ORDER ADITYA KUMARTRIVEDI, J. Hear the parties. 2. Petitioner has challenged his preventive detention passed under Section-12 (2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act dated 04.03.2012 passed by District Magistrate, Patna as well as order dated 12.03.2012 passed by the State in terms of Section 12 (3) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act along with order dated 12.04.2012 passed by the State in terms of Section 21 of the Act. 3. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that there happens to be non application of mind on behalf of Detaining Authority while passing the order dated 04.03.2012 because of the fact that petitioner was already enjoying bail in connection with Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 113/2011 vide order dated 27.01.2012 passed in Cr.Misc.No.1314/12 as well as in connection with Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 118/2011 vide order dated 09.01.2012 passed in B.P. No. 4676/2011 from the court Additional Sessions Judge-XI, Patna, which have been shown to be grounds for justifying issuance of preventive detention inconsonance with the chequered history shown as Masaurhi P.S. Case No.81 of 2011, Masaurhi P.S. Case No. 174 of 2011, Patliputra P.S. Case No. 117/08. This is sufficient to show that instead of verifying the facts as referred above, the Detaining Authority passed the order impugned in mechanical way disclosing that efforts were being made on behalf of the petitioner to obtain bail instead of having been bailed out much earlier than passing of order the impugned (Annexure-1) and (Annexure-3). It has further been pleaded that though petitioner has been granted bail on 30.10.2012 by this Court vide Cr.Misc. No. 3525 of 2012 in connection with Masaurhi P.S. Case No. 81/2011 but that was not taken as ground for validating the detention order rather the same has been incorporated as criminal antecedents. Not only this, from Annexure-2 the order passed by this Court relating to grant of bail to the petitioner in connection with Masaurhi P.S. Case No. 81/2011, it is evident that intentionally and purposely he was not produced in the above referred case for quite a consecutive period. Therefore, the process of subjective satisfaction is full of infirmities and on account thereof the order impugned followed with successive orders passed at the end of State up to confirming the order of detention are bad. 4. Therefore, the process of subjective satisfaction is full of infirmities and on account thereof the order impugned followed with successive orders passed at the end of State up to confirming the order of detention are bad. 4. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of A.G. that the detention order could very well be passed against the detenu even having him in custody. From the order dated 04.03.2012, it is evident that petitioner was already in custody in spite of having been bailed out as per Annexure-1 and 3 of the writ application. Then submitted that the order dated 04.03.2012 clearly speaks with regard to proper application of mind leading to satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to the context that the petitioner was seriously taking every effort for getting himself bailed out and further concluded that after being so released on bail, he would be indulged in activity affecting the public order which can not be prevented without having him under preventive detention. 5. The position is now very much clear that the detenu while undergoing judicial custody could be confronted with the order of preventive detention. The aforesaid issue has already been decided by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdawan as reported in AIR 1964 SC 334 under para 12 wherein it was held as follows:- “[12] As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. ... Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case.” 6. The aforesaid issue has further been explained with certain precautions to be followed by the Detaining Authority while passing preventive detention as reported in (1986) 4 SCC 416 in the case of Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad wherein at para-7, it was held as follows:- “7. The aforesaid issue has further been explained with certain precautions to be followed by the Detaining Authority while passing preventive detention as reported in (1986) 4 SCC 416 in the case of Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad wherein at para-7, it was held as follows:- “7. It is well settled in our constitutional framework that the power of directing preventive detention given to the appropriate authorities must be exercised in exceptional cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive detention and should be used with great deal of circumspection. There must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defence. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. In the instant case when the actual order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu was in jail. There is no indication that this factor or the question that the said detenu might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedom of our citizens.” 7. It has further been elaborated in the case of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 746 , wherein at para-21 it was held as follows:- “21. The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression „compelling reasons? The expression „compelling reasons? in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.” 8. The aforesaid points have been reiterated in the case of Kamarunnisa v. Union of India, reported in (1991)1 SCC 128 wherein at para 13 it was held as follows:- “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher court.” 9. The theme of obtaining bail by the detenu should not be an imagination of the Detaining Authority but must found to be substantiated. The same has been observation by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A. Geetha v. State of T.N., reported in (2006) 7 SCC 603 , wherein at para-10 it has been held as follows:- “10..... that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority.” 10. that the detaining authority should be aware that the detenu is already in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit of the detaining authority.” 10. In 2011 (3) BBCJ 289 (S.C.) in the case of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu wherein it has been held and observed as follows:- “if no bail application was pending and the detenu was already in fact in jail in a criminal case the detention order under the Preventive Detention Law is illegal”. 11. The aforesaid theme has further been reiterated in the case of Huidrom Konungjao Singh v. State of Manipur & Ors, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 181 wherein it has been held as follows:- “9. In view of the above, it can be held that there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of criminal case. However, if the detention order is challenged the detaining authority has to satisfy the Court the following facts: (1) The authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in custody. (2) There was reliable material before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. (3) In view of the above, the authority felt it necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities and therefore, detention order was necessary. In case either of these facts does not exist the detention order would stand vitiated. The present case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition.” 12. When the legality and propriety of the detention order dated 04.03.2012 is taken into consideration inconsonance with the settled principle laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court as referred above, it is evident that mere mentioning the fact that petitioner is in jail custody and trying for bail would be mere ipse dixit of the Detaining Authority without having substantiation from any corner justifying satisfaction of the Detaining Authority on that very score. 13. 13. Thus, taking into account the order of detention dated 04.03.2012 in its entirety, there is no impediment in between to infer regarding the illegality committed at the end of Detaining Authority during the process of satisfying itself and on account thereof the successive orders are found to be unsustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the same are set aside. Consequent thereupon, the petition is allowed. 14. The petitioner is directed to be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.