JUDGMENT : J.K. Ranka, J. Instant petition has been filed by the defendant No. 1- petitioner assailing the order dated 19.12.2012 passed by the trial Court by which it has allowed the applications dated 22.05.2012 & 26.05.2012, filed by the defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 and plaintiff-respondent No. 2 respectively for return of documents i.e. the sale deed dated 01.02.1997 and allotment letter dated 06.02.1980 etc. and rejected the application dated 28.05.2012 filed by the defendant No. 1-petitioner for return of the allotment letter dated 06.02.1980 and other documents. 2. Brief facts of the case, as apparent from the file of the writ petition, are that a civil suit came to be filed on 21.03.1997 by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 before the trial Court for declaration of ownership rights against the defendant No. 1-petitioner and defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 and for declaring the sale deed dated 01.02.1997, allegedly executed by the defendant No. 1-petitioner in respect of the suit property in favour of defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 as null & void and for permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining the defendant No. 1-petitioner and defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 from interfering in possession of the suit property. The said suit came to be dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment & decree dated 27.04.2005 against which the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 filed a Civil Regular First Appeal before this Court but thereafter an application came to be filed on 01.05.2012 by the plaintiff respondent No. 2 and defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 to withdraw the said appeal. On the basis of the said application, permission was granted by this Court to withdraw the appeal and the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 02.05.2012. 3. Thereafter the defendant-respondent No. 3 filed an application on 22.05.2012 before the learned trial Court for return of the documents i.e. the sale deed dated 01.02.1997 and in the same manner, the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 also moved an application on 25.05.2012 before the trial Court for return of the documents i.e. the allotment letter dated 06.02.1980 etc. The defendant No. 1 petitioner also filed an application on 28.05.2012 before the trial Court for return of the allotment letter dated 6.2.1980 and other documents. Defendant No. 1-petitioner filed a counter affidavit to both the applications filed by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3. 4. The defendant No. 1 petitioner also filed an application on 28.05.2012 before the trial Court for return of the allotment letter dated 6.2.1980 and other documents. Defendant No. 1-petitioner filed a counter affidavit to both the applications filed by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3. 4. The learned trial Court passed an order dated 19.12.2012 and allowed the two applications dated 26.5.2012 and 22.5.2012 filed by the defendant No. 2- respondent No. 3 and plaintiff-respondent No. 2 respectively and ordered for returning the original documents to them but rejected the application dated 28.05.2012 filed by the defendant No. 1-petitioner. Hence, instant writ petition has been filed by the defendant No. 1-petitioner assailing the order impugned dated 19.12.2012 passed by the learned trial Court. 5. Learned counsel for the defendant No. 1-petitioner contends that the Court below has committed a grave error, both in law and facts and the orders impugned, if allowed to stand, would inflict serious injury to the rights of the defendant No. 1-petitioner. He submits that the declaratory suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 was dismissed and it was held that he was not the legal owner of the suit property. He further submits that the sale deed dated 01.02.1997, allegedly executed by the defendant No. 1- petitioner in favour of defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 was, in-fact, never executed and thus, in such facts and circumstances, the Court below committed a jurisdictional error in ordering return of the documents to both i.e. the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and the defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3. He further drew attention of this Court towards the provisions of Order 13 Rule 9 CPC, specifically the proviso of the same. He submits that by force of the decree, the documents became useless and, therefore, there was no occasion for the Court below to order for return of such documents. He further stressed that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2, in connivance with the defendant No. 2 respondent No. 3, withdrew the First Appeal No. 494/2005 on 1.5.2012 at the back of the defendant No. 1-petitioner although the defendant No. 1-petitioner was made a party-respondent to such an appeal. He further stressed that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2, in connivance with the defendant No. 2 respondent No. 3, withdrew the First Appeal No. 494/2005 on 1.5.2012 at the back of the defendant No. 1-petitioner although the defendant No. 1-petitioner was made a party-respondent to such an appeal. He submits that the defendant No. 1-petitioner was the real owner of the property and he never sold it to the defendant No. 2- respondent No. 3 or anybody else and hence, the documents, pertaining to the plot in question, ought to have been returned to its real owner i.e. the defendant No. 1-petitioner and none-else. In support of his contentions, he relied upon judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of M/s. Alphabettes Pvt. Ltd. v. Lohia Jute Press,, AIR 2004 Del. 374 ; judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Juggi Lal Kamla Pat v. Ram Janki Gupta & Anr.,, AIR 1962 All. 407 ; judgment of Apex Court in the case of S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay,, AIR 2003 SC 3039 ; judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Silla Jagannadha Prasad v. Smt. Silla Lalitha Kumari,, AIR 1989 AP 8 ; judgment of Apex Court in the case of Surya Deo Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors.,, (2003) 6 SCC 675 . 6. Per-contra, learned counsels for the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and defendant No. 2-respondent No. 3 submit that the order passed by the Court below is just and proper and that by force of the decree dated 27.04.2005, no document had been declared void rather the Court had confirmed the validity of the sale deed executed by the defendant No 1. petitioner in favour of the defendant No. 2-respondent No. 2. It has been further submitted that in the suit, the defendant No. 1-petitioner never sought a declaration that the sale deed dated 01.02.1997 was not binding on him rather he did not dare to appear in the witness box to support his claim. It has been further submitted that the defendant No. 1- petitioner in the Court below had submitted his written statement supporting the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and now has somersaulted and taken a contrary stand before this Court for exploiting illegal gains from the respondents. It has been further submitted that the defendant No. 1- petitioner in the Court below had submitted his written statement supporting the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 and now has somersaulted and taken a contrary stand before this Court for exploiting illegal gains from the respondents. It has been further contended that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 had all the legal rights to withdraw the First Appeal No. 474/2005 and, therefore, there was no conspiracy or illegality in such an action on the part of the respondents. It has been further contended that the respondents were demanding return of only those documents under Order 13 Rule 9 CPC and General Rules (Civil), 1986, which were submitted by them and the Court was duty bound to return the documents to those persons who submitted such documents before the Court and none- else. 7. Heard the learned counsels for the rival parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned order. 8. Before dealing further, it would be fruitful to refer Order 13 Rule 9 CPC which provides as under:- "Return of admitted documents.- (1) Any person, whether a party to the suit or not, desirous of receiving back any document produced by him in the suit and placed on the record shall, unless the document is impounded under Rule 8, be entitled to receive back the same,- (a) where the suit is one in which an appeal is not allowed, when the suit has been disposed of; and (b) where the suit is one in which an appeal is allowed, when the Court is satisfied that the time for preferring an appeal has elapsed and that no appeal has been preferred or, if an appeal has been preferred, when the appeal has been disposed of: Provided that a document may be returned at any time earlier than that prescribed by this rule if the person applying therefore- (a) delivers to the proper officer for being substituted for the original,- (i) in the case of a party to the suit, a certified copy, and (ii) in the case of any other person, an ordinary copy, which has been examined, compared and certified in the manner mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 Order 7, and (b) undertakes to produce the original, if required to do so. Provided also, that no document shall be returned which, by force of the decree, has become wholly void or useless. (2) On the return of a document admitted in evidence, a receipt shall be given by the person receiving it." 9. Besides the above provision, the procedure for return of documents has been provided under the General Rules (Civil), 1986 as under:- "Rule. 57. Return of certain documents.- A document which is rejected as irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible under Order 13, Rule 3 of the Code, shall unless impounded under Order 13, Rule 8 of the Code, be returned to the person producing it or to his counsel, and such person or counsel shall give a receipt for the same in column 7 of the list of documents filed. 58. Retention of impounded and certain other documents.- (1) Documents impounded shall be dealt with in accordance with Order 13, Rule 8 of the Code, and the "Impounded" should be noted in red ink across appropriate columns of the list of documents filed against the entries relating to such documents in the said list. (2) Should either party or his counsel entitled to receive a document, under rules, be absent or for good cause unwilling to receive it, it shall be marked "not part of the record" a note of the same being made in appropriate column of the list of document filed. 59. Care of impounded documents.- (a) No document which the Court has ordered to be impounded or which is required by law to be filed and preserved (for instance a will under Section 294 of the Indian Succession Act No. XXXIX of 1925) shall be allowed to pass out of the custody of the Court and no document produced for the purpose of comparison of signature, writing or seal shall be returned within the periods specified in Order 13, Rule 9(1). (b) With reference to Order 13, Rule 9(1)(b) of the Code an interval of four months shall ordinarily be allowed to intervene from the date of decree before the documents whether original or copies, filed in a case are returned to the parties who produced them. 60. (b) With reference to Order 13, Rule 9(1)(b) of the Code an interval of four months shall ordinarily be allowed to intervene from the date of decree before the documents whether original or copies, filed in a case are returned to the parties who produced them. 60. Cost of proving documents.- When a party has, without good reason, refused to admit the genuineness of a document, the Court may order it to bear the cost incurred in proving it, irrespective of the result of the suit or proceeding. 61. Return of documents.- A general notice shall be pasted in a conspicuous part of every Court house, giving warning that all documents filed in any suits or proceeding which may legally be returned, must be withdrawn as soon as the decree or order made in the suit or proceeding has become final or after four months of the decree or order, which ever is longer, and that if they are not so withdrawn they will remain at the risk of the persons concerned. 10. A bare glance at the above provisions, makes it abundantly clear that only a person, whether a party to the suit or not, is entitled to receive back the documents who produced the same in the Court in the suit and only those documents can be retained by the Court which by force of a decree had become wholly void or useless. A cumulative effect of the above provision of the CPC and General Rules (Civil) amply demonstrates that the power to return documents exercised by the Court under Order 13 Rule 9 CPC is more of a ministerial and administrative act in contradiction to adjudicatory action. In other words, when the Court returns a document under Order 13 Rule 9 CPC to a person who produced it, it does not declare, confer or otherwise deal with right, title or interest of the property related with such document, rather the Court merely discharges its duty as a caretaker of returning it to the person who produced it before the Court. By such action of mere returning of documents, no right, title or interest is vested in such person or another person, is divested of any right. By such action of mere returning of documents, no right, title or interest is vested in such person or another person, is divested of any right. The only eventuality, which confers on Court the power to withheld a document, is in the case when by the force of a decree, the document had become wholly void or useless. In the instant case, by virtue of the decree dated 27.04.2005 the documents claimed by the respondents No. 2 and 3 had not become wholly void or useless. It was not declared by the decree that the sale deed dated 01.02.1997 in favour of respondent No. 3 was a nullity or void as claimed by the petitioner rather it is pertinent to mention that no such relief was even claimed by the petitioner in the suit but contrary to what the petitioner is stating before this Court, it emerges that the petitioner did not even come up in the witness box to testify in the suit. As regards the other objections raised by the petitioner that the first appeal was withdrawn at his back by the respondent No. 2 in connivance with respondent No. 3, all that this Court can say is that these matters are not germane for decision under Order 13 Rule 9 CPC for return of the document. The power under Order 13 Rule 9 CPC cannot be converted into a full fledged civil trial, adjudicating each and every issue related with title. If the petitioner claims himself to be the owner of the suit property and feels aggrieved by the order of withdrawal of SB Civil First Regular Appeal No. 474/2005, he needs to seek his remedy elsewhere in accordance with law but not under the proceedings emanating from Order 13 Rule 9 CPC. As regards the citations, relied upon by the petitioner, this Court wants to say that they are wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, however, since case laws have been raised, the same are being discussed herein below: 11. As regards the citations, relied upon by the petitioner, this Court wants to say that they are wholly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, however, since case laws have been raised, the same are being discussed herein below: 11. In the case of M/s. Alphabettes Pvt. Ltd. v. Lohia Jute Press (supra), the matter before the Delhi High Court was with regard to Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and the case related to return of the plaint as there was no jurisdiction vested with the trial Court to try the suit and, therefore, the Court was of the opinion that once the Court comes to a finding that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit, it would have been an exercise in futility to decide the other issues on merits of the case. 12. In the case of Juggi Lal Kamla Pat v. Ram Janki Gupta & Anr., (supra), the facts were that the petitioner filed an affidavit in support of the application and the Court opined that it is not open to a party to brush aside the averments of his opponent made in the affidavit filed in support of his application by merely stating that the allegations were untrue. A statement on oath, whether true or false, has to be met by a counter affidavit in reply or by challenging the statement by cross examining the deponent. If that is not done, it would be presumed that the allegations, if untrue, would have been rebutted by the other side. 13. In the case of S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay (supra), the facts were about Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971) and it was on account of false verification of statement of facts and it was held that where a verification is specific and deliberately false, there is nothing in law to prevent a person from being proceeded for contempt. 14. In the case of Silla Jagannadha Prasad v. Smt. Silla Lalitha Kumari (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with a case of Hindu Marriage Act and opined that Section 2(2) of CPC defines a "decree" as a formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It was held that a decree means the expression of an adjudication and the suit or petition may either be dismissed or allowed, a relief may be given or refused in either case, it is a decree. It was further held that there is no reason to give a restricted meaning to the expression "decree". In the present case, the suit of the respondent was dismissed by the trial Court but nowhere it was held that the petitioner was the real owner of the suit property. 15. In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors., (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had the occasion of considering the jurisdiction of the High Court, nature and ambit of power under Article 227 and after elaborate discussion, it was expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction." Therefore, there is no conflict on the power of this Court as expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court ultimately came to the conclusion that this Court has no power to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied:- "(i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated on experience and expressed by enactments where the legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the aforesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though callings for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an appellate Court and step into re-appreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior Court." 16. In so far as the impugned order is concerned, this Court under its supervisory jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment as the appellate Court, and this Court does not find any infirmity or grave error in the findings of the trial Court in ordering for return of the original documents to the persons who filed the same in the suit before the trial Court. 17. In view of the discussion made above, this Court does find any manifest, apparent error, illegality or perversity in the order impugned passed by the learned trial Court so as to call for any interference by this Court under its limited scope of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 18. Consequently, the writ petition has no force and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.