ORDER The petitioner was the Chairman of the Saran Zila Parishad at Chapra. She has lost in the vote of confidence. She challenges the same. 2. Heard Mr. S.B.K. Mangalam, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel for the private-respondents, learned counsels for the Zila Parishad and the State and with their consent, this writ petition is being disposed of at this stage itself. 3. The private-respondents consist of Upahyaksh and other members of the Zila Parishad who had requisitioned the special meeting for consideration of no confidence against the petitioner. 4. Mr. S.B.K. Mangalam, learned counsel appearing in support of the writ petition has raised principally two issues. Firstly, he submits that no 7 clear days notice had been issued by the Chief Executive Officer fixing date for special meeting and, as such, the notice was bad and the notice being bad the proceedings taken pursuant thereto cannot be sustained. Secondly, he submits that the special meeting in which no confidence motion was passed was presided by the Upadhyaksh and in presence of the Deputy Development Commissioner (D.D.C.) and was not presided by or the voting was not conducted by the District Magistrate-cum-Collector and as such the very voting stands vitiated. 5. In order to substantiate his submissions for the first proposition with regard to 7 clear days notice, Mr. Mangalam refers to Section-70 (4) and the second proviso to Section-72 (1) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). He refers to Section-44 (1) (vi) of the Act as well. 6. In my view, Section-44 of the Act has no application as it deals with Panchayat Samiti, which is a separate and an independent constitutional local self government. The provision in relation to Zila Parishad, which is yet another constitutional local self government, is contained in Chapter-V of the said Act starting from Section-62 on wards. If we read Section-70 sub-section (4) of the Act, we find that the only limitation caste upon the Chairman of the Zila Parishad is that if there is a requisition then the meeting has to be fixed not later than 15 days from the date of issue of notice of the meeting. Then, reference is made to second proviso to Section-72 (1), which is quoted hereunder:– “72. Meeting of the Zila Parishad.– (1)….. ….. Then, reference is made to second proviso to Section-72 (1), which is quoted hereunder:– “72. Meeting of the Zila Parishad.– (1)….. ….. Provided further that the Adhyaksha when required in writing by one-fifth of the members of the Zila Parishad to call a meeting shall do so within ten days failing which the aforesaid members may call a meeting after giving intimation to the District Magistrate and seven clear days notice to the Adhyaksha and the other members of the Zila Parishad.” 7. A reference to the aforesaid provision would show that the contingency of 7 clear days arises only when the Chairman (Adhyaksh) fails to fix the meeting. In the present case, it is not in dispute that upon Requisition being filed Adhyaksh, i.e., the writ petitioner, herself fixed the date. Once that was done the contingency of the members themselves fixing a date does not arise and hence the question of 7 clear days notice does not arise. 8. It may be that while dealing with Panchayat Samiti the Legislature has provided a notice fixing a date not earlier than 7 days and not later than 15 days. But, while dealing with the Zila Parishad, that distinction has been given up. Once the Legislature have so provided it is not open for the Court to read otherwise. 9. So far as the next contention of Mr. Mangalam that meeting being held or the voting being not conducted by the District Magistrate is concerned, the submission on behalf of the petitioner is equally misconceived. 10. If we refer to Section-70 (4) (i) of the Act, it would show that the provisions are clear. It provides that if the notice of no confidence is against the Adhyaksh, i.e., the Chairman, it is the Upadhyaksh, i.e., the Vice-Chairman, who would preside the meeting. If it is against the Vice-Chairman then it would be the Chairman who would preside the meeting and if it is against both Adhyaksh and Upadhyaksh in that case it would be presided by the District Magistrate. Thus, keeping this in mind which is the principal provision and specifically in relation to no confidence motion we have then to consider and interpret Section-70 (4) (vi) of the Act, which reads as under:– “70. Resignations or Removal of Adhyaksha and Up-adhyaksha.– (1)……… ………….. Thus, keeping this in mind which is the principal provision and specifically in relation to no confidence motion we have then to consider and interpret Section-70 (4) (vi) of the Act, which reads as under:– “70. Resignations or Removal of Adhyaksha and Up-adhyaksha.– (1)……… ………….. (4) (vi) During discussion, opportunity shall be given to the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha or both against whom no confidence motion is moved, for his defence before the Zila Parishad. The motion shall be put to vote on the same day after discussion which shall take place by secret ballot in the prescribed manner by the District Magistrate.” 11. A plain reading of the aforesaid sections would show that the section as drafted in English is not properly worded. I have pointed out above all the three contingencies which separately provided that where the motion is against the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman presides, where motion is against the Vice-Chairman, the Chairman presides and where the motion is against both, i.e., against the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, it is only in that contingency the District Magistrate presides. 12. Thus, when the expression District Magistrate is now used in sub-clause (vi) Sub-section (4) of Section-70 of the Act, it could only mean that where the District Magistrate was required to present he shall conduct the secret voting means he shall preside because it is the officer presiding the meeting who gets voting conducted. That is the harmonious way to read the two provisions. Thus, in the present case, there was no requirement of presence of the District Magistrate. 13. Mr. Giri points out that even if there was requirement of presence of the District Magistrate the instructions issued by the Election Commission clearly states that the District Magistrate is authorized to depute any other senior officer for this purpose in terms of Section-157 of the Act. A reading of Section-157 of the Act also shows that the District Magistrate is not required to be present at all and every special meeting where no confidence is the issue. The Election Commission says that the District Magistrate may authorize someone as found in Section-157 of the Act. 14. Thus, on both the issues, as raised by Mr. Mangalam, I find no merit. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed and the interim order as granted by this Court earlier stands vacated.