Judgment : 1] This Civil Revision Application takes exception to the judgment and order, dated 30.6.2003, passed by the learned District Judge, Latur, in Rent Appeal No. 3 of 1998. 2] The facts for filing this Civil Revision Application, as stated in the Revision Application, are as under: It is the case of the revision applicants, who are the legal representatives of original petitioner/landlord Vishwambhar, that the suit premises consists of a shop admeasuring 15’ x 20’ ft. out of House No. 1270/6, situated at Gunj Golai area of Latur town. The original petitioner/landlord Vishwambhar was the owner of the suit premises and after his death, the present revision applicants/landlord (hereinafter referred to as “the applicant/landlord”) have inherited the suit premises. The suit premises was leased out to one Sadhuram, original respondent no.1, on monthly rent basis. Sadhuram used to run a fair price shop in the suit premises. However, subsequently respondent no.2 i.e. Radhesham started Ravi Bhandi Stores in the suit premises. Thereafter, the business was run by respondent no.2/tenant (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) under the name and style “Sachin Bhandi Stores”. The rent of the suit premises was increased from time to time and one of the last payments made by the respondent to the applicant was of Rs.1,750/-. The said monthly rent of Rs. 1,750/-was paid up to November, 1992 by the respondent. However, the rent from December, 1992 to 31st March, 1994 was not paid by the respondent. Even prior to that also, the respondent did not pay the rent in time. Under the said circumstances, the applicant was constrained to issue notice, dated 15.4.1994 (Exh.’A’ annexed with the revision memo) claiming possession of the suit property for default in making the payment of rent of Rs.1,750/- per month for the period from December 1992 to March 1994, amounting to Rs.28,000/-. 3] It is further the case of the applicant that despite service of notice, the respondent failed to pay the amount of rent, and therefore, applicant filed Rent Application No. 10 of 1994 (Exh.’B’ annexed with the revision memo) before the learned Rent Controller, Latur, under Section 15 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as, “the said Act”), on the grounds:- [a] The tenant is in arrears of rent from December, 1992 to March, 1994, and hence, he is willful defaulter. [b] The suit premises are bona fide and reasonably required by the landlord for starting business for his unemployed sons. [c] The tenant has acquired alternate accommodation, and [d] The tenant has changed the use of the suit premises. 4] The applicant filed Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 on 18.6.1994 before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur, for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs.28,000/- from the respondent for the period from December 1992 to March 1994. 5] Respondent appeared in the suit and filed their written statement on 3.10.1994 and admitted the ownership of the applicant over the suit property. The respondent also admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 6] It is further the case of the applicant that after framing necessary issues and recording the evidence, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur partly decreed Regular Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 by order, dated 21.2.1997 (Exh.’C’ annexed to the revision memo), thereby decreeing the suit for Rs.20,500/-, as the amount of Rs.7,500/- was already paid by the respondents. 7] Being aggrieved by the decree in the suit, the respondent filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1997 before the District Court, Latur. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the learned Joint District Judge, Latur, by judgment and order dated 18.1.2001 (Exh.’D’ annexed to the revision memo), confirming the decree passed by the learned Trial Court. 8] Aggrieved by dismissal of the appeal, the respondent preferred Second Appeal No. 149 of 2001 before this court, which was also dismissed confirming the earlier judgment and orders passed by the trial court as well as the first appellate court. 9] The respondent challenged the judgment and order passed by this court before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No. 13918 of 2001. It is contended by the applicant in the notice, dated 19.1.2002 (Exh. ‘E’ annexed to the revision memo) that the said notice was issued by respondent to the applicant, wherein there is a reference to the Second Appeal No. 149 of 2001 preferred before the High Court and the Special Leave Petition No. 13918 of 2001 preferred before the Apex Court. It is the contention of the applicant that in the said notice, the respondent stated that the Special Leave Petition No. 13918 of 2001 preferred by the respondent was dismissed. It is the contention of the applicant that in the said notice, the respondent stated that the Special Leave Petition No. 13918 of 2001 preferred by the respondent was dismissed. 10] It is further case of the applicant that the in the eviction proceedings, as per judgment and order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur in the Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994, the respondents had filed their say on 31.1.1998 (Exh. ‘F’ annexed to the revision memo). The respondent alleged that the applicant is not the owner of the suit premises, however, it has been pleaded, the rent was paid to him. It is the case of the applicant that the respondent failed to pay the agreed rent and also deliberately denied the ownership of the applicant over the suit property and that both the said issues were available for eviction, since both the grounds were directly and substantially in issue between the parties in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 and this finding operates as res judicata in view of the proviso 8 to Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 11] It is further the case of the applicant that the respondent alleged that original respondent no.1 Sadhuram had no interest in the suit property since the year 1972 and that original respondent no.2 was carrying on the business in the suit premises. It was also alleged by the respondent that the sons of the original petitioner are carrying on the business. However, details of same were not pleaded by the respondent, and it was mentioned that, details thereof would be furnished at the time of deposition. 12] The learned Rent Controller, Latur, by his judgment and decree, dated 10.7.1998 dismissed the eviction petition filed by the applicant holding that the eviction proceedings cannot be considered, since the recovery of arrears of rent as per the judgment and order of the Trial Court was stayed by the Appellate Court. 13] The applicant contended that the Rent Controller accepted the oral argument of the respondent about sending the cheque and money order, etc. without there being any pleading or evidence on record to that effect. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the Rent Petition No. 10 of 1994 by judgment and decree, dated 10.7.1998. 13] The applicant contended that the Rent Controller accepted the oral argument of the respondent about sending the cheque and money order, etc. without there being any pleading or evidence on record to that effect. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the Rent Petition No. 10 of 1994 by judgment and decree, dated 10.7.1998. 14] Aggrieved by the dismissal of Rent Petition, the applicant preferred Rent Appeal No. 3 of 1998 before the learned District Judge, Latur (Exh.’H’ annexed with the revision memo). The learned District Judge, Latur, by his judgment and decree, dated 30.6.2003 dismissed the Rent Appeal, thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Rent Controller, Latur on 10.7.1998, thereby holding that the respondent is in arrears of rent. 15] Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, passed by the learned District Judge, Latur, dated 30.6.2003, in Rent Appeal No. 3 of 1998, this Civil Revision Application is filed by the original petitioner/landlord. 16] The learned counsel appearing for the revision applicant, in addition to the grounds taken in the Revision Application, submits that the revision applicants/landlord filed Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 against the respondent for recovery of rent due for the period from December 1992 to March 1994 at the rate of Rs.1,750/-per month. 17] The respondent herein contested the suit on the ground that rent was agreed at the rate of Rs.3,730/- per annum. It is submitted that the II Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur on 21.2.1997 partly decreed the suit holding that the respondent was in arrears of rent. It is further submitted that feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the respondent preferred Regular Civil Appeal before the District Court, which was dismissed and the said decree for recovery of rent was confirmed up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further submitted that though the decree for recovery of arrears of rent was passed holding that the rent is to be paid at the rate of Rs.1,750/-per month, the respondent did not pay the rent accordingly till giving of notice in the year 2002, which amounts to willful default in payment of rent. The defence raised by the respondent was not bona fide. The defence raised by the respondent was not bona fide. 18] It is further submitted that the revision applicant filed Eviction Petition under Section 15 of the said Act on three grounds, (i) default in payment of rent; (ii) bona fide requirement; and (iii) acquisition of alternate accommodation by the tenants. It is submitted that the said rent petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground that though the respondent had defaulted in payment of rent, it was not willful default and the alternate accommodation of a shop proved on record may not be suitable accommodation. It is further submitted that the appellate court, without appreciating the contentions of the applicant in the light of evidence available on record, rejected the appeal filed by the applicant. 19] It is submitted that so far as the ground of acquisition of alternate accommodation is concerned, it is a matter of record and already admitted by the respondent in the deposition that the respondent had constructed a premises in Dalda factory area at Latur, which is not more than at 500 meters (800 feet) distance from the present shop and is on one of the main roads leading to Ganj Golai at Latur. It is submitted that the shop subsequently constructed complies with all the requirements of acquisition of alternate accommodation as contemplated under the said Act. It is submitted that as on today the respondent is running a utensil shop in this premises at Dalda factory area, which is much bigger than the shop in question. It is further submitted that though it is not requirement under the said Act that alternate accommodation acquired by the tenant should be within the specific distance from the tenanted premises, it is sufficiently brought on record that the newly acquired premises is nearby and suitable for running the shop. It is submitted that both the courts below accepted the fact of existence of shop in newly constructed premises, however, the courts turned down the ground of acquisition of alternate accommodation by the respondent on the wrong premise that when the said shop was offered to the landlord for running his business, he refused to accept the same. 20] According to the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, such ground, on which the applicant's case that the respondent has acquired alternate accommodation, has been turned down, cannot sustain in law. 20] According to the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, such ground, on which the applicant's case that the respondent has acquired alternate accommodation, has been turned down, cannot sustain in law. It is submitted that there is finding rendered by Rent Controller in para 12 of judgment to the effect that there is existence of shop in newly constructed premises by the respondent. The District Court, in para 37 of the impugned judgment has also confirmed the said findings. 21] It is further submitted that the ground of acquisition of alternate accommodation was considered and accepted for eviction by this court in the cases of Prabhakar s/o Tatyarao Mangulkar vs Suresh s/o Kishanrao Takalkar [ 1985 (2) Bom.C.R. 293 ]; Anant Tulshiram Bajaj vs Chaguram Ishwardas Keshwani [1994 (2) B.C.R. 122]; Manikchand Manaji Sarode vs Dr. Vijaykumar M. Kawadiya [1995 (4) B.C.R.542]; and M/s Nanded Wine Mart vs Suresh Shanaklal Dhoot [2000 (2) B.C.R. 784]. 22] It is submitted that the ground of alternate accommodation can be pressed by the landlord even in absence of bona fide requirement as an independent ground. It is further submitted that in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar and Anant Bajaj (supra), the ground of bona fide requirement was held against the landlord and even then the decree for eviction was passed only on the ground of alternate accommodation by the High Court. 23] It is further submitted that the judgment reported in the case of Ramesh Vithalrao and another vs Dixit and Apte Engineers and Constructions and others [2002 (Suppl.) B.C.R. 148], relied upon by the respondent, is of no use for consideration of eviction on the ground of alternate accommodation, as the said ground was pressed in that case as subsequent development. 24] It is further submitted that so far as ground of default in payment of rent is concerned, though the respondent/tenant had taken plea of rent, not being decided or having disputed, at no point of time till this date, the respondent availed remedy of approaching the Rent Controller under Section 9 of the said Act for determination of fair rent, and hence, the plea of dispute is not genuine. The Rent Controller turned down the said ground on the incorrect legal premise that though default is proved, the landlord has not proved the willful default. The Rent Controller turned down the said ground on the incorrect legal premise that though default is proved, the landlord has not proved the willful default. It is further submitted that the District Court entered into the aspect of rent claimed, being in excess of provided under the Rent Act, which was not permissible, as it was not the proceeding for fixation of fair rent and the question of rent claimed being agreed between the parties was concluded by the decree of Civil Court and confirmed up to the Apex Court. Therefore, the respondent/tenant is the willful defaulter in payment of rent. 25] It is further submitted that the ground of bona fide requirement is also substantiated by the applicant/landlord by way of evidence on record, and that his sons are in requirement of establishing the business, which is not disputed. Ultimately, it is now held by the court that it is the prerogative of the landlord so far as bona fide requirement is concerned and the tenant can neither challenge it nor dictate the terms. 26] It is further submitted that so far as the question of scope of revision is concerned, the jurisdiction is always vested in the High Court to grant relief in favour of the parties, if the impugned judgment suffers from material irregularity or is perverse. The refusal of decree for eviction at least on the ground of alternate accommodation is a material irregularity on the part of both the courts below though they concluded that the tenants have acquired alternate accommodation. Therefore, the High Court is empowered to grant decree of eviction, if it comes to the conclusion, on the basis of evidence on record, that the applicant/landlord is entitled for such decree, as per the ratio laid down in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra). 27] The learned counsel appearing for the revision applicant invited my attention to paras 11 and 12 from the reported judgment in the case of Sunderlal Kundanmal Patni vs Nagori Printing Press and another [2001 (3) B.C.R. 217] and submitted that if the tenant has failed to prove payment in civil suit and he had no receipts for alleged payments, the findings of the Civil Court are binding on the Rent Controller and default in payment is proved. It is submitted that the findings of the Civil Court, who decreed the suit for arrears, as also the findings of the Rent Controller holding him defaulter, show that the tenant had set up a false defence and the respondent/tenant was a willful defaulter. The learned counsel further invited my attention to the exposition of this court in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra) and submitted that once default is proved, burden to prove that it is a willful default lies on the tenant and the tenant can avail of the benefit of the proviso by discharging this burden only. It is submitted that in the present case the Rent Controller wrongly held that it is for the revision applicant to prove the willful default. It is submitted that such finding recorded by the Rent Controller amounts to illegality, and therefore, the present Civil Revision Application deserves to be entertained. It is further submitted that merely because the rent is paid subsequently, it cannot be a ground for the respondent/tenant to contend that he has not made default in payment of rent. 28] The learned counsel pressed into service the judgment of this court in the case of Manikchand Manaji Sarode (supra) and submitted that the High Court passed the decree of eviction in the facts of that case, and therefore, there is no impediment while exercising the revisional jurisdiction to pass the decree of eviction in the present case, if this court comes to the conclusion that while passing the impugned judgment and order, the courts below have committed illegalities and irregularities and thereby recorded perverse findings. 29] The learned counsel appearing for the applicant further invited my attention to the decision of this court in the case of Anant Bajaj (supra) and in particular para 11 thereof and submitted that if tenant has acquired alternate accommodation, then he loses the character of tenant and becomes landlord and in view of provisions of clause (v) of Sub-section 2 of Section 15 of the said Act, the tenant can be evicted on the ground that he has secured an alternative house or ceased to occupy the house for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. 30] Therefore, relying upon the averments in the application, grounds taken therein, the provisions of the said Act, the judgments of this court and the Supreme Court and also the record and the evidence from the original record, the counsel appearing for the revision applicant prays that this Civil Revision Application may be allowed. 31] On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2/tenant submits that the father of respondent namely Sadhuram Agrawal was inducted in the premises by one Panditrao Malharrao Kulkarni somewhere in the year 1968. The rent at the inception of the tenancy was Rs.75/- per month. The learned counsel invited my attention to the deposition of PW2 Panditrao Malharrao Kulkarni to support his contention that the rent at the inception of the tenancy was Rs.75/- per month. It is submitted that there was partition in the landlord’s family and the property has come to the share of the original plaintiff/landlord Vishwambhar. However, no notice to that effect was ever served upon the defendants. The defendants were paying the amount of the rent due and payable. According to the respondents/defendants, the amount of rent was Rs.3,600/-per annum. However, the plaintiff was demanding the rent at the rate of Rs.1,750/- per month. 32] It is submitted that reference to the pre-suit notice would show that the rent till the month of November, 1992 is received by the landlord. Except alleged arrears of rent, no other ground is stated in the pre-suit notice. It is further submitted that on 18th June, 1994, the plaintiff has filed rent petition before the Rent Controller at Latur, thereby seeking the eviction of the defendants on the ground that the premises have been taken on rent basis for residential use, however, the same is used for commercial purpose. The rent of the premises is at Rs.1,750/- per month and prior to November 1992 the entire amount of rent due and payable was paid. However, since December 1992 till March 1994, it is alleged that the amount of rent is not paid, and therefore, the respondent is willful defaulter. The respondent also possesses other premises for doing business and the original petitioner has two sons and suit shop is required to start new business of his sons. The description of the property specifically refers to the premises as shop and it’s area is 300 sq. The respondent also possesses other premises for doing business and the original petitioner has two sons and suit shop is required to start new business of his sons. The description of the property specifically refers to the premises as shop and it’s area is 300 sq. ft., which clearly shows that the property is nonresidential. 33] The learned counsel for respondent further submits that, the respondent filed the written statement and stated that the property is leased out 30 years prior to filing of the suit and same is leased out by Panditrao Neturkar, who is brother of the original petitioner. The suit shop was taken for commercial purpose. The property is located at market place and it is purely for non-residential purpose and the suit premises cannot be used for residential purpose. The respondent no.2/tenant carries on business in the said shop from the very beginning. The yearly rent of the shop is 3,750/-. It was further stated in the written statement that the applicant has also not stated since when rent of Rs.1,750/- per month was settled to be paid and the rent at the rate of Rs.3,750/- per annum is sent by money order and the applicant/original petitioner had accepted the rent. The respondent does not possess any business premises and the building near Dalda factory is purely of residential nature. The applicant's need is not bona fide as he has huge landed property at that place. 34] The learned counsel further submitted that one Murlidhar Kulkarni has stepped in witness box and stated that it has been agreed between the parties that Rs.1,750/-per month would be the amount of rent. However, this witness has not produced any document to show that there is any other property standing in the name of respondent no.2/tenant. It is submitted that the said witness has admitted in his cross-examination that the increase in rent was used to be decided by the parties mutually. He does not possess any of the rent receipts, for 35 years at no point of time any receipt of payment of rent is issued, and no account or register or diary has been maintained in respect of rent and further 50 acres of land is standing in the name of the father of the said witness. He does not possess any of the rent receipts, for 35 years at no point of time any receipt of payment of rent is issued, and no account or register or diary has been maintained in respect of rent and further 50 acres of land is standing in the name of the father of the said witness. The said witness has further stated that the residential house in Sangameshwar Colony, Latur is in the name of the said witness. There is one shop by name ‘Shivneri’ in the name of brother of the said witness and same is situated at the ground floor of the same building. It is further admitted in cross-examination by the said witness that the agreed rent between the parties was Rs.3,750/- per annum and if one shop is given to him from the house property of Radhakishan, he is not ready to do the business therein. It is further admitted in cross-examination that even if rent is paid as per his wish at Rs.1,750/- per month, yet he is not ready to keep the respondent in the suit premises. It is further submitted that one Pandit Malharrao Kulkarni has stepped in the witness box and in his examination-in-chief he stated that the premises in dispute was let out 30 to 35 years back. The initial rent of the disputed premises was Rs.75/- per month. 35] According to the learned counsel appearing for respondent/tenant, the said witness has give admission that the shop let out to Shri Kauthale is adjacent to the disputed shop and the said shop is bigger than the suit shop, the rent of the said shop was Rs.3,600/- per annum, and increase in rent used to take place every one or two years. However, the said witness has stated that he does not have written proof of the same. He also has not issued any receipt of receiving the payment of rent. The said witness has further admitted that 50 to 60 acres of land is standing in the name of Vishwambhar and 50 to 60 acres of land is standing in his name. The agricultural land is cultivated by both the sons of Vishwambhar. He has not filed any documents to show that Radhesham is possessing any other shop at Latur. The said witness has further admitted that 50 to 60 acres of land is standing in the name of Vishwambhar and 50 to 60 acres of land is standing in his name. The agricultural land is cultivated by both the sons of Vishwambhar. He has not filed any documents to show that Radhesham is possessing any other shop at Latur. The respondent has stepped in the witness box and has been cross-examined at length, however, no admission can be extracted from the cross-examination of the defendant. 36] The learned counsel further submits that the plaintiff/applicant/landlord did file Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 for recovery of amount of rent. The decree passed in the said suit is confirmed up to the Supreme Court. However, the said proceedings were going on parallel to the proceedings of eviction. It is argued that the judgment debtors have satisfied the decree. It is submitted that an objection was raised in the execution petition, which came to be rejected. 37] Being aggrieved thereby, Writ Petition No. 1456 of 2003 has been filed in the High Court challenging the order passed in the execution proceedings and same is still pending before the High Court. 38] It is further submitted that initially the Rent Controller allowed the eviction proceedings, however, appeal filed by the respondent/tenant is allowed and the proceedings were remitted back to the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller has considered the facts and circumstances of the case and has ultimately dismissed the proceedings negativating all the issues. The fact that there is dispute regarding quantum of the rent is noticed by the court. The Rent Controller held that the plaintiff has other properties, and therefore, requirement is not bona fide. It is further held that the applicant has failed to produce the documentary evidence to show that respondent no.2 holds any other property and that the suit premises is let out for commercial purpose. It is submitted that the applicants filed rent appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Rent Controller. 39] During the pendency of the proceedings before the District Court, the amount of Rs.1,22,500/- is deposited before the lower Appellate Court towards the alleged arrears of rent. It is submitted that the applicants filed rent appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Rent Controller. 39] During the pendency of the proceedings before the District Court, the amount of Rs.1,22,500/- is deposited before the lower Appellate Court towards the alleged arrears of rent. Further more, it is also brought on record that an amount of Rs.63,000/- was deposited on 9.7.2002, amount of Rs.36,658/- was deposited on 27.9.2002, and an amount of Rs.33,435/- was deposited in Regular Darkhast No. 125 of 1997. As such, total amount of Rs.2,55,593/- was deposited till the month of February, 2003. It is submitted that moment the dispute regarding quantum of rent was finally decided, the applicant/landlord was called upon to furnish details of amount of rent in arrears, and subsequently, the amount was deposited. This can be considered as compliance of proviso regarding the decree for eviction on the ground of willful default. 40] It is further submitted that the appellate Court has correctly assessed the evidence and considered the rival contentions of the parties and held that there is no willful default on the part of the respondent/tenant. It is further submitted that increase in rent, which is sought for, is in contravention of the provisions of the said Act, as is held in para 29 of the judgment of the Appellate Court. It is submitted that the issue of non-residential use of residential premises was also considered and on appreciation of evidence, the finding of fact that there is no change in use of the property is arrived at. It is submitted that on the issue of acquisition of alternate house, the lower Appellate Court has appreciated the evidence. It is recorded that the landlord has not produced any evidence on record to hold that there is acquisition of alternate accommodation. It is further held that the house near Dalda factory is a residential house and same cannot be put to non-residential use. It has further been considered that the landlord has declined to accept the said premises. It is further argued that on the issue of bona fide requirement it is stated that as other business may be seen from record and that the landlord and their family owns 200 acres of land, and therefore, the courts below have rightly held that the landlord is not in bona fide need of the suit premises. It is further argued that on the issue of bona fide requirement it is stated that as other business may be seen from record and that the landlord and their family owns 200 acres of land, and therefore, the courts below have rightly held that the landlord is not in bona fide need of the suit premises. 41] It is further argued by the learned counsel appearing for respondent no.2 that considering the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction, there is a limited prayer of quashing of the judgments of both the courts below in Civil Revision Application. There is no prayer for decreeing the proceedings filed before the authorities below, and therefore, the relief, which has not been prayed before this court, may not be considered. 42] The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, in order to distinguish the ratio laid down in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra) would contend that the issue before the High Court was in relation to burden of proving that the default was not willful, it is submitted that there cannot be dispute about the said legal provision. However, the lower Appellate Court has rightly considered the said aspect and held that the tenant has proved that the default was not willful. It is submitted that in the said premises the point in relation to the applicability of proviso to Section 15 of the said Act is not dealt with, as it appears that same was not raised in the facts of the case. 43] Learned counsel further submits that in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra), which is relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision applicant, both the courts below, after considering the evidence, have held that there is a willful default. However, in the facts of the present case, both the courts below have held that the default was not willful. Therefore, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2 submits that facts of the case in hand are different than the facts involved in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra). 44] It is further contended that the facts in the case of Shriniwas Shaligram Totla vs Dagdu Ramchandra Waghmare [2005 B.C.I. 100], relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, are different than the facts involved in the present case. 44] It is further contended that the facts in the case of Shriniwas Shaligram Totla vs Dagdu Ramchandra Waghmare [2005 B.C.I. 100], relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, are different than the facts involved in the present case. In the said case, the fact that the rent was not paid was admitted and illegal increase in rent was not an issue before the court, as is in the present case. It is further submitted that in the case of Sheshappa Narayan vs Narottam Jainarayan [1991 (1) B.C.I. 143] both the courts below had concurrently held that there was willful default. However, in the present case, both the courts below have concurrently held that there is no default. 45] The learned counsel further argued that in the case of Ramkubai vs Hajarimal Chandak [2000 (3) B.C.R. 628] the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act are referred. The provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and the Hyderabad Rent Act are different. The Division Bench judgment of this court followed by the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Sanjaykumar Agrawal vs Keshaval Shah [2001 (1) All MR 703] makes it clear that the landlord is entitled for decree of eviction of non-residential premises, only if there is running business. It is submitted that as per the pleadings of the landlord himself, the premises is required for starting a new business and it further refers that there is no running business and his sons are jobless. Further more, a finding of fact is arrived at by the courts below that there is no bona fide requirement and the landlord has several other properties. 46] The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the judgment in the case of Shivlingappa vs Malappa [(2000) Vol.1 B.C.R. 161] is under the Bombay Rent Act and in view of the reasons mentioned in para 5 thereof, the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 47] The learned counsel further submits that in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra), the Head Note ‘B’ makes it clear that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is very limited. 47] The learned counsel further submits that in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra), the Head Note ‘B’ makes it clear that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is very limited. It is submitted that in the facts of that case what is the location of the property, whether it is residential or capable of non-residential use, is not brought on record, and therefore, in such circumstances, the denial of the fact that the property is utilized for non-residential purpose has to be believed. 48] It is further submitted that in the case of Manikchand Sarode v/s Dr. Vijaykumar Motilal Kawadia [1995 (4) B.C.R. 542], the issue of bona fide requirement has been considered. However, in the facts of that case the said issue is covered by another judgment of this court in the case of Sanjaykumar Govindlalji Agrawal vs Keshavlal s/o Banduchand Shah [2001 (1) ALL MR 703]. 49] It is further submitted that the judgment in the case of Nagji vs Vimalbai [2005 DGLS 474] is a judgment referring to the provisions of Kerala Act, which are different from the provisions of Hyderabad Rent Act. Further more, the provisions in relation to bona fide requirement under the Hyderabad Rent Act are different. 50] The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/tenants further submitted that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court has to consider that there is a limited scope of revisonal jurisdiction. In support of this contention, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent pressed into service, reported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bhawarlal Dugar vs Birdichand [2010 AIR SCW 4288], wherein it is held that interference in the concurrent findings by the High Court is not sustainable and it is always open to the High Court to remit the matter, if in its opinion, the courts below did not consider the material on record. 51] The learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon the exposition of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Urmila and others vs Ram Kumar Verma [ AIR 1998 SC 1188 ] and submitted that the said judgment deals with the point that there is limited scope while exercising the revisional jurisdiction and reversal of concurrent findings of fact while exercising the revisional jurisdiction is not justified. 52] The learned counsel further placed reliance on the reported judgment in the case of Masjid Kacha vs Tufail Mohammad [ AIR 1995 SC 455 ] and argued that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and take a different view thereby upsetting the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. 53] He further submits that in the case of Shaikh Jaffar Shaikh Mehmood vs Mohammad Pasha [ AIR 1975 SC 794 ], while dealing with the provisions of the Hyderabad Rent Act, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act are similar to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 54] It is further submitted that in the case of Agasara Yellapa vs D.S.Sattendra [2007 (15) SCC 711], the Supreme Court held that revisional jurisdiction of High Court is very limited. For the said proposition, the learned counsel further placed reliance in the cases of Yunus Ali vs Khurshed Akram [ AIR 2008 SC 2607 ]; Chandmal vs Ramchandra [ AIR 1991 SC 1594 ]; and Ramesh Shelke vs Bhaskar Pradhav [2011 (2) ALL MR 258]. 55] Learned counsel for the respondent/tenant further argued that so far as bona fide requirement is concerned, this court in the case of Sanjaykumar Agrawal (supra), in paras 9 to 13 held that for claiming the eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, there has to be running business. 56] Yet in another judgment in the case of Govindrao Tandale vs Babulal Patel [2009 B.C.I. 292], the High Court held that the landlord must have running a business to claim eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. 57] The learned counsel for the respondent submits that so far as issue of willful default is concerned, in the case of Shaikh Jamil Ahmed vs Nasim Shaikh [1981 B.C.R. 808], and in particular para 15 thereof, while dealing with Section 12 of the said Act, this court held that any increase in rent inconsistent with Section 12 of the said Act is void. 58] Yet in another reported judgment in the case of Nandkumar Patil vs P.N.Shahane [1979 Law Suit (Bombay) 98], the Court has considered the facts of the case and held that there is no willful default. 58] Yet in another reported judgment in the case of Nandkumar Patil vs P.N.Shahane [1979 Law Suit (Bombay) 98], the Court has considered the facts of the case and held that there is no willful default. 59] It is further submitted that in the case of Chunilal Dhoke vs Shivprasad Devidan [1982 Law Suit (Bom) 160], the High Court has considered the proviso to Section 15 of the said Act and held that the Controller can grant the tenant an opportunity to pay the rent. 60] The learned counsel for the respondent further pressed into service reported judgment of this court, in the case of Banekhan vs Surajlal [1983 Law Suit (Bom) 244], and in particular paras 3 to 7 thereof, wherein the question of applicability of proviso is considered and this court has held that the order of eviction, even after the decree of civil court, is not permissible as the application of proviso to Section 15 of the said Act has not been considered by the court. 61] The learned counsel relying upon the judgments of this court in the cases of Marotirao Bhairao vs Kashinath Singh Gangusingh Raut [1989 Law Suit (Bom) 304] and M/s Shrikrishna Oil Mill vs Radhakishan Ramchandra [ AIR 2002 SC 562 ] and in particular paras 5 to 10 thereof submits that, the Supreme Court, after considering the provisions of the Hyderabad Rent Act has held that subsequent default in payment of rent cannot be considered and when earlier default was satisfied, then there cannot be any cause of action as to the arrears of rent. 62] It is further submitted that so far as alternate accommodation is concerned, the respondent/tenant is relying upon paras 12 to 25 of the judgment in the case of Ramesh Vitthalrao (supra). 63] The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant further submits that Section 2 (h) of the said Act provides for definition of ‘house’. According to the learned counsel if the house is let out for non-residential purpose, then house would be treated for nonresidential house only. It is submitted that Section 2 (g) of the said Act defines ‘tenant’. Section 9 of the said Act confers the jurisdiction on the Rent Controller for determination of the standard rent. According to the learned counsel if the house is let out for non-residential purpose, then house would be treated for nonresidential house only. It is submitted that Section 2 (g) of the said Act defines ‘tenant’. Section 9 of the said Act confers the jurisdiction on the Rent Controller for determination of the standard rent. Section 12 of the said Act contemplates increase in rent and Sub-section (3) of Section 12 thereof specifically contemplates that any stipulation in contravention of Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be null and void. It is submitted that Section 13 (1) of the said Act specifically states that it is the duty of the landlord to issue receipts to the tenant. It is further argued that proviso to Section 15 (2) of the said Act confers the jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to consider the facts of the case and permit the payment of rent. It is submitted that said Section also makes distinction between non-residential and residential house. Therefore, it is submitted that for non-residential house alternate house would mean to nonresidential house only. 64] Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant relying upon the averments in the written statement which was filed before the court below, the evidence of the applicant/landlord, evidence of the respondent/tenant, written notes of arguments placed on record and the judgments cited across the Bar, would submit that the Civil Revision Application is devoid of any merits and same may be rejected. 65] The learned counsel appearing for the respondent in addition to the written notes of arguments, which are placed on record, also invited my attention to the other material from the original record, which is summoned by this court and would contend that the District Court allowed the respondent/tenant to deposit the decretal amount and thereafter the applicant/landlord did file the application for withdrawal of the said amount, and therefore, the decree on the ground of willful default cannot be passed, as rightly held by the District Court. The learned counsel also invited my attention to certain admissions given by the landlord and his sons during the course of cross-examination. It is submitted that the alternate accommodation acquired by the respondent/tenant is purely for residential purpose, and therefore, the said accommodation cannot be used for the purpose of business. The learned counsel also invited my attention to certain admissions given by the landlord and his sons during the course of cross-examination. It is submitted that the alternate accommodation acquired by the respondent/tenant is purely for residential purpose, and therefore, the said accommodation cannot be used for the purpose of business. The learned counsel submits that this court in case of Ramgopal Hazarimal Parikh vs Rikhabchand Sumermal Surana [1978 U.C.R. (Bom) 628] in paras 7 and 8 held that the alternate premises acquired by the tenant must be such which can reasonably be used for the same purpose for which the tenanted premises from which eviction is sought, are used. Therefore, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant submits that the Civil Revision Application is devoid of any merits and same may be rejected. 66] I have given careful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties across the Bar, with their able assistance perused the entire record including the impugned judgments and orders passed by the Rent Controller and the District Court. Learned counsel for the parties, during the course of hearing, also invited my attention to the documents/evidence from the original record, which is summoned from the District Court. At the out set, it would be apt to reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 15 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 , which reads thus:- “15. Eviction of tenants (1) .......... ......... (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied – (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered rent due by him in respect of the house, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable; or ........ ............... (v) that the tenant has secured alternative house or ceased to occupy the house for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, or ........ .......... ............... (v) that the tenant has secured alternative house or ceased to occupy the house for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, or ........ .......... the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if he Controller is satisfied that the tenant’s default to pay or tender rent was not willful he may, before making an order as aforesaid, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding 15 days, to pay or tender the rent to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender. .......... ..........” 67] Upon careful perusal of Section 15 (2)(i), it is clear that if the tenant has not paid or tendered rent due by him in respect of the house, within 15 days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable, the landlord can institute suit for eviction of the tenant on the said ground. In the present case, the revision applicant i.e. original petitioner, filed eviction petition under Section 15 of the said Act on three grounds, firstly the default in payment of rent; secondly bona fide requirement; and thirdly acquisition of alternate accommodation by the tenant. 68] At the out set, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is not pressing the ground of bona fide requirement. Therefore, this court has to consider only grounds of default in payment of rent and acquisition of alternate accommodation by the tenant. 69] It is not in dispute that the applicant herein did file Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur for recovery of Rs.28,000/- i.e. arrears of rent due from the tenant i.e. respondents herein, for the period from December 1992 to March 1994. The said suit was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur on 21.12.1997. Being aggrieved by the said decision, Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1997 was preferred by the respondent/tenant, which came to be dismissed by the judgment and order, dated 18.1.2001 passed by the Joint District Judge, Latur. The said suit was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur on 21.12.1997. Being aggrieved by the said decision, Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1997 was preferred by the respondent/tenant, which came to be dismissed by the judgment and order, dated 18.1.2001 passed by the Joint District Judge, Latur. The Second Appeal preferred by the respondent/tenant bearing No. 149 of 2001 before the High Court came to be dismissed. Being aggrieved, the respondent/tenant preferred Special Leave Petition bearing No. 13918 of 2001 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was also disposed of thereby confirming the findings recorded by the Civil Court. Therefore, indisputably the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur for recovery of the arrears of rent due from the respondent/tenant for the period from December 1992 to March 1994 has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. 70] It appears that Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 for recovery is decided by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur on 21.2.1997 and the Rent Controller was pleased to dismiss the eviction proceedings on 17.7.1998. Therefore, at the time of final hearing of the petition filed by the applicant herein before the Rent Controller, Latur, the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 was already passed, and therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, so far as default in payment of arrears of rent is concerned, the said judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court was binding upon the Rent Controller, Latur. This court in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra) held that, as the tenant had failed to prove payment in Civil Suit and he had no receipt for alleged payments, the findings of the civil suit were binding on Rent Control Authority and default in payment is proved. Therefore, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of this court in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra), the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 was not only binding to the Rent Controller, Latur, but even it was binding upon the District Court. 71] While considering the ground of default, it appears that the Rent Controller, after hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, held that willful default has to be proved by the applicant/landlord. 71] While considering the ground of default, it appears that the Rent Controller, after hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, held that willful default has to be proved by the applicant/landlord. It appears that, Rent Controller did enter into exercise of finding out what was the rent agreed between the parties and held that there was some dispute between the parties in respect of agreed rent. The relevant paragraphs, in which there is a discussion/findings recorded by the Rent Controller in respect of contention of the applicant that the respondent/tenant has made default in payment of rent are in paragraph nos. 8 to 10. In para 10 of the judgment of the Rent Controller, it appears that the Rent Controller proceeded to decide what was the agreed rent and whether the respondent/tenant has made any default in payment of rent. It would be appropriate to reproduce herein below para 10 from the judgment of the Rent Controller, which reads as thus:-“Rival claims and cases on the point of rent is pending before Civil Court. I have also to decide the default. The petitioner is bound to prove not only default but he has to prove willful default by the respondent. A simple meaning of willful default is default made purposely, deliberately. P.W. 1 was suggested in cross-examination, if suppose he would have given a rent @ Rs.1750/- per month is he ready to keep the tenant in occupation of business. The answer is ‘No’. This itself is sufficient to show that the main purpose of the landlord is to take eviction and he has failed to prove the point of default. The respondent also relied the ruling Maharashtra Law Report 1988 Bombay 558 Aurangabad Bench. If willful default is not proved the order of eviction is not sustainable u/sec. 15(2). Hence, I replied this point in negative.” 72] Upon careful reading of para 10, the ignorance of law of the Rent Controller is writ large. The Rent Controller held that the applicant/landlord is bound to prove not only default but he has to prove willful default also. 15(2). Hence, I replied this point in negative.” 72] Upon careful reading of para 10, the ignorance of law of the Rent Controller is writ large. The Rent Controller held that the applicant/landlord is bound to prove not only default but he has to prove willful default also. The Bombay High Court in case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra) held that once default is proved, burden to prove that it is not willful default, lies on tenant and the tenant can avail of the benefit of proviso to Section 15 of the said Act, by discharging said burden only. Therefore, finding/observation of the Rent Controller that the petitioner/landlord has not only to prove the default but even he has to prove the willful default, is an illegality committed by the Rent Controller while recording such finding. In fact, as already observed, so far as default in payment of rent is concerned, the judgment and decree, passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 was binding upon the Rent Controller, Latur. There was no scope for the Rent Controller to enter into exercise to find out what was the agreed rent and whether the respondent/tenant is in arrears of rent. It was incumbent upon the Rent Controller to follow the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, as held by this court in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra). Therefore, there is no hesitation to hold that, the findings recorded by the Bombay Rent Controller are contrary to the law laid down by the High Court in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra) that once default is proved, burden shifts on the tenant to prove that it is not willful. 73] The District Judge, Latur while deciding the rent appeal filed by the applicant/landlord framed the point in respect of default in payment of rent and held that the landlord failed to prove that tenant is willful defaulter. The District Court in para 23 of the impugned judgment recorded the arguments of the applicant/landlord that, the Civil Court has decreed the suit against the respondent, and therefore it is established that the tenant is willful defaulter. The District Court in para 23 of the impugned judgment recorded the arguments of the applicant/landlord that, the Civil Court has decreed the suit against the respondent, and therefore it is established that the tenant is willful defaulter. In para 24, the District Court observed that respondent no.2 has admitted in his cross-examination that, the suit filed by the landlord against him for recovery of monthly arrears of rent in Civil Court is decreed and it has been concluded that the situation calls for inference that rent for suit premises was a monthly rent and there was increase in the said monthly rent from time to time and practically in every year and in the year 1992 rent for suit premises was Rs.1,750/- per month. However, in para 25, the District Court has discussed about the rival claims in respect of agreed rent for the suit premises. It appears that the District Court did enter into exercise to find out what was the rent agreed between the parties. In fact, when the District Court had taken a note that the decision in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur with decree for arrears of rent against the tenant establishes that the tenant is in arrears of rent, it ought to have abided by the decree in the said suit. It appears that the District Court held that decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur was binding upon the Rent Controller while deciding the petition filed by the applicant/landlord. In para 26 of the impugned judgment, the District Court, in order to find out whether the tenant has discharged his burden to the effect that he is not a willful defaulter, has referred to the evidence on record and observed that the evidence on record for respondent is only establishing that he has paid rent at the rate of Rs.3,750/- per annum. It is further observed that, there is no explanation offered by the tenant for not paying rent as per the established claim of landlord for rent at the rate of Rs.1,750/- per month. It is further observed that, there is no explanation offered by the tenant for not paying rent as per the established claim of landlord for rent at the rate of Rs.1,750/- per month. In para 27, it is observed by the District Court that in view of the judgment in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra), the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 was binding upon the Rent Controller and hardly he had any scope to take different view than to hold that the tenant is in default in paying arrears of rent. It further appears that in para 28, the District Court proceeded to discuss what was the rent from beginning of the tenancy and after such discussion, reached to the conclusion that there was increase in rent every year for the continuation or renewal of lease, and as such agreement is void, and therefore, the landlord is not entitled to claim rent with said increased amount, and consequently, non-payment of such increased rent is not amounting to willful default. In fact, the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994, was even binding upon the District Court and having been accepted the finding that the rent was Rs. 1,750/-per month in the year 1992, it was not open for the District Court to enter into adjudication of rival claims in respect of rent of the suit premises. 74] Upon careful perusal of the findings recorded by the District Court, there is no doubt that the District Court, on the basis of judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994, held that the respondent/tenant is in default of payment of arrears of rent for the period December 1992 till March 1994. The District Court has also observed that in view of the judgment in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra), there was no scope for the Rent Controller except to follow the decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 and to conclude that there is default in payment of arrears of rent as claimed by the landlord. The District Court has also observed that in view of the judgment in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra), there was no scope for the Rent Controller except to follow the decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 and to conclude that there is default in payment of arrears of rent as claimed by the landlord. 75] Therefore, it follows from the findings recorded by the Rent Controller and the District Court that the respondent/tenant made default in payment of rent at least for the period which is covered by the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994. At the cost of repetition, it has to be observed that the Rent Controller was not correct in law to hold that it is for the landlord to prove the default and also the willful default. The District Court having been held that the respondent/tenant is in default of payment of rent, could not have held that the said default is not willful default. 76] Though the learned counsel for the respondent/tenant was at pains to argue that the entire decretal amount in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 has been deposited before the District Court after obtaining permission from the District Court, and therefore, the respondent is not willful defaulter, in my opinion, such deposit of arrears of rent at belated stage when the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur has been confirmed up to the Supreme Court, cannot be treated compliance of provisions of Section 15 (2)(i) of the said Act. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant that the decretal amount in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 has been deposited by the respondent/tenant before the District Court and the applicant/landlord has applied for withdrawal of the said amount, and in the light of judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Shrikrishna Oil Mill (supra) the decree of eviction cannot be passed on the ground of willful default, is devoid of any merits and same deserves to be rejected. In the case of M/s Shrikrishna Oil Mill (supra), the Supreme Court held that at the time of filing the eviction petition, the landlord had no cause of action as the arrears of rent were paid and accepted by the landlord, and therefore, the petition became infructuous and same is liable to be rejected. Therefore, the facts of the case in the case of M/s Shrikrishna Oil Mill are totally different than the facts involved in the present case. 77] In the facts of the present case, already proceedings before the Rent Controller are concluded. The rent appeal was filed by the applicant/landlord and even at the time of deciding the petition by the Rent Controller, the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 was available and by the time Rent Appeal was finally decided by the District Court, the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant that since the amount is deposited and appeal is continuation of the suit, and therefore, in view of the proviso to Section 15 (2) of the said Act, such amount is deposited after due permission from the District Court, and as such, if the proviso to Section 15 (2) of the said Act is satisfied, in that case, the decree for eviction on the ground of default cannot be passed, deserves no consideration in the light of discussion in further paragraphs of this judgment. 78] This court in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra) has considered the proviso to Section 15 of the said Act and held that subsequent deposit of rent by the tenant taking recourse to proviso to Section 15 of the said Act, if accepted, would defeat the substantive provisions of the said Act. In the facts of the present case, neither the Rent Controller nor the District Court has invoked the proviso to Section 15 of the said Act, nor the respondent/tenant has applied for invoking the said proviso. In the facts of the present case, neither the Rent Controller nor the District Court has invoked the proviso to Section 15 of the said Act, nor the respondent/tenant has applied for invoking the said proviso. Merely because the respondent/tenant filed the application to deposit the amount towards arrears of rent since the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur was confirmed up to the Supreme Court, cannot be construed or said to be compliance of the proviso to Section 15 of the said Act. In the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra), this court has extensively dealt with the provisions of the said Act, and in particular Section 15 thereof and proviso to said Section. 79] While considering the provision in Section 15, this court in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra) has considered various judgments of the different High Courts and also the Supreme Court, and in para 11 thereof held:- “The landlord’s application for getting the possession of the premises on account of default will fail if landlord fails to prove default as per Clause (i), landlord proves the default as per Clause (i) of Section 15 (2) but tenant satisfies the Controller that his default to pay or tender the rent was not willful and that he deposited the amount of rent or tendered the same to the landlord within a reasonable time not exceeding 15 days as per the direction of the Controller.” 80] In the facts of the present case, there is nothing on record to indicate that the District Court has adverted to the said proviso and thereafter the respondent/tenant was allowed to deposit arrears towards rent. Therefore, merely because the respondent/tenant has deposited the decretal amount, that too, at belated stage after the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994, passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Latur, it cannot be said that the respondent/tenant has complied with the proviso to Section 15 of the said Act, and therefore, he is not willful defaulter. 81] This court in M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra), in para 12, while interpreting provisions of Section 15 of the said Act held that under the proviso, if the tenant’s default is not willful, the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding 15 days to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord up to the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender, the application shall be rejected. The moment the tenant fails to pay the rent within 15 days after expiry of the time fixed in the agreement, or if there is no such agreement before the last date of the month next following that for which rent is payable, there is a default and a right on the part of the landlord to have the tenant evicted arises subject only to the proviso. There is nothing in the said Section, which enables the tenant to contend that the right is lost merely because he pays or tenders the rent due by him subsequently. This Court in para 13 of the said judgment, after detailed discussion and after considering the provisions of Section 15 of the said Act, and in particular proviso thereto, held that the practice of payment of accumulated rent cannot be accepted by way of explanation or defence to infer that default was not willful default. If such practice is accepted for any defence covered under the proviso, the main provision is permanently defeated and, therefore, such a practice which defeats the provision permanently and makes the law nugatory cannot be accepted as an explanation for inferring the tenant as not a willful defaulter. If a man claims the benefit of the statutory provisions, then he is equally under an obligation to discharge his statutory duty initially. However, the plea of practice of payment of accumulated rent to be paid by the tenant shows that basically the tenant fails to discharge his statutory duty as provided under Clause (i) of Section 15 (2) of the said Act but claims the benefit of the proviso, which is against the settled principles of law. However, the plea of practice of payment of accumulated rent to be paid by the tenant shows that basically the tenant fails to discharge his statutory duty as provided under Clause (i) of Section 15 (2) of the said Act but claims the benefit of the proviso, which is against the settled principles of law. [underlines supplied] 82] It, therefore, follows from the authoritative pronouncement in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra) that, the tenant by depositing the accumulated rent as has happened in the facts of the present case deposited arrears of rent, after the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994 has been confirmed up to the Supreme Court, is not entitled for benefit of the proviso and therefore it will have to be held that he was willful defaulter. As already observed, the District Court has already concluded that in view of the judgment in the case of Sunderlal Patni (supra), the Rent Controller was bound by the decree in Special Civil Suit No. 113 of 1994, and therefore, there was no option with the Rent Controller but to hold that the respondent/tenant was defaulter. Even the District Court has held that the respondent/tenant is defaulter, however, for erroneous and unsustainable reasons in law held that the respondent/tenant is not a willful defaulter. 83] In the light of the law laid down by this court in the case of M/s Nanded Wine Mart (supra), and in particular para 13 thereof, which is already discussed herein above, it can safely be concluded that the respondent/tenant was willful defaulter, and hence, eviction decree on the said ground should have been followed. 84] The applicant/landlord has raised another important ground that during the period of tenancy, the respondent/tenant has acquired alternate accommodation. In this behalf, the Rent Controller has discussed in para 12 of his judgment and observed that, the petitioner failed to produce the documentary evidence or any record to show that respondent no.2 holds or possesses any premises. However, the Rent Controller further observed that, “There is residential house of respondent no.2 in the premises of Dalda factory which is purely for residential purpose, which is away from road. The respondent kept the proposal that he is ready to give the premises for business of applicant/landlord in his house in the Dalda Factory, to which landlord declined to accept. The respondent kept the proposal that he is ready to give the premises for business of applicant/landlord in his house in the Dalda Factory, to which landlord declined to accept. So it indicates that the premises are owned by respondent no.2. Dalda Factory area is purely the residential area, and no business can be run there. So I am inclined to hold that respondent no. 2/tenant has no alternate accommodation for his business.” 85] The issue whether the respondent/tenant has acquired alternate premises, has been considered by the District Court. The District Court framed necessary point to that effect at Sr.No. 3. There is discussion about the said point from paras 32 to 37. In paras 32, 33 and 34, the District Court has referred to the evidence of PW2 Panditrao and also PW3 Balaji. In para 32, the District Court has adverted to deposition of PW1 Murlidhar, who deposed that the respondent has constructed a building by name, “Mateshwari” in the Dalda factory area and in the said building there are two shops and those two shops are vacant. So also, respondent is owner of the building by name “Devikripa” and that respondent is also in possession of two shops of Latur Municipal Council in Ganj Golai and respondent is also having a shop in M.I.D.C. area. As such, the respondent has acquired alternate premises. It appears that in cross-examination of the said witness, he admitted that the respondent/tenant is residing in the building situated near Dalda factory. However, he has denied that in the said building, shops are not available. It further appears that during the course of recording of the evidence of PW1, said witness was offered shop in the said building for running business and the said offer is declined by this witness. It further appears that in paras 33 and 34, there is discussion that, PW2 and PW3 have also deposed that the respondents have acquired alternate premises. In para 35, the District Court has referred to the evidence of PW 2 Radhesham, who deposed that he is not having any other shop in Latur besides the suit shop. However, he admitted that he is having residential house in the area of Dalda factory. His father is residing in the premises on Masjid road. His brother is residing in M.I.D.C. Area. There are other statements made in his examination-in-chief. However, he admitted that he is having residential house in the area of Dalda factory. His father is residing in the premises on Masjid road. His brother is residing in M.I.D.C. Area. There are other statements made in his examination-in-chief. However, the District Court has referred to the cross-examination of said witness and observed thus:- “He has admitted that invitation card for house warming ceremony of his house was sent to landlord and the photograph of the building was printed on the said invitation card and that two shops are shown in said photograph” (emphasis supplied) 86] The said invitation card for house warming ceremony and the photograph of the building is on record before the court below. The District Court in para 37 has further discussed the evidence of respondent no.2 and recorded the finding that respondent no.2 has constructed his house in the area nearby Dalda factory. According to him, it is entirely a residential house. However, respondent no.2 has admitted in cross-examination that in the invitation card of house warming ceremony of said building, two shops with shed are seen in the photograph of said building. According to the respondent, premises is not in use for business purpose. It has further come in the evidence of said witness that the said shops are being used as godown. In order to ascertain the findings recorded by the District Court about evidence of respondent no. 2, I have gone through the evidence of respondent no.2 and upon perusal of his examination-in-chief/cross-examination, it is clear that the District Court has recorded a correct finding that, the respondent no.2 has admitted that in the said residential building near Dalda factory two shops with shed are seen in the photograph of the said building. It appears that the District Court after recording such finding declined to pass the decree of eviction on the ground of acquisition of alternate premises by the respondent/tenant on unsustainable grounds in law. The District Court strangely enough observed that since PW 1 Murlidhar declined to accept the offer of said shop in the said building for running business, and therefore, it appears that the decree on the said ground has been declined. Therefore, the District Court has committed material irregularity, and therefore, this is a fit case to correct material irregularity and pass decree of eviction. Therefore, the District Court has committed material irregularity, and therefore, this is a fit case to correct material irregularity and pass decree of eviction. 87] This Court in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra) while considering the provisions of Section 15(2)(v) of the said Act, in para 6 held thus:- “The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended before me that in view of the provisions of section 15(2)(v) of the said Act, the alternative accommodation must be such which satisfy the requirements of the premises which are being used for the purpose for which the accommodation is required. The learned counsel contended that the alternative house to be secured by the tenant must be a house which must be capable of being used for the business purpose. His main contention was that since he has acquired the premises for residential purpose, it is not possible to convert the same into business premises. So, according to him, it cannot be said that it is an alternative accommodation within the meaning of section 15(2)(v) of the said Act. The wording of section 15(2)(v) of the said Act does not admit any such interpretation.” 88] Therefore, it follows from the afore said authoritative pronouncement that it is not necessary that alternative house should be secured for the same purpose for which the disputed premises are being sought by the landlord. In the said judgment, in para 6, this court has considered the definition of “house” given in Section 2(h) of the said Act and observed that ‘house’ means any building or hut or part of a building or hut let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purpose. Therefore, the contention of the respondent/tenant that alternate accommodation acquired by the respondent/tenant is for residential purpose and not fit for business, cannot be accepted. The law laid down by this court in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra) on interpretation of provisions of Section 15(2)(v) and definition of 'house' in Section 2 (h) of the said Act is squarely applicable in the facts of present case. Moreover, evidence on record indicates that, there are two shops in premises built by the respondent no.2 near Dalda factory at Latur. 89] Reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant in the case of Ramgopal Parikh (supra) is not applicable in the facts of the present case. Moreover, evidence on record indicates that, there are two shops in premises built by the respondent no.2 near Dalda factory at Latur. 89] Reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/tenant in the case of Ramgopal Parikh (supra) is not applicable in the facts of the present case. It appears that, in the facts of that case, the Court has not considered the provisions of Section 2 (h) of the said Act, which defines ‘house’. Moreover, in case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra), the court has considered provisions of Section 15 (2)(v) coupled with Section 2(h) of the said Act. 90] Therefore, in the light of discussion herein above on the issue of acquisition of alternate accommodation by the respondent/tenant, it will have to be held that on the said ground the applicant/landlord was entitled for the decree of eviction, since the District Court on unsustainable grounds has refused the decree observing that PW1 Murlidhar when offered the shop from the building owned by respondent no.2/tenant had declined to accept the said offer to use the said premises for business purpose. The said ground on which decree is declined is not sustainable in law and thereby the District Court has committed material irregularity in declining decree, therefore, in revisional jurisdiction said material irregularity deserves to be corrected by allowing the prayer of the applicant for directing the respondent no.2 to vacate the suit premises on the ground that, he has acquired alternate premises during subsistence of tenancy and thereby lost the character of tenant and became landlord. 91] Yet in another authoritative pronouncement, this court in the case of Anant Bajaj (supra) while dealing with the plea of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground of securing alternate accommodation/alternate acquisition during the subsistence of tenancy in respect of the suit premises had an occasion to consider the provisions and applicability of Section 15 (2)(v) of the said Act. This court held thus:-“W hat is required to be considered under Clause (v) is whether the tenant had secured the alternative house. If in spite of securing the alternative house, he sleeps over and allows others to occupy, even then, the provisions of Clause (v) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 are attracted in these circumstances also. This court held thus:-“W hat is required to be considered under Clause (v) is whether the tenant had secured the alternative house. If in spite of securing the alternative house, he sleeps over and allows others to occupy, even then, the provisions of Clause (v) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 are attracted in these circumstances also. It is true that the provisions of the Rent Act are required to be construed as far as possible to protect the tenants from eviction. But, that does not mean that a tenant, who, having secured an alternative house, allows the house to be occupied by others also requires to be protected from eviction. In such an event, the tenant who would become landlord in terms of his own house would continue to occupy the tenanted premises by letting out the premises belonging to him to others. The Legislature has never thought of such an eventuality and has never intended to protect such tenants, who having secured the premises for reasons best known to them refuse to occupy the premises and allow the premises to be occupied by others and sit tight over the properties belonging to the landlord by taking statutory protection offered to them under the provisions of the Rent Act. In the present case, the tenant had secured the alternative house during the term of his tenancy and has failed to occupy the same which fact gives a right to the landlord to evict him under the provisions of Clause (v) of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Rent Act. ” 92] In the said judgment in para 11 while interpreting provisions of Section 15(2)(v) of the said Act, this court held that what is required to be considered under clause (v) is whether the tenant has secured the alternative house. 93] On plain reading of clause (v) of Section 15(2) of the said Act, the wording of the said provision contemplates that if the tenant has secured alternate house or ceased to occupy the house for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, the Controller shall make an order rejecting application. Therefore, there is nothing in the said provision so as to construe that, the alternate accommodation/acquisition should be fit for residential purpose or for the business purpose. Therefore, there is nothing in the said provision so as to construe that, the alternate accommodation/acquisition should be fit for residential purpose or for the business purpose. As held in the case of Prabhakar Mangulkar (supra), the definition of 'house' as defined under Section 2(h) of the said Act does not make distinction whether it is a residential or non-residential house. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that in view of the evidence of respondent no.2 before the court, and in particular in cross-examination that he has built a residential house near Dalda factory, Latur and in the said building there are shops as it is evident from the invitation card and photograph of the said building that there are two shops, both the courts below should have accepted the said ground and ought to have passed the decree of eviction on the ground of acquisition of alternate accommodation by the tenant. It is difficult to fathom that after adverting to the evidence of the witnesses, and in particular respondent no.2 and his clear admission of acquisition of alternate accommodation, the District Court instead of passing the decree of eviction on the ground of acquisition of alternate accommodation observed that, when said premises i.e. shops, as stated by PW 1 to be in the building built by respondent no.2 was offered for business to PW1, he declined to accept the same. Such a ground is unsustainable in law and thereby the District Court has committed illegality and further material irregularity by not passing the ‘eviction’ decree on said ground. 94] So far as the issue whether this court can allow the prayer of the applicant for eviction of respondent/tenant from the said premises and whether the applicant can be placed in possession of the suit premises is concerned, in the light of the discussion herein above, once this court found that, the Rent Controller and also the District Court have committed material irregularity by not passing the decree on the ground of acquisition of alternate premises and also the Rent court illegally held that, the landlord has to prove ‘wilfull default’, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, this is a fit case in which material irregularities/illegalities deserve to be corrected by passing decree of eviction and further directing the respondent no.2 to hand over the possession of the suit property to the applicant/landlord. 95] In the result, the Civil Revision Application is allowed. The judgment and order, dated 10.7.1998, passed by the Rent Controller in Rent Petition No. 10 of 1994 and the judgment and order, dated 30.6.2003, passed by the learned District Judge, Latur, in Rent Appeal No. 3 of 1998 are quashed and set aside. The application of the applicant/landlord for eviction of the respondent/tenant from the suit house consisting of a shop admeasuring 15’ x 20’ ft. out of House No. 1270/6, situated at Gunj Golai area of Latur town, is allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly. In the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. This Court directs the respondent/tenant to put the revision applicant/petitioner/landlord in possession of the suit shop within two months from today.