JUDGMENT : Sujoy Paul, J. 1. In this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 19.6.2013, whereby he is transferred from Morena to Sheopur. It is contended that petitioner is subjected to frequent transfer. Another ground for assailing the transfer order is that as per para 5 of the return, the petitioner is transferred because of alleged complaint of consumers. Shri B.P. Singh submits that such transfer castes a stigma on the petitioner and, therefore, transfer order needs to be interfered with. Per Contra, Shri M.K. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was transferred on 11.6.2009 to Betul. Thereafter, in 2011 he was promoted and posted to Harda. Thus, this order does not come within the purview of transfer. His transfer orders dated 23.11.2011 and 12.6.2012 were issued on his own request. In administrative exigency the order dated 26.11.2012 was passed. Thereafter, there were several complaints against the petitioner and, therefore, in administrative exigency the petitioner was transferred. Shri Dwivedi submits that such transfer is in administrative exigency and no stigma is casted. 2. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. This is settled in law that transfer order can be interfered with only when it is passed contrary to statutory provision, passed by an incompetent authority, proved to be malafide or changes the service conditions of an employee to his detriment. 5. On a specific question from the Bench, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a class-2 employee. The interference in frequent transfer was made in cases of low-paid class-3 and class-4 employees. In case of B. Vardha Rao vs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (1986)4 SCC 131 , the Apex Court gave finding regarding frequent transfer in cases of class-3 and class-4 employees. Thus, such observations cannot be mechanically made applicable in case of the petitioner who is a class-2 employee. 6. As demonstrated by Shri Dwivedi, it is clear that one transfer of the petitioner was in fact a posting on promotion whereas two transfers were made on his own request. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner is unilaterally and frequently transferred by the department. Thus, the contention regarding frequent transfer is rejected. 7. 6. As demonstrated by Shri Dwivedi, it is clear that one transfer of the petitioner was in fact a posting on promotion whereas two transfers were made on his own request. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner is unilaterally and frequently transferred by the department. Thus, the contention regarding frequent transfer is rejected. 7. Next contention of Shri Singh is that the impugned order castes stigma and the petitioner has not been given any opportunity of hearing. In the considered opinion of this Court, the complaint itself can be a reason to transfer an employee. No opportunity or full-fledged enquiry needs to be conducted in such matter. This view is taken by the Apex Court in (2004)4 SCC 245 (Union of India vs. Janardhan Debanath). The relevant portion reads as under:- ...For the purposes of effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out whether there was misbehavior or conduct unbecoming of an employee is unnecessary and what is needed is the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned on the contemporary reports about the occurrence complained of and if the requirement, as submitted by the respondents, of holding an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted upon, the very purpose of transferring an employee in public interest or exigencies of administration to enforce decorum and ensure probity would get frustrated. 8. In view of the stand of Shri Dwivedi that the impugned order does not caste stigma, I am unable to hold that the impugned order is either punitive or it castes stigma. Thus, no interference on this ground is also warranted. 9. Transfer is a condition of service. The transfer will not adversely affect the career prospects of the petitioner. It is made clear that it will not be open for the respondents to treat the impugned order, Annexure P-1, as stigmatic order in any manner. As analyzed above, there is no scope for interference in the transfer order. Petition sans substance and is hereby dismissed.