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2013 DIGILAW 1464 (MAD)

Joint Commissioner (Admn), Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, New Delhi v. S. S. Selvakumari

2013-03-28

ELIPE DHARMA RAO, M.VENUGOPAL

body2013
Judgment :- M. Venugopal, J. 1. The Petitioners have preferred the instant Writ Petition as against the order, dated 21.12.2010, made in O.A.No.759 of 2009, passed by the Second Respondent/Central Administrative Tribunal. 2. The Second Respondent/Tribunal, while passing orders in O.A.No.759 of 2009 filed by the first Respondent/Applicant on 21.12.2010, inter-alia observed that, 'the Disciplinary Authority has not dealt with the explanation offered by the first Respondent/Applicant and when an Appeal is preferred to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has expanded the charges to the effect that the children were forced to attend the personal needs like errands and the Applicant is in the habit of using vulgar language against the students and so on'. It also held that, 'if such facts are dealt with by the Appellate Authority which are totally new and not incorporated in the Articles of charges, we are of the opinion that the findings rendered on new set of facts is perverse etc.' and consequently allowed the original application without costs. 3. It is not in dispute that as per Memorandum, dated 15.03.2007, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the First Respondent/Applicant as per Rule 14 of C.C.S.(C.C.A.) Rules, 1965 in respect of the following Articles of charges:- Article 1:That the said Smt. S.Selvakumari, while functioning as PET at KV No.1 Kalpakkam during October 2006 was deputed to escort girl students of KV NO.1 Kalpakkam to KVS national swimming meet held at KV Ambarnath, Pune from 08.10.2006 to 12.10.2006. She behaved with the girl students in a manner unbecoming of a KVS employee. Article 2:That the said Smt. S.Selvakumari, while functioning as PET at KV No.1 Kalpakkam during October 2006 was directed to escort-II-students from KV No.1 Kalpakkam to KV Island Grounds on 04.10.2006. Instead of traveling with the children in one of the vans arranged by the Principal, she traveled from Kalpakkam to Chennai in her car on 04.10.2006. She had not complied with directions of the Principal to escort the students to Chennai by traveling along with the students in the van. Article 3:That the said Smt. S.Selvakumari, while functioning as PET at KV NO.1 Kalpakkam did not bother to meet the primary requirement of collecting certificates from the students in advance till their departure to Chennai by van. Article 3:That the said Smt. S.Selvakumari, while functioning as PET at KV NO.1 Kalpakkam did not bother to meet the primary requirement of collecting certificates from the students in advance till their departure to Chennai by van. She directed the parents to handover the eligibility certificates with photos attested by the Principal at the Central Railway Station on the day of departure. 4. The First Respondent/Employee denied the charges through a reply dated 07.04.2007. An Enquiry Officer, viz., Sh. Rajendran Kamayil, the then Principal, KV Adoor, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer, as per Office Order dated 20.04.2007. The Enquiry Officer, after completing the conduct of enquiry, submitted his report on 05.03.2008 holding that the three charges were proved against the First Respondent/Applicant. 5. The Disciplinary Authority (Second Appellant) agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, through his order, dated 09.07.2008 and imposed a penalty of 'reduction to lower stage in the time scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect' to the First Respondent/Applicant. 6. In regard to the first charge that the First Respondent/ Applicant behaved rudely with girl students, the second Respondent/Tribunal in its order dated 21.12.2010 in O.A.No.759 of 2009 has opined that the Disciplinary Authority arrived at a conclusion not based on available materials on record. As a matter of fact, the Enquiry Officer had not examined the complainants (Parents) and examined only minor children. As such, the second Respondent/Tribunal has held that the statements of the minor students are not corroborative in nature, which cannot be relied primarily to impose punishment. 7. Further, the second Respondent/Tribunal in respect of the second charge has also observed that, 'the same is very flimsy and the same is nothing but the first Respondent/Applicant instead of travelling in the van has chosen to travel in her own car'. Moreover, the first Respondent/Applicant has given explanation to the charge memo to the effect that the Applicant was about to board the van but some parents have already boarded the van and the van has become full and there was no sufficient space to accommodate her. Moreover, the first Respondent/Applicant has given explanation to the charge memo to the effect that the Applicant was about to board the van but some parents have already boarded the van and the van has become full and there was no sufficient space to accommodate her. Also that, the first Respondent/Applicant's four year minor daughter was also travelling along with her who was ill at the relevant point of time and under the said circumstances, she has decided that it may not be desirable to direct the parents to get down from the van and accordingly, she had to travel in a car from the school to the Island grounds from where the students were escorted to Pune by train. 8. Added further, the second Respondent/Tribunal has also held that the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have not chosen to consider the above explanation and they opined that the first Respondent/Applicant is duty bound to travel in the van. That apart, the first Respondent/ Applicant has also offered an explanation to the effect that she could not be able to meet the Principal at that time and she was absent on the relevant date and the Principal has also not given any instructions about the travel made by the parents to whom no arrangements were made initially. Since all the above valid points were not considered, the second Respondent/Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the order of punishment cannot stand in the eye of law. 9. In regard to the third charge levelled against the first Respondent/Applicant, she has offered a specific explanation to the effect that it has been decided in the Regional Committee Meeting in the Vidyalaya in the presence of the Principal that the parents could collect the eligibility certificates. When such a decision was taken and when the parents failed to collect the eligibility certificates, with due attestation by the Principal, the first Respondent/Applicant is bound to take necessary corrective steps to which she cannot be found fault with. 10. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal has come to the resultant conclusion that the above explanation was not at all considered by both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority and also it is opined that the finding rendered on this score by the Authorities concerned is not based on merit. 11. 10. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal has come to the resultant conclusion that the above explanation was not at all considered by both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority and also it is opined that the finding rendered on this score by the Authorities concerned is not based on merit. 11. It is to be pointed out that 'a charge sheet is a formal accusation made by a competent authority that an employee is guilty of misconduct'. Indeed, the charge must contain some accusation of misconduct against an employee. In Service Law, the term 'misconduct' refers to those acts or omissions of an Employee/ Public Servant as the case may be. Where a charge sheet in an appropriate case is vague or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 12. It is well settled principle of law that where the charges framed are vague, the fact that the charged employee has participated in the conduct of enquiry would not exonerate the Employer/Department to bring home the charges and in fact, such participation would not confer validity to the proceedings as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sawai Singh -vs- State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1986 SC 995 ). 13. That apart, where the date, time and location of alleged incident which constitute the charge of misconduct was not indicated with sufficient particulars, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the charge sheet was vague and Employee was prejudiced in the matter of his defence at the enquiry as per decision in State of Uttar Pradesh -vs- Mohd. Sharif (dead) through Legal Representatives ( AIR 1982 SC 937 ). 14. We deem it appropriate to point out that a charge sheet should disclose with adequate clarity and precision the charge levelled against an Employee and the requirement is one of the essential adjuncts of concept of a reasonable and adequate opportunity of defending oneself as per decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surath Chandra Chakravarty -vs- State of West Bengal ( AIR 1971 S.C. 752 ). 15. Further, once a charge has been framed by competent authority, it is not within the competence of the Enquiry Officer to frame fresh charges as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.Subha Rao -vs-State of Mysore [AIR 1964 Mysore 221 (Division Bench)]. 16. 15. Further, once a charge has been framed by competent authority, it is not within the competence of the Enquiry Officer to frame fresh charges as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.Subha Rao -vs-State of Mysore [AIR 1964 Mysore 221 (Division Bench)]. 16. In the instant case on hand, the second Respondent/Tribunal has held that the charges are vague and both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have not considered the explanation offered by the first Respondent/Applicant and allowed O.A.No.759 of 2009 filed by the her, by setting aside the order, dated 09.07.2008, passed by the second Respondent therein/Original Authority as well as the order, dated 10.07.2009, passed by the Appellate Authority. 17. Assailing the correctness of the order passed by the second Respondent/Tribunal, in O.A.No.759 of 2009, dated 21.12.2010, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the order passed by the Tribunal is contrary to facts and Law. 18. It is the further submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had rested their findings on the evidence available before them. 19. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners urges before us that the second Respondent/Tribunal committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Appeal submitted by the first Respondent/Applicant has not been taken into account by the Appellate Authority. 20. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners strenuously contends that the second respondent/Tribunal committed an error in substituting its own finding in the place of the finding rendered by the second Appellant/second Respondent, as per order dated 09.07.2008 (signed on 10.07.2008) and as confirmed by the First Appellant/First Respondent through his order dated 10.07.2009. 21. Yet another plea taken on behalf of the Petitioners is that the principles of natural justice have been adhered to by the Authorities concerned in the domestic enquiry conducted in regard to the charges framed against the delinquent. As such, there is no scope to interfere with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority,. 22. As such, there is no scope to interfere with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority,. 22. Once again this Court has gone through the entire materials available on record and is of the considered view that in regard to the three charges framed against the first Respondent/ Applicant, the authorities, viz., Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have taken into account the entire facts and circumstances of the case and also they have looked into the explanation furnished by the first Respondent/Applicant and has come to a resultant conclusion in imposing the punishment of reduction to lower stage in the time scale of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect, as per order dated 09.07.2008. As against the original order of finding of the Domestic Enquiry Officer, the first Respondent/Applicant has also preferred an Appeal on 04.08.2008 and the Appellate Authority also has arrived at a finding on 10.07.2009 thereby concurring with the view taken by the Original Authority. 23. Moreover, on going through the entire materials available on record and it is quite evident from the records that the Disciplinary Authority has not dealt with the explanation furnished by the first Respondent/Applicant. More over, the Appellate Authority, before whom the first Respondent/Applicant has preferred an appeal, has also elongated the charges to the effect that the children were forced to attend the personal needs like errands and further the first Respondent/Applicant has been in the habit of using vulgar language against the students and so on. In short, the Appellate Authority has dealt with the new facts in the order of punishment dated 10.07.2009 and these facts have not been admittedly incorporated in the Articles of charges. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the finding rendered by the Appellate Authority on new sets of facts is a perverse one. 24. In any event, on going through the entire gamut of the materials available on record, this Court comes to an inevitable conclusion that the second Respondent/Tribunal has rightly held that the articles of charges 1 to 3 framed against the first Respondent/ Applicant are vague and the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have not considered the explanation offered by the applicant in a proper perspective, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice by imposing punishment against the first Respondent/Applicant. Viewed in that perspective, this Court concludes that the second Respondent/Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that the order, dated 09.07.2008, passed by the Original Authority as well as the order, dated 10.07.2009, passed by the Appellate Authority are liable to be set aside and accordingly, set aside the same to prevent an aberration of justice. Consequently, the writ petition fails. 25. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.