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2013 DIGILAW 146 (RAJ)

Dhirendra Nath v. State of Rajasthan

2013-01-17

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners have prayed for quashing of F.I.R., namely F.I.R. No.223/2012, registered at Vaishali Nagar, Police Station, Jaipur for offences under Sections 376, 420, 406, 504 read with 34 of I.P.C. 2. Mr. A.S. Narang, learned counsel for the petitioners, has vehemently raised the following contentions before this Court:- 3. Firstly, the prosecutrix has lodged a false complaint against the petitioners, which was sent for further investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. On the basis of the false complaint, a F.I.R. was registered for the aforementioned offences. 4. Secondly, the falsity of the cases is apparent from the fact that she claimed that the petitioner No.1, Dhirendra Nath assured her that he had legally married her by filling parting on her hair with Vermilion power. According to her, they lived as husband and wife between 2003 to 2008. Since she was his "lawful wedded wife", he continued to have physical relationship with her. However, the said complaint was not filed till four-years later i.e. 09.05.2012. The inordinate delay in filing the complaint is a pointer to the fact that a false case is being hoisted upon the petitioners. 5. Thirdly, there are certain contradictions between the F.I.R., and the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. This again reveals the falsity of the case. 6. Fourthly, the prosecutrix herself gave an affidavit in which she clearly stated that she has no relationship with Dhirendra Nath, petitioner No.1. Moreover, she has also given certain affidavits saying that she is married to one Sanjay Khanna as is apparent from Annexures 15 and 16, attached with the petition. Thus, her story that she was married to Dhirendra Nath is absolutely false. 7. Fifthly, it is she who had borrowed money from Dhirendra Nath; it is she who had issued a cheque in favour of Dhirendra Nath. However, as the said cheque bounced on 27.07.2012, thus, in order to save her skin, she lodged a false complaint against Dhirendra Nath and his family members. 8. As far as petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are concerned, the learned counsel has contended that there is a contradiction in the stand taken by the prosecutrix as to when and how she met petitioner No.2, Gajendra Nath, the brother of Dhirendra Nath. Moreover, according to the prosecutrix herself, she had met petitioner No.3, Smt. Rama Devi, mother of the Dhirendra Nath. Moreover, according to the prosecutrix herself, she had met petitioner No.3, Smt. Rama Devi, mother of the Dhirendra Nath. However, no offence can be said to be made out against Smt. Rama Devi. Since the F.I.R., is absolutely a false complaint, learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the same should be quashed by this Court. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the F.I.R. as well as the other documents submitted along with the petition. 10. It is, indeed, trite to state that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for interfering with the F.I.R. is extremely limited one. In catena of cases the Apex Court has held that the Court should take the F.I.R. as the truth for the time being. In case, the ingredients of the alleged offence are prima-facie made out, then the Court should not interfere with the F.I.R. For, investigation is arena of the Police; the veracity of the F.I.R. can be investigated only by the Police. Therefore, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the High Court should refrain from entering into the said arena. Further-more, while exercising its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., at the initial stage of investigation, the High Court is not permitted to consider the evidence, which may be produced by the defense during the course of the trial. At the initial stage, when the investigation is in progress, to enter into defense evidence would be a premature step. Therefore, the High Court should be weary of interfering with the investigation and in quashing the F.I.R. at the out set. 11. While deciding this case, these well known principles will have to be kept in mind. 12. The issue whether the F.I.R. is a delayed one? The issue about the impact of such a delay would have on the veracity of the testimony of the prosecutrix? These issues cannot be decided at this stage by this Court. After all, these issues are matters to be considered and adjudicated upon by the trial Court. Therefore, even if there is a delay of four-years in lodging the F.I.R. by the prosecutrix, this Court cannot conclude that the delay proves the falsity of the case. 13. These issues cannot be decided at this stage by this Court. After all, these issues are matters to be considered and adjudicated upon by the trial Court. Therefore, even if there is a delay of four-years in lodging the F.I.R. by the prosecutrix, this Court cannot conclude that the delay proves the falsity of the case. 13. Similarly, even if there were contradictions between the F.I.R. and the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., it would be improper on the part of this Court to express any opinion about the contradictions. After all, such expression of opinion may prejudice the trial itself. 14. There may be affidavits given by the prosecutrix, the evidentiary value of these affidavits, the affect of these affidavits on the veracity of the prosecutrix would again have to be decided by the trial Court. Affidavits produced by the petitioners, at best, are their defense to the allegations leveled by the prosecutrix. Therefore, at the initial stage, this Court cannot enter into the evidentiary value of these affidavits. 15. Contention raised by the learned counsel that prosecutrix has cleverly fabricated a case against the petitioners in order to escape her liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also can not be looked into by this Court at the initial stage. For, again this forms part of the defense, which may be available to the petitioners to plead before the trial Court. 16. Even the contentions with regard to petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are unacceptable. Even if, there were contradictions with regard to meeting between the prosecutrix and the petitioner No.2, such contradictions do not dilute the veracity of the F.I.R. The F.I.R. has to be taken as its face value at this stage. 17. A bare perusal of the F.I.R., clearly reveals that prima-facie the offences are made out against each of the petitioners, as sufficient allegations have been leveled against them. However, this opinion is only prima-facie. Even this opinion of the Court should not influence either the investigation, or the subsequent development of the case, which may occur, in case charge-sheet is filed. This Court is of the opinion that as allegations taken on the face value, do constitute the offences alleged by the prosecutrix, this Court should not interfere with the F.I.R. 18. Consequently, the petition being devoid of merit is, hereby, dismissed. 19. This Court is of the opinion that as allegations taken on the face value, do constitute the offences alleged by the prosecutrix, this Court should not interfere with the F.I.R. 18. Consequently, the petition being devoid of merit is, hereby, dismissed. 19. Upon dismissal of the main petition, stay application, filed therewith, does not survive; the same is also dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******