Judgment : (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) The Appeal arises from a judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge on 4 July 2012 on a Chamber Summons that was taken out by the Appellant in the course of execution proceedings. By the Chamber Summons, the Appellant had sought a direction for setting aside the warrants of attachment which were levied under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of the immovable and movable properties of the Appellant. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Chamber Summons. 2. Asia TV Limited ( ATL ) is a company registered in the United Kingdom and is a distributor of the ZEE TV Network Channels. The First Respondent claims a copyright in a film titled “Talash” and his grievance was that the film had been unauthorisedly broadcast on 27 March 2005 at 12 noon (GMT) without authorisation. There was an exchange of correspondence between ATL and the First Respondent. ATL stated that there was an inadvertent telecast on one occasion which had not earned any revenue, but with a view to avoiding further litigation, ATL, UK offered an amount of Rupees One lakh by way of settlement. 3. On 10 November 2009, the First Respondent filed a complaint with the Western India Film Producers Association (WIFPA) purportedly under Article 32(A) of the Articles of Association of WIFPA which provides a dispute settlement mechanism. On 18 November 2009, the Association sought comments of ZEE TV within seven days of receipt. The Appellant by its letter dated 3 December 2009 stated that it had several discussions with the First Respondent and had offered him a compensation of Rupees One lakh for the inadvertent broadcast of the film four years previously. The Appellant stated that in recognition of its respect for the association, it was willing to honour it and requested the association to call for a meeting of the overseas distributors which would objectively evolve the amount of compensation. The Appellant thereafter appeared before the Dispute Settlement Committee of the Association in the proceedings which took place under Article 32(A). Evidently, no settlement was arrived at. 4. The Appellant thereafter appeared before the Dispute Settlement Committee of the Association in the proceedings which took place under Article 32(A). Evidently, no settlement was arrived at. 4. On 25 May 2011, the Association forwarded to the Appellant a copy of an “Award” passed by the Dispute Settlement Committee directing the Appellant to pay to the First Respondent an amount of Pound Sterling Ninety thousand together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, if the amount was not paid within two weeks from the receipt of the “Award”. According to the Appellant, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee, it invoked arbitration under Article 32(B) of the Bye-laws on 24 June 2011. 5. On 23 December 2011, the First Respondent initiated execution proceedings in this Court on the basis that the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee was an arbitral award. On 24 January 2012, warrants of attachment were levied under Order 21 Rules 43 and 54 in respect of the movable and immovable properties of the Appellant. When the Sheriff arrived at the office of the Appellant on 27 January 2012 to execute the warrants of attachment, the Appellant deposited an amount of Rs.67,68,450/-under protest and on 3 February 2012 filed a chamber summons for setting aside the warrants of attachment, inter alia, on the basis that the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee was not an arbitral award and hence, was not executable. The learned Single Judge dismissed the chamber summons with costs quantified at Rs.50,000/- by the impugned judgment and order dated 4 July 2012. 6. Three submissions have been raised on behalf of the Appellant by learned Counsel in support of the Appeal: (i) Articles 32(A) and 32(B) make it abundantly clear that the proceeding which takes place before the Dispute Settlement Committee in the first instance is a conciliation and in the event that a settlement cannot be arrived at, the Committee is authorised to render a decision. That decision of the Settlement Committee does not constitute an arbitral award since the proceedings before the Committee do not have the trappings of an arbitration. That decision of the Settlement Committee does not constitute an arbitral award since the proceedings before the Committee do not have the trappings of an arbitration. A party which is not satisfied with the decision is entitled by Article 32(B) to invoke arbitration which militates against the decision under Article 32(A) being regarded as an arbitral award; (ii) In the present case, the Appellant participated in the proceedings before the Dispute Settlement Committee on the basis that it was a conciliation proceeding. The Settlement Committee did not have a claim, a reply or evidence before it and what took place was an informal conciliation process. A decision rendered thereafter does not have the character or trappings of an arbitral award nor does the process before the Settlement Committee constitute an arbitral proceeding; (iii) Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 contains a specific prohibition on a conciliator acting as an arbitrator. Hence, the Dispute Settlement Committee could, in any event, not have acted as an arbitrator. In any event, the Appellant has already invoked arbitration under Article 32B on 24 June 2011. Hence, on a proper construction of Articles 32(A) and 32(B) and the conduct of the parties, the proceeding before the Committee and its decision cannot be regarded as an arbitral proceeding or an abitral award. 7. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the First Respondent by learned Senior Counsel that: (i) Article 32(A) provides for a stand alone arbitration clause and the culmination of the process before the Settlement Committee results in an arbitral award; (ii) Even if Article 32(B) were to be absent from the Articles of Association, the proceeding under Article 32(A) would by itself constitute an arbitral proceeding and the decision of the Settlement Committee would have the trappings of an arbitral award, (iii) Article 32B is in the nature of an appellate procedure in arbitration which is not unknown to the law. The Appellant, according to the First Respondent, has not filed his letter of invocation before the association and quite independently of the arbitration under Article 32(B), a decision under Article 32(A) can be executed as an arbitral award. 8. These submissions now fall for consideration. The Articles of Association of WIFPA provide for a dispute settlement mechanism. The Appellant, according to the First Respondent, has not filed his letter of invocation before the association and quite independently of the arbitration under Article 32(B), a decision under Article 32(A) can be executed as an arbitral award. 8. These submissions now fall for consideration. The Articles of Association of WIFPA provide for a dispute settlement mechanism. Article 32 is to the following effect: “32(A) ANY Disputes between a Member and Member or Members or between Member and Non – Member or Non – Members, who is registered shall be first referred by the Secretary to the Sub Committee known as Disputes Settlement Committee appointed by the Executive Committee and the said Sub – Committee will comprise of three to five members. The dispute Settlement Committee will try for mutual conciliation and arrive at mutual settlement, with its utmost efforts to reach an agreement between the parties (sic) do not resolve their differences the sub committee shall give its verdict which will be binding on both the parties. (B) However, if the aggrieved party or parties, not satisfied with the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee, so desire can refer the matter for joint arbitration and both the parties shall have to appoint their own arbitrator each. In case both the arbitrators fail to reach to an unanimous verdict they shall appoint a single umpire whose award shall be final and binding on both the parties on a reference made by any party desiring to settle dispute by arbitration. The Association shall give notice to both parties in the dispute calling upon each party to appoint an (one) arbitrator. In the event the other party to the dispute does not comply with the requirements on receipt of a notice from the Association, then the Association shall have the authority to appoint one Arbitrator for, and on behalf of the arbitrator (sic) has been appointed, and the decision of the Arbitrators, or the awards so given shall be final and binding on both the parties. Both the parties in the dispute, if so agree, can appoint a single arbitrator and his decision and award given, shall be final and binding on both the parties.” 9. Essentially, the provisions of Article 32 fall for interpretation. Article 32(A) provides for a conciliatory mechanism in the first instance. Both the parties in the dispute, if so agree, can appoint a single arbitrator and his decision and award given, shall be final and binding on both the parties.” 9. Essentially, the provisions of Article 32 fall for interpretation. Article 32(A) provides for a conciliatory mechanism in the first instance. Consequently, a dispute between two members of the Association or between a member and non-member or between non-members who are registered is to be referred to the Settlement Committee. The Settlement Committee has to endeavour a settlement of the dispute. Article 32(A) makes it clear that the Settlement Committee has to attempt a “mutual conciliation” and, endeavour that parties “arrive at a mutual settlement”. The Settlement Committee has to use “its utmost efforts to reach an agreement between the parties”. The process which takes place before the Settlement Committee is voluntary and it is for the parties to determine whether a settlement should be arrived at and if so, what terms should govern a settlement. Article 32(A) is, therefore, predicated on the principle of party autonomy. When the parties do not resolve their differences, the Committee is empowered to render its verdict which Article 32(A) states would be binding on both the parties. However, Article 32(B) provides that if the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee, it can, if it so desires, refer the matter for joint arbitration. A procedure is laid down for the appointment of arbitrators by each of the parties. Article 32(B) makes it clear that the binding character of a decision which is rendered under Article 32(A) stands lifted, at the option of the aggrieved party, upon an invocation of arbitration. Significantly, while Article 32(B) uses the expression “Arbitration” and lays down the procedure for the appointment of arbitrators by each of the disputing parties and for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, Article 32(A) does not provide for the procedure that has to be followed in the first instance. The procedures before the Disputes Settlement Committee under Article 32(A) is neither an arbitration nor is the decision of the Settlement Committee an arbitral award. Article 32(A) does not impose a requirement that the Dispute Settlement Committee which is to render its decision must receive evidence, that it must act on the basis of judicial principles or that it must hear parties before delivering its verdict under Article 32(A). Article 32(A) does not impose a requirement that the Dispute Settlement Committee which is to render its decision must receive evidence, that it must act on the basis of judicial principles or that it must hear parties before delivering its verdict under Article 32(A). But above all, a party which is aggrieved by a decision under Article 32(A) can at its option refer the matter to joint arbitration. This militates against a decision under Article 32(A) being regarded as an arbitral proceeding or the consequence thereof as an arbitral award. Though Article 32(A) states that the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee will bind the parties, this is lifted on a party aggrieved invoking arbitration. Indeed that is made more clear in Article 32(B) which commences with the word “however.” A decision which ceases to be binding at the option of a party, on the party invoking arbitration cannot be regarded as an arbitral award. Moreover, while Article 32(A) eschews any reference to the expression “arbitration” Article 32(B) carefully uses that expression. 10. In arriving at this interpretation, we are bound by the law which has been enunciated by several judgments of the Supreme Court. In Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander and Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 719 ), the Supreme Court considered the earlier decisions in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi (1998) 3 SCC 573 ) , Bharat Bhushan Bansal v. U.P. Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 166 ), Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I)(P) Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 418 ), and State of Orissa v. Damodar Das (1996) 2 SCC 216 ). The principles of law which have been laid down by the Supreme Court have been formulated as follows : (i) The intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration agreement shall have to be gathered from the terms of the agreement. If the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to refer their disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be bound by the decision of such tribunal on such disputes, it is arbitration agreement. While there is no specific form of an arbitration agreement, the words used should disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of going for arbitration. While there is no specific form of an arbitration agreement, the words used should disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of going for arbitration. Where there is merely a possibility of the parties agreeing to arbitration in future, as contrasted from an obligation to refer disputes to arbitration, there is no valid and binding arbitration agreement. (ii) Even if the words “arbitration” and “Arbitral Tribunal (or arbitrator)” are not used with reference to the process of settlement or with reference to the private tribunal which has to adjudicate upon the disputes, in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, it does not detract from the clause being an arbitration agreement if it has the attributes or elements of an arbitration agreement. They are : (a) The agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties should have agreed to refer any disputes (present or future) between them to the decision of a private tribunal. (c) The private tribunal should be empowered to adjudicate upon the disputes in an impartial manner, giving due opportunity to the parties to put forth their case before it. (d) The parties should have agreed that the decision of the Private Tribunal in respect of the disputes will be binding on them. (iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes arising between the parties, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration, it is an arbitration agreement. Where there is a specific and direct expression of intent to have the disputes settled by arbitration, it is not necessary to set out the attributes of an arbitration agreement to make it an arbitration agreement. But where the clause relating to settlement of disputes, contains words which specifically exclude any of the attributes of an arbitration agreement or contains anything that detracts from an arbitration agreement, it will not be an arbitration agreement. For example, where an agreement requires or permits an authority to decide a claim or dispute without hearing, or requires the authority to act in the interests of only one of the parties, or provides that the decision of the Authority will not be final and binding on the parties, or that if either party is not satisfied with the decision of the Authority, he may file a civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be termed as an arbitration agreement. (iv) But mere use of the word 'arbitration' or 'arbitrator' in a clause will not make it an arbitration agreement, if it requires or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the parties for reference to arbitration. For example, use of words such as "parties can, if they so desire, refer their disputes to arbitration" or "in the event of any dispute, the parties may also agree to refer the same to arbitration" or "if any disputes arise between the parties, they should consider settlement by arbitration" in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, indicate that the clause is not intended to be an arbitration agreement. Similarly, a clause which states that "if the parties so decide, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration" or "any disputes between parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to arbitration" is not an arbitration agreement. Such clauses merely indicate a desire or hope to have the disputes settled by arbitration, or a tentative arrangement to explore arbitration as a mode of settlement if and when a dispute arises. Such clauses require the parties to arrive at a further agreement to go to arbitration, as and when the disputes arise. Any agreement or clause in an agreement requiring or contemplating a further consent or consensus before a reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement, but an agreement to enter into an arbitration agreement in future.” The essential attributes of an arbitration agreement are that : (i) There must be a written agreement; (ii) Parties must have agreed to refer their disputes to the decision of their private Tribunal; (iii) The Tribunal has to be empowered to adjudicate upon their disputes in an impartial manner, after furnishing an opportunity to the parties; (iv)The parties should have agreed that the decision of the tribunal would be final and binding. Where parties make a specific or express reference to an intent to have the dispute settled by arbitration, it is not necessary they have to spell out all the characteristic features of an arbitration. However, where there is no such express description of intent, the Court may have due regard to those circumstances which would have a bearing on whether or not the agreement constitutes an agreement to arbitrate. However, where there is no such express description of intent, the Court may have due regard to those circumstances which would have a bearing on whether or not the agreement constitutes an agreement to arbitrate. For example, in the present case, the fact that a party which is not satisfied with the decision under Article 32(A), can invoke arbitration at its unilateral option under Article 32(B), would weigh against a decision under Article 32(A) being regarded as an arbitral award. It must be noted at this stage that Article 32(A) and 32(B) do not contemplate a two-tier arbitral process at all as contended on behalf of the Respondent. In certain cases such as the statutory bye-laws of the stock exchanges, an arbitral award is followed by a recourse to an appellate tribunal before which the validity of the arbitral award can be tested. In the present case, the invocation of arbitration under Article 32(B) constitutes an independent recourse to the arbitral process and is not in the nature of an appellate remedy against an arbitral award rendered in the first instance. Article 32(A) does not contemplate an arbitral process at all and the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee does not constitute an arbitral award. 11. Reliance was sought to be placed on behalf of the First Respondent on the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. vs. G. Harischandra Reddy and another (2007) 2 SCC 720 ) , In that case, Clause 29(a) of the conditions of contract provided that the Chief Engineer had the jurisdiction to decide in the first place disputes in regard to several matters including in regard to disputes arising out of or relating to the contract. The Chief Engineer declined to accede to the request of the contractor to arbitrate, upon which the contractor filed a petition under Section 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In that petition, the High Court directed the Chief Engineer to act as an arbitrator. The Chief Engineer received claims and counter-claims and delivered his award on the basis of evidence produced by the parties. No objection was raised before the Arbitrator by the Jala Nigam of the absence of an arbitration clause nor was an objection to that effect raised before the civil court when a petition under Section 34 for challenging the arbitral award was filed. No objection was raised before the Arbitrator by the Jala Nigam of the absence of an arbitration clause nor was an objection to that effect raised before the civil court when a petition under Section 34 for challenging the arbitral award was filed. Both the civil court and the High Court in an appeal under Section 37 held that the Jala Nigam had consented to the arbitration of disputes by the Chief Engineer and had filed written statements. No objection under Section 16 to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal was raised. The case before the Supreme Court was, therefore, one where in pursuance of a proceeding under Section 11, an arbitrator was appointed and no objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was raised either during the course of the arbitral proceedings or thereafter in challenge to the arbitral award. It was in this background that it was evident that the proceedings before the arbitrator appointed under Section 11 were arbitral proceedings and the decision which was rendered was an arbitral award. Such a situation must be distinguished from the present one where proceedings under Article 32(A) do not have the trappings of the arbitral process. Article 32(A) does not provide for an arbitration and the decision which is rendered does not constitute an arbitral award. Parties treated the proceedings under Article 32(A) as a conciliation. It is not possible for the court to accept the submission of the Respondent that Article 32(A) should be read in a stand alone manner in isolation from Article 32(B). Both constitute a composite part of Article 32 and it is evident that it is Article 32(B) which provides for invocation of arbitration by a party which is not satisfied with the decision of the Settlement Committee under Article 32(A). 12. Similarly, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Surendra Kapoor vs. Prabir Kumar ( 2007 (4) Bom.C.R. 345 ) is distinguishable. Where an arbitral proceeding takes place before an arbitral tribunal, an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal must be raised under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 12. Similarly, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Surendra Kapoor vs. Prabir Kumar ( 2007 (4) Bom.C.R. 345 ) is distinguishable. Where an arbitral proceeding takes place before an arbitral tribunal, an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal must be raised under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. What the Division Bench holds is that if an objection to the jurisdiction was not raised about the absence of an agreement between the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration and the parties participate in the proceedings before the tribunal without objection, the award cannot be challenged on the ground that it is a nullity. There can be no doubt that this is the general principle of law. Section 16 requires an objection as to jurisdiction to be raised before the arbitral tribunal. However, the point in the present case is that a proceeding under Article 32(A) does not constitute an arbitral proceeding in the first instance and the decision which is rendered by the Settlement Committee is not an arbitral award. We have already indicated our reasons earlier for holding that the decision under Article 32(A) does not constitute an arbitral award. 13. The Learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment has proceeded on the basis that the Appellant did not object to appear before the “Tribunal” namely, the Dispute Settlement Committee. The learned Single Judge also held that the Appellant proceeded with the “arbitration:” calling for documents, applying for adjournment and making its submissions and did not derogate from any provision of Part I of the Act. The learned Single has also held that the Appellant proceeded with the “arbitration” without taking any objection that no agreement in writing to refer the dispute to arbitration was executed between the parties. This finding of the learned Single Judge clearly misses the central issue which is that what took place before the Dispute Settlement Committee was a proceeding under Article 32(A) which was in the nature of a conciliation. Once conciliation failed, the Dispute Settlement Committee rendered its decision which is not an arbitral award. In such a situation, there was no occasion for the Appellant to raise an objection under Section 16 or challenge the decision which was rendered by the Dispute Settlement Committee under Section 34. Once conciliation failed, the Dispute Settlement Committee rendered its decision which is not an arbitral award. In such a situation, there was no occasion for the Appellant to raise an objection under Section 16 or challenge the decision which was rendered by the Dispute Settlement Committee under Section 34. The occasion to object under Section 16 would, if at all, arise once arbitration is invoked under Article 32(B) and it is when an arbitral award is rendered under Article 32(B) that recourse to the remedy under Section 34 would arise. For these reasons, we are of the view that the judgment of the learned Single Judge would have to be set aside in appeal. 14. The Appeal is accordingly allowed by setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 4 July 2012. In consequence, the Chamber Summons is made absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a), (b) and (c). 15. In view of the disposal of Appeal, Notice of Motion 2007/2012 in the Appeal does not survive and is accordingly disposed of. 16. On the request of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the First Respondent and in order to enable the First Respondent to have recourse to its remedy against this judgment in appeal, we direct that the monies which have been deposited with the Sheriff shall not be returned for a period of eight weeks from today.