JUDGMENT A.K. Trivedi, J. - Due to non-presence of learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Opposite Party No.2, the record has properly and minutely been gone through with the assistance of learned Additional P.P. 2. Petitioner/informant has challenged the judgment dated 13.6.2002 passed by Presiding Officer, Additional Court, Fast Track Court, Munger in Sessions Trial No.144 of 1992 acquitting the Opposite Party No.2. 3. Informant Suresh Prasad Singh gave his fardbeyan on 19.5.1991 at about 10.15 P.M. at Sadar Hospital, Munger which was recorded by police officials of Kotwali P.S. disclosing therein that on the same day at about 8.30 P.M. while he was in his mango orchard for keeping watch, his co-villager Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) whose orchard also lies adjacent to his orchard and who was present there, called him. He had gone there and found Gopal Jha, Manoj Tanti along with one unknown person with Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2). Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) enquired from him regarding purchase of land from his brother Phuleshwar Jha and for that he threatened to assault. In the meantime, on an order of Gopal Jha, Gangadhar Jha took out pistol and fired causing injury over his abdomen. Subsequent round was also fired but could not hit. The persons having in surrounding rushed and rescued him. He was thereafter taken to hospital. Animosity since before has been shown to be motive of the aforesaid occurrence. 4. Thereafter, the aforesaid fardbeyan was sent to Mufassil P.S. whereupon Mufassil P.S. Case No. 110 of 1991 was registered and then thereafter the investigation commenced and concluded by way of filing of charge-sheet only against Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) as well as Manoj Tanti (absconder). However, Gopal Jha was not sent up for trial. 5. During course of trial five witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as series of documents have also been exhibited. In the similar way, series of documents have been brought up on record on behalf of Opposite Party No. 2/accused. It is further evident that I.O. has been examined as C.W.1 while doctor has been examined as C.W.2. 6. In the similar way, series of documents have been brought up on record on behalf of Opposite Party No. 2/accused. It is further evident that I.O. has been examined as C.W.1 while doctor has been examined as C.W.2. 6. From the grounds taken up by the petitioner, it is evident that the petitioner has challenged the judgment impugned (a) after examination of doctor, the assault by means of fire-arm is fully proved, (b) the evidence of the witnesses have been appreciated and dealt with under wrong prescription, (c) animosity amongst the parties are admitted one, (d) the objective finding of the I.O. during course of inspection of the P.O. is found supported with the prosecution version. 7. At the other hand, the plea of the Opposite Party No. 2 happens to be with regard to complete denial of occurrence. The injured happens to be renowned criminal of the locality being an accused in so many cases might have sustained injury at different place in different manner by different persons but as animosity was prevailing amongst the parties, therefore, got this case filed implicating the petitioner. It has also been pleaded that the prosecution version suffers from improbability on account of the fact that much before the alleged date of occurrence Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) had already filed Title Suit No. 13 of 1990 for declaring the sale deed inoperative and not binding upon him which was executed by his brother in favour of informant therefore neither there was any occasion for the Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) to call the informant and in likewise manner, the informant was also not expected to go to Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2). Not only this, the witnesses also belong to his camp and for that by exhibiting documents their status was exposed. 8. In Venkatesan v. Rani and others, AIR 2013 SC 3320 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down guidelines for adjudicating upon revision against acquittal. The relevant para is quoted below : "6. To answer the questions that have arisen in the present case, as noticed at the very outset, the extent and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, particularly in the context of exercise thereof in respect of a judgment of acquittal, may be briefly noticed. The law in this regard is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The law in this regard is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. Illustratively, as also chronologically, the decisions rendered in Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu, (1975) 4 SCC 477 ; Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 ; Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 ; K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1962 SC 1788 and Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas, AIR 1951 SC 316 may be referred to. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in the case of Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (supra) may be usefully extracted below. "8. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision : (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal." "10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village mukhia, should go unpunished. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court." The observations in para 9 in the case of Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh, (1998) 7 SCC 223 would also be apt for recapitulation and. Therefore, are being extracted below. "9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial Court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial Court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt. the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial." 7. The above consideration would go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the trial Court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence thereby causing miscarriage of justice. The above consideration would go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the trial Court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence thereby causing miscarriage of justice. He-appreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Code. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a re-trial after setting aside the acquittal. As the language of Section 401 of the Code makes it amply clear there is no power vested in the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. "9. Thus, the Court has identified five categories apart from others which may vary from case to case whereunder the judgment of acquittal was permitted to be interfered with. Now the only question remains whether the matter in hand did justify any of the grounds so prescribed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred above. 10. While deciding a revision against acquittal, apart from this, it has to be borne in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. The first one, presumption of innocence available in his favour under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence and secondly by having the judgment of acquittal the presumption of innocence is found further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the verdict of the competent Court. 11. In likewise manner, it has also been held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence available on the record out of which one has been accepted by the trial Court by way of acquitting the accused then in that event, the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless and until there happens to be glaring defect as well as manifest error visualizing therefrom.- 12. Now coming to the judgment impugned in consonance with the plea of rival parties, it is apparent that the learned Lower Court had committed some sort of gross error during course of appreciation of evidence and on account thereof, the finding so recorded by the learned Lower Court is not at all found to be sustainable. 13. The learned Lower Court while dealing with the evidences of the witnesses had completely given go by to the evidence of I.O. C.W.1, more particularly, his objective finding regarding the place of occurrence which, according to prosecution happens to be the orchard of Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) lying adjacent to the orchard of informant Suresh Prasad Singh and on account thereof, the learned Lower Court failed to appreciate the evidence of PWs under the guise of objective finding of the I.O. Apart from this, by way of ignoring the same has given a jerk to the prosecution case because of the fact that the prosecution had alleged that Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) had shot at petitioner/informant in his orchard and at that very time none was accompanying the petitioner/informant. Section 134 of the Evidence Act requires the quality and not quantity and even in case of single witness, the case of the prosecution is found proved, the conviction can be recorded. 14. Because of the fact that mentioning other circumstances will influence the ultimate finding of the Court, therefore, same is forbidden although some other kind of infirmities are also persisting justifying adverse remark over conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court, moreover, during appreciation of evidence. 15. Hence, the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court is set aside. Petition is allowed. The matter is remitted back to the learned Lower Court to hear the argument of both the parties and will pass judgment afresh in accordance with law. Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2) is directed to appear before the learned Lower Court within a fortnight, failing which, the learned Lower Court will take all legal recourse for procurement of attendance of Gangadhar Jha (Opposite Party No.2). Petition allowed.