JUDGMENT : R.K. GUPTA (Chairperson) 1. These are two appeals which are decided by a common order because the question in the present case is a common. Appeal No. R-23/13 has been filed by the appellant challenging the order passed by the Tribunal on 30th November, 2012 in Appeal No. 03/10, by which the Tribunal has allowed the appeal so preferred by the Bank in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. Appeal No. R-22/13 has been filed by the appellant against the order passed by the Tribunal on 30th November, 2012 in appeal No. 02/10, by which the Tribunal has allowed the appeal of the borrower. 2. Before the Tribunal two appeals were preferred one by the borrower and another by the respondent-Bank challenging the order passed by the Recovery Officer on 7th January, 2010. Appeal preferred by the borrower has been allowed by the Tribunal and as a consequence of the order passed in appeal preferred by the borrower, the Tribunal has also allowed the appeal preferred by the Bank which is reflected from the orders impugned passed by the Tribunal. 3. Before the Tribunal the borrower as well as the Bank preferred the appeals under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 challenging the order passed by the Recovery Officer on 7th January, 2010. By this order the Recovery Officer rejected the objections of the Bank as well as the borrower and other persons against the auction sale and the Recovery Officer has also confirmed the auction. 4. The relevant facts for the adjudication of the present case are that against the borrower an Original Application under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 was filed by the Bank which ultimately was allowed by the Tribunal. After issuance of the Recovery Certificate, the Recovery Officer proceeded towards the recovery and the Bank submitted the relevant information with regard to the property along with the reserve price. Accordingly the property was put to auction and the auction was scheduled for 2nd September, 2009. In the auction three bidders participated and bid of the appellant for Rs.20.00 lacs was accepted being a highest bid. In addition to the appellant, two other bidders i.e. National Constructions and Sanjay Agrawal participated in the auction. 5. Accordingly the property was put to auction and the auction was scheduled for 2nd September, 2009. In the auction three bidders participated and bid of the appellant for Rs.20.00 lacs was accepted being a highest bid. In addition to the appellant, two other bidders i.e. National Constructions and Sanjay Agrawal participated in the auction. 5. It is stated that after the auction was conducted, an objection was raised by the respondent No. 1 before the Recovery Officer that two other bidders namely Hari Kishan Das Jaikishan Rathi and Mr. Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal could not prepare the demand drafts, therefore, they were not permitted to participate in the auction. 6. An objection was also filed by the respondent-Bank before the Recovery Officer that after the auction the respondent No. 1 borrower submitted a compromise proposal on 24th September, 2009 for an amount of Rs.25.00 lacs along with a cheque amounting to Rs.5.00 lacs. The said proposal was accepted by the Bank on 2nd October, 2009. On this ground the respondent-Bank sought setting aside the auction dated 2nd September, 2009. 7. It is submitted that the appellant submitted reply to the said objection stating that along with the proposal the judgment debtor has not deposited the amount as per requirement of the Second Schedule of Rule 61 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to set aside the auction sale, therefore, the objection was not maintainable. 8. It is stated that the publication of me auction notice dated 23rd July, 2009 in respect of the auction sale of the property in question was issued by the Recovery Officer-II. The reserve price of the said property was fixed at Rs.18.00 lacs and the earnest money, which was deposited, was for Rs.1.80 lacs. The auction was to be held on 2nd September, 2009 at 12.00 p.m. in the open premises of the respondent-Bank. 9. It is contended on behalf of the respondent-borrower that no time for closure was mentioned in the auction notice, which was published. On the date of auction itself one Harikishandas Jaikishan Rathi submitted an objection that he applied for preparation of Demand Draft of Rs.1.80 lacs towards the earnest money for participating in the auction but due to non-functioning of the draft printer, the draft could not be prepared timely, with the result Harikishandas Jaikishan Rathi was not permitted to participate in the auction. It is further stated on behalf of the respondent-borrower that the said objection was filed at 2.20 p.m. on 2nd September, 2009. 10. Similarly, another objection was submitted by one Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal to the effect that due to some technical reason the draft could not be prepared from the Bank of Maharashtra, Parasia Branch and he called on the premises of the Bank at 12.30 p.m. on 2nd September, 2009. It is farther submitted that before that the entire auction was concluded. One bidder offered an amount of Rs.24.00 lacs for the property in question and also enclosed the Demand Draft amounting to Rs.6.80 lacs along with the objection, but he did not say that he submitted the Form along with the earnest money. 11. It is further stated on behalf of the respondent-borrower that the auction was conducted by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Recovery Officer. The bid was finalized in favour of the appellant for a sum of Rs.20.00 lacs. It is further submitted that no other bidder was permitted to participate in the auction in spite of the fact that there was no closure time mentioned in the publication of the auction notice. 12. It is further submitted that the respondent-Bank also wrote a letter on 29th September, 2009 to the Recovery Officer that Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal offered the bid of Rs.24.00 lacs and also deposited Rs.6.80 lacs but the said bid was not accepted by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Recovery Officer despite the fact that the said offer was Rs.4.00 lacs over and above the bid amount or Rs.20.00 lacs, as the Bank had to realize Rs.35.00 lacs from the borrower. It was also the grievance of the borrower that the reserve price fixed was on a very lower side, whereas the market value of the land together with building is approximately Rs. 1,08,70,000/-. It is further stated that nobody was permitted to take part in the auction proceedings except the appellant who has been declared as successful bidder. 13. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings an offer was submitted, by the respondent-borrower on 24th September, 2009 with the respondent-Bank for a sum of Rs.25.00 lacs towards full and final settlement of the claim. 13. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings an offer was submitted, by the respondent-borrower on 24th September, 2009 with the respondent-Bank for a sum of Rs.25.00 lacs towards full and final settlement of the claim. The said proposal was accepted by the Bank vide its letter dated 26th October, 2009 subject to the decision of the Recovery Officer. The Recovery Officer by an order dated 7th January, 2010 considered the objection and ultimately rejected the same and directed the confirmation of the sale of the property in question, against which the Bank as well as the borrower both preferred the appeals under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993. The Tribunal has allowed the appeals preferred by the Bank and the borrower. The relevant paragraphs of both the judgments passed by the Tribunal in both the appeals are as under: Appeal No. 02/2010 3. It is revealed from the pleadings that the sale of the property was for Rs.20.00 lacs as per auction held on 2nd September, 2009 in which the property was bid by respondent No. 1. Annexures A-1 and 2 reveals that the other bidders were not allowed to participate in the bid and therefore the auction conducted is found to be illegal. 4. So also it is revealed that after the illegal auction, the appellant had lodged A-7 proposal for settlement on 24th September, 2009 for settlement of dues at Rs.25.00 lacs along with cheque of Rs.5.00 lacs which was duly accepted by the Bank as per A-8 dated 26th November, 2009 subject to the decision of respondent No. 3. In spite of such settlement, the R.O. is seen to have confirmed the illegal sale in favour of respondent No. 1 vide A-9 order dated 7th January, 2010. When the dues are admittedly settled between the creditor and debtors for an amount higher than the auction price, the RO should not have confirmed the sale in favour of the auction purchaser. When there is illegality in the conduct of auction, the provision for deposit as required under Rule 61 is not applicable. 5. The respondent-Bank has accepted the settlement at Rs.25.00 lacs out of which Rs.5.00 lacs was already deposited by the appellant who has submitted that he is willing to compensate the auction purchaser by paying the interest on the purchase price of Rs.20.00 lacs remitted by him. 5. The respondent-Bank has accepted the settlement at Rs.25.00 lacs out of which Rs.5.00 lacs was already deposited by the appellant who has submitted that he is willing to compensate the auction purchaser by paying the interest on the purchase price of Rs.20.00 lacs remitted by him. Appeal No. 03/2010 2. Vide judgment dated 30th November, 2012, in appeal No. 2/10, this Tribunal had set aside the auction held in O.A. Ex. 92/04 by setting aside the order of R.O. dated 7th January, 2010 since the auction held on 2nd September, 2009 was found to be illegal. 3. The appellant-Bank is seen to have accepted the proposal of the judgment debtors for settlement at Rs.25.00 lacs out of which Rs.5.00 lacs was already accepted by the appellant. Therefore, the prayer for re-auction of the property cannot be allowed when the settlement for Rs.25.00 lacs has already been accepted. 4. When the dues are settled at Rs.25.00 lacs and the auction held is found to be illegal, then A-9 order of R.O. is also set aside directing the appellant/respondent No. 1 to pay the settlement amount to the Bank who shall return the purchase price with 12% interest to the auction purchaser, out of which F.D. rate shall be paid by the Bank and balance percentage by the appellant in Appeal No. 2/10. Parties shall bear their respective cost. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in the present case the reasons given by the Tribunal in the impugned order for allowing the appeals are not only perverse but the Tribunal has not given proper reasons for setting aside the order passed by the Recovery Officer. 15. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellant that such casual approach of the Tribunal deserves to be deprecated because the Tribunal has not even considered the reasons given in the order passed by the Recovery Officer. 16. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the judgment passed by the Tribunal is also contrary to the judgment passed by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in 499272 . 16. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the judgment passed by the Tribunal is also contrary to the judgment passed by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in 499272 . It is submitted that the Tribunal has also not taken care of the fact that the appeal which was preferred by the borrower was barred by time in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble High Court, Bombay in 442368 , wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court has held that there is no power vested with the D.R.T. to condone the delay if the appeal preferred before it is beyond the period of limitation. It is submitted that the Tribunal had not even seen the objections with regard to the aspect that the appeal preferred by the borrower under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 was barred by time. 17. It is also submitted that the Tribunal has not even taken into account the inconsistent plea raised by the Bank before the Recovery Officer. Before the Recovery Officer, it was the case of the Bank itself that for want of deposit of the amount after the sale of the property as per the requirement of Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which are made applicable to the Tribunal for the recovery of the amount due as per Section 29 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, the objection raised by the borrower could not have been entertained. 18. Submissions so made as aforesaid are replied by the learned Counsel for the auction purchaser and also the Counsel appearing for the Bank and it is submitted by them that the judgment passed by the Tribunal is proper and does not deserve any interference. Rival submissions of the parties are considered. 19. It is true that the appellant has specifically raised an objection before the D.R.T. to the appeal submitted by the borrower and the relevant para No. 2 of the objection submitted by the appellant reads as under: 2. That as per Section 30 of RDDBFI Act a limitation of 30 days is prescribed for filing an appeal. The appellant has filed the appeal after a period of three month that too without any application for condonation of delay. The appeal deserves to be dismissed being barred by limitation. 20. That as per Section 30 of RDDBFI Act a limitation of 30 days is prescribed for filing an appeal. The appellant has filed the appeal after a period of three month that too without any application for condonation of delay. The appeal deserves to be dismissed being barred by limitation. 20. The aforesaid plea was available to the Tribunal as was specifically raised. As per Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, the plea with regard to the limitation since affects the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and decide the Suit or appeal, therefore, even though the question of limitation is not set up as a defence, yet the Court or Tribunal is bound to decide the plea with regard to the limitation. In the present case, it was the specific objection of the appellant that since the appeal is not preferred within thirty days, therefore, appeal is barred by time. It was also stated that no application for condonation of delay was moved and, therefore, the appeal preferred by the borrower deserves to be dismissed. 21. The Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court, Bombay in Madhukar Govindrao Thaware (supra) has held that the appeal has to be preferred within a period of thirty days and in case not preferred, then Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 does not provide the power to the Tribunal to condone the delay. 22. It appears that the Tribunal has not even cared to look into the objections to the appeal submitted by the appellant and without even deciding the question, whether the appeal preferred by the borrower is within time or not, has dealt with the appeal on merits and allowed the same. It was expected from the D.R.T. to have dealt with the question of limitation and, thereafter, would held that the appeal is within time. 23. Another aspect is also relevant to be considered. The Recovery Officer has stated in its impugned order that since the borrower has raised an objection against the auction sale, therefore, the objection against the sale as such cannot be entertained until the full amount of debt is deposited by the borrower under the Rule 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 24. The Recovery Officer has stated in its impugned order that since the borrower has raised an objection against the auction sale, therefore, the objection against the sale as such cannot be entertained until the full amount of debt is deposited by the borrower under the Rule 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 24. If the borrower intended to raise any objection against the auction sale on the ground of any irregularity, then the borrower within the period of thirty days from the date of sale should have deposited the full amount of debt for which the property was put to auction. In this regard, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur in Shyama Devi Chaurasia v. State Bank of India (supra), is relevant, wherein it is held that in case there is any irregularity in the auction sale, then the borrower under Rule 61 of the IInd Schedule of the Income-tax Act has to deposit the full amount for the valid objection and in case the amount as such is not deposited, then the objection of the borrower has to be rejected for not complying with the requirement of deposit. The relevant para Nos. 9 to 14 of the said judgment are as under: 9. Mr. Rajesh Maindiretta, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. I Bank, submitted that Proviso (b) to Rule 61 of the Schedule Second to the Income-tax Act, 1961 also makes it clear that an application made by a defaulter under this rule shall be disallowed unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. He submitted that by the time, the sale of the property of late Gourishankar Chourasiya was conducted on 31st October, 2003 only the sale proceeds of the first property of Umarkand Chourasiya, another guarantor, which was sold for Rs.14.10 lacs had been deposited with the respondent No. 1 Bank on 31st October, 2003 and after adjustment of the said amount of Rs.14.10 lacs, an amount of Rs.11,86,414.20 was recoverable as on 31st December, 2003 and hence, the respondent No. 1 in its reply to the objection to the sale filed before the Recovery Officer had stated that the said amount of Rs.11,86,414.20 was outstanding with further interest and yet the appellant did not deposit the said amount of Rs.11,86,414.20. He submitted that the application of the appellant under Rule 61 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was, therefore, rightly disallowed by the Recovery Officer. He submitted that this was one of the grounds on which the appeals of the Appellant have been rejected by the DRT and DRAT in their respective orders dated 18th February, 2005 and 13th December, 2005. 10. Rule 61 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which provides for application for setting aside the sale of immovable property on the ground of non-service of notice or irregularity, is quoted herein-below: Rule 61. Application to set aside the sale of immovable property on ground of non-service of notice or irregularity-Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a certificate (such Income-tax Officer as may be authorized by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in this behalf), the defaulter, or any person whose interests are affected by the sale, may at any time within thirty days from the date of sale, apply to the Tax Recovery Officer to set aside the sale of the immovable property on the ground that notice was not served on the defaulter to pay the arrears as required by this Schedule or on the ground of a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. Provided that- (a) No sale shall be set aside on any such ground unless the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of the non-service. (b) An application made by the defaulter under this rule shall be disallowed unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. 11. A reading of the aforesaid Rule 61 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would show that one of the grounds on which an application can be made for setting aside sale of the immovable property before the Recovery Officer is that notice was not served on the defaulter to pay the arrears “as required by the Schedule Second”. Rule 2 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 states that when a certificate has been drawn up by the Tax Recovery Officer for the recovery of arrears under the Schedule, the Tax Recovery Officer shall cause to be served upon the defaulter a notice requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified in the certificate within fifteen days from the date of service of the notice and intimating that in default steps would be taken to realize the amount under the Schedule. It is not the case of the appellant that notice as required by Rule 2 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not served on late Gourishankar Chourasiya, who was Defendant No. 4 in Original Application No. 76 of 2000. Late Gourishankar Chourasiya died on 4th September, 2003. Rule 84 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides that no certificate shall cease to be in force by reason of the death of the defaulter and Rule 85 of the Schedule Second provides that if at any time after the certificate is drawn up by the Recovery Officer, the defaulter dies, the proceedings under the Schedule may be continued against the legal representative of the defaulter, and the provisions of the Schedule shall apply as if the legal representative was the defaulter. Mr. Agarwal has not brought to our notice any provision in the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requiring that after the death of defaulter, a fresh notice is required to be served on the legal representatives of the defaulter to pay the amount sought to be recovered. Thus, this is not a case where notice was not served, on the defaulter to pay the amount “as required by the Schedule Second” and the contention of Mr. Agarwal that the sale is liable to be set aside on the ground of non-service of notice on the defaulter to pay the amount “as required by Schedule Second” of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has no merit. 12. A further reading of Rule 61 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 would show that the second ground on which an application can be filed before the Recovery Officer to set aside sale of immovable property is that there has been a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. According to Mr. 12. A further reading of Rule 61 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 would show that the second ground on which an application can be filed before the Recovery Officer to set aside sale of immovable property is that there has been a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. According to Mr. Agrawal, since the Recovery Officer did not serve a notice on the appellant and did not pass any order in the order sheet setting the terms of the proclamation of sale of the property belonging to late Gourishankar Chourasiya after adjusting the amount already deposited towards the sales of the first property and the second property, there has been a material irregularity in conducting the sale. But, we find from the records that on 13th February, 2003 a proclamation of sale was, in fact, drawn up in Form No. 13 and signed by the Recovery Officer specifying that the property consisting of plot and house constructed on Plot No. 109/5, Settlement No. 660, P.H. No. 25, Khasra Nos. 170, 171 and 172 situated at Lokalyan Grah Nirman Samiti, Modhotal, Jabalpur, admeasuring area 30 x 50=(1,500 sq. ft.) would be sold to recover a sum of Rs.22,97,081.45 including the costs and interest and the reserve sale price was indicated in the said proclamation to be Rs.3,75,000/-. The proclamation of sale was addressed to late Gourishankar Chourasiya who was alive when the said proclamation was made on 15th February, 2003. It is not the case of the appellant that before making the said proclamation of sale, notice was not served on late Gourishankar Chourasiya. There is no provision in the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for issuing fresh notice and for making fresh proclamation of sale after the death of the original defaulter. Rule 53 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961, only requires that a proclamation of sale shall be drawn up by the Recovery Officer and it does not state that a Recovery Officer will pass an order in the order sheet setting the terms of proclamation as contended by Mr. Agrawal. There is, thus, no material irregularity in conduction the sale of the property. 13. Even assuming as contended by Mr. Agrawal. There is, thus, no material irregularity in conduction the sale of the property. 13. Even assuming as contended by Mr. Agrawal that there was non-service of notice on the defaulter to pay the amount as required by the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or there was material irregularity in conduction of the sale, Proviso (a) to Rule 61 of the Schedule Second make it clear that no sale shall be set aside on any such ground unless the Recovery Officer was satisfied that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason of the non-service or the irregularity. Interpreting a similar provision in Order 21 Rule 90(2) of the CPC, the Supreme Court has held in 280710 and Ram Maurya v. Kailashnath, (supra) that for the Court to set aside the sale under the said provisions it must be established that there were both material irregularity and substantial injury. In this case, the appellant has not been able to show that she has suffered any substantial injury on account of non-service of notice or material irregularity in conducting the sale, if any. 14. Moreover, Proviso (b) to Rule 61 of the Schedule Second of the Income-tax Act, 1961, mandates that an application made by a defaulter under the rule “shall be disallowed” unless the applicant deposits the amount recoverable from him in execution of the certificate. The appellant in her application for setting aside the sale before the Recovery Officer has herself stated that after acceptance of the offer of the Respondent No. I for One Time Settlement at Rs.15,84,934.72, the borrower was required to deposit the balance amount of Rs.1,74,934.72 within a year, but even this meagre amount of Rs.1,74,914.72 was not deposited by the appellant. Hence, the DRT and the DRAT have rightly held that the application made by the applicant for setting aside the sale had to be disallowed by the Recovery Officer. 25. The Recovery Officer in the present case while rejecting the objection of the borrower has held that any objection with regard to the irregularity in the sale cannot be entertained until a valid objection is filed by complying with the Rules 60 and 61 of the IInd Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after the sale of the property by depositing the amount. 26. 26. The appellant being an auction purchaser raised an objection before the Tribunal, that the objection of the mortgagor cannot be entertained until the full amount is deposited as per the requirement of Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961. On the basis of the same it was expected from the DRT first to have looked into the order passed by the Recovery Officer which was passed in detail rejecting the objection of the borrower and then if according to the Tribunal the reasons given by the Recovery Officer to reject the objection of the borrower were not valid, then certainly the Tribunal was entitled to interfere into the order passed by the Recovery Officer. The Tribunal has not even taken pains to look into the reasonings given by the Recovery Officer and without appreciating the reasoning given by the Recovery Officer, the Tribunal in paras No. 3 of its impugned order allowed the appeal of the borrower stating that it is revealed from the pleadings that the sale of the property was for Rs.20.00 lacs as per auction held on 2nd September, 2009 in which the property was bid by the respondent No. 1, Annexures A-1 and 2 reveals that the other bidders were not allowed to participate in the bid and, therefore, the auction conducted is found to be illegal, If the auction was irregular for any reason and the auction as such was challenged, then the Tribunal should have taken care of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra) at least to ascertain, whether by entertaining the objection auction of the property can be set at naught without even pre-deposit of the amount by the borrower under Rule 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961, but the Tribunal has not even cared in it’s judgment to look into and decide the objection of the present appellant, as if the Tribunal is not required to give reasons for setting aside the order of the Recovery Officer dated 7th January, 2010. 27. It appears that the Tribunal was of the opinion that the objections submitted by the appellant to the appeal were not relevant for its consideration and what is relevant for consideration, is only the pleadings of the mortgagor in the appeal. 27. It appears that the Tribunal was of the opinion that the objections submitted by the appellant to the appeal were not relevant for its consideration and what is relevant for consideration, is only the pleadings of the mortgagor in the appeal. Further the Tribunal also found that whatever the reasonings given by the Recovery Officer to reject the objection were also not relevant for the purpose of allowing the appeal of the borrower, therefore, the order impugned does not find even reasons given by the Recovery Officer to reject the objections of the mortgagor. On the basis of such a wrong assumption the Tribunal proceeded to decide the appeal of the borrower and has even allowed. Thus such an approach of the Tribunal can only be termed to be a casual approach which has no nexus to the reasons for setting aside the order passed by the Recovery Officer. This Tribunal being an appellate authority can only hope and trust that the Tribunal while deciding the cases in future must at least consider the reasons given in the impugned order, whether the reasons in the impugned order are in accordance with law and if ultimately, it is found that the reasons are not in accordance with law, then the Tribunal is entitled to set aside the order passed by the Recovery Officers. 28. This is to be noted that though the word “judgment” has not been defined under the RDDBFI Act, 1993, but the judgment shall be a conclusion of the judicial proceedings determining the rights of the parties, therefore, it must contain the reasons. If the judgment does not contain the reasons to allow or to set aside the order impugned, then the conclusion so drawn would be contrary to the settled principle of law of passing the reasoned order. When the judgment is passed by any judicial officer in exercise of its power, then a litigant expects that it should contain the reasons for accepting the plea and for not accepting the plea by setting aside the reasons given in the impugned order. It should also consider the pleadings from both the sides, but the judgment should not contain one-sided pleadings for determination of the rights. It should also consider the pleadings from both the sides, but the judgment should not contain one-sided pleadings for determination of the rights. In the present case the Tribunal has set aside the order passed by the Recovery Officer without even appreciating the reasons given by him for rejection of the objection of the borrower/mortgagor against which the appeal was preferred. Even it is not known from the order of the DRT as to how the reasons given by the Recovery Officer for not accepting the objection of the borrower were not correct. Under the circumstances the judgment passed by the Tribunal in the absence of non-consideration of reasons given by the Recovery Officer and also by not considering the plea of the appellant before it could only be termed as without application of mind. 29. In this reference it is relevant to mention here that in para No. 3 of the impugned order it is only stated that there were other bidders, who were available, but they were not permitted to participate in the auction proceedings, therefore, the auction conducted is found to be illegal and irregular. 30. If the order passed by the Recovery Officer is to be seen, then the Recovery Officer has concluded that the auction notice states that the auction would be initiated from 12.00 p.m. but the closing time of the auction was not given. Auction was conducted as per schedule. The Recovery Officer held that nothing prevented the owner of the property to bring a buyer who could have participated in the auction if the value of the property was less estimated by the Bank. He also considered that before the Recovery Officer two other persons submitted a letter that they were not permitted to participate in the auction proceedings. They were namely Harikishandas Jaikishan Rathi and Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal. 31. With regard to the objection submitted by Harikishandas Jaikishan Rathi, the Recovery Officer has held that he was not eligible to participate in the auction as he has not deposited the Form with 10% as earnest money, which was the requisite condition for participating in the auction. He further stated that they have approached the Advocate Commissioner after the proceedings were over, then there is no concept for exercising the rights against a person by submitting a higher bid than accepted in the auction. 32. He further stated that they have approached the Advocate Commissioner after the proceedings were over, then there is no concept for exercising the rights against a person by submitting a higher bid than accepted in the auction. 32. With regard to the objection filed by Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal to the Advocate Commissioner, the Recovery Officer held that after the highest bid was received in the auction, Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal offered a higher amount of Rs.24.00 lacs and he agreed to deposit a sum of Rs.6.80 lacs and has also agreed to deposit the balance amount of Rs.17.20 lacs. The Advocate Commissioner who was the in-charge of the auction submitted that in spite of the sufficient time provided, he was not present at the time of auction proceeding and the objection was received at 2.20 p.m. on 2nd September, 2009. 33. It was the case of Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal himself that he reached the auction place after when the auction proceedings were closed. He has also not deposited the Form and the earnest money entitling him to participate in the auction and, therefore, according to the reasons given by the Recovery Officer he could have not been permitted to participate in the auction, even though he was prepared to pay the higher amount of the property. These were the reasons given by the Recovery Officer and the Tribunal without even appreciating the reasons held that other bidders were not allowed to participate in the bid, therefore, the auction is illegal. The said point was only decided on the basis of the pleadings perused by the Tribunal in the appeal of the mortgagor and has not even cared to refer to the reasons given by the Recovery Officer and such carelessness has resulted into the perversity. 34. Learned Counsel for the borrower submitted that in the present case the auction purchaser will have no vested right created in his favour as the auction was not confirmed. He relied upon a judgment passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi in Devender Verma v. State Bank of Patiala, III (2009) BC 9 (DRAT). 34. Learned Counsel for the borrower submitted that in the present case the auction purchaser will have no vested right created in his favour as the auction was not confirmed. He relied upon a judgment passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Delhi in Devender Verma v. State Bank of Patiala, III (2009) BC 9 (DRAT). In this reference the question is not with reference to the right of the auction purchaser, but the question is in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra), where the borrower or mortgagor whose property is put to auction challenges the auction on the ground of any irregularity, then such question whether can be entertained either by the Recovery Officer or by the Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 without pre-deposit of the amount as per the requirement of Rule 61 of the IInd Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In this reference the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra) specifically rules out that without deposit the objection as such cannot be entertained. 35. With regard to the appeal preferred by the Bank, it is found that the appeal preferred by the Bank was within time and there is no dispute about the same. The Bank filed reply/rejoinder to the objection dated 1st October, 2009 filed by the borrower in the appeal of the Bank and the relevant para. No. 1 of the same is as under: 1. That, as per the Recovery Certificate issued by this Hon’ble Tribunal, execution case has been registered as O.A. Ex. No. 92/04. The Notices have already been sent by the executing Court to the judgments debtors. Thus the Tribunal has adopted proper and legal procedure. No. 1 of the same is as under: 1. That, as per the Recovery Certificate issued by this Hon’ble Tribunal, execution case has been registered as O.A. Ex. No. 92/04. The Notices have already been sent by the executing Court to the judgments debtors. Thus the Tribunal has adopted proper and legal procedure. Thereafter, the legal search report and valuation report had been submitted and thereafter the property was put for auction and accordingly the property was auctioned, which was purchased by one auction purchaser and the auction purchaser deposited the entire auction amount before the Court of Hon’ble Recovery Officer, therefore, it is denied that the auction proceedings commenced on 2nd September, 2009 is perverse and against the rules laid down and also denied that the proper and legal procedure has not been followed by the authorities performing the auction proceedings. 36. From the reading of para No. 1 of the rejoinder/reply filed by the Bank, it is clear that Bank itself denied that the auction proceedings commenced on 2nd September, 2009 is perverse and against the rules laid down and the Bank further denied that the proper and legal procedure has not been followed by the authorities conducting the auction. The sentence is though worded in negative but the careful reading of para No. 1 itself indicates that the Bank insisted that there was a proper auction. The Bank also submitted that the objection raised by the judgment debtor cannot be entertained for non-compliance of Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 37. It was case of the Bank that earlier the value of the property was fixed for a sum of Rs. 1,08,70,000/-, but the auction failed, as no bidders turned up. For this reason the Bank reduced the value of the property and the auction was fixed. 38. The Bank itself submitted that only one person Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal submitted a written objection who offered the higher price of the property than the amount received by the Bank in the auction. Bank has not referred the presence of any other persons. In spite of this, the Tribunal held that there were bidders to purchase the property for higher amount and they were not permitted to participate in the auction. Bank has not referred the presence of any other persons. In spite of this, the Tribunal held that there were bidders to purchase the property for higher amount and they were not permitted to participate in the auction. The Recovery Officer recorded that Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal reached late after the auction and, therefore, there was no occasion for him to participate in the auction as the auction proceedings were over. 39. It was also submitted by the Bank that the auction proceedings were proper and in spite of it, the Tribunal held that the auction was illegal without even differing to the reasons given by the Recovery Officer. If the Tribunal would have read the order passed by the Recovery Officer, then appreciation to the illegality in the auction would be in a different way than the conclusion which has been arrived at by the Tribunal. The findings as such under the circumstances could only be said to be not only perverse but also without application of mind to the record of the case and after reading the order of the DRT, the judicial conscience is shocked. 40. The auction was conducted on 2nd September, 2009 and subsequently, on 24th September, 2009 a proposal was given by the borrower to settle the case. On this date the auction proceedings were already over. The proposal as such was accepted by the Bank on 26th October, 2009. The period for redemption of the property as per Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against the sale of the property for which it was sold, is thirty days from the date of sale. If the amount is not deposited within that time, then the owner of the property losses its right on the property. At the first the Recovery Officer held that such compromise offer cannot be entertained without complying with mandatory provisions of Rules 60 and 61 of the IInd Schedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was also in consonation of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra) and for this reason the compromise was not accepted and, thus, the proposal should not have been accepted by the Bank by entering into a compromise. It was also in consonation of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra) and for this reason the compromise was not accepted and, thus, the proposal should not have been accepted by the Bank by entering into a compromise. The Tribunal has not even looked into the same and held that since the compromise proposal is submitted and the money is deposited, therefore, the auction is bad. Such recourse is not permissible as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra) that the auction was irregular in any manner. Again the Tribunal has failed to apply its mind to the moot question about the applicability of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh in Shyama Devi Chauraisa (supra) in the facts and circumstances of the case and has allowed both the appeals. In the light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh in Shyama Devi Chaurasia (supra) no sale can be set aside if the property is auctioned and the period for raising the objection is of 30 days. Auction held on 2nd September, 2009 and it was accepted by the Bank on 26th October, 2009 i.e., beyond the period of thirty days. It is reflected from the letter dated 26th October, 2009 of the Bank that only a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs was to be deposited upfront and rest with the incidence of normal rate of interest up to 31st March, 2010. Thus, within the period of 30 days there is no deposit by the borrower/owner of the property so that the sale could not have been set aside and the property would not have been redeemed by him. 41. Before the DRT two so-called bidders were not permitted to participate in the auction, namely Shri Bhagwan Prasad Khandelwal and Harikishandas Jaikishan Rathi, and the Recovery Officer when rejected their objections, then they were the persons aggrieved and they did not file any appeal before the DRT to challenge the order passed by the Recovery Officer. Bank or the guarantor cannot be permitted to raise the grievance of these persons, as they are not their representative and were not party to the proceeding before the DRT. 42. Bank or the guarantor cannot be permitted to raise the grievance of these persons, as they are not their representative and were not party to the proceeding before the DRT. 42. Before parting the judgment I restrain myself in proceeding further in the light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in 292660 and the relevant para. No. 26 reads as under: 26. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is quite clear that for more than four decades this Court has been laying emphasis on the sacrosanct duty of a Judge of a superior Court how to employ the language in a judgment so that a message to the officer concerned is conveyed. It has been clearly spelt out that there has to be a process of reasoning while unsettling the judgment and such reasoning is to be reasonably stated with clarity and result orientation. A distinction has been lucidly stated between a message and a rebuke. As per the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court, the Appellate Authority must employ the language in a judgment so that a message to the officer concerned is conveyed. Thus, I hope and trust that in future good and better judgments shall be delivered by ignoring the past. For the reasons hereinabove I am inclined to allow both the appeals and to set aside the orders impugned passed by the Tribunal on 30th November, 2012 in Appeal No. 02/2010 and Appeal No. 03/2010 and the order passed by the Recovery Officer is upheld.