JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. D.K. Mishra for the petitioners, and learned Addl. A.G., Assam, Mr. D. Saikia for the State respondents and learned senior counsel, Mr. D. Das for the private respondents. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners sought for the following relief(s): ...It is therefore most respectfully prayed that Your Lordships may graciously be pleased to admit this Petition, call for the records of the case and issue a Rule calling upon the Respondents to show cause as to why the Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service (Amendment) Rules, 1987 and notification issued under memo No. HLA.133/98/317-A dated 01.03.2011 issued by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Health and F.W.(A) Department should not be set aside and quashed and be pleased to struck of the Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service (Amendment) Rules, 1987 by declaring the same as ultra virus of the Constitution of India and as to why a writ in the nature of Mandamus should not be issued directing the Respondent authorities to maintain the petitioners original position in the gradation list placing them above the private respondents in the cadre of Upper Division Assistants and cause or causes been shown and upon hearing the parties be pleased to make the Rule absolute and/or pass such further or other order or orders or direction as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper. 2. Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service (Amendment) Rules, 1987(for short, Amendment Rules, 1987) and the Notification No. HLA. 133/98/317-A, dated 01.03.2011, have been challenged and the petitioners prayed for setting aside and quashing the same, which read thus: 11.-Encadrement of Typists (Ordinary Grade). (1) Typists of ordinary grade who were appointed on or before December 31, 1980 and were borne in the service on January 1, 1981 shall be deemed to have been encadred as Lower Division Assistants on January 1, 1981. (2) Typists of ordinary grade who have been appointed on or after January 1, 1981 but before the publication of the Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service (Amendment) Rules, 1987 shall be deemed to have been encadred as Lower Division Assistants on the dates of their appointments as Typists ordinary grade in the service. (2) Typists of ordinary grade who have been appointed on or after January 1, 1981 but before the publication of the Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service (Amendment) Rules, 1987 shall be deemed to have been encadred as Lower Division Assistants on the dates of their appointments as Typists ordinary grade in the service. xxxx 19(5-A)(i) The inter-se-seniority between the typists encadred as Lower Division Assistants under sub-rule (1) of rule 11 and other Lower Division Assistants appointed on or before December 31, 1980, shall as on January 1, 1981 be fixed by placing the former group immediately after the latter group and the relative position of those in the former group, among themselves, shall be in the order in which their position had been as typists (ordinary grade). (ii) The inter-se-seniority of the typists' encadred as Lower Division Assistants under Sub-rule (2) of rule 11 and other Lower Division Assistants shall be determined by treating their appointments as if made under sub-rule (1) of rule 10. (b) sub-rule(7) shall be deleted. xxxx GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE (A) DEPARTMENT DISPUR, GUWAHATI-6 ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR OF ASSAM NOTIFICATION Dated, Dispur the 1st March, 2011 No. HLA. 133/98/317: Subject to reversion without notice and without assigning any reason thereof and on the recommendation of the Selection Committee the following UDAs(Sr. Asstt) office of the Director of Health services, Assam, and Director of Family Welfare, Assam are hereby promoted to the post of Superintendent in the Scale of pay PB-3 Rs. 8000/-36,000/- Grade Pay Rs. 4600/- PM and other allowances as admissible under the rules with effect from the date of joining in the places of posting as indicated against their names:-- The promotion is subject to clearance of Vigilance Report. Sd/- A.H. Khandakar, Under Secretary to the Govt. of Assam Health & F.W.(A) Deptt. Dated, Dispur the 1st March, 2011 Memo. No. HLA. 133/98/317-A 3. The Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service Rules, 1973 (for short, Service Rules 1973) prescribe provisions relating to appointment and other service conditions of the ministerial staff of the offices of the Heads of Department/Directorates of the Government of Assam. Rule 3(2) prescribes different cadres, in the service, comprising of the following categories of posts- (a) Registrar, (b) Superintendent, (c) Upper Division Assistants (UDA), (d) Lower Division Assistants (LDA), (e) Typists-- (i) Selection Grade (SG), (ii) Ordinary Grade (OG). Rule 3(2) prescribes different cadres, in the service, comprising of the following categories of posts- (a) Registrar, (b) Superintendent, (c) Upper Division Assistants (UDA), (d) Lower Division Assistants (LDA), (e) Typists-- (i) Selection Grade (SG), (ii) Ordinary Grade (OG). Rule 3(3) prescribes that each of the categories of posts mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 shall form an independent cadre. Members of a lower cadre shall have no claim for appointment to any of the higher cadres except in accordance with the provisions made in the Rules. 4. The petitioners, inter alia, contend that petitioner No. 1 was appointed as LDA on 26.08.1981 and petitioner No. 2 was appointed as LDA on 27.01.1982. They have been serving with all sincerity and devotion and their service career was without blemish. They further contend that at the relevant point of time, while the post of LDA carried pay scale of Rs. 300-575/-, the post of Typist carried pay scale of Rs. 275-475. 4.1 Rule 10 of the Service Rules 1973, prescribed two distinct modes of appointment to the post of LDA (i) by direct recruitment and (ii) by selection strictly on the basis of merit from amongst the Typists of the service, who are matriculate or passed equivalent examination and have rendered not less than four years of service in the post of Typist. 4.2 Rule 11(i) of the Service Rules, 1973, prescribe appointment to the post of Typists (Selection Grade) by selection on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from amongst the Typists of ordinary grade of the service and Rule 11(ii) prescribes appointment to the post of Typists (ordinary grade), either by direct recruitment or by selection from amongst the Grade-IV employees of the service, who have specified qualification, such as, knowledge of typing, etc. It is, therefore, contended that the post of LDA is a post higher in rank and status than that of the post of Typist. 4.3 The Government of Assam, by Notification, dated, 08.11.1979, constituted the Assam Pay Commission, 1979, and the Commission, so constituted, submitted its report to the Government, the report was accepted by the Government of Assam and, accordingly, the Assam Services (Revision of Pay) Rules, 1983 (for short, ROP Rules, 1983) was published on 27.06.1983. 4.3 The Government of Assam, by Notification, dated, 08.11.1979, constituted the Assam Pay Commission, 1979, and the Commission, so constituted, submitted its report to the Government, the report was accepted by the Government of Assam and, accordingly, the Assam Services (Revision of Pay) Rules, 1983 (for short, ROP Rules, 1983) was published on 27.06.1983. It was stipulated, in the ROP Rules, 1983, that the revised scales and the dearness allowances over, the revised scales, will be effective from 01.01.1981 and all other benefits at the revised rate, including those which were newly introduced, will be effective from 01.09.1982. The ROP Rules, 1983 abolished the cadre of Typist in the Offices of the Heads of Department and it was further stipulated that the cadre of Typist should be amalgamated with the cadre of LDA in the Offices of the Heads of Department and there will be no separate cadre of Typists in the Offices of Heads of Department. 4.4 In view of the provisions embodied in the ROP Rules, 1983, the Service Rules, 1973, was amended. The Assam Directorate Establishment (Ministerial) Service (Amendment) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter mentioned as Amendment Rules, 1987), thus, came to be published, by Notification No. ABP.277/82/116, dated 06.05.1987. Under Clauses 4 and 8 of the Amendment Rules, 1987, Rule 11 and Rule 19 of the Service Rules, 1973, were amended, as reproduced hereinbefore, which stand challenged in this writ petition. 4.5 The petitioners contended that after coming into force of the Amendment Rules, 1987, the employees, appointed in the grade of Typist, prevailed upon the authorities to fix their seniority by treating them to be appointed in the cadre of LDA from 01.01.1981, though, according to the petitioners, this could have been made effective from 01.09.1982. All the persons, working as Typist, ought to have been placed in the bottom of the seniority list of LDAs as was prevailing at that time, since the persons, working in the cadre of Typist, were not entitled to claim their seniority over the persons working as LDA including that of the petitioners. All the persons, working as Typist, ought to have been placed in the bottom of the seniority list of LDAs as was prevailing at that time, since the persons, working in the cadre of Typist, were not entitled to claim their seniority over the persons working as LDA including that of the petitioners. The petitioners also contend that it was the clear mandate of the ROP Rules, 1983, that except the revised scale and dearness allowance, other benefits will be effective from 01.09.1982; but in violation thereof, the Service Rules, 1973, was amended prescribing thereunder the amalgamation w.e.f. 01.01.1981 and, as a result, the interest of the petitioners, who were in service in the post of LDA before the Amendment Rules, 1987, came into force, were made junior to the Typists working in the establishment, though the post of LDA was a promotional post by the Typists immediately preceding the amendment. 4.6 The petitioners submitted objection on 02.08.1993 (Annexure-C to the writ petition) highlighting the relevant facts stating that the amendment would give undue benefits to the Typists, which is in violation of the recommendations of the Pay Commission and also requested the authorities concerned not to put the Typists above the petitioners in the amalgamated list of the LDAs and Typists. The petitioners also stated that the Director of Health Services, Govt. of Assam, by a letter, dated 05.08.1993 (Annexure-D to the writ petition) requested the Secretary, Government of Assam, Health & Family Welfare (A) Department, to clarify the issue involved and the Government in the Health & Family Welfare Department, by a letter, dated 08.11.1993 (Annexure-E to the writ petition) again sought for the views of the Director on the same issue in respect of the appeal preferred by the petitioners and the Director of Health Services informed the Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, that the claim of the petitioners was justified and genuine. 4.7 The petitioners also contended that when a lower cadre is amalgamated with a higher cadre, the seniority of the lower cadre is to be determined from the date from which they were encadred in the higher cadre; but in the case of the petitioners, though they had been working as LDA, a higher cadre, the private respondents, who were Typists, have been made, by virtue of the Amendment Rules, senior to the petitioners and, as a result, the promotional scope of the petitioners had been adversely affected. The petitioners have annexed a list of LDAs and Typists before amalgamation (Annexure-F to the writ petition) and also an unpublished gradation list of common cadre of the three Directorates as Annexure-G to the writ petition. 4.8 On 28.10.2010, the petitioners made a representation before the Commissioner & Secretary, Government of Assam, Health & Family Welfare Department, with a prayer for determination of their seniority and giving them benefit after modifying the Amendment Rules, 1987, but the representation was not responded to by the State respondents and the same remained pending for disposal. A copy of that representation has been annexed as Annexure-H to the writ petition. 4.9 The Government of Assam, in the Health & Family Welfare (A) Department, initiated a process to correct the gradation list of UDAs (Common Cadre) and, in fact, a Memo., dated 18.1.2011, was issued by the Government, in this regard, asking the Director of Health Services to take necessary action for correction of gradation list of UDAs as per rules and procedures (Annexure-J to the writ petition). 4.10 The petitioners also contended that respondent Nos. 5 and 6, while holding the post of Typist, were encadred as LDA and they were promoted to the post of UDA prior to the petitioners and, therefore, the petitioners challenged the order of the authority by filing a writ petition, being WP(C) No. 6105 of 2003, but after filing of the writ petition, when the authorities concerned promoted the petitioners to the post of UDA on 21.09.2004, without disturbing the seniority position of the petitioners vis--vis the private respondents, the said writ petition was closed by an order of this Court, dated, 01.02.2011, with an observation that the writ petition may be reopened if the grievances of the petitioners were not redressed. 4.11 The petitioners contended that after issuance of letter, dated 18.01.2011 (Annexure-J to the writ petition), the petitioners were expecting a seniority list putting them above the private respondents, but no common seniority list was published till date; whereas, by issuing impugned letter, dated 01.03.2011 (Annexure-K to the writ petition), respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were promoted to the post of Superintendent without considering the case of the petitioners and, hence, the impugned Notification is liable to be set aside and quashed. According to the petitioners, Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Amendment Rules, 1987, are illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires to the Constitution and, by virtue of the said Amendment Rules, the seniority position of the petitioners, in the service, has been arbitrarily taken away and, hence, the said Rules are violative of the constitutional mandate and, therefore, liable to be quashed. 5. Respondent No. 2 submitted affidavit-in-opposition contending that the respondents have no comment in respect of the averments made in paragraphs 1 to 5, 9 to 15, 17 to 24 and 26 to 32 of the writ petition and, in respect of the averments made in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 16 and 25 of the writ petition, the respondent No. 2 stated that in respect of the cadre of Typists, the Service Rules, 1973, was amended by Notification, vide No. ABP/277/82/116, dated 06.05.1987, inter alia, deleting the provision of direct recruitment of Typists. In the Amendment Rules, 1987, it was prescribed that there shall be no further appointment to the post of Selection Grade Typists and this category of post shall be filled up by LDAs after existing incumbents retire or finally cease to hold the post and that the Typists of Ordinary Grade, who were appointed on or before 31.12.1980 and were borne in the service on 01.01.1981, shall be deemed to have been encadred as LDAs on 01.01.1981. Further, the Ordinary Grade of Typists, on or after 01.01.1981, but before publication of the Amendment Rules, 1987, shall be deemed to have been encadred as LDAs on the dates of their appointment as Typist Ordinary Grade, meaning thereby that the Typist, ordinary grade, were not only made at par with the LDA already existing in the service, but also made the encadrement of the Typist as LDAs with retrospective effect. 6. 6. Respondent No. 12, Principal Secretary, Finance (Pay and Research Unit) Department, Government of Assam, also submitted affidavit-in-opposition stating that the case is related to the fixation of seniority of Government employees and the Finance (PRU) Department is not concerned with fixation of seniority. However, while accepting the recommendations of the Assam Pay Commission, 1979, Assam Government has allowed revised scales and the dearness allowance over the revised scales w.e.f. 01.01.1981 and all other benefits at the revised rate including those which were newly introduced w.e.f. 01.09.1982. The Assam Pay Commission, 1979 has recommended amalgamation of the cadre of LDAs and Typists in the Heads of the Department Offices with the revised pay scale of Rs. 500-875/-. 7. Other respondents have chosen to file no affidavit-in-opposition. 8. A bare reading of the writ petition and the affidavits-in-opposition makes it clear that the respondents did not dispute the pleadings made in the writ petition. It is abundantly clear that on the date of coming into force of the ROP Rules, 1983, all persons, working as LDA, irrespective of their dates of appointment, were serving in a superior post compared to the post of Typists. However, because of encaderment of Typists, appointed on or before 31.12.1980, in the common cadre of LDAs w.e.f. 01.01.1981, the persons, who had already been working as LDAs on being appointed on or after 01.01.1981, but before the ROP Rules came into force and became, in view of the Amendment Rules, 1987, junior to the Typists. It is abundantly clear from the pleadings itself that the Amendment Rules, 1987, did not take care of the seniority position of the LDAs appointed on or after 01.01.1981 vis--vis the Typists, appointed on or before 31.12.1980, though, admittedly, the persons appointed as LDA on or after 01.01.1981, being in superior cadre, were supposed to be listed above all the Typists irrespective of their dates of appointment. Bringing into force of the ROP Rules, 1983, does not automatically change the Service Rules, which were made in exercise of power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Appointments were made in different cadres of the service as per the provisions of the Service Rules and, hence, the appointments, made in the cadre of LDA, ought to be treated as superior cadre than that of the cadre of Typists. Appointments were made in different cadres of the service as per the provisions of the Service Rules and, hence, the appointments, made in the cadre of LDA, ought to be treated as superior cadre than that of the cadre of Typists. It is evident that the petitioners, though they had been holding the post of LDA before Service Rules were amended, their position in the common cadre was treated below the Typists, because of the impugned Amendment Rules, 1987. It is the settled position of law that a wrong cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. Whenever a wrong is detected and it is found that injustice has been caused, because of such wrong, it should not be allowed to continue and it should be corrected. Because of the incidence of amalgamation of cadre, the Typists got the jump to the cadre of LDA. Had there been no such amalgamation, the private respondents would have remained in the inferior cadre of Typists and the petitioners in the superior cadre of LDA. On the date of merging/integration, all employees, working as LDAs, ought to be placed over and above the employees, who had been working as Typists irrespective of their dates of appointment. 9. Admittedly, the petitioners made representation/objection after amendment of the relevant Service Rules. The Director, Health & Family Welfare Department, Assam, too by a letter, addressed to the Secretary, Govt. of Assam, Health & Family Welfare Department, described the claim of the petitioners as justified and genuine. It was, in these circumstances, necessary for the State respondents to prepare, upon amalgamation, a list of common cadre of LDAs, placing all the persons, working as LDA, above the persons working as Typists; but no list of common cadre, showing the position of the persons at the time of amalgamation has yet been published by the State respondents even after repeated representations made by the petitioners. The fact of such a representation having been filed by the writ petitioners, on 28.10.2010, has not been disputed by, or responded to, by the State respondents. 10. A bare reading of the impugned Notification, dated, 01.03.2011 (Annexure-K), makes it abundantly clear that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have been promoted to the post of Superintendent without assigning any reason. The fact of such a representation having been filed by the writ petitioners, on 28.10.2010, has not been disputed by, or responded to, by the State respondents. 10. A bare reading of the impugned Notification, dated, 01.03.2011 (Annexure-K), makes it abundantly clear that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have been promoted to the post of Superintendent without assigning any reason. The petitioners, therefore, could successfully make out a case that though the Service Rules were amended in the year 1987, the State respondents could not and/or did not prepare till date, a list of the common cadre of LDAs after amalgamation and the claim of the petitioners, regarding their seniority position has been kept unattended. The petitioners filed the writ petition, bearing WP(C) No. 6105 of 2003, when their juniors were promoted to the posts, of UDA. However, immediately thereafter, the petitioners, too, were promoted. Hence, the writ petition was closed and/or disposed of without adjudication; but the grievances of the petitioners were not addressed to and redressed. In these circumstances, the petitioners filed the present petition challenging the vires of Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Amendment Rules, 1987, and prayed for quashing the same including the Notification, dated, 01.03.2011 (Annexure-K). 11. Integration of services and seniority 11.1 Learned senior counsel of the petitioners has submitted that the question of fixation of seniority as a result of integration between the lower cadre and higher cadre is no more a res-integra but has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Kewal Krishan Bagga Vs. The Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 733 , K.C. Gupta & Ors. Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. reported in 1994 Supp(3) SCC 408, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Anil Kumar & Ors. reported in (1999) 5 SCC 743 and Maharashtra State Judges Association Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Bombay reported in (2009) 1 SCC 569 . 11.2 Learned counsel of the respondents has submitted that integration and/or amalgamation of services is legally permissible in the public interest and the petitioners have no locus to challenge, in any manner, the integration, as is done in this case. Registrar General, High Court of Bombay reported in (2009) 1 SCC 569 . 11.2 Learned counsel of the respondents has submitted that integration and/or amalgamation of services is legally permissible in the public interest and the petitioners have no locus to challenge, in any manner, the integration, as is done in this case. 11.3 In the case of Kewal Krishan Bagga (supra), 30 godown keepers, working in the clerical cadre, in the Amritsar workshop, under Government of Punjab, were taken over as clerks by the Government of India and a question arose, in course of time as regards the fixation of their inter se seniority. Government of India decided that the inter se seniority of godown keepers and clerks, who after the transfer of employment, was assimilated in a common cadre of clerks should be fixed on the basis of their length of service. The decision to treat the clerks as senior to godown keepers was held by the Apex Court not to be arbitrary or irrational. 11.4 In the case of K.C. Gupta (supra), post-graduate teachers and trained graduate teachers of different grades were merged into one cadre and it was held that the period of service in the lower grade would not be counted for the purpose of seniority in the new cadre. In the cases of Anil Kumar (supra) and Maharashtra State Judges Association (supra), the same principle has been laid down by the Apex court. 11.5 Learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. Saikia, has contended that in service jurisprudence, integration is a complicated administrative problem, where some bruise to a few cannot be ruled out and, hence, no policy of integration of service can satisfy all and some section of the employees are/were bound to feel aggrieved as it is simply not possible to satisfy the expectation of every employee. The integration of two cadres, which places some in an advantageous position in comparison to some others, is not violative of the guarantee contained under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In support of his contention, learned Additional Advocate General has relied on following case laws- (i) Reserve Bank of India Vs. N.C. Paliwal & Ors. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 838 . (ii) V.T. Khanzode & Ors. Vs. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. reported in (1982) 2 SCC 7 . (iii) Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association & Ors. Vs. N.C. Paliwal & Ors. reported in (1976) 4 SCC 838 . (ii) V.T. Khanzode & Ors. Vs. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. reported in (1982) 2 SCC 7 . (iii) Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in (1980) 3 SCC 97 . 11.6 In the case of N.C. Paliwal (supra), the Reserve Bank of India, for carrying out its diverse functions, divided its administrative machinery in different (five) groups of departments. Some of the departments were in general side and some were specialized side, each group of departments was treated as a separate unit for the purpose of determining the seniority and promotion of the employees within that group and that was done on centre wise basis. As a result, there was a separate seniority of the employees in each group of departments at each centre of the Reserve Bank and the employees could seek confirmation and promotion only in the vacancies arising within their own group of departments at their own centre. There was dissatisfaction amongst employees of the general department, for, the promotional opportunities in the specialised departments were much more and this issue was taken up in the National Tribunal, which recommended that it is desirable that wherever it is possible employees, serving in different departments be grouped, without detriment to the interests of the Bank and without affecting efficiency in a particular category at one centre for the purpose of being considered for promotion on the basis of a common seniority list and such an approach would result in opening up equal avenues of promotion for a large number of employees and there would be lesser sense of frustration and greater peace of mind among the employees. The Reserve Bank, while making integration of services of different group of employees adopted different measures, which was challenged before the Court. The Supreme Court, while deciding the issue, in paragraph 15 of the judgment, observed: 15. Now, the first question which arises for consideration is whether the Reserve Bank violated the constitutional principle of equality in bringing about integration of non-clerical with clerical services. We fail to see how integration of different cadres into one cadre can be said to involve any violation of the equality clause. Now, the first question which arises for consideration is whether the Reserve Bank violated the constitutional principle of equality in bringing about integration of non-clerical with clerical services. We fail to see how integration of different cadres into one cadre can be said to involve any violation of the equality clause. It is now well settled, as a result of the decision of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India: AIR 1962 SC 1139 : 44 ITR 532 that Article 16 a fortiori also Article 14 do not forbid the creation of different cadres for government service. And if that be so, equally these two Articles cannot stand in the way of the State integrating different cadres into one cadre. It is entirely a matter for the State to decide whether to have several different cadres or one integrated cadre in its services. That is a matter of policy which does not attract the applicability of the equality clause. The integration of non-clerical with clerical services sought to be effectuated by the combined seniority scheme cannot in the circumstances be assailed as violative of the constitutional principle of equality. In paragraph 16 of the judgment the Court further observed: ...Obviously, if the non-clerical service rendered by the employees from non-clerical cadres were wholly, ignored, it would have been most unjust to them. Equally, it would have been unjust to employees in the clerical cadre, if the entire non-clerical service of those coming from non-clerical cadres were taken into account, for non-clerical service cannot be equated with clerical service and the two cannot be treated on the same footing. The Reserve Bank, therefore, decided that one third of the non-clerical service rendered by employees coming from non-clerical cadres should be taken into account for the purpose of determining seniority. This rule attempted to strike a just balance between the conflicting claims of non-clerical and clerical staff and it cannot be condemned as arbitrary or discriminatory. Vide Anand Parkash Saksena v. Union of India: (1968) 2 SCR 611 . 11.7 In the case of V.T. Khanzode (supra), the Supreme Court, while relying on the principles laid down in N.C. Paliwal (supra), observed in paragraph 40 of the judgment thus, 40. It is clear from this narration of historical events that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank were grouped and regrouped from time to time. 11.7 In the case of V.T. Khanzode (supra), the Supreme Court, while relying on the principles laid down in N.C. Paliwal (supra), observed in paragraph 40 of the judgment thus, 40. It is clear from this narration of historical events that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank were grouped and regrouped from time to time. Such adjustments in the administrative affairs of the Bank are a necessary sequel to the growing demands of new situations which are bound to arise in any developing economy. The group system has never been a closed or static chapter and it is wrong to think that the officers of the various groups were kept, as it were, in quarantine. The group system has been a continuous process of trial and error and the impugned scheme of inter-group mobility has emerged as the best solution out of the experience of the past. Combined seniority has been recommended by two special committees, whose reports reflect the expertise and objectivity which was brought to bear on their sensitive task. It is clear that inter-group mobility and common seniority are a safe and sound solution to the conflicting demands of officers belonging to Group I on one hand and those of Groups II and III on the other. Private interest of employees of public undertakings cannot override public interest and an effort has to be made to harmonize the two considerations. No scheme governing service matters can be foolproof and some section or the other of employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fides will of course render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of every employee is not evidence of these. Vested interests are prone to hold on to their acquisitions and we understand the feelings of Group I Officers who have to surrender a part of the benefits which had accrued to them in a watertight system of grouping. Combined seniority is indispensable for the smooth functioning of the Bank and no organisation can function smoothly if one section of its officers has an unfair advantage over others in matters of promotional opportunities. Combined seniority is indispensable for the smooth functioning of the Bank and no organisation can function smoothly if one section of its officers has an unfair advantage over others in matters of promotional opportunities. The reports of the Cadre Review Committee and the Thareja Committee show that combined seniority has emerged as the most acceptable solution as a matter of administrative, historical and functional necessity. We see no justification for undoing what these committees have achieved after an objective and integral examination of the whole issue. We may mention that the conclusion to which these committees came were considered by the Bank when Shri M. Narasimhan, later India's Executive Director in the World Bank, was the Governor and it was after Dr. I.G. Patel, Formerly Secretary, Economic Affairs, Government of India and Deputy Administrator, United Nations Development Programme, took over as Governor in December 1977 that the final decision was taken by the Central Board to introduce inter-group mobility and combined seniority. 11.8 In the case of Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that in service jurisprudence, integration is a complicated administrative problem, where, in doing broad justice to many, some bruises to a few cannot be ruled out. Some play in the joints, even some wobbling, must be left to government without fussy forensic monitoring, because the administration has been entrusted by the Constitution to the executive and not to the Courts. 11.9 Amalgamation and/or integration of cadres/services is, no doubt, a complicated administrative process and it is not required to be interfered with by the court of law in ordinary course. While doing integration of services, for administrative exigencies, interest of some of the employees may be affected; but it has to be kept in mind that such steps have been taken in the greater public interest and it was inevitable. In the case at hand, the Typist cadre was decided to be amalgamated with the LDA cadre. Admittedly, LDA cadre was a superior and promotional cadre of Typist cadre irrespective of date of joining of the employees on the date of amalgamation. All those, working in the LDA cadre, ought to have been placed above the Typists; but it has not been done and no seniority list of the common cadre has yet been prepared. Admittedly, LDA cadre was a superior and promotional cadre of Typist cadre irrespective of date of joining of the employees on the date of amalgamation. All those, working in the LDA cadre, ought to have been placed above the Typists; but it has not been done and no seniority list of the common cadre has yet been prepared. The petitioners, who had been, admittedly, working in LDA cadre, at the time of amalgamation, has been placed below some of the Typists and the private respondents have been given an unusual jump, because of the Amendment Rules. This could have been easily avoided. There was no reason at all of excluding the petitioners at the time of amendment of the relevant Rules. Therefore, the ratio of the decisions, referred to by learned Additional Advocate General, cannot be applied to the case at hand. 12. Challenge on the ground of delay and laches 12.1 Learned counsel for the respondents seriously opposed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 12.2 It has been argued that the Amendment Rules had been notified on 06.05.1987; whereas the writ petition has been filed in March, 2011, i.e., after about twenty four years, without any reason, to justify the long and inordinate delay in challenging the Amendment Rules and that no endeavour has been made by the writ petitioners to explain the long delay. The writ petition, therefore, suffers from the mischief of delay and laches and, hence, is liable to be dismissed in limine on that ground alone. Several case laws have been referred to by the learned counsel in support of their contention. 12.3 Learned counsel of the petitioners, on the contrary, submitted that there was no pleading from the end of the respondents denying the chronological facts pleaded by the petitioners in the writ petition. Though the Amendment Rules were published in the year 1987 and the cadres of LDA and Typist were amalgamated, no seniority list of the common cadre was prepared and published till date, no objection was invited from the members of the common cadre in respect of their seniority position. This apart, in paragraph 24 of the writ petition, the petitioners categorically stated that no seniority list was circulated amongst the staff nor was it published and this statement has not been denied by the official respondents. This apart, in paragraph 24 of the writ petition, the petitioners categorically stated that no seniority list was circulated amongst the staff nor was it published and this statement has not been denied by the official respondents. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to ascertain and find out as to when the Rules were acted upon and when the writ petitioners were actually aggrieved by the impugned provisions of Amendment Rules. Since no seniority list of the combined cadres has been circulated till date for giving effect to the impugned Amendment Rules, the petitioners cannot be blamed for delay and laches. 12.4 Learned counsel of the petitioners further has contended that in paragraph 17 of the writ petition, the petitioners stated that the gradation list, maintained in the Directorate of Health Services, Assam, has been made without any intimation or notice to the petitioners by putting the names of the Typists above the petitioners and that has been done behind the back of the petitioners, which has adversely affected the promotional scope and avenues of the petitioners to the higher cadre. The averments, so made in paragraph 17, have not been disputed by the official respondents. 12.5 Referring to Annexure-F and Annexure-G to the writ petition, learned counsel of the petitioners has submitted that Annexure-F is a list of LDAs and Typists before amalgamation. In Annexure-F, names at serial No. 1 to 39 were of the persons working as LDAs and at serial No. 40 to the rest were of the persons working as Typists. The names of petitioners were shown at serial No. 36 and 37 of the list and that of the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 at serial Nos. 42 and 43. But in Annexure-G, which was prepared on 20.01.2011, the petitioners were shown in serial Nos. 23 and 24; whereas respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were shown in serial Nos. 12 and 14. The said list was never published asking for any objection and no seniority list of the common cadre was prepared till today; whereas the State respondents, by the impugned Notification, dated, 01.03.2011, promoted respondent Nos. 5 and 6 to the post of Superintendent, depriving the petitioners and, therefore, the cause of action arose for filing of this writ petition challenging the provisions prescribed in Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Amendment Rules. 5 and 6 to the post of Superintendent, depriving the petitioners and, therefore, the cause of action arose for filing of this writ petition challenging the provisions prescribed in Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Amendment Rules. 12.6 It is also contended that the constitutional validity of a statute or Rule cannot be challenged in abstract. The person, who lays the challenge, must be aggrieved by the enforcement of the provisions of the offending statute or rules; otherwise, Court may refuse to decide the constitutional validity of the statute if the case is capable of being disposed of on other grounds. It is submitted that because of this principle, the Supreme Court has laid down that unless a persons is aggrieved by any provision of the statute, he cannot challenge the vires of the statute. Referring to the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1951 SC 41 and referring to an observation made by His Lordship, Justice Syed Fazl Ali of the Supreme Court, in paragraph 7 of the judgment, learned Senior counsel, Mr. D.K. Mishra, has contended that no one except those whose rights are directly affected by a law, can raise the question of the constitutionality of that law. 12.7 It is submitted that the petitioners from the very inception recorded their objection and the Director of Health Services found the claim of the petitioners as justified and genuine, but even thereafter, the seniority list of the common cadre was not prepared and published by the State respondents. The documents, annexed to the writ petition, make it clear that the representations, made by the petitioners, were not responded to by the State respondents, and, so, the petitioners cannot be blamed for delay and laches and cannot be deprived of their legitimate right. 12.8 In the case of Rabindranath Bose & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1970(1) SCC 84 , the Apex Court considered the ground for refusing relief in case of inordinate delay in filing the petition. In paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment, the Court observed thus, 32. The learned Counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the decision of this Court in M/s. Tilokchand Motichand's & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi & Ors.: 1969(1) SCC 110 needs review. In paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment, the Court observed thus, 32. The learned Counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the decision of this Court in M/s. Tilokchand Motichand's & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi & Ors.: 1969(1) SCC 110 needs review. But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 33. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity. justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. It was on this ground that this Court in S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors.: (1967) 2 SCR 703 observed that the order in that case would not affect Class II officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In that case, the Court was only considering the challenge to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this case, we are asked to consider the validity of appointments and promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950. If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone. 34. If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone. 34. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, says that there has been no undue delay. He says that the representations were being received by the Government all the time. But there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations. If the Government has turned down one representation, the making of another representation on similar lines would not enable the petitioners to explain the delay, learned Counsel for the petitioners says that the petitioners were under the impression that the Departmental Promotion Committee had held a meeting in 1948 and not on April 29, 1949, and the real true facts came to be known in 1961, when the Government mentioned these facts in their letter dated December 28, 1961. 35. We are unable to accept this explanation, This fact has been mentioned in the minutes of the meeting of the Committee which met in Feb, 1952 and we are unable to believe that the petitioners did not come to know all these facts till 1961. But even assuming that the petitioners came to know all these facts only in Dec. 1961, even then there has been inordinate delay in presenting the present petition. The fact that Jaisinghani's case was pending before the High Court and later in this Court is also no excuse for the delay in resenting the present petition. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 12.9 In the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 , the Apex Court, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, observed thus, 10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. 12.9 In the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 , the Apex Court, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, observed thus, 10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The divisional cadres of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back as November 1, 1956 by the Government Resolution of that date, and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select-list, which was a necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of years, at any rate from April 7, 1961, and the Rules of July 30, 1959 were also given effect to since the date of their enactment and yet the petitioner did not file the petition until July 14, 1969. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Tilockchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi : (1969) 2 SCR 824 "is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit.... Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Tilockchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi : (1969) 2 SCR 824 "is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit.... It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose." Here the petitioners were informed by the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division by his letter dated October 18, 1960 and also by the then Secretary of the Revenue Department in January 1961 that the rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector in the reorganised State of Bombay had not yet been unified, and that the petitioners continued to be governed by the rules of Ex-Hyderabad State and the Rules of July 30, 1959 had no application to them. The petitioners were, therefore, justified in proceeding on the assumption that there were no unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector and the promotions that were being made by the State Government were only provisional, to be regularised when unified rules of recruitment were made. It was only when the petition in Kapoor's case was decided by the Bombay High Court that the petitioners came to know that it was the case of the State Government in that petition and that case was accepted by the Bombay High Court-that the Rules of 30th July, 1959 were the unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector applicable throughout the reorganised State of Bombay. The petitioners thereafter did not lose any time in filing the present petition. Moreover, what is challenged in the petition is the validity of the procedure for making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector-whether it is violative of the equal opportunity clause-and since this procedure is not a thing of the past but is still being followed by the State Government, it is but desirable that its Constitutionality should be adjudged when the question has come before the court at the instance of parties properly aggrieved by it. It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reasons of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. This principle was stated in the following terms by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand v. H.B. Munshi s (supra). The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court. Sikri, J., (as he then was), also re-stated the same principle in equally felicitous language when he said in R.N. Bose v. Union of India: (1970) 2 SCR 697 : "It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years." Here as admitted by the State Government in Paragraph 55 of the affidavit in reply, all promotions that have been made by the State Government are provisional and the position has not been crystallised to the prejudice of the petitioners No rights have, therefore, accrued in favour of others by reason of the delay in filing the petition. The promotions being provisional, they have not conferred any rights on those promoted and they are by their very nature liable to be set at naught, if the correct legal position, as finally determined, so requires. We were also told by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, and that was not controverted by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government, that even if the petition were allowed and the reliefs claimed by the petitioners granted to them, that would not result in the reversion of any Deputy Collector or officiating Deputy Collector to the post of Mamlatdar/Tehsildar; the only effect would be merely to disturb their inter se seniority as officiating Deputy Collectors or as Deputy Collectors. Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like. 12.10 In the cases of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 183, and the State Bank of Indore Vs. Govindrao, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 617 , the Apex Court considered the delay and laches. In both the reported cases, there was no challenge on the issue of constitutionality of any enactment, but seniority and regularization as well as dismissal after considerable period of time were challenged. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra), challenge was made after eight years and in the case of State Bank of Indore (supra), challenge was made after ten years of dismissal in a disciplinary proceedings and, in both the cases the Apex Court held that the writ petitions fell within the mischief of delay and laches. The ratio of the above decisions cannot be applied to the instant case since the factual aspects are clearly distinguishable. 12.11 In the case of Shiv Doss Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 , the appellant was out of service in the year 1983 and the petition was filed for disability pension in 2005. The Apex Court, though held that in appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the petitioner to approach the Court, but remitted the case to the High Court to hear the writ petition on merit. In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment, the Court observed thus-- 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment, the Court observed thus-- 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd: (1874) 5 PC 221, PC at p.239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher: AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Ors.: AIR 1969 SC 329 , Sir Barnes had stated: Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy. 8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors.: (1987) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 , that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Raja Lakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore: AIR 1967 SC 993 . There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray: AIR 1976 SC 2617 making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar: AIR 1976 SC 1639 ). 12.12 In the case of Shankara Co-Op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar & Ors., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 607 , a challenge was made to the declaration of the ownership in respect of an evacuee property under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, after a delay of about fifteen years and, in the meantime, interest of third party was created. The Apex Court has held that inordinate and unexplained delay, in approaching the Court, in a writ, is, indeed, an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion. The Apex Court has held that inordinate and unexplained delay, in approaching the Court, in a writ, is, indeed, an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion. 12.13 In the present case, Annexure-C to Annexure-J to the writ petition make it abundantly clear that the petitioners approached the State respondents ventilating their grievances, but the State respondents did not respond to the representations and also failed to bring any seniority list of the combined cadre and nothing was filed before the Court that such a seniority list of the combined cadre was published inviting objections from the employees concerned. Under such circumstances, while the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the rules by filing the present writ petition after issuance of Annexure-K by the State respondents, the writ petition cannot be referred to be entertained on the ground of delay and laches. 12.14 In the case of Motor General Traders & Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. reported in (1984) 1 SCC 222 , the Supreme Court, in paragraph 24 of the judgment, observed thus-- 24. It is argued that since the impugned provision has been in existence for over twenty three years and its validity has once been upheld by the High Court, this Court should not pronounce upon its validity at this late stage. There are two answers to this pro position. First, the very fact that nearly twenty three years are over from the date of the enactment of the impugned provision and the discrimination is allowed to be continued unjustifiably for such a longtime is a ground of attack in these cases. As already observed, the landlords of the buildings constructed subsequent to August 26, 1957 are given undue preference over the landlords of buildings constructed prior to that date in that the former are free from the shackles of the Act while the latter are subjected to the restrictions imposed by it. What should have been just an incentive has become a permanent bonanza in favour of those who constructed buildings subsequent to August 26, 1957. There being no justification for the continuance of the benefit to a class of persons without any rational basis whatsoever, the evil effects flowing from the impugned exemption have caused more harm to the society than one could anticipate. There being no justification for the continuance of the benefit to a class of persons without any rational basis whatsoever, the evil effects flowing from the impugned exemption have caused more harm to the society than one could anticipate. What was justifiable during a short period has turned out to be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter of century. The second answer to the above contention is that mere lapse of time does not lend constitutionality to a provision which is otherwise bad. "Time does not run in favour of legislation. If it is ultra vires, it cannot again legal strength from long failure on the part of lawyers to perceives and set up its invalidity. Albeit, lateness in an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute is but a reason for exercising special caution in examining the arguments by which the attack is supported." (See W.A. Wynes: 'Legislative Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia' Fifth Edition p. 33). We are constrained to pronounce upon the validity of the impugned provision at this late stage because the garb of constitutionality which it may have possessed earlier has become worn out and its unconstitutionality is now brought to a successful challenge. 12.15 Having considered the facts pleaded by the petitioners, in respect of their representations, made time to time, which has not been denied by the State respondents in their counter affidavit and taking into consideration of the legal position in respect of belated and stale claims, as discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioners, since after the amendment rules was given effect to, submitted representations, but no effective action was taken on those representations. No seniority list of common cadre was prepared and published; whereas, pursuant to the amendments made after amalgamation, private respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were promoted and this compelled the petitioners to file a writ petition; but, immediately thereafter, they were also promoted. Even thereafter, no seniority list was prepared taking into consideration the representations made by the petitioners and the latest representation, made by the petitioners (Annexure-H), has not even been responded to. Submission of representation by itself cannot be a ground to explain delay and laches if such representation is answered by the responsible authorities. Even thereafter, no seniority list was prepared taking into consideration the representations made by the petitioners and the latest representation, made by the petitioners (Annexure-H), has not even been responded to. Submission of representation by itself cannot be a ground to explain delay and laches if such representation is answered by the responsible authorities. In this case, since the representations were not responded to and since the grievance, which is apparent, was not addressed, filing of writ petition after 23/24 years when the rights of the petitioners were found adversely affected, the petition cannot be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 13. GROUND OF CONSTRUCTIVE RES JUDICATA 13.1 The respondents have challenged the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of constructive res judicata. With regard to the above, the Additional Advocate General has submitted that a similar writ petition, being WP(C) No. 6105 of 2003, was filed by the petitioners raising the same grievance as raised in the instant writ petition and that the said writ petition was closed by order, dated 01.02.2011. By the said order, this Court, points out the learned Additional Advocate General, granted liberty to the petitioners to have the said writ petition revived if they are interested in pursuing the lis and, hence, while the said order is still in force, the petitioners cannot raise the same grievance, which was substantially an issue in the earlier writ case, in the instant writ petition. It is further pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General that the issue, in question, could not be decided in the earlier writ proceedings, because of the writ petitioners and, therefore, the present writ petition is a sheer abuse of process of the Court and, thus, the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, has submitted that the earlier writ petition was not decided by this Court and the same was closed with liberty to revive the subject matter and since the petitioners were promoted during the pendency of the said writ petition, constitutional validity of the Amendment Rules, 1987, was not raised in the earlier writ petition. This apart, points out Mr. This apart, points out Mr. Mishra, learned senior counsel, that no combined seniority list of the cadre after amalgamation was, admittedly, prepared and circulated inviting objection from the members of the integrated cadre and, hence, the present writ petition, challenging the vires of the Rules as well as challenging promotion of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 by impugned Notification, dated, 01.03.2011, do not come within the purview of constructive res judicata. 13.2 In paragraph 21 of the writ petition, the petitioners has stated that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were promoted to the post of UDA prior to the petitioners and, therefore, they challenged the order by filing writ petition being WP(C) No. 6105 of 2003 and, thereafter, the respondents authorities concerned promoted the petitioners to the post of UDA. The said writ petition came before this Court on 01.02:2011 and this Court dispose of the writ petition with liberty to reopen the writ petition if any grievance subsists. These statements of the petitioners have not been disputed by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition. 13.3 What is, therefore, evident from the above pleadings is that, the writ petition was just closed without adjudication and, therefore, the question of constructive res judicata does not arise at all. 13.4 Learned Addl. A.G., Assam, Mr. Saikia has referred to the case of M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 408 and S. Nagaraja Vs. B.R. Vasudeva Murthy reported in (2010) 3 SCC 353 . In the case of M. Nagabhushana (supra), while deciding that appeal, the Apex Court on the principle of constructive res judicata has held, "res judicata is based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause". Therefore, a judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive, which is based on public policy. In the present case, issues raised, by the petitioners, were never decided by this Court in the previous writ case. Therefore, a judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive, which is based on public policy. In the present case, issues raised, by the petitioners, were never decided by this Court in the previous writ case. There is no pleading of the respondents that the same issue, especially, the issue of constitutionality of the amended provisions were raised in the earlier case. Under such circumstances, the ratio of the decision in M. Nagabhushana (supra), cannot be applied in this case. 13.5 The case of S. Nagaraja (supra) is in a different context and clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. We find no justification to refer the case here, because it is not relevant at all. 13.6 In the case of Nand Kishore Vs. State of Punjab reported in (1995) 6 SCC 614 , the Apex Court, in paragraph 19 of its decision, held thus, 19. It would then have to be seen the twin play of the notion of deemed constitutionality and bar of constructive res judicata. Raising the constitutionality of a provision of law, as it appears to us, stands on a different footing than raising a matter on a bare question of law, or mixed question of law and fact, or on fact. There is a presumption always in favour of constitutionality of the law. The onus is heavy on the person challenging it. It is by the discharge of onus that the presumption of constitutionality can be crossed over. When a person enters a court for relief and does not challenge the constitutionality of the law governing the matters directly and substantially in issue, it only means and implies that he goes by the presumption of constitutionality. He cannot on this stance be deemed to have raised the question of constitutionality and the question of constitutionality to have been decided against him and such matter to have been directly and substantially in issue. The constitutionality of the Rule relating to compulsory retirement cannot be deemed to have been questioned and decided against the appellant on the principles of "might and ought" or it being "directly and substantially in issue". The constitutionality of the Rule relating to compulsory retirement cannot be deemed to have been questioned and decided against the appellant on the principles of "might and ought" or it being "directly and substantially in issue". It cannot be taken as a rule that one of the pleas, either by the plaintiff or the defendant, in every suit or proceeding, must of necessity relate to the constitutionality of the law on which the cause is founded or defended in order to obviate the plea of constructive res judicata being raised in an eventuality. It cannot also be taken as a rule that constitutionality of the law involved is a matter directly and substantially in issue, and if not raised renders a mute decision in favour of its constitutionality barring the plea being raised in a subsequent suit. If there be read such a rule in all civil litigation, it would, to our mind, be against public policy vexing and burdening the courts to go into the constitutionality of provisions of law in every case. When under the impugned rule, the Government assumed to itself the power to compulsorily retire a permanent government servant after ten years of qualifying service, the court's act of striking that Rule as unconstitutional is the law which appeared on the scene, not only to break the presumption of constitutionality but to declare it void. In a sense the offending provision was never there and in the other it was henceforth not there. In either event, it would be within the ambit of the emphasised word in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy: (1970) 1 SCC 61. 13.7 Admittedly, there is no pleading of the respondents, taken in their counter affidavit that the instant writ petition is barred by constructive res judicata in view of the decision of this court in previous writ petition, being WP(C) No. 6105 of 2003. Neither a copy of the writ petition nor the order passed by this Court, while closing that writ petition, is placed on record. Under such circumstances, we find nothing to hold that the present writ case is barred by constructive res judicata and the argument, therefore, merits no consideration. 14. Whether the writ petition is barred by Estoppel Waiver and Acquiescence. 14.1 Learned Addl. A.G., Assam, Mr. Under such circumstances, we find nothing to hold that the present writ case is barred by constructive res judicata and the argument, therefore, merits no consideration. 14. Whether the writ petition is barred by Estoppel Waiver and Acquiescence. 14.1 Learned Addl. A.G., Assam, Mr. Saikia, argued that the writ petitioners submitted themselves to the ambit of the Amendment Rules and they not only got their services confirmed, but also accepted the benefit of promotion from the post of LDA to the post of UDA vide Notification, dated, 21.09.2004. They did not raise any objection at the time of their promotion regarding the impugned Rules and, so, once they have submitted themselves to the operation of the Amendment Rules and enjoyed the benefit of the same, the instant challenge to the said rules is barred by the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. 14.2 Learned counsel of the petitioners submitted that the argument made by learned Addl. A.G., Mr. Saikia is beyond the pleadings. Nothing stated in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents that the petitioners submitted themselves to the ambit of Rules and since they have accepted the Rules, they cannot raise objection to the Rules by filing the present writ petition. 14.3 It is true that there was no objection raised by the respondents in their affidavits-in-opposition. The averments made in the writ petition, as already stated earlier, clearly spelt out the case of the petitioners that from the very inception, they recorded their objection regarding their seniority after amalgamation of the cadres. Their last representation, dated, 28.10.2010 (Annexure-H), was not even responded by the State respondents. They were promoted to the post of UDA after they filed the writ petition being WP(C) No. 6105 of 2003. No seniority list was, admittedly, published by the State respondents after integration of the cadres by inviting objection from the interested persons. Therefore, the case of the writ petitioners can in no way be termed to be barred by the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. The ratio of the decision in the case of Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Ann Vs. Jaswant Singh & Anr. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 , is clearly distinguishable and in no way helps the respondents. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam (supra), the respondents were employees of Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam and they were retired on attaining the age of superannuation at fifty eight years. Jaswant Singh & Anr. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 , is clearly distinguishable and in no way helps the respondents. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam (supra), the respondents were employees of Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam and they were retired on attaining the age of superannuation at fifty eight years. Some of them filed writ petitions, in the High Court, challenging the retirement age since the State Government employees were allowed to continue up to the age of sixty years. The writ petitions failed; but on appeal, the Apex Court allowed the appeals and held that the employees of the Jal Nigam shall be entitled to continue up to sixty years. Thereafter, the employees, who retired on attaining the age of fifty-eight years, approached the Court and while deciding their cases, the Apex Court has held that delay and laches has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person, who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces to the situation, his writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief shall be granted to him as was granted to a person similarly situated, who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement on attaining the age of fifty eight years. The ratio of the law laid down in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam (supra), is in our considered opinion, cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. Whether there was violation of fundamental rights or lack of legislative competence? 15.1 Learned Addl. A.G., Mr. Saikia, submitted that the Amendment Rules, 1987, was made in exercise of powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution of India and the petitioners challenged constitutionality of the said Rules. He has also submitted that it is the settled position of law that validity of any provision of law can be challenged only on two grounds, i.e., (i) lack of legislative competence, and (ii) violation of any fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-Ill of the Constitution of India. Except the said two grounds, no third ground can be availed to challenge the vires in law, but the petitioners have stated nothing in the writ petition identifying the ground on which they have challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment Rules. Except the said two grounds, no third ground can be availed to challenge the vires in law, but the petitioners have stated nothing in the writ petition identifying the ground on which they have challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment Rules. 15.2 Learned counsel of the petitioners has submitted that the legislative competence of Rule making power, under Article 309 of the Constitution, is not in challenge, but the petitioners' fundamental right, as guaranteed under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, has been violated by Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Amendment Rules, because their position, upon integration of the cadre, was not determined by the State respondents and, admittedly, promotion was given to the persons, who were in inferior cadre at the time of integration of service. The private respondents were, admittedly, in the cadre of Typist at the time of integration, while the petitioners were in the cadre of LDA. However, because of the impugned Amendment Rules, the private respondents have stolen a march over the petitioners and, therefore, the fundamental rights of the petitioners, as guaranteed under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, have been violated and the petitioners are, therefore, entitled to maintain the writ petition by challenging the vires of the rules. 15.3 In the case of Prafulla Kumar Das & Ors. Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., reported in (2003) 11 SCC 614, the writ petitioners as well as the appellants were the members of Orissa Subordinate Service Class III, which was designated as Orissa Administrative Service(Junior Branch) following its proposed and partial merger, on January 7, 1972, with the Orissa Administrative Service II, which, in turn, was designated as Orissa Administrative Service(Senior Branch). The complete and final merger of these branches by virtue of the governmental resolution, dated, December 21, 1973, resulted in the creation of a single integrated Orissa Administrative Service Class II. The Deputy Collectors, i.e. the members of the erstwhile Senior Branch, and the Sub-Deputy Collectors of the Junior Branch, were consequently conferred inter se seniority in the integrated service by putting the first name of the Junior Branch immediately below the last name of the Senior Branch. The Deputy Collectors, i.e. the members of the erstwhile Senior Branch, and the Sub-Deputy Collectors of the Junior Branch, were consequently conferred inter se seniority in the integrated service by putting the first name of the Junior Branch immediately below the last name of the Senior Branch. The established practice of the State of Orissa as to the appointment and allocation of seniority of its officers was to follow the principle of "year of allotment", whereby not the date of actual appointment, but the year in respect of which the vacancy was originally proposed to be filled was regarded as the date of appointment for the purpose of promotion and seniority. Accordingly, the direct recruits, though, joined service in 1975, were given 1973 as their year of allotment. The petitioners and appellants, being mergerists, who were borne in the integrated service on the date of merger, that is, December 21, 1973, were consequently denied seniority with respect to the respondents. The concept of year of allotment, in the particular context of the 1973 merger, with respect to those direct recruits, who, though appointed later, were conferred 1970 and 1971 as their respective years of allotment, was upheld by the Orissa High Court in Ananta Kumar Bose & Ors. Vs. State of Orissa & Ors. AIR 1986 Ori 151 ), which was, later on, approved by the Supreme Court in Nityananda Kar &. Anr. Vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in 1991 Supp. (2) 516.... The writ petitioners challenged validity of Section 2 of the Orissa Administrative Service, Class-II (Appointment of Officers Validation) Amendment Act, 1992 and also sought for a declaration that the Act was inapplicable to them and, in any event, could not have been applied retrospectively.... The petitioners have contended that the effect of the merger of December, 1973, was that appointment to the integrated cadre would be solely by means of direct recruitment, whereas prior to the merger, recruitment to the OAS Class II could be by any of the four different sources specified in Rule 4 of the Orissa Administrative Service Class II (Recruitment) Rules, 1959. Therefore, the principle of year of allotment had become redundant and unworkable and its application was uncalled for.... Therefore, the principle of year of allotment had become redundant and unworkable and its application was uncalled for.... The petitioners further contended that there was no advertisement in respect of any vacancy in the OAS Class II, and that the direct recruits with 1973, as their year of allotment, were appointed to OAS II in spite of the fact that the advertisements for that year were solely in respect of the Financial Service and the Police Service. The petitioners and the appellants, relying on certain observations made by two Judges Bench, which first considered the matter, contented that the cadre, constituted on 21.03.1973 could not be made from an earlier date even if the vacancy existed on that date. While deciding the writ petition and appeal, the Apex Court held, "Neither the Governmental Resolution of December, 1973, nor the impugned Section 2 of the Amendment Act, 1992, have repealed, whether explicitly or implicitly, the Recruitment Rules of 1959. Indeed, the Resolution itself alludes to the relevant rules thereby eradicating the possibility of the inference of an implied repeal of the 1959 Recruitment Rules. Similarly, the 1973 Resolution did not, in any way, provide for termination of recruitment of Deputy Collectors or an alternative method of recruitment in which case it cannot be averred that its effect was to repeal in toto the provisions contained in the 1959 Recruitment Rules. It was not until 1978 that the 1959 Recruitment Rules were repealed by the Orissa Administrative Service Recruitment Rules and Regulations for Promotion and Competitive Examination, 1978. The concept of year of allotment is a workable one inasmuch as it was still open to the Government in the post-1973 merger scenario to recruit officers from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, transfer from comparable services. The material point of fact is that through the adoption of a legal fiction and by having recourse to its Constitutional function under Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor of the State of Orissa appointed certain officers in the year 1975, who were appointed against vacancies, which were identified in the year 1973, prior to the entry into force of the Merger Resolution of December, 1973. That being the case, the legal fiction of year of allotment would operate in respect of the 1975 appointees as if they had been appointed in the year, when the vacancies were initially identified. That being the case, the legal fiction of year of allotment would operate in respect of the 1975 appointees as if they had been appointed in the year, when the vacancies were initially identified. In other words, they would be deemed to have been appointed in the year 1973, prior to the merger of the O.A.S. II with the O.S.A.S., although their actual period of service seemed to commence only in 1975. The Court has held that seniority is not the fundamental right, but is merely a civil right. The right of the seniority, in that case, was also not a vested or accrued right. The petitioners seek benefit to which they are not otherwise entitled. The legislature, in their opinion, has the requisite jurisdiction to pass an appropriate legislation which would do justice to its employees. Even otherwise a presumption to that effect has to be drawn. If a balance is sought to be struck by reason of the impugned legislation, it would not be permissible for the Supreme Court to declare the law it ultra vires merely because some hardship might be caused to the petitioners. A mere hardship cannot be a ground for striking down a valid legislation unless it is held to be suffering from the vice of discrimination or unreasonableness. Article 14 of the Constitution is not attracted. 15.4 In the case of Public Services Tribunal Bar Association Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., reported in (2003) 4 SCC 104 , in paragraphs 26 and 27 of its decision, the Apex Court observed thus-- 26. The constitutional validity of an Act can be challenged only on two grounds viz., (i) lack of legislative competence; and (ii) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provisions. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co. and Ors.: (1996) 3 SCC 709 , this Court has opined that except the above two grounds there is no third ground on the basis of which the law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation must necessarily fall within the four corners of the aforementioned two grounds. 27. Power to enact a law is derived by the State Assembly from List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 27. Power to enact a law is derived by the State Assembly from List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 41 confers upon a State Legislature the power to make State Public Services; State Public Services Commission. Under this entry, a State Legislature has the power to constitute State Public Services and to regulate their service conditions, emoluments and provide for disciplinary matter etc. The State Legislature had enacted the U.P. Public Services Tribunals Act, 1976 in exercise of the power vested in it by Entry 41 of List II of seventh schedule. Power to enact would include the power to re-enact or validate any provision of law in the State Legislature provided the same falls in a entry of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution with the restriction that such enactment should not nullify a judgment of the competent court of law. The legislative competence of the State to enact the U.P. Public Services Tribunal has not been questioned in these appeals. The challenge put forth is to various amendments made is that the same are violative of Articles Hand 16 of the Constitution being arbitrary as they are onerous and work inequitably. In the present appeals legislative action of the State is under challenge. Judicial system has an important role to play in our body politic and has a solemn obligation to fulfil. In such circumstances it is imperative upon the courts while examining the scope of legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the constitutional validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenges it. It is true that it is the duty of the Constitutional Courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by the Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when the Parliament or State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void, either from want of constitutional power to enact it or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed or where the law infringes the fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. 15.5 There is a presumption always in favour of constitutionality of law. The legislative power of the Governor to make Rules as conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution is not under challenge. 15.5 There is a presumption always in favour of constitutionality of law. The legislative power of the Governor to make Rules as conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution is not under challenge. The petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of the rules on the ground that after integration of the cadre, their position, in the common cadre, has not been determined by the impugned Rules and that the persons, who were in the inferior cadre at the time of amalgamation, have been given a march over them. When respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were promoted to the post of UDA, before the petitioners, the petitioners challenged the order by filing writ petition in the year 2003 and, thereafter, since they were promoted and the writ petition was closed. Again, by impugned order, dated 01.03.2011, respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have been promoted to the post of Superintendent, but still the position of the writ petitioners in the common cadre has not been ascertained and fixed formalizing the seniority list of the members of common cadre after integration. Since the matter has been kept unattended to by the impugned Rules and the right of the petitioners is kept clouded and the Rule is not clear about the position of the petitioners, they have a right to challenge the same. 15.6 We have already reproduced above the impugned provisions prescribed in Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) of the Amendment Rules. The Rule has not clearly addressed the position of LDAs appointed on or after 01.01.1981 at the time of amalgamation of the cadres. Therefore, on this ground alone, we find no justification to strike down the impugned provisions of the Amendment Rules and the relief(s), sought by the petitioners, since found justified, may be given otherwise, by way of reading down the statute. 16. The Supreme Court, in the case of Jagdish Pandey Vs. The Chancellor University of Bihar & Anr. reported in 1968(1) SCR 231 , case of Sri Indra Das Vs. State of Assam reported in 2011(4) SCR 289 and in the case of Rapti Commission Agency Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 555, considered the principle of reading down statue. In paragraph 9 of its decision in Jagdish Pandey (supra), the Apex Court has observed thus, 9. State of Assam reported in 2011(4) SCR 289 and in the case of Rapti Commission Agency Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 555, considered the principle of reading down statue. In paragraph 9 of its decision in Jagdish Pandey (supra), the Apex Court has observed thus, 9. The next attack on the validity of s. 4 is that it confers uncanalised powers on the Chancellor without indicating any criterion on the basis of which the power under s. 4 can be exercised. There is no doubt that if one reads s. 4 literally it does appear to give uncanalised powers to the Chancellor to do what he likes on the recommendation of the Commission with respect to teachers covered by it. We do not however think that the Legislature intended to give such an arbitrary power to the Chancellor. We are of opinion that s. 4 must be read down and if we read it down there is no reason to hold that the legislature was conferring a naked arbitrary power on the Chancellor. It seems to us that the intention of the legislature was that all appointments, dismissals etc. made between the two dates should be scrutinised and the scrutiny must be for the purpose of seeing that the appointments, dismissals etc., were in accordance with the University Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules named thereunder, both in the matter of qualifications, and in the matter of procedure prescribed for these purposes. We do not think that the legislature intended more than that when it gave power to the Chancellor to scrutinise the appointments, dismissals, etc. made between these two dates. We have therefore no hesitation in reading down the section and hold that it only authorised the Chancellor to scrutinise appointments, dismissals etc. made between these two dates for the purpose of satisfying himself that these appointments, dismissals etc. were in accordance with the University. Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations or Rules made thereunder, both as to the substantive and procedural aspects thereof. If the appointments etc. were in accordance with the University Act etc. the Chancellor would uphold them, and if they were not, the Chancellor would pass such orders as he deemed fit. were in accordance with the University. Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations or Rules made thereunder, both as to the substantive and procedural aspects thereof. If the appointments etc. were in accordance with the University Act etc. the Chancellor would uphold them, and if they were not, the Chancellor would pass such orders as he deemed fit. Read down this way, s. 4 does not confer uncanalised power on the Chancellor; as such it is not liable to be struck down as discriminatory under Art. 14. 16.1 Applying the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in Jagdish Pandey (supra), Rapti Commission Agency (supra) and Sri Indra Das (supra), we are of considered opinion that the relief(s), the petitioners sought for in the present writ petition, may be fairly given by reading down the impugned provisions, directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners and to place them in the array of LDAs over and above the Typists on the date of amalgamation of the cadres since they were, admittedly, working in a superior cadre (LDA) on the date of integration of the cadres. For giving this direction, we find no justification at all to strike down the provisions of the Amendment Rules made in the year 1987. 17. Indisputably, in the event of integration of cadre and/or amalgamation of services, there must be a cut off date, but it should be reasonable and with the only object of the interest of public service. In the present case, the integration of services of LDAs and Typists was made pursuant to a recommendation made by the Pay Commission, which was accepted by the State Government. It was clearly stipulated in the ROP Rules, 1983, that revised scale and dearness allowance, over the revised scale, will be effective from 01.01.1981 and other benefits will be effective from 01.09.1982. The State respondents, while accepting the recommendation of the Pay Commission, have taken the steps for amendment of the Service Rules. The amendment was given effect on 06.05.1987. Rule 11(1) is silent about the LDAs appointed on or after 01.01.1981. Simultaneously, Rule 19(5-A) is also silent about the position of the persons working as LDA on or after 01.01.1981 and before amalgamation. The amendment was given effect on 06.05.1987. Rule 11(1) is silent about the LDAs appointed on or after 01.01.1981. Simultaneously, Rule 19(5-A) is also silent about the position of the persons working as LDA on or after 01.01.1981 and before amalgamation. The ROP Rules, 1983, was made in exercise of the power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution, wherein it was clearly stipulated that other benefits will come into effect w.e.f. 01.09.1982. The State respondents ought to have made the Rules consistent with the ROP Rules. However, on this ground alone, we find no justification to strike down the Amendment Rules since even without striking down the rules the relief(s), as sought for by the petitioners, may be ensured and it will meet the ends of justice. 18. In view of the discussions made above, the writ petition is allowed to the extent that the petitioners are entitled to be placed above the private respondents. Prayer for striking down Rule 11(1) and Rule 19(5-A) is rejected. The prayer, for striking down Notification, dated, 01.03.2011 (Annexure-K), is allowed and the impugned notification, dated 01.03.2011, is hereby set aside and quashed. The State respondents shall prepare a list of the common cadre and, on the date of amalgamation, since the petitioners had been working in the cadre of LDA and the private respondents were working in the cadre of Typists, the petitioners shall be placed above the private respondents in the list of common cadre as LDA and consequential promotion as well as seniority shall be fixed between the petitioners on the one hand and the private respondents on the other hand accordingly. 19. In terms of the above observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. We allow the parties to bear their respective costs. Disposed off