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2013 DIGILAW 1459 (PNJ)

Ajay Kumar Saini v. State of Haryana

2013-11-07

JITENDRA CHAUHAN

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Judgment Jitendra Chauhan, J. 1. The present revision has been filed against the judgment dated 16.12.2003, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, vide which, respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were acquitted of the charges under Sections 148, 149, 323, 506, 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 12.10.2002, at about 10 P.M. Ajit Singh told accused Jeet Singh that his tenants had been throwing waste rice in to the drain, which attracts pigs, causing considerable inconvenience to him, while he comes home in the night, whereupon Jeet Singh started abusing. Surat Singh, father of Ajit Singh, injured had bee listening to the conversation while standing at the door of his house. Meanwhile all the four sons of accused Jeet Singh came there. Accused Bitto caught hold Ajay and dragged him upto gate of his house in the street. Accused Sonu gave batten blow on the head of Ajay, accused Parveed gave lathi blow on his head, accused Bitto gave 4-5 kicks on his back and Jeet Singh gave a Koncha blow on his head. Robin also gave many stick blows to Ajay. Surat Singh came running there raising noise to rescue his son Ajay. The persons from the locality gathered there. Father and son Surat Singh and Satte alias Sat Narain respectively also reached at the spot. Surat Singh also received injuries. 3. It is averred in the grounds of revision that the learned trial court gravely erred while acquitting the accused-respondents. The prosecution case is fully established by way of ocular evidence of the eye witness PW8 Surat Singh and injured Ajay, which is corroborated by the medical evidence. As per MLR, injured Ajay suffered multiple injuries on his person. There is no reason as to why the injured would falsely implicate the accused-respondents. 4. Heard and perused. 5. By now it is settled that it is not permissible for the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court without rendering specific finding that the decision of the Trial Court is perverse or unreasonable resulting in miscarriage of justice. 4. Heard and perused. 5. By now it is settled that it is not permissible for the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court without rendering specific finding that the decision of the Trial Court is perverse or unreasonable resulting in miscarriage of justice. The Appellate Court while entertaining an appeal against the judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court is entitled to reappreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, and while doing so it may consider the entire material on record, and the reasons given by the Trial Court in support of its order of acquittal. It is also settled proposition that if two views are possible on a set of evidence, then the Appellate Court need not to substitute its own view in preference to the view of the Trial Court, which has recorded an order of acquittal. It is settled by various precedents that presumption of innocence of the accused is strengthened with the Trial Court's order of acquittal. Moral consideration cannot be a substitute for legal evidence. 6. If an order of acquittal has been challenged by way of a criminal revision petition, in that eventuality, the scope of setting aside the well reasoned order of acquittal becomes narrow. In the case in hand, the State did not file any appeal. 7. Though the scope for interference with an order of acquittal, while exercising the jurisdiction as a Revisional Court is very limited, but to satisfy the conscience of this Court, the whole evidence available on record has been rescanned. It is found that there is not an iota of legal evidence connecting respondent Nos. 2 to 4 with the offence punishable under Sections 148, 149, 323, 506, 307 IPC. There are two material witnesses and their statements are full of material contradictions and not in line with the version rendered in the FIR. Surat Singh PW8 states that his son was pushed towards the wall by accused Bittu and Parveen, whereas as per FIR, it was only Bittu, who dragged his son, and Parveen is not named in the FIR. Further, Parveen had given lath blow on the head of Ajay, whereas Robin had given danda blows to Ajay, but the FIR is silent about it. Further, Parveen had given lath blow on the head of Ajay, whereas Robin had given danda blows to Ajay, but the FIR is silent about it. As per FIR, Bittu gave 45 lath blows on the back of Ajay, but PW8 Surat Singh did not state nothing in this regard before the Court. The occurrence took place at 10 PM on 12.10.2002, whereas, the report was lodged on the next day at 9.25 P.M. As per the prosecution version, the occurrence took place in a public street and the people gathered at that time, but none of public witness was examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution. 8. The factum of powers of the revisional court dealing with the revision against acquittal being extremely reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Ramachandran Versus V.N. Rajan & Anr. [2010 (5) R.C.R. (Criminal) 237, wherein it was held as under: This question has been considered in the celebrated judgment of Akalu Ahir & Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram [ (1973) 2 SCC 583 ], where, after considering the judgments of D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [ 1951 SCR 284 ], Logendranath Jha v. Polailal [ 1951 SCR 676 ], K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (1963) 3 SCR 412 ] and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [ (1968) 2 SCR 287 ] this Court came out with categories of case which would justify the High Court in interfering with the finding of acquittal in revision: "(i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the appellant-accused; (ii) Where the Trail Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the Trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. "Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. "Of course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In this very judgment though in paragraph 10, this Court did not generally approve of the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court Judge and held it to be not perfect or free from flaw and further observed "the Court of appeal may be justified in disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is not entitled to reappreciate the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a retrial. "The situation, as we will show further, is identical in the present case. 9. In the said case, it has been pointed out that reappreciation of evidence cannot be done by the revisional Court while dealing with the judgment against acquittal unless and until there are some procedural irregularities or illegalities in the decision of the case. Even if the reading of evidence by the trial Court is free from flaw the same cannot be a ground to justify the exercise of powers in revision against acquittal. It is pertinent to mention herein that in the case of Akalu Ahir & Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram [ (1973) 2 SCC 583 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.” 10. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court.” 10. Similarly, in the case of Hydru v. State of Kerala, [ 2004 (13) SCC 374 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “3. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the High Court upon reappraisal came to a conclusion different from the one recorded by the appellate court. It is well settled that in revision against acquittal by a private party, the powers of the Revisional Court are very limited. It can interfere only if there is any procedural irregularity or material evidence has been overlooked or misread by the subordinate court. If upon reappraisal of evidence, two views are possible, it is not permissible even for the appellate court in appeal against acquittal to interfere with the same, much less in revision where the powers are much narrower. No procedural irregularity has been found by the High Court in the order of the Sessions Court whereby the appellant was acquitted. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional powers, as such the same is liable to be interfered with by this Court”. 11. Thus, it is apparent that reappraisal of evidence is not possible in a revision against acquittal unless and until there are some procedural irregularities or illegalities, which has been pointed out by the complainant/petitioner so as to justify the exercise of revisional powers by this Hon’ble Court. 12. In view of the above and after taking into consideration the evidence led by the prosecution and the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, this Court finds no perversity, illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment. As such, the present revision fails and is hereby dismissed.