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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 1449 (MP)

Sudarshan Ahuja v. State of M. P.

2013-11-22

G.D.SAXENA, S.K.GANGELE

body2013
JUDGMENT Saxena, J. -- 1. This appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been preferred against an Award dated 31st January 2004 in Reference Case No.34/2002 recorded by the VIII Additional District Judge, Gwalior (M.P.). The Reference Court while deciding the case in addition to the amount of Rs.10,90,986/- granted by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer further awarded a sum of Rs.99,180/-, in favour of petitioners/appellants. Against this little enhancement in the amount of compensation, the appellants have come to this Court raising certain other grounds as mentioned in the appeal. 2. It is the case of the appellants that the land comprised in Survey Nos.26,27,28,29, 30, total Surveys No. 5, having an area of 1.484 hectares, situated in village Mauja Kishanbag, tehsil and district Gwalior, which were in the joint ownership and possession of the appellants-petitioners were acquired in the year 1985 by the State Government for implementation of the Scheme known as ‘Apana Ghar Yojna’ introduced by the Gwalior Development Authority (respondent No.2 herein) and possession of the land was also taken over by the Land Acquisition Officer, Gwalior. At that time, no compensation was paid to the owners of the land. By an order dated 19th February 2001 passed in Writ Petition No. 1649/1999, the learned writ Court for non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, set aside the acquisition of the appellants’ land and directed that if the State chose to acquire the lands of the above petitioners-owners, in that situation, the aforesaid lands may be acquired by fresh acquisition proceedings. Consequently, the lands of the petitioners-appellants were again by issuing a fresh notification as per law were acquired. The Land Acquisition Officer while conducting the acquisition proceedings passed the award of compensation of Rs.10,90,986/- for acquired of the lands of appellants. Being aggrieved by the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, Gwalior, the petitioners preferred an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for making a reference before the District Collector Gwalior. On reference by the District Collector Gwalior, the Reference Court after providing due hearing to the parties by an award dated 31st January 2004 came to enhance a sum of Rs.99,180/- in the amount of Rs.10,90,986/- and directed for payment of the total amount of compensation to the respondents. On reference by the District Collector Gwalior, the Reference Court after providing due hearing to the parties by an award dated 31st January 2004 came to enhance a sum of Rs.99,180/- in the amount of Rs.10,90,986/- and directed for payment of the total amount of compensation to the respondents. It was the order which has been assailed in the appeal before us with a prayer for setting aside the same by allowing the appeal. It is also prayed that the appellants may be awarded damages for the period of illegal possession by the State over the land till the next date of acquisition under subsequent Notification by the State Government. 3. The contention of the appellants are that the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Award passed by the Reference Court both are contrary to the law and against the evidence as adduced before them and therefore the orders are not liable to stand. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there is not dispute with regard to dispossession of the petitioners-appellants from their lands dragging these land-losers to the Court of law. Therefore, on the prayer of the petitioners, the learned writ Court in Writ Petition No.1649/1999 by an order dated 19th February 2001 decided that since the compensation has not been paid to the petitioners within two years from the date of acquisition of the land, and proceedings for acquisition of the land have lapsed, the petitioners are entitled to get back possession of the land as the lands have not been acquired. It was further observed that if the respondents feel that lands deserve to be acquired, they may issue notification and determine the compensation as on date of fresh notification. The Gwalior Development Authority-respondent No.2 being aggrieved by the order dated 19th February 2001 of learned Writ Bench preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.69/01 (now writ appeal) before the Division Bench of this Court which by an order dated 9th July 2001 was dismissed. Thereafter, the State for benefit of the Gwalior Development Authority, in whose possession the lands of the petitioners-appellants were lying by issuing fresh Notification, initiated the land acquisition proceedings again and acquired the lands again of the petitioners-appellants. Thereafter, the State for benefit of the Gwalior Development Authority, in whose possession the lands of the petitioners-appellants were lying by issuing fresh Notification, initiated the land acquisition proceedings again and acquired the lands again of the petitioners-appellants. Thus, the petitioners-appellants claimed compensation of the acquired lands from the date of subsequent acquisition of the lands as Rs.3,000/- per square meter as per market rate of the area with solatium with stipulated interest and also claimed damages of Rs.8,50,000/- for a period of 17 years for depriving the use of the acquired lands, as according to the learned counsel, the compensation of the acquired lands were not granted as per mandatory provisions of the law. On reference, the learned Reference Court denied the compensation as per request of the petitioners with claim for damages. It is thus, submitted that both the Courts in awarding the compensation of the acquired lands, ignored the recognised principles of law and the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble apex Court on the matter in issue. On these premised submissions, it is prayed that the award passed by both the Courts may be set aside by awarding an appropriate compensation for acquisition of the lands of the petitioners-appellants with further damages for illegal possession by the Gwalior Development Authority over more than 17 years with interest and costs of the litigation. 4. On the contrary, the respondent No.2-Gwalior Development Authority, by filing reply before the Reference Court contended that after fresh acquisition by the State, the respondent No.2-Gwalior Development Authority deposited Rs.73,500/- on 17th January 2002 and rest award amount of Rs.10,17,986/- was deposited on 28th February 2002 in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Gwalior. It is submitted that now the entire land is vested with the respondent No.2-Gwalior Development Authority. It is submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer had properly valued the acquired land and granted proper compensation to the owners of the land by rejecting prayer for claiming damages since year 1985. It is denied that at the time of acquirement of the lands, the market value of the acquired land was Rs.3,000/- per square meter. Under the circumstances, the Land Acquisition Officer did not commit any error and passed the just and fair compensation which had been deposited by the authority. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal may be dismissed. 5. Under the circumstances, the Land Acquisition Officer did not commit any error and passed the just and fair compensation which had been deposited by the authority. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal may be dismissed. 5. Supporting the contentions put forth by the respondent No.2, the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing on behalf of State/respondent No.1 also prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of parties and also perused the record of the Reference Court and the law applicable to the present case. 7. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, following questions arise for consideration of the present appeal : (i) Whether, the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in the proceedings and the award passed by the Reference Court granting some aid to the earlier award can be held to be sufficient for the acquired land admeasuring 1.485 hectare situated in Village Kishanbagh, Tahsil and District Gwalior? (ii) Whether the compensation as awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and the award of enhanced compensation announced by the Reference Court seem to be inadequate in the light of the market value of the acquired land on the date of acquisition i.e., 28th March 2002 which is claimed to be Rs.3,000/- per square meter making the cost of the land as Rs.95,80,704/- in addition to 30% solatium and interest @ 12% and in that view the appellants can be held entitled to receive enhanced compensation after taking over all facts and circumstances of the case? (iii) Whether the claimants/owners of the acquired land are entitled to damages for their wrongfully dispossession of the land from year 1985 till initiation of subsequent acquisition proceedings on 28th March 2002 at the rate of Rs.50,000/- yearly from the beneficiary, i.e., respondent No.2-the Gwalior Development Authority Gwalior? 8. Before considering the dispute involved in this case, it would be useful to refer section 23 of the Act. Section 23 reads as under : “23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation. 8. Before considering the dispute involved in this case, it would be useful to refer section 23 of the Act. Section 23 reads as under : “23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation. -- (1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration - firstly, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 sub-section (1); secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector’s taking possession thereof; thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector’s taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land; fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector’s taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings; fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any), incidental to such change; and sixthly, the damage (if any), bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector’s taking possession of the land. (1-A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation : In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded. Explanation : In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded. (2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.” Section 23(1) of the Act charges determination of the amount of compensation for the acquired land taking into account firstly the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. The question, therefore, would be that what would be the market value of the land. The market value prevailing on the date of the notification including potentiality the land possessed of or realisable potentiality existing as on the date of the notification would be the relevant fact for consideration to determine market value.” 9. The burden of proving inadequacy of the amount is to be discharged by the claimant himself and he has to satisfactorily furnish basis for determining market value of acquired land. In the case of Land Acquisition Officer v. Karigowda [ (2010)5 SCC 708 , at page 723], the Hon’ble apex Court observed as follows : “29. It is a settled principle of law that the onus to prove entitlement to receive higher compensation is upon the claimants. In Basant Kumar v. Union of India, this Court held that the claimants are expected to lead cogent and proper evidence in support of their claim. Onus primarily is on the claimants, which they can discharge while placing and proving on record sale instances and/or such other evidences as they deem proper, keeping in mind the method of computation for awarding of compensation which they rely upon. In this very case, this Court stated the principles of awarding compensation and placed the matter beyond ambiguity, while also copulating the factors regulating the discretion of the Court while awarding the compensation.” 10. In this very case, this Court stated the principles of awarding compensation and placed the matter beyond ambiguity, while also copulating the factors regulating the discretion of the Court while awarding the compensation.” 10. Therefore, while deciding on the compensation to be paid for acquisition of the land, the Court is duty bound to ensure that compensation determined is just and fair not only to the individual whose land is acquired but also to the public which has to pay for it. 11. Now, coming to the scenario of the present case, the facts of the case disclose in one breath that the Land Acquisition Officer Gwalior in LA Case No. 06/A-82/84-85 by an order dated 20th August 2002 while determining the market price of the land acquired admeasuring 1.484 hectors situated in village Kishanbagh, tehsil and district Gwalior called the guidelines of sale of the local area from the District Registrar, Gwalior and determined Rs.49,000/- per hector by applying all relevant factors and therefore calculated the market value of the acquired land as Rs.10,90,986/-. In Reference Case No.34/2002 decided vide Award dated 31st January 2004, the Reference court on the basis of statements of Vijay Ahuja, the Power of Attorney of the land owners, Sudhir Deshpande and Shiv Narayan Dubey, Revenue Inspector posted on deputation in Gwalior Development Authority, by disallowing the plea of the petitioners that the market value of the acquired land was Rs.3,000/- per square meter enhanced Rs.99,180/-. It is pertinent to mention here that the claimants/owners of the acquired land did not produce the sale-deeds of the area or adjourning area to prove the market value of the land acquired before the Land Acquisition Officer Gwalior in the Land Acquisition Proceedings or before the Reference Court in the aforesaid Reference Proceedings. The appellants/land owners of the acquired land could not prove that the market value of the acquired land on the date of acquisition was Rs.3,000/- per square meter. No doubt, the onus to prove entitlement to receive higher compensation is upon the claimants which they can discharge while placing and proving on record sale instances and/or such other evidences as they deem proper, keeping in mind the method of computation for awarding of compensation which they rely upon. No doubt, the onus to prove entitlement to receive higher compensation is upon the claimants which they can discharge while placing and proving on record sale instances and/or such other evidences as they deem proper, keeping in mind the method of computation for awarding of compensation which they rely upon. So, it appears that the claimants/appellants failed to prove before the Land Acquisition Officer during pendency of land acquisition proceeding and before the Reference Court during pendency of reference proceeding that the value of the acquired land was at the time of acquisition Rs.3,000/- per square meter. However, in this appeal, the appellants moved I.A. No.17769/08 along with four sale-deeds of the adjoining areas executed from 2000 to 2002 with a view to ascertain the costs of the questioned lands. We have considered the application and also perused the sale-deeds aforesaid. Unfortunately, the sale-deeds do not represent the market value of the land acquired since they related to the constructed room/building with land of the area while the acquired land is vacant agricultural land. Further the sale-deeds are not proved by the statements of the vendees/vendors. So, the appellants could not take advantage on the basis of these documents. The Land Acquisition Officer for want of sale-deeds of the adjoining areas, after inviting comparable sale instances of similar lands from nearby village Shankarpur pertaining to year 2001-02, which were the best guiding factors, have arrived at fair estimate of amount of compensation. In such cases, it must be taken in to consideration that the norms applied for determination of market value of agricultural land and homestead land are different. Therefore, taking into account the extent of land covered by the exemplar sale-deeds, the view of the Collector for sale of the particular area seems to be just and proper. The appellants-claimants, therefore, cannot be held entitled for compensation at the enhanced market value. Accordingly, I.A. No.17769/08 stands hereby dismissed. 12. Having considered the legal and factual aspects of the case, we are of the view that the conclusion of the Reference Court regarding fixation of the compensation on the basis of the market value of the acquired land and other amenities under section 23 of the Act as granted to the petitioners-appellants are correct in law and needs not to be interfered with. However, regarding deductions for development charges, it is seen that in reference proceedings, there was no such deductions ordered. Admittedly, the lands required were only for residential purposes, therefore, there was possible expenditure for it. The proceedings recorded by the Land Acquisition Officer also discloses this fact that the lands subject to the acquisition were made useful for the residential purposes by the Gwalior Development Authority. In the case of Ashrafi v. State of Haryana [ (2013)5 SCC 527 , at page 543], it is held by Hon. the apex Court that valuation of the land differs from that of land used for house sites and therefore for determining value of such agricultural land, deductions should be made in respect of development expenses, interest on the outlays for the period of deferment of realisation of the price, profits on venture, etc. Relevant paras from the aforesaid decision are quoted below : “48. This brings us to the last part of the submissions made with regard to the amount of deduction effected in respect of the various properties. The general cut imposed is at a flat rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted on account of the fact that the lands in question have lost their character and potentiality as agricultural lands and have more or less been converted into lands which were ready for use for the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal’s submissions regarding the factors which determine deduction towards development cost, such as location and potentiality, into account, we are of the view that a deduction of 33-1/3% would be reasonable on account of the passage of time and the all-round development in the area which has made it impossible for the lands to retain their original character. 49. Accordingly, we direct that except where we have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of 40% had been made, the same should be altered to 33-1/3% and the compensation awarded is to be modified accordingly.” 13. Taking in to consideration the aspect regarding deduction for development charges to make the land suitable for the purpose the lands were acquired, as held in the case of Ashrafi (supra), after deducting 30% on total amount of compensation of Rs.11,90,172, Rs.8,33,120/- (Rs. Taking in to consideration the aspect regarding deduction for development charges to make the land suitable for the purpose the lands were acquired, as held in the case of Ashrafi (supra), after deducting 30% on total amount of compensation of Rs.11,90,172, Rs.8,33,120/- (Rs. Eight lacs thirty three thousand one hundred and twenty only) would be payable to the appellants along with the solatium @ 30% on this amount, i.e., Rs.2,49,936/-, with 12% simple interest from the date of fresh Notification of acquisition of land, i.e., 28th March 2002. 14. Now, the only question remains for consideration is whether the claimants/owners of the acquired land are entitled to damages @ of Rs.50,000/- yearly for their wrongfully dispossession since year 1985 till the date of subsequent acquisition proceedings on dated 28th March 2002 from the beneficiary, Gwalior Development Authority Gwalior/respondent No.2? 15. By submitting another I.A.No.4273/13 under Order 41 rule 27 CPC, the appellants sought to establish that the learned Reference Court drew a wrong inference that the lands in question were vacant land and they were not useful for the appellants. This was the reason for denial of the damages. In support of the I.A. aforesaid, original Khasras, Rin Pustika including copy of the order of the Additional Collector, Gwalior have been filed. 16. On perusal of these documents, it is crystal clear that the lands were agricultural lands and they were not vacant lands. In this case, the claimants were deprived of enjoyment of their lands for the reasons not known to them. Hence, while considering the claim of damages, it should be kept in mind that the reasons for grant of additional statutory benefits are clearly different which has no bearing on determination of market value. 17. In the case of Executive Engineer v. Vilas Eknath Jadhav [ (2013)4 SCC 268 , at page 269], the Hon’ble apex Court in the same set of factual aspects like present one decided as follows : “The appellant had taken possession of the land of Respondents 1 to 4 on 3.6.2001 whereas the Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) was issued on 30.12.2006. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid respondents would have been entitled to interest on the statutory benefits under the Act calculated from the date when the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid respondents would have been entitled to interest on the statutory benefits under the Act calculated from the date when the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued. However, for the period between 3.6.2001 and 30.12.2006, they would only be entitled to rental compensation. On the rental compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, the respondents would also be entitled to the interest at bank rate. In support of this, he relies on observations made in para 18 of the judgment in R.L. Jain (2004)4 SCC 79 . In the aforesaid paragraph, this Court has observed as follows (SCC pp.93-94) : “18. In a case where the landowner is dispossessed prior to the issuance of preliminary notification under section 4(1) of the Act the Government merely takes possession of the land but the title thereof continues to vest with the landowner. It is fully open for the landowner to recover the possession of his land by taking appropriate legal proceedings. He is therefore only entitled to get rent or damages for use and occupation for the period the Government retains possession of the property. Where possession is taken prior to the issuance of the preliminary notification, in our opinion, it will be just and equitable that the Collector may also determine the rent or damages for use of the property to which the landowner is entitled while determining the compensation amount payable to the landowner for the acquisition of the property. The provision of section 48 of the Act lend support to such a course of action. For delayed payment of such amount appropriate interest at prevailing bank rate may be awarded.” The aforesaid observations make it abundantly clear that in case the landowner has been dispossessed prior to the issuance of the preliminary notification under section 4(1) of the Act, it will be open to such landowner to recover the possession of his land by taking appropriate legal proceeding. In case the possession is not recovered, he would be entitled to rent or damages for use and occupation for the period Government retained possession of the property.” 18. Further, in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M.I.D.C. ( AIR 2013 SC 565 ), the Hon’ble apex Court observed as follows : “7. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Further, in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M.I.D.C. ( AIR 2013 SC 565 ), the Hon’ble apex Court observed as follows : “7. The right to property is now considered to be, not only a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right, human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multi-faceted dimension. The right to property is considered, very much to be a part of such new dimension. 8. In the case at hand, there has been no acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the Rule of Law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal. 9. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of “eminent domain” and “police power” of the State. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between the principle of “eminent domain” and “police power” of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers has been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of “absolute power” which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a ‘subject’ of medieval India, but not as a ‘citizen’ under our Constitution. 10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 11. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. 11. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. 12. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged, by delay on the part of the petitioners. 14. The High Court committed an error in holding the appellants non-suited on the ground of delay and non-availability of records, as the court failed to appreciate that the appellants had been pursuing their case persistently. Accepting their claim, the statutory authorities had even initiated the acquisition proceedings in 1981, which subsequently lapsed for want of further action on the part of those authorities. Accepting their claim, the statutory authorities had even initiated the acquisition proceedings in 1981, which subsequently lapsed for want of further action on the part of those authorities. The claimants are illiterate and inarticulate persons, who have been deprived of their fundamental rights by the State, without it resorting to any procedure prescribed by law, without the court realising that the enrichment of a welfare State, or of its instrumentalities, at the cost of poor farmers is not permissible, particularly when done at the behest of the State itself. The appellants belonged to a class which did not have any other vocation or any business/calling to fall back upon, for the purpose of earning their livelihood. 15. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such illtreatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development. 16. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens, the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law. 17. The appellants have been seriously discriminated against qua other persons, whose land was also acquired. Some of them were given the benefits of acquisition, including compensation in the year 1966. This kind of discrimination not only breeds corruption, but also dis-respect for governance, as it leads to frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to take the law into their own hands. Some of them were given the benefits of acquisition, including compensation in the year 1966. This kind of discrimination not only breeds corruption, but also dis-respect for governance, as it leads to frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to take the law into their own hands. The findings of the High Court, that requisite records were not available, or that the appellants approached the authorities at a belated stage are contrary to the evidence available on record and thus, cannot be accepted and excused as it remains a slur on the system of governance and justice alike, and an anathema to the doctrine of equality, which is the soul of our Constitution. Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment of requisite compensation. The appeals etc. are required to be decided expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a person is not paid compensation in time, he will be unable to purchase any land or other immovable property, for the amount of compensation that is likely to be paid to him at a belated stage.” 19. Thus, after examining the case in the light of the above, we are of the view that the claimants/owners of the acquired lands are entitled to damages for their wrongfully dispossession from the acquired lands since 1985 till subsequent acquisition proceedings initiated on 28th March 2002, @ of Rs.50,000/- yearly. This additional benefit is extended to the claimants to mitigate hardship suffered by them on account of deprivation of enjoyment of the lands because of delay in making award and offering payments. It may be mentioned further here that solatium under section 23(2) is in compulsory nature of acquisition and interest under section 28 is paid for delay in payment of compensation from the date on which possession is taken. In this manner, the total amount of damages comes to Rs.8,50,000/- for which the appellants are entitled to receive along with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of illegally dispossessing them since year 1985 till the date of deposit of the award of compensation before the Land Acquisition Officer, Gwalior for disbursement to appellants vide Notification issued under section 4 of the Act, which would be payable by the respondent No.2/Gwalior Development Authority Gwalior. It is also made clear that the aforesaid amount of damages shall be paid within a period of three months from the date of delivery of the judgment of this Court and on failure, the Gwalior Development Authority shall pay penal interest @15% on damages from the date of taking over possession since year 1985 till the date of deposit of the award of compensation before the Land Acquisition Officer, Gwalior. The costs of the appeal to the extent of relief granted above shall be paid by the respondent No.2 to the appellants. Obviously, if any amount is received by the appellants/owners of the acquired land, same shall be deducted from the aforesaid amount of the award directed to be paid under our judgment. 20. In view of above, the appeal stands hereby partly allowed.