Judgment Ajay Kumar Mittal,J. 1. This order shall dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos.11786 of 1988 and 7012 of 1991, as learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the issue involved in both the petitions is identical. However, the facts are being extracted from Civil Writ Petition No.11786 of 1988. 2. Challenge in CWP No.11786 of 1988 is to the order dated 1.9.1988, Annexure P.1 passed by respondent No.2 – the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Chandigarh at Mohali, whereby the petition filed by respondent No.3 under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (in short, “the Act”) against repartition carried out under Section 21(1) of the Act was allowed. 3. A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversy involved, as narrated in the petition, may be noticed. Consolidation proceedings took place in Village Jebbo Majra, Tehsil Malerkotla, District Sangrur in late 1950s. The scheme was prepared and reparation was carried out after confirmation of scheme by the Settlement officer under the Act. The record of rights on the basis of revenue record was prepared by the consolidation staff. The land was graded as per its value and this was so shown in the haqdarwar of each right holder as per his respective khata. Some land was reserved for the petitioner-Gram Panchayat to meet the expenses of village community. In order to meet the requirements of the right holders, bachat area was left i.e. a pool to meet the deficiency of land of right holders of the village and this was made possible after imposing prorata cut on the khataof the right holders. In the year 1982, respondent No.3 filed an application under Section 42 of the Act before respondent No.2 for making up the deficiency of land of his khata. The same having been allowed by respondent No.1 vide order dated 1.9.1988, Annexure P.1, the petitioner-Gram Panchayat is before this Court through the present writ petition. 4. As per the averments in the petition, the impugned order was passed on 1.9.1988 on an application filed by respondent No.3 under Section 42 of the Act in the year 1982. The said respondent had sought repartition of the land and amendment in the scheme which was framed in pursuance of consolidation proceedings which took place in late 1950s. 4. As per the averments in the petition, the impugned order was passed on 1.9.1988 on an application filed by respondent No.3 under Section 42 of the Act in the year 1982. The said respondent had sought repartition of the land and amendment in the scheme which was framed in pursuance of consolidation proceedings which took place in late 1950s. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the connected petition being CWP No.7012 of 1991 submitted that the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 was not a speaking order. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Additional Director of Consolidation, 1997(4) RCR (Civil) 498 and judgment of this Court in Ajit Singh and others v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, 2004(3) PLR 360, it was urged that the petition under Section 42 of the Act having been filed after a long and inordinate delay of the finalization of the consolidation scheme, the Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings had erroneously exercised jurisdiction as the scheme was sought to be amended after an inordinately long delay of more than three decades from its framing. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the private respondents besides supporting the impugned order, submitted that the area reserved for various categories in the original consolidation scheme was against the statute which could be rectified at any time. It was also argued that the land was bachatland which was sought to be partitioned and, therefore, the same would not be hit by law of limitation. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find merit in the petitions. 7. Hon'ble the Apex Court in M/s Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, while delving into the issue of passing a speaking order by a quasi judicial authority held as under: “17. The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report) 18. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report) 18. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the `inscrutable face of a Sphinx'. 19 to 50 XX XX XX 51. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “Due Process”.” 8. A perusal of the order dated 1.9.1988 passed by respondent No.2 – the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Chandigarh at Mohali and order dated 13.2.1991, Annexure P.4 in the connected petition passed by the same authority reveals that it does not satisfy the requirement of being a speaking order in terms of the decision of the Apex Court in M/s Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd's case (supra). 9. In view of the above, the impugned orders in both the petitions are quashed. The petitions stand allowed. 9. In view of the above, the impugned orders in both the petitions are quashed. The petitions stand allowed. The matter is remanded to the Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab for deciding it afresh after hearing the parties in accordance with law. It shall be open to the petitioners to raise the plea of limitation before respondent No.2 who shall decide the same in accordance with law.