by the respondent/defendant. On the other hand, since the respondent/defendant was in need of some money, he has taken loan from the appellant and for the collateral security of the loan, such an acknowledgment was got written. There was no intention to sale the property, therefore, there was no out and out sale agreement executed by the respondent/defendant. It was contended that the land of more value is sought to be purchased through such a manipulated document stating that it was an agreement of sale whereas no such agreement was ever executed by the respondent/plaintiff. It is further contended in the written statement that the amount was paid in installment, the appellant was asked to return back the document but it was said by the appellant that since the loan amount is already paid, there was no need of returning of such document. 3. The Trial Court after recording of the evidence reached to the conclusion that the appellant has proved that a sale agreement was executed in between the appellant and the respondent and that the appellant was entitled to get the sale-deed executed for specific performance of the agreement of sale. Against this judgment and decree, the respondent preferred an appeal before the lower Appellate court, which appeal has been allowed in part and instead of specific performance of the agreement for sale, the lower appellate Court has modified the decree for return of the amount of earnest deposit with interest at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from 24.04.1987 to 05.02.1990 and at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 05.02.1990 till the date of realization. Against this modified decree, the present appeal is filed by the appellant/plaintiff. 4. It is vehemently contended by learned Counsel for the appellant that on overall consideration of the evidence so adduced by the appellant, it was amply proved that a valid agreement of sale of land in suit was executed. It was also proved that the appellant was ever since willing to perform his part of agreement and to get the sale-deed executed. It was further proved that the respondent/defendant was not willing to perform his part of agreement to sale and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly granted a decree of specific performance of agreement in favour of the appellant. It was further proved that the respondent/defendant was not willing to perform his part of agreement to sale and, therefore, the Trial Court has rightly granted a decree of specific performance of agreement in favour of the appellant. Such a decree was not to be modified in exercise of the discretion prescribed under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to the detriment of the appellant/plaintiff only because the lower Appellate Court has recorded a finding that in the agreement itself such a condition was mentioned for getting back the amount of earnest money as compensation. The reasons as assigned in paragraph 15 of the judgment impugned, according to learned Counsel for the appellant, are imaginary. If when the agreement was executed even after receipt of the amount of earnest money, possession of the suit property was not delivered to the appellant/plaintiff, it was not justified to deny specific performance of agreement. It is contended that such a reasoning assigned by the lower Appellate Court is not sustainable in law in view of the law laid-down by the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Chandra vs. Narayan, (2012) 5 SCC 403 . It is contended that the discretion is to be exercised in given circumstances only when certain conditions, as stipulated in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are fulfilled. Thus, it is contended that modification of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court by the lower Appellate Court is unjust and not proper. 5. Per contra it is contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that a bare perusal of the agreement of sale produced on record as Exhibit P-1 will make it clear that it was not an out and out sale. It is contended that there was no justified reason shown as to why instead of a round figure, an amount of Rs. 1,298/- was paid as earnest money, out of the sale consideration of Rs. 3,000/-. It is contended that in fact it was nothing but a document of collateral security of the loan taken by the respondent/defendant and for the purposes of computation of the amount of loan with interest, such a figure was worked out and mentioned as earnest money received on the date of execution of the said document. 3,000/-. It is contended that in fact it was nothing but a document of collateral security of the loan taken by the respondent/defendant and for the purposes of computation of the amount of loan with interest, such a figure was worked out and mentioned as earnest money received on the date of execution of the said document. It is further contended that the evidence to the effect that the value of the land in suit was more than what was mentioned in the document (Exhibit P-1), was produced by the respondent/defendant and it was demonstrated by oral evidence that in fact the appellant was involved in the business of money lending. From this evidence, it is contended that the valuable land of the respondent/defendant was not to be given for a paltry amount to the appellant/plaintiff and keeping in view these facts, the learned first Appellate Court has modified the judgment and decree. It is further contended that the evidence adduced by the respondent demonstrate that the amount taken on loan by the respondent/defendant was repaid to the appellant/plaintiff and, therefore, the decree was rightly modified by the first Appellate Court. It is contended that the law well settled by various Courts indicates that in such circumstances, the decree could be modified in exercise of discretionary power under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Relying in the case of Laxminarayana Reddiar vs. Singaravelu Naicker and another, AIR 1963 Mad. 24 and in the case of Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew vs. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son and others, AIR 1987 SC 2328 , it is contended that if the decree of specific performance is modified in such a manner, only to safeguard interest of a poor litigant who is made to suffer such a huge loss only because of fraudulent act of the appellant/plaintiff, a moneylender, no wrong is committed by the Court below. 6. The law explained by the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Chandra (supra) is looked into. Where a decree of specific performance was modified in the given circumstances and such judgment and decree was affirmed by the High Court in second appeal only in case of a hardship to the respondent/defendant, the Apex Court has held that specific pleadings in this respect should be made and proved then only the hardship can be looked into. Where a decree of specific performance was modified in the given circumstances and such judgment and decree was affirmed by the High Court in second appeal only in case of a hardship to the respondent/defendant, the Apex Court has held that specific pleadings in this respect should be made and proved then only the hardship can be looked into. However, the said law is not applicable in the present case in view of the fact that the first Appellate Court has not modified the decree of specific performance on account of hardship to the respondent/defendant. On the other hand, the facts as were pointed out by adducing the evidence, which were totally ignored by the learned Trial Court, were taken note of and it was held that there was no proof of the fact that after execution of the agreement on 25.04.1987, immediately steps were earnestly taken by the appellant/plaintiff to get the sale-deed executed. On the other hand it was found that after about a period of 21/2 years for the first time a notice was sent to the respondent/defendant by the appellant/plaintiff for execution of the sale-deed without describing as to in what manner the appellant was ready and willing to get the sale-deed executed expeditiously, was not specifically proved and, therefore, only because of giving of one notice, that too after a considerable time, it was not possible to hold that the appellant/plaintiff was ever since willing to execute his part of agreement. Further in the agreement itself, facts were recorded that in case of non-execution of the sale-deed, the appellant/plaintiff would be entitled to compensation by way of refund of earnest money and that being a specific condition mentioned, if instead of specific performance of agreement a decree of refund of earnest money is granted, no wrong would be committed. Yet another fact was found proved that there was a Well constructed on the land of the respondent/defendant, which was agreed to be sold to the appellant/plaintiff and the cost of the said land was assessed by the Trial Court at Rs. 6,000/-, which finding is not challenged anywhere. There were certain other discrepancies, which were noted but were not taken into consideration by the Courts below with respect to the description of the land to be sold. 6,000/-, which finding is not challenged anywhere. There were certain other discrepancies, which were noted but were not taken into consideration by the Courts below with respect to the description of the land to be sold. In view of this, if a discretion is exercised by the first Appellate Court, it cannot be said that such judgment and decree passed by the first Appellate Court modifying the decree of specific performance is bad in any manner. 7. Though it is not necessary to examine the evidence available on record in a second appeal but for the purposes of assessment of exercise of discretion by the first Appellate Court, it would be appropriate to look into some of the statements of the witnesses and some of the relevant documents. Exhibit P-1, the document allegedly executed by the respondent/defendant, contains a date but it has been executed on a revenue stamp of 20 Paise. Normally an agreement is required to be executed on a non-judicial stamp paper. This itself is enough to show that though subsequently under order of court the said document was impounded but the document was not a valid document as was presented at the time of filing of the suit. Secondly, it is to be seen that descriptions, the boundaries of the land to be sold, are not mentioned in such an agreement. It is the common practice that agreement of sale as collateral security is got executed by certain persons involved in money lending business without a licence of money lending. These facts are further seen from the statements of witnesses examined by the respondent/defendant. One of the relative of the appellant/plaintiff by name Chandan Singh, was examined as a witness DW-2 by the respondent/defendant, who has deposed that when the respondent approached the appellant for the purposes of repayment of loan, the said witness was called by the appellant/plaintiff for doing the accountings of loan. The amount was paid by the respondent/defendant in his presence. In the extensive cross-examination of this witness, nothing has been brought that he has any ill-will against the appellant, therefore, he was making any statement in the Court against the appellant/plaintiff. The amount was paid by the respondent/defendant in his presence. In the extensive cross-examination of this witness, nothing has been brought that he has any ill-will against the appellant, therefore, he was making any statement in the Court against the appellant/plaintiff. In his statement, in cross-examination para 5, he categorically stated that a Panchayat meeting was called by the said respondent/defendant for the purposes of settlement of loan amount and in presence of various persons fact was pointed out that for the loan of Rs. 600/-, Rs. 1,400/- was paid by the respondent/defendant, therefore, the matter should be resolved. Certain statements were recorded after doing the accounting of the loan and outstanding amount and the Panchayat meeting was over. Again in the cross-examination of this witness, nothing has come out. Yet another witness namely Gajraj Singh, DW-3, has deposed about the repayment of the loan to the appellant/plaintiff by the respondent/defendant but again the said person has not been asked anything in his cross-examination in this respect. A specific plea was raised by the respondent/defendant in his written statement that he has taken only a loan from the appellant/plaintiff and executed an agreement and the amount of loan was repaid but there was no out and out agreement for sale of the land of the respondent/defendant. If this evidence is marshalled in appropriate manner, it would be clear that in fact the Trial Court was required to dismiss the suit of the appellant/plaintiff for specific performance and if at all there was any amount left for payment of the loan amount or the amount of earnest money, the refund of the said amount could have been ordered. 8. These circumstances further lead to show that if the provisions of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act are made enforced and a discretion is exercised by the Court, interference in such discretion is not necessary. In fact the Trial Court was required to meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case, was required to assess the evidence in appropriate manner, keeping in view the defence taken by the respondent/defendant and then only to order specific performance of agreement. Having failed to do so, if such a discretion is interfered by the first Appellate Court in appropriate manner, in the considered opinion of this Court, no illegality is committed by the first Appellate Court. 9. Having failed to do so, if such a discretion is interfered by the first Appellate Court in appropriate manner, in the considered opinion of this Court, no illegality is committed by the first Appellate Court. 9. In view of these findings, answering the question of law framed, it is held that the first Appellate Court has not committed any illegality in specific circumstances in exercising the judicial discretion of not granting the decree of specific performance of agreement to sale and accordingly modifying the decree of the trial court in suitable manner. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.